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To Stalin Top Secret Summaries Of The most important testimonies Of Those arrested 1937‐ 1938
A summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR for February 9, 1938
Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 404. L. 149‐176.
13 February 1938
SECRETARY of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade STALIN
I am sending you a summary of the most important testimonies of the arrested GUGB NKVD of the USSR for February 9, 1938.
Peopleʹs Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Peopleʹs Commissar for
State Security (EZHOV) 
For the 3rd DEPARTMENT
1. KLIGERMAN NM, former head of the laboratory of the oil society ʺROPʺ in London. Interrogated: IVANOV.
He testified that he had passed secret information to two intelligence services ‐ English and German.
To work in favor of British intelligence, KLIGERMAN was hired in October 1932 by a Soviet citizen, the former chairman of the ROP Board, the current manager of Nefteexport, PEVZNER.
KLIGERMAN told PEVZNER for a monetary reward for transferring information to British intelligence about the method of producing bright stocks (aviation oils) in Baku, about the method of cleaning oils with liquid sulfur dioxide, about the method of improving gasolines by using aromatics extracted from kerosene for this, about the method of regenerating liquid sulfur dioxide ...
All this information was not known abroad and is of great interest from the point of view of defense.
At the request of Pevzner, while already in the USSR, KLIGERMAN passed on secret information on oils and gasoline to the British intelligence resident ABRAMOV, also a former ROP employee working in the Soviet trade mission abroad.
In 1934, KLIGERMAN agreed to transfer secret information about the oil refining industry of the USSR to a foreign specialist working in Moscow, an Austrian citizen Ludwig ROSENFELD (in 1937 he went abroad). After his departure, KLIGERMANN contacted another German intelligence resident, an Austrian citizen, KVARTNER Siegfried, who was working in Gormastrest.
In addition, KLIGERMAN, on behalf of ROSENFELD, received secret information from the former chief engineer of the Organeft trust, FINGOR, who had been recruited by the latter, and gave FINGOR money for this information.
2. KA MEKHANOSHIN, former director of the Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography, Narkomischprom (former military attaché in Poland). Interrogated: PUNKOV.
He gave additional testimony about his espionage and subversive activities, which he carried out as an agent of Polish intelligence.
Working from 1931 to 1934. Head of the Planning Directorate of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Communications of the USSR, MEKHANOSHIN created an espionage network, recruiting the employees of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Communications ROSSOLOVSKY, TIMOFEEV, ANISIMOV, EVSYUGOV and the head of the mobilization department of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Communications ZVONAREV.
MEKHANOSHIN gave the Poles extensive materials on the work of the Soviet Unionʹs communications in the Far East, on the expansion of communications during the war, on the state of communications in the Western part of the Soviet Union, etc.
MEKHANOSHIN and the persons recruited by him carried out a lot of destructive work in connection.
3. FOKIN VV, deputy. Peopleʹs Commissar of Mechanical
Engineering. Interrogated: KOROTKOV.
In addition, he testified that the anti‐Soviet Pravotrotskyist organization at the Stalingrad Tractor Plant led by him and ChUNIKHIN (convicted) included, in addition to those previously named, the following persons: the head of the design department of the LEV plant, the engineers of the NURK and KARGOPOLOV plant, the former head of the model shop PERCHENKO, DOMASHNEV ‐ the former deputy. secretary of the district party committee, KOTOV and BYCHKOV ‐ secretaries of the shop party committees.
Fokin testified that according to the direct instructions of VAREIKIS, with whom he was linked by CHUNIKHIN, he carried out sabotage work aimed at deliberately delaying the development of a new tractor by means of improper design and confusion of technological processes.
With sabotage purposes, design work on the reconstruction of the plant was delayed, projects for the location of equipment in the shops were deliberately delayed.
A lot of sabotage work was carried out to disrupt the current special production and the plantʹs mobility for wartime.
The re‐compilation of the mob plan was deliberately delayed, despite the fact that the tasks according to the old plan were outdated.
The current special production (tanks) was delayed in every possible way by not releasing materials, and equipment by delays in the manufacture of tools and devices.
The funds allocated to the plant for capital construction were deliberately used only for non‐industrial construction.
According to FOKINʹs testimony, the members of the anti‐Soviet organization led by him and Chunikhin at the plant carried out sabotage acts to disable the most important equipment for the plant.
4. OTTEN PL, former chief designer of aircraft plant No. 34. Interrogated by: LOGUNKOV.
He pleaded guilty to the fact that in 1935 he was involved by the former head of the section of the 5th department of TsAGI Pogossky
E.I. (arrested) in an anti‐Soviet sabotage organization and, on the instructions of this organization, carried out sabotage in the design radiators for aircraft engines.
OTTEN knew from Pogoskiy that the anti‐Soviet organization included:
1. RUNIKHIN Alexander Lvovich, engineer of the 5th department of TsAGI (arrested). 
2. UKSHE Boris Alfonsovich, engineer of the 5th department of TsAGI (arrested)  .
3. IZHVOTOVSKY Leonid Semenovich, engineer of the 5th department of TsAGI.
4. FOMIN Alexander Ivanovich, engineer of the 5th department of TsAGI (arrested)  .
In addition, OTTEN pleaded guilty to having transmitted espionage information about the state of the radiator production at plant No. 34 to POGOSSKY, associated with the Polish and French intelligence services.
The indications are primary.
5. AV LEITMAN, former manager of the office of
Glavshirpotreba. Interrogated: POSTNIKOV.
He showed that, while in Latvia, in 1930 he was recruited for intelligence work in the Soviet Union by the head of the Riga secret police OZOLIN. In Moscow, at the direction of the secret police, LEITMAN contacted its residents: KRASTYN (convicted), the former secretary of the Latvian section of the Comintern, and WEINSTEIN (convicted), a former employee of the NKVD.
Having got a job in the management of local industry in the Moscow region, LEITMAN, through WEINSTEIN, transferred information about production programs and characteristics of all enterprises in this industry to the Latvian intelligence service. After a short time, LEITMAN moved to work at Glavmetiz and, on the instructions of VEINSHTEIN, collected and transmitted to the latter information characterizing the enterprises of Glavmetiz.
The indications are primary.
6. KELMANZON ZN, from 1915 to 1919 who was in the Bund, a former member of the CPSU (b), who worked as chairman of Sovsintorg. Interrogated by: KUPRIYANOV, SHCHERBAKOV.
He showed that since 1935 he has been a member of the counterrevolutionary Trotskyist organization in the system of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Foreign Trade, where he was involved by the former Deputy Peopleʹs Commissar for Foreign Trade ELIAVA.
KELMANZON carried out a series of sabotage acts against Sovsintorg, in particular, he drew up a sabotage trade plan for Sovsintorg, created an artificial shortage of goods in the Xinjiang market, and deliberately carried out a form of barter trade with Xinjiang.
He named 16 people known to him as members of the organization, of whom 15 were arrested.
7. KOSHKAREV I.Ya., former deputy manager of the Soyuzslanets trust. Interrogated: VLADIMIROV, LOLODTSOV.
He showed that in 1935 the former deputy chief of Glavugol for capital construction KAGAN I.B.  was involved in the counterrevolutionary organization of the right, which operated in the NKTP system. When recruiting, KAGAN told KOSHKAREV that the organization was headed by Rukhimovich.
On the instructions of KAGAN, KOSHKAREV carried out the following sabotage work:
1. The plan of capital works for 1936 was made in such a way that not a single object under construction ended with construction. With the aim of disrupting the construction of mine power plants, he deliberately understated funding for this construction.
2. Under the guise of concentrating funds on a smaller number objects, he suspended the construction of the Gdovsky mine No. 1, in which significant funds have already been invested.
3. The construction of mines by KOSHKAREV was disrupted by revising and reworking finished projects, as if they were of poor quality.
The project of the Gdovsky mine No. 1, drawn up quite correctly, was deliberately rejected, and KAGAN proposed to redo the project. This, in turn, caused the alteration of the work already performed (dismantle one metal head and rotate the other 180 °).
In the Buinsky mine project, manual work was approved at all stages of underground and surface work without any mechanization.
The project of the Gdovsky mine No. 2 was approved by KOSHKAREV, with an obviously unsuitable scheme for crushing and sorting shale. Also, a deliberately unsuitable method of driving 2‐ton trolleys into 25‐meter longwalls along temporary tracks was approved instead of installing conveyors and conveyors.
In the project of Kalpirsky mine No. 1, a two‐stage crushing unit was approved with the installation of hammer crushers, which are very expensive, complex and capricious in operation, without any need.
The design of mine No. 1 of the Savelievsky mine deliberately does not provide for over‐sampling  and crushing of shale, which greatly removes the already low calorific value of shale and gives shale in very large pieces, restricts the number of shale consumers to only one Saratovskaya CHPP.
KOSHKAREV personally attracted 6 people to the organization, working directly at the mines, and through them carried out a number of sabotage acts.
KOSHKAREV also testified that in 1926, while working as secretary of the Central Committee of Miners, he joined the underground group of
TOMSKY and was active in anti‐Soviet work in the trade unions. Working from 1928 to 1931 in the Donbass, he took part in the counterrevolutionary group of the right in the coal industry and carried out active anti‐Soviet work there.
8. ARONSHTAM GN, Head of the State Trade Inspection of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Interrogated: VARAXO.
He confessed that he was a member of the anti‐Soviet organization of the right, which existed in the USSR Peopleʹs Commissariat for Internal Trade. In this organization ARONSHTAM was recruited by one of its leaders ‐ the former deputy. Narkomvnutorg BOLOTIN (arrested).
On the instructions of BOLOTIN, ARONSHTAM carried out a lot of work on the collapse of the trade inspection in the center and on the periphery.
On the instructions of the organization, ARONSHTAM planted antiSoviet and alien people in the trade inspection system.
According to the testimony of ARONSHTAM, he has been a cadre right since 1921.
In his counter‐revolutionary work, ARONSHTAM was also directly associated with the former deputy. Peopleʹs Commissar for Internal Trade KHLOPLYANKIN (arrested).
9. SKVORTSOV PM, Head of the Supply Department of the Main Directorate of the Fishing Industry of the USSR Peopleʹs Commissariat for Food Industry. Interrogated: LUKHOVITSKY.
Gave evidence of his involvement in the subversive organization of the right in the food industry.
On the instructions of one of the most active participants in this organization ‐ the former head of the Main Directorate of the USSR Fishing Industry ‐ ANDRIANOV, SKVORTSOV carried out a lot of sabotage work in the fishing industry. He disrupted the supply of fish trusts with motors for ships and other equipment.
SKVORTSOV named the following members of the organization of the right in the fishing industry: ROGOVIN ‐ former deputy. early sales department of Glavryba, RAZUMOVSKY ‐ former employee
These persons are installed.
For the 5th DEPARTMENT:
1. VINOKUROV BC, Head of the Political Department of the Amur Flotilla. Interrogated: IVANOV, PROKHOROV.
In addition, he showed: he joined the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1920 with double‐dealing goals, remaining still in the positions of the party of revolutionary communists and SocialistRevolutionaries, in which he was previously.
Already a communist, VINOKUROV conducted underground work against the Communist Party, created counter‐revolutionary groups, organized obstructions against the decisions of the CPSU (b).
In 1920, at 2 artillery courses in Leningrad, VINOKUROV created an anti‐Soviet Socialist‐Revolutionary group.
In 1922‐24. in the GUVUZ he also organized an SR cell, which included:
V. V. VETVITSKY  ‐ Socialist‐Revolutionary, maximalist, participant in expropriations (not arrested).
KOZBENKO  ‐ a member of expropriations and Socialist Revolutionary terror groups (to be established).
NIKITIN  ‐ Socialist‐Revolutionary, in 1935 he worked as the head of the educational unit of the International Lenin School (established).
At the same time VINOKUROV and VETVITSKY recruited new members to the Socialist‐Revolutionary cell:
STEPANOV Ivan Stepanovich ‐ a former military commissar of the Faculty of the Chemical Academy (arrested), Mikhail STRUVE ‐ worked in Voengiz in recent years, the nephew of Wrangelʹs minister P. STRUVE, Lugovskiy Vladimir ‐ recently worked in the Writersʹ Union, from a large bourgeois environment (both are being established).
All of them are active participants in the Socialist‐Revolutionary underground until the last day.
There, in the GUVUZ, there was a counter‐revolutionary monarchist organization made up of guards officers from the bourgeoisie and the nobility. The organization included:
1. KAZAREVICH ‐ Guards officer, in recent years he worked as head of the Department of the Transport Academy, openly expressed at that time hatred of the Soviet system.
2. GARF ‐ nobleman, career officer. From 1935 he worked as the head of the Academy of Communications.
3. SUVOROV AB ‐ former colonel, monarchist.
4. MIKHEEV ‐ former general, university inspector, etc.
(All are installed).
This organization was guarded by the head of the GUVUZ, D.L. PETROVSKY. (arrested).
VINOKUROV and the Socialist‐Revolutionary cell of the GUVUZ supported the counter‐revolutionary work of this organization in every possible way, covering up its activities from public attacks.
2. YANSON, a former brigade commander, located at the location of the RU RKKA.
Interrogated: LUKIN, STEPANTSEV.
JANSON, who had previously confessed to spying for Germany and participating in the Latvian fascist espionage organization, additionally testified about his subversive work in Spain.
As a senior adviser to the Northern Republican Front, YANSON, on the instructions of URITSKY and BERZIN (arrested), established contact in Bilbao with members of the Trotskyist organization TUMANOV (not arrested), the former consul of the USSR in Bilbao, and VINZER, the former trade representative of the USSR in northern Spain (arrested).
TUMANOV and VINZER informed JANSON about the existence and activities of the Trotskyist organization in Spain, which included: former USSR plenipotentiaries ROSENBERG, GAITIS, former consul in Barcelona ANTONOV‐OVSEENKO (all three were arrested), former
USSR trade representative STASHEVSKY (convicted), he is VINZER TUMANOV and others. The Trotskyist organization was directly connected with the leader of the POUM  in Spain, NINOM, who at the same time was the main emissary of Trotsky in Spain.
TUMANOV established contact with TROTSKY through the former correspondent of Izvestia Ukhartsev (convicted) when he was an adviser to the embassy in Czechoslovakia.
The Trotskyist organization was connected with the Trotskyist center in the USSR through the former Peopleʹs Commissariat for Foreign Trade, ROZENGOLTS (arrested). The latter, in order to strengthen the cadres of the Trotskyists in Spain, carrying out the directives of TROTSKY, sent Trotskyists from the USSR and other countries to work on the line of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Foreign Trade.
On the instructions of the Trotskyist center, the leader ʺPUOMʺ and NIN, together with ANTONOV‐OVSEENKO, prepared the ʺMayʺ uprising of the anarchists and the Puomites in Barcelona. The Trotskyists in Spain through the PUOM channels had connections with the command of General FRANCO and German intelligence.
JANSON, together with TUMANOV and VINZER, carried out work in northern Spain to disrupt the united front in order to prevent an agreement between the Basque government and the command of the Northern Front on joint actions against General FRANCO before the offensive of the fascist troops in Spain.
In personal negotiations with the president of the Basque country AGGIRE and individual members of the Basque government, they set them against the central command of the Northern Front (the headquarters of General LIANOS DE LA ENCOMENDI) and achieved that by the spring of 1937 all the military power of the Basque province was concentrated in the hands of the Basque nationalists.
In early May 1937, AGGIRE, at their insistence, refused to obey the central Spanish government and assumed command of the troops in Vizcaya (as they put it among themselves, they staged a coup dʹétat).
At the same time, the military leaders of the Northern province of Spain, Santander and Asturias, were incited against the Basques, and all the time they incited mutual antagonism. As a result of the same line pursued in Valencia by GAITIS and BERZIN, by the spring of 1937 there was a gap between the Basque government and the central government (Caballero). The central government refused to supply the Basque troops with weapons and ammunition. All this led to the fact that at the time of the general offensive of the fascist troops on Bilbao, the Basque troops were completely isolated, incapable of combat, without reserves and support from other troops of the Northern Front.
Along with subversive work, the Trotskyists in Spain were engaged in espionage for German intelligence. VINZER and STASHEVSKY were associated with the German intelligence station in Spain and reported on the ports of departure, cargo and arrival times of ships bound for Spanish ports with different cargo. As a result of this treacherous activity, the naval command of the fascists took measures to seize these ships.
WINZER, on instructions from the Trotskyist center, disrupted the organization of the production of shells and cartridges in Bilbao. TUMANOV supplied GAITIS and German intelligence with spy information about the Northern Front, which he received from the secretary of AGGIRE, recruited by him, a Basque nationalist, supporter of Franco BASALDUA.
In the spring of 1937, TUMANOV, while in Valencia, received from GAITIS a special order from the Trotskyist center to establish negotiations between the President of the Basque country AGGIRE and the command of General FRANCO with the aim of concluding peace and the voluntary transfer of the province of Vizcaya to the fascists. With the assistance of TUMANOV, these negotiations between AGGIRE and General FRANCO began through the English consul of Bilbao, who constantly traveled to San Sebastian, occupied by fascist troops. TUMANOV in this case was playing some kind of dual game, since, according to his story to JANSON, these negotiations were thwarted by the Germans with his participation.
In addition, JANSON handed over to BERZIN for German intelligence, while he was in Valencia in March 1937, the plan for the defense of Bilbao and Santander. These plans were top secret, were of great value and were subsequently used by the fascist command in the offensive in northern Spain.
3. GRYAZNOV IK, former commander of the Trans‐Baikal Military District. Interrogated by YAMNITSKY and KAZAKEVICH.
He additionally testified that from BELOV he knew about his meeting in 1930 in Berlin with the head of the TKP  MASLOV. During this meeting MASLOV and BELOV mutually informed each other about the progress of counterintelligence work.
BELOV, reporting to the members of the military‐SocialistRevolutionary conspiracy of the center, said that Maslov guided him about the tasks of the TKP, which boil down to the following:
“The Socialist‐Revolutionary organization in its old form has become obsolete. The ʺClass Peasant Partyʺ Peasant Russia ʺ(TKP) was created, which is preparing an anti‐Soviet coup for the complete restoration of the bourgeois system in the city and in the countryside.ʺ
To fight the Soviet regime, Maslov recommended to BELOV the use of any means to prepare an uprising: ʺpartisanʺ struggle, sabotage, terror, sabotage, etc. The main task of MASLOV set before BELOV was the organization of the former Social Revolutionaries in the army into a strong anti‐Soviet underground as a base for seizing power.
MASLOV told BELOV about the support provided by the TCH, the governments of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and England. He asked BELOV to supply him with espionage materials in order to strengthen the authority of the TCH before foreign governments. BELOV and GRYAZNOV  supplied the TCH with espionage
materials, using for this the Intelligence Departments of the military districts they commanded.
GRYAZNOV through the heads of the Intelligence Department Zab. VO ‐ participants in the conspiracy of RUBEN and TSYUPKO  ‐ handed over espionage materials (the deployment of troops of the Zab. VO, the states of the units, information about the armored units of the Zab. VO) to the head of the regional Far Eastern Committee of the TKP ‐ AGAPOV, located in Harbin.
GRYAZNOV shows that in 1935 the emissary AGAPOV, who illegally crossed over to the USSR from Manchuria, came to him. This emissary GRYAZNOV (through TSUPKO) supplied Soviet documents and money, as well as some espionage data on aviation.
Correspondence with AGAPOV was conducted by GRYAZNOV through TSUPKO. On behalf of MASLOV, AGAPOV insisted on strengthening counter‐revolutionary work, a transition to active methods, to sabotage and terror.
4. HAKHANYAN GD , former member of the Military Council of the OKDVA. Interrogated by LISTENGURT and MALYSHEV.
In addition, he shows that from Tukhachevsky he received a number of instructions to cover up sabotage activities in the military industry. TUKHACHEVSKY, giving instructions on sabotage in the aviation industry, said: “It is necessary to push as much as possible heavy, super‐heavy and any other focus aircraft, for example tailless. The future war will not be based on them. ʺ
HAKHANYAN, using his official position as head of the ISK military group, carried out the following sabotage measures:
1) Knowing that the I‐15 aircraft is recognized as a good maneuverable fighter, instead of setting up its production, he specially ʺinvestigatedʺ 2‐3 cases of accidents of these aircraft; After discovering that the crashes were due to poor fastening of the wing skin, HAHANYAN submitted a report to the government in 1935 that the calculation of the aircraft was wrong, that the wing of the aircraft was fragile and the aircraft was dangerous in flight. As a result, the I‐15 was completely out of production.
2) Production aircraft were manufactured at Plant No. 22: high‐speed bomber (SB), experimental aircraft ʺDBAʺ and five‐engine aircraft by engineer TRESKIN.
With the aim of delaying the serial production and modernization of the SB aircraft, KHAKHANYAN, under the pretext of the need to finetune the DBA and the TRESKINA aircraft, managed to divert highly qualified workers and engineers to these aircraft, which, according to Tukhachevsky, were unpromising.
3) With the aim of disrupting production and mastering at plant No. 18, which is extremely necessary for re‐equipping bomber aviation with DB‐3 bombers, HAKHANYAN achieved in the commission of Comrade Ordzhonikidze that the design bureau was given to the designer KALININ, who was building his experimental tailless aircraft K‐7.
4) In 1936, the controller of the KSK  ZHUZHANAVA was sent to Taganrog to find out the state of the plant No. 31, which builds seaplanes. ZHUZHANAVA discovered an ugly situation at this plant and upon his return to Moscow wrote a report to the government and presented a draft of measures to eliminate the shortcomings at the plant. KHAKHANYAN hid the ugliness discovered at the plant No. 31 and did not present ZHUZHANAVAʹs report to the government.
5) Designer KURCHEVSKY (arrested) produced experimental series of his cannons for the aircraft (first ZET, and then IP‐1). These systems were clearly unusable and sabotage. Their immediate removal from experimental armament was required. KHAKHANYAN, instead of raising the question of the immediate removal of Kurchevskyʹs cannons from experimental armament, supported Kurchevsky in every possible way, having Tukhachevskyʹs instructions on this, from the latterʹs words, he knew that Kurchevsky was a participant in the conspiracy. KHAKHANYAN provided incorrect data on the results of the Kurchevsky gun and got comrade. Ordzhonikidze, the transfer to Kurchevsky of the whole aircraft plant in Kharkov for the production of cannon fighters IP‐1.
KHAKHANYAN shows that he knows the following members of the Pravotrotskyist organization, workers of the aviation industry: KOROLEV ‐ former director of plant No. 24 in Rybinsk
(arrested); KATSVA ‐ former director of plant number 39 in Moscow (arrested); ABRAMOV  ‐ Chief Engineer of Plant No. 24 in Rybinsk (not arrested); PISMENNY  ‐ employee of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (not arrested); TUPOLEV ‐ former head of the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (arrested).
5. SURIN BC, former head of the diving service of the headquarters of the MC RKKA. Interrogated: PETROV.
He gave initial testimony that he was a member of an anti‐Soviet military conspiracy, in which he was involved by the former head of the military training department of the Red Army MC PANTSERZHANSKY (arrested) in 1933. On the instructions of PANTSERZHANSKY, he carried out sabotage in the field of combat training of the submarine fleet, which consisted in distorting the methodology and inhibition of combat training, incorrectly substantiating the consulting data in the design of submarines, prepared acts of sabotage aimed at sinking submarines, by using batteries, which, according to the state of their equipment should explode. As a result, on 28.VIII.37, the battery of the submarine ʺGaribaldiyetsʺ exploded on the Black Sea. The explosion killed 5 people, and 6 people were seriously injured, the boat was out of order for a long time. In September 1934, a battery explosion occurred on the Stalinets submarine of the Baltic Fleet. At the same time, the commander of the TAUBE submarine division was killed, 5 personnel and 6 people were wounded.
In addition, SURIN was recruited for espionage activities in favor of German intelligence by an engineer from the Nikolaev plant “A. Marty ʺSINICINOUS (not arrested). Subsequently, he kept in touch on espionage activities with the engineer of the Baltic plant MALININ (not arrested) and the head of the 2nd section of the 2nd Main Directorate of the NKOP KRITSKY (not arrested). During this period, SURIN transmitted information on the tactical use of submarines, the material support of boats and on newly built submarines.
6. LITVINSKY, former head of the sector of the RU RKKA, teacher of the Academy. Frunze. Interrogated: CHEKHOV, TAKE.
He testified about his espionage activities in favor of Poland.
Being a resident of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Warsaw in 1929, he was associated with an employee of the Polish intelligence KRUSHINSKY (he is also an agent of the Republic of Uzbekistan), to whom he passed on spy materials on the Red Army about the work of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
On behalf of KRUSHINSKY, LITVINSKY recruited people for Polish intelligence in the USSR embassy.
Upon his arrival in the USSR in 1930, LITVINSKY was associated with the Polish residents in the USSR KAMINSKY and ROSENBLUM (to be established).
In espionage work, LITVINSKY was associated with ARTUZOV, who in turn linked him with the Polish resident LADOVSKY (to be established).
Personally, LITVINSKY recruited and transferred to the Polish residency in the USSR for espionage work: MAZANOV ‐ a former employee of the Polish sector of RU (arrested); IVANOV Petr Ivanovich, now the USSR military attaché in Finland; KOPETS ‐ press worker of the NKID. He worked in Poland under the name GORFINKEL; ARKUPA Alexander Ivanovich ‐ former assistant to the beginning. sector of RU; ZHENKO ‐ Former Secretary of the Defense Attaché in Poland; KREKLIN (aka SADOVSKY, aka LYUBOMIRSKY) ‐ former secretary of the consulate in Lvov, a former employee of the NKVD; SOSNOVSKY Peter ‐ a former employee of the Warsaw Consulate.
All named persons are installed.
For the 6th DEPARTMENT
1. RUBINSTEIN, the former head of the Zavodvokzalstroy trust, recently was the head of the Tsentrostroyput trust. Interrogated: PAROVISHNIKOV.
He confessed that for 4 years he has been an agent of Polish intelligence and a member of the POV. On the instructions of the Poles, he became a member of the anti‐Soviet Trotskyist organization in the Tsuzheldorstroi system and conducted sabotage and sabotage work along the line of new railway construction.
RUBINSTEIN testified that for espionage work in favor of Poland he was recruited in 1938 by KORETSKY, a Polish political emigrant, who at that time worked with him in the Zavodvokzalstroy trust as the head of the planning department and secretary of the party committee.
KORETSKY ‐ a former member of the Communist Party of Poland, was subjected to repression by the Polish authorities. In 1927 he emigrated to the USSR, from where he was sent for illegal party work in Poland and was, allegedly, the secretary of the Warsaw CPR organization. In 1930, KORETSKY arrived in the USSR for the second time, spreading the version that he was sentenced in absentia by the Polish authorities to death for the murder of a provocateur and therefore fled.
According to Rubinsteinʹs testimony, KORETSKY was in fact, even before his first arrival in the Soviet Union, an agent of Polish intelligence and was twice transferred to the USSR under the guise of a political emigrant.
Using the anti‐Soviet sentiments of RUBINSTEIN, KORETSKY for a long time processed him in the spirit of anti‐party Polish‐nationalist attitudes, after which, through provocation, he obtained his consent to espionage.
KORETSKY informed RUBINSTEIN about the sabotage, espionage and subversive work of the POV on the territory of the USSR, aimed at uniting all Polish nationalist elements and preparing the military defeat of the USSR in the coming war.
RUBINSTEIN carried out espionage work together with KORETSKY, which was facilitated by their joint service in the trust. On the instructions of the Polish intelligence, they regularly transmitted spy materials about the planned and under construction railway lines, car repair plants, locomotive and carriage depots.
RUBINSTEIN testified that he had given the Poles plans and title lists for the construction of the Shcherbinsky and Kazan car‐repair plants; plans for the construction of a depot at St. Cherusti; information about the construction of an auto‐brake point at this station; plans for the construction of wheel shops in the depots of Lyangasovo and Bryansk stations; plans for the construction of an auto brake station at St. Gomel; plans and calculations for the construction of water supply lines at the stations: Gomel, Mikhnovichi, Komarichi and Usov and a number of others.
On the instructions of KORETSKY RUBINSTEIN, in 1936 he contacted the head of the anti‐Soviet Trotskyist organization in the Puzheldorstroy trust GRANOVSKY (arrested) and became a member of the organization he headed.
GRANOVSKY and KORETSKY set before RUBINSHTEIN the task of creating sabotage and sabotage groups at large construction sites (mainly at construction sites of car repair plants) and planting antiSoviet elements at construction sites in order to disrupt and disorganize construction work.
RUBINSTEIN, together with KORETSKY, recruited a number of heads of construction enterprises that were part of the trust system for sabotage and sabotage work, including: MANYUKOVA ‐ deputy. head of the Zavodvokzalstroy trust, LEIBOVICH ‐ early. supply of this trust, BURMAKIN ‐ Ch. construction engineer of the Lianozovsky car‐repair plant, POLYAKOVSKY ‐ Ch. the engineer of the assembly office of the trust, TURETSKY ‐ the head of the group of sanitary equipment of the trust, and others (the arrest of these persons is being prepared).
KORETSKY named RUBINSHTEINA the following persons who were in the leadership of the ʺPOVʺ: UNSHLICHT ‐ the former secretary of the Central Executive Committee, BUDZINSKY ‐ the employee of the Polish section of the Comintern, SLAVINSKY ‐ the former head of the Polish section of the Comintern, KOPNICA ‐ the assistant for Polish affairs of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for b) in Moscow, DBNIZESHTERNA ‐ editor of the Jewish Pravda in Moscow, SAVITSKY ‐ a former Zakordon NKVD worker, LESHCHINSKY ‐ an employee of the Comintern, and Babinsky ‐ a Polish political emigrant.
KORETSKY was directly associated with UNSHLIKHT, BUDZINSKY and GURSKY, he received assignments from them to organize espionage, sabotage and sabotage in transport.
In 1935, SAVITSKY, a member of this POV leadership group, told RUBINSTEIN that he was personally involved in espionage work with some workers of the OGPU, including SOSNOVSKY and OLSK
(convicted), whose task was to keep the organization from failure.
2. MOISEEV ‐ former deputy. Head of the Central Department of Signaling and Communication NKPS. Interrogated: GRAY.
He testified about belonging to the anti‐Soviet Trotskyist organization in transport, into which he was recruited in 1936 by PODCHEPAEV, the former head of the communications and signaling department of the NKPS (arrested) on the instructions of POSTNIKOV (convicted).
In order to organize acts of sabotage and widespread sabotage in the communication and signaling economy on the roads, MOISEEV, on the instructions of PODCHEPAEV, recruited a number of leading engineering and technical workers of the central communications and signaling department of the NKPS and factories that manufacture communication equipment for transport.
During 1937, they recruited: USTINOVICH ‐ former head of the communications department of the central communications and signaling department, SHUMILOV ‐ head of the technical department of the same department, ROZHENKO ‐ head of the planning department of the Svetofor plant in Dnepropetrovsk, SEMENOV ‐ head of the communications department of centralization and blocking of the central communication department NKPS.
SEMENOV, on the instructions of MOISEEV, in turn involved the deputy. the chief of communications of the Omsk road KUDRYAVTSEVA, and USTINOVICH ‐ the communications engineer SHIMAN. At the same time, PODCHEPAEV recruited 6 more executives through the communication service on the roads, including: IVANOV ‐ the head of the communication service of the road named after Voroshilov, PASHINTSEVA ‐ the head of the communication service of the Oktyabrskaya railway, NAUMOV ‐ the head of the service of the South Donetsk railway, and others.
In addition to the above persons, Podchepaev and Moiseev were associated with: TYAGNI‐RYADNO ‐ head of the
Transsignalsvyazstroy trust. MAKSIMOV is the head of the Transsignal plant, KAMINSKY is the head of the Construction Department of the Transsignalsvyaz trust, and a number of other engineers and technicians who were in charge of the production of communication equipment for transport.
In mid‐1937, PODCHEPAEV told Moiseev that, on the instructions of the Pravotrotsky center in the NKPS, he was connected with the German intelligence agent DRANGOVSKY, who worked at the Moscow Institute of Railway Transport, and regularly gave him spy materials about the state of the communications economy.
At the same time, MOISEEV was tasked with preparing a number of materials on the technical equipment, capacity and throughput of the largest nodes and stations of defense significance.
MOISEEV compiled and transmitted through PODCHEPAEV for
German intelligence a list of railway stations equipped with centralized switches and signals indicating the number of switches and train routes on each road separately.
At the same time, on the instructions of PODCHEPAEV, Ustinovich drew up and handed over for the German intelligence a communication scheme for the entire road network.
MOISEEV testified that, on the instructions of an anti‐Soviet organization, he carried out a lot of subversive work in the communications economy on the roads: he delayed the preparation of construction projects through the communication line, disrupted the supply of roads with the necessary equipment and materials, carried out wrecking repairs of telegraph and telephone lines, disrupted the operation of new types of communication equipment, invented and improved by scientific research institutes. In order to organize the train crash, MOISEEV gave deliberately confusing, incorrect orders for the installation of communication and signaling equipment on the roads, disrupted the construction of mechanical and electrical centralization, and carried out a sabotage of mechanized slides.
3. SHPEKTOROV ‐ head of the road named after Molotov. Interrogated: MARTYNOV.
He confessed to belonging to an anti‐Soviet Trotskyist organization and espionage and sabotage activities on the orders of the Polish and Japanese intelligence services.
Showed that on the road to them. Molotov, he headed a sabotage and espionage organization created earlier by the former head of this road DRUSKIS.
SHPEKTOROV was associated with the participants in the anti‐Soviet military conspiracy in the Trans‐Baikal Military District ‐ GRYAZNOV, the former commander of the district troops, and SHESTAKOV, the former head of the district political department (convicted).
At the same time, he was a member of the Chita Pravotrotskyist organization, headed by the former secretary of the Chita City Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) ELKIN and the former head of the Chita NKVD operative officer PETROSYAN (arrested) and took part in the sabotage and sabotage activities of the anti‐Soviet organization that existed in the Vostochnik trust. ALLILUYEV (arrested).
The united Pravotrotskyist organization carried out sabotage and espionage work on direct assignments of Japanese intelligence. The management of the organizationʹs espionage activities was carried out by a major Japanese spy ‐ the director of the Department of the Ministry of Railways of Japan MINAMI, who was directly connected with a member of the organization CRITSEM ‐ the former representative of the road named after. Molotov.
In addition, the members of the organization were associated with the consul of Manchukuo in Chita ISIDA. Communication with them was maintained by SHPEKTOROV, DRUSKIS and KRITS through special couriers, the wife of DRUSKIS and TITOV, the former head of the planning department of the road administration (arrested).
Members of the organization, on assignments from Japanese intelligence and the center of the right, destroyed the locomotive system of roads, communications and water supplies, disrupted coal mining, spoiled and destroyed the track facilities in order to organize train crashes.
Members of the organization trained rebel cadres from the SocialistRevolutionaries, White Guards, and kulaks with the aim of creating sabotage and rebel detachments in wartime for destructive actions in the rear of the Red Army.
The testimony of SHPEKTOROV establishes that a number of former prominent Social Revolutionaries were involved in the united Pravotrotskyist organization: MURASHKIN ‐ the former head of the track service, the Right Social Revolutionary, BALTENKO ‐ a former Social Revolutionary, worked on the road to them. Molotov head of the communications service, FOMIN ‐ former early. construction companies of the communications service, the Right SR, and others (all of them arrested), who were previously part of the SR group in Irkutsk.
SHPEKTOROV confessed that he began to carry out espionage work in favor of Poland back in 1928, while in Belarus and being a member of the counter‐revolutionary national Democratic organization. In this organization, as well as for espionage in favor of Poland, SHPEKTOROV was recruited by SLAVINSKY, the former head of the Polish section of the Comintern.
SLAVINSKY was recruited by Polish spy Slavia TSWELTOVSKAYA, the former wife of the Polish ambassador to the USSR PATEKA.
Head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR, senior major of state security (SHAPIRO)
 Signature of Deputy Peopleʹs Commissar of Internal Affairs
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 The surname is underlined.  So in the source.
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 POUM ‐ Labor Party of Marxist Unity.
 TKP ‐ Labor Peasant Party.
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 KSK ‐ Soviet Control Commission.On the left margin there is Stalinʹs mark ʺ x ʺ.  On the left margin there is Stalinʹs mark ʺ x ʺ.