On Stalin

Marx-Engels |  Lenin  | Stalin |  Home Page

    To Stalin Top Secret Summaries Of The most important testimonies Of Those arrested 1937‐ 1938

A summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR for December 13, 1937

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 404. L. 36‐65.


Comrade STALIN

I am sending you a summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the NKVD GUGB for December 13, 1937.

Peopleʹs Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Peopleʹs Commissar for State Security (EZHOV) [1]                                  

Top secret

For the 3rd DEPARTMENT

1. LINDBERG M.Ya., former deputy head of the planning and financial sector of the All‐Union Radio Committee under the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR. Interrogated: GRIGORIEV.

He showed that, being a Socialist‐Revolutionary since 1906, he had been actively anti‐Soviet work until the day of his arrest.

Living in Harbin since 1922, LINDBERG established an organized connection with a number of former SRs who emigrated abroad during the civil war ‐ N.P. PUMPYANSKY, A.I. POGREBETSKY, A.P. LISIENKO, at whose suggestion he center and conducted active counter‐revolutionary work among Soviet citizens living in Manchuria. At the same time, LINDBERG, being a Japanese agent, was engaged in intelligence activities.

In 1929, in connection with the Soviet‐Chinese conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway, LINDBERG left for the Soviet Union with the task of the Harbin Socialist‐Revolutionary Center to establish an organized connection with the Socialist‐Revolutionary underground in Moscow. Arriving in Moscow, LINDBERG established contact with one of the leaders of the Moscow Socialist‐Revolutionary Center, Sergei KUDRYAVTSEV (not arrested), together with whom, at the beginning of 1930, took part in negotiations on the establishment of a united bloc of Socialist‐Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

During 1930‐1937, LINDBERG, together with other members of the Socialist‐Revolutionary underground, carried out active espionage, sabotage and recruiting work.

In connection with the changes that took place in the personnel of the

SR center, caused by partial arrests, LINDBERG at the beginning of

1937 took over the leadership of the Moscow SR center, which included

M.           F.            OMELKOV. (arrested),   I.             I.             CHERKASHENINOV, KRYUKOVSKAYA (not arrested).

At the beginning of 1937, P.A. GRINEVICH was involved in the creation of terrorist cells and the implementation of direct communication with Japanese intelligence by LINDBERG. (arrested), through whom LINDBERG received a directive from the Harbin Socialist‐Revolutionary Center to carry out active anti‐Soviet work aimed at disrupting the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

During 1932‐1934. personally, LINDBERG, during his work on the board of Vneshtorgbank of the USSR, carried out sabotage through the sale and accounting of Torgsinʹs trade orders, which led to a loss for the state in the amount of about 100,000 rubles in gold.

During 1934‐1937. LINDBERG, together with the Trotskyist SM IL GA (until the day of the arrest of the latter), carried out sabotage work through the All‐Union Radio Committee under the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR in planning the financing of radio broadcasting in the USSR.

As a result of the wreckingly drawn up 2nd five‐year plan for the Radio Committee in 1937, it took an unforeseen vacation of 70 million rubles from the state budget.

In 1930‐1936. LINDBERG was associated with a major Japanese intelligence resident, BOCHKAREV [2] , who lived in the city of

Sverdlovsk (under investigation ).

2. KLYUCHNIKOV YV, former editor of the social economy. GIZ, formerly             the          Minister               of Foreign                 Affairs of            the          Kolchak government. Interrogated: GRIGORIEV.

He showed that in 1918 he was recruited to work for Japan by the High Commissioner of Japan in Omsk, the Japanese representative under the government of Kolchak SATO.

KLYUCHNIKOV shows that the Japanese intelligence services were also recruited by the former. Minister of War of the Kolchak government SURIN [3] and former. professor USTRYALOV.

Leaving Paris in 1919, KLYUCHNIKOV stopped in Tokyo, where he contacted a representative of Japanese intelligence, from whom he received instructions on further espionage activities and an appearance at the secretary of the Japanese embassy in Paris, YAMOSITO.

The main task that was assigned to KLUCHNIKOV by Japanese intelligence was the massive legal transfer of large Russian White emigrants to the Soviet Union in order to use them on Soviet territory in the interests of Japanese intelligence through espionage, sabotage and insurgency.

Personally, KLYUCHNIKOV was asked to infiltrate the apparatus of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for provocative espionage activities.

Arriving in Paris, KLYUCHNIKOV, in order to fulfill the assignments of the Japanese intelligence service, began to conduct a campaign under the slogan of reconciliation of Russian White emigrants with the Bolsheviks, which would enable the White emigres to travel to the Soviet Union.

Fulfilling further the tasks of the Japanese, KLYUCHNIKOV managed to get into the confidence of the responsible workers of the Soviet government and in 1922 he went as an expert with the Soviet delegation on international law to the Genoa conference: In Genoa, KLYUCHNIKOV regularly met with the Japanese intelligence officer

SATO, to whom he transmitted spy information.

Returning            to            Moscow,              KLYUCHNIKOV               contacted             Professor USTRYALOV and, in accordance with directives from Japanese intelligence, through USTRYALOV, got a job at the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Foreign Trade. While working in the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Foreign Trade, KLYUCHNIKOV pursued a line that ensured the protection of the interests of the Japanese, especially in fishing matters and along the line of coal concessions.

3.  BERZIN R.I. Interrogated: ILYITSKY.

In addition, he showed that for counterrevolutionary work he maintained direct contact with ALKSNIS, who indicated that the Latvian candidate ‐ r. the organization was created to participate in the overthrow of Soviet power and is organizationally linked with other anti‐Soviet      organizations,    namely:                the          underground     Polish organization led by UNSHLICHT, an Estonian counter‐revolutionary organization, one of the leaders of which is JANSON, and with the military conspiratorial organization TUKHACHEVSKY.

ALKSNIS instructed BERZIN to establish contact with the Latvian intelligence agencies, supply them with spy material and deploy sabotage and sabotage activities to destroy livestock.

4.  SAKKART A. , former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia. Interrogated: DEAD.

He testified that in 1932, after his arrest in the town of Yuryev, he was recruited by the secret police and all the subsequent time he was conducting provocative work on the instructions of the security department.

SAKKART shows that, having arrived in Moscow in 1934 for a party conference and then returned to Estonia, he handed over to the Estonian secret police detailed materials on the activities of the Estonian section of the Comintern, on the decisions made, etc. At the same time, SAKKART, on assignments from the secret police, dispatched Estonian spies to the territory of the USSR ‐ MÜNBERG and MULGAUSEN, who later settled in the Urals.

SAKKART shows that in 1935 he left for Moscow and received the task of the Estonian secret police to penetrate the Red Army, not show much activity, firmly settle in the USSR and report his whereabouts in simple letters to a conditional address in Estonia. Instructions were given to SAKKART to take a wait‐and‐see attitude in order to carry out active espionage work during the war.

The indications are primary.

5.                   BREMMAN Ya.P., former senior researcher at the Institute of World Economy and World Politics. Interrogated: GRIGORIEV.

He testified that while working in 1932 at the USSR Trade Mission in Tokyo, he was recruited by Japanese intelligence and, upon his return to the USSR, was associated with a Japanese intelligence agent, correspondent of the newspaper Asahi MARUYAMA. In 1934, while working in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, BREMMAN handed over to Japanese intelligence a number of secret documents and decisions of the Central Committee. Since 1934, in order to further conceal his espionage activities, BREMMAN maintained contact with MARUYAMA through a Japanese language teacher at the Institute of Oriental Studies, a Japanese agent BIRIG (being verified) [4] .

The indications are primary.

6.                   KIM‐DANYA, former editor of the Korean section of the Foreign Workers Publishing House. Interrogated by: GUZOVSKY.

He testified that since 1929 he was an employee of the police department in Seoul and was involved in intelligence activities by the Japanese TOKEDA. Working at that time on the line of the Comintern, KIM‐DANYA informed TOKEDA about all the assignments he received from the Comintern, giving out appearances known to him and people associated with him.

When he was sent to Shanghai in 1929, KIM‐DANYA worked under the direction of an employee of the Japanese consulate YAMOGUCHI, and as a result of the betrayal of KIM‐DANYA by the Japanese, a member of the Dalburo IKKI NEULIN and several Korean communists were arrested.

Arriving in Moscow at the end of 1933, KIM‐DANYA contacted an employee of the Japanese embassy KIMURA and, on his instructions, created a sabotage and insurgent Korean organization in the Korean regions of the Far Eastern Territory.

The indications are primary.

7.                       SODNOMON RB, former head of the Mongolian group of the Central School of the NKVD. Interrogated by: GUZOVSKY.

He showed that in 1930 he was involved in a counterrevolutionary organization acting on the orders of the Japanese and headed by the former chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Buryat ASSR DABAIN. The organization, as SODNOMON shows, had direct contact with an official of the Chita Japanese Consulate and, through illegal couriers, communicated with Japanese intelligence agencies in Manchuria and Hailar.

On the instructions of the Japanese intelligence, the counterrevolutionary organization launched active anti‐Soviet work in Buryatia, disrupted collective farm construction, organized kulak uprisings and conducted Japaneseophile propaganda in Buryatia for the formation, together with external and internal Mongolia, of a PanMongolian state under the protectorate of Japan.

8.                       SHUVAL, former deputy manager and chief. engineer of the Soyuzkhimplastmass trust. Interrogated: GALKIN.

He showed that he was a member of a subversive sabotage and sabotage organization in the plastics industry and was involved in antiSoviet work in mid‐1935 by the head of the organization, former. director of the Okhta chemical plant VIGDOROVICH (convicted). SHUVAL shows that the organization prepared and carried out fires and explosions at the Okhta chemical plant, which led to the decommissioning of the celluloid and etrol workshops, the nitro mass workshop and digging.

Having recruited the head of the resin workshop SHNEER, SHUVAL through him organized the explosion of the digester in the resin workshop and dug a fire in the ether department of the workshop.

SHUVAL reveals that he knew that the head of the organization, VIGDOROVICH, had created a terrorist group consisting of LEP and MASARSKY (convicted), who were supposed to carry out the murder of Comrade Zhdanov.

9.                       BOSHKOVICH               Y.S., former         manager               of

Soyuztorgmekh. Interrogated: FROLOV.

He showed that in 1925, while working in Berlin, he was involved in espionage activities by an agent of the German intelligence EGER.

BOZHKOVICH testified about the transfer of a number of espionage materials to the German intelligence service and about subversive and sabotage work on intelligence assignments in the Chemical Combine and the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

The indications are primary.

10.                    NEBYLITSKY, former deputy head of Glavselmash. Interrogated: GOLUBEV.

Previously confessed to sabotage and sabotage work, he additionally showed that, according to the instructions of the former. chief of Glavselmag [5] BORISOV [6] (the question of arrest was raised), he, NEBYLITSKY, carried out espionage work in favor of German intelligence.

NEBILITSKY shows that with the help of the engineers of the special department of the Glavka * KHRAPACH and PONKRATOV * [7] (the question of their arrest was raised) recruited by him for intelligence work, the German intelligence received detailed materials on the mobility and mob plans of the Glavselmash factories and the defense products produced by these factories.

NEBYLITSKY transmitted all espionage information through a member of the sabotage and sabotage organization SHAPS (arrested), who had direct contact with German intelligence.

11.                    IVANOV IA, former assistant to the head of the 13th department of the 4th department of the GUGB. Interrogated: BEREZOVSKY.

He showed that he was a member of an anti‐Soviet terrorist conspiratorial group that existed in the 4th department of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR under the leadership of MOLCHANOV.

IVANOV shows that he was personally involved in the group by MOLCHANOV in mid‐1932, and that the group included: 1) Former assistant. early SPO GUGB STEIN; 2) the former beginning. Of the 3rd department of the 4th department of the GUGB V.I. TIMOFEEV (arrested); 3) Meshcheryakov M.P. ‐ former pom. early departments of the 4th department, currently pom. early 3rd department of the NKVD of Azerbaijan SSR; 4) EDELMAN ‐ former operational secretary of MOLCHANOV, currently on the periphery; 5) V.P. GORBUNOV ‐ former early. branches of the

4th department (arrested); 6) GRIGORIEV ‐ former. pom. early departments of the 4th department of the GUGB; 7) GOLUBEV ‐ former. early 5th department of the 4th department, currently beginning. 4th department of the UGB NKVD of the Mordovian ASSR; 8) I. ILYUSHENKO ‐ pom. early department of the 4th department of the GUGB (arrested).

As IVANOV shows, the counter‐revolutionary group and he personally, in the process of work, sought to direct an operational blow towards small secondary anti‐Soviet formations in order to encrypt the main cadres of the right‐wing, Trotskyists and bourgeois nationalists.

IVANOV shows that after coming to the NKVD Comrade. N. I.

Ezhova the group set itself the task of committing a terrorist act against comrade Ezhov in order to prevent the full disclosure of the criminal activities of the anti‐Soviet group MOLCHANOV and the rout of the right‐wingers with whom MOLCHANOV was associated.

Fulfilling a number of MOLCHANOVʹs assignments to curtail cases of nationalist counter‐revolution, IVANOV in 1937 through V.I. TIMOFEEV. (arrested) received a directive from MOLCHANOV (given by the latter even before his arrest) on the need to kill Comrade. N.I. EZHOVA. IVANOV testified that he had agreed to personally commit a terrorist act during a round of Comrade EZHOV of the rooms of the investigators of the 4th department.

The indications are primary.

For the 4th DEPARTMENT

1. VOLKOV P.Ya., former Deputy Peopleʹs Commissar of Light Industry of the RSFSR. Interrogated: GATOV, KOZUNOV.

He confessed that he was a member of the anti‐Soviet organization of the right, to which he was recruited by Ukhanov in the fall of 1928.

Was aware of the terrorist activities of the anti‐Soviet organization of the right. According to Ukhanov, back in 1931‐32. I knew that in Moscow and Leningrad, even then, deeply conspiratorial work was being carried out to create militant terrorist groups to carry out terrorist attacks on the leaders of the party and government.

In 1933, while working as the Peopleʹs Commissar for Supply of the RSFSR, VOLKOV created an anti‐Soviet group of the right in the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Squad, which carried out sabotage work in the field of supply.

After the reorganization of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Education into the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Industry, he continued to carry out sabotage activities in the system of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Industry. The leaders of the anti‐Soviet organization of the right in the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Industry were UKHANOV, BOGDANOV and he was VOLKOV.

Having moved to the Narkomlegprom, VOLKOV, together with UKHANOV, launched sabotage work in the system of the Narkomlegprom of the RSFSR, which was in contact with LYUBIMOV and YEREMIN.

VOLKOV named the members of the anti‐Soviet organization of the Rights known to him.

2.        IVANOV     BA, former          secretary              of            SULIMOV. Interrogated:


He confessed that he was a German spy. He maintained contact with

German intelligence through BESSONOV, who worked in the period 1932‐1936. Counselor of the Embassy in Berlin.

3.        Shvetsov      AI, former           deputy head      of            Vostsibles Narkomles. Interrogated: YAKHONTOV.

He showed that before joining the CPSU (b) in 1918 he was a member of the Socialist‐Revolutionary Party. He retained his SocialistRevolutionary convictions even after joining the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and from 1927 he switched to the path of active struggle against Soviet power.

In 1927, while working as the chairman of the Vsekobank, under the influence of KAMINSKY and SADYRIN, he pursued a counterrevolutionary right‐wing policy in lending, contributing to the strengthening of kulak farms.

In 1928 he took an active part in the organization and leadership of the underground counter‐revolutionary organization of the Vologda Socialist‐Revolutionaries in Moscow, as well as in the organization of the Socialist‐Revolutionaries in Vologda. The counter‐revolutionary Socialist‐Revolutionary organization set itself the task of carrying out terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and government, and one of the organizers of the terror was he ‐ SHVETSOV. For this purpose, he kept weapons (3 revolvers).

In            1934       he,          SHVETSOV,       was        recruited              by           the former. deputy. Narkomlesa ROSENTAL K.Ya. in the anti‐Soviet organization of the right and carried out, on the instructions of ROSENTAL             and LOBOV,               sabotage               activities              in            the          forest industry. Later, the counter‐revolutionary activities of the SocialistRevolutionary organization came into contact with the anti‐Soviet organization of the right.

For the 5th DEPARTMENT

1. ANISIMOV      ID, former     head     of     the     sector     of     the     RU

RKKA. Interrogated by: LORKISH, ELS, KUZMENKO.

He gave preliminary evidence that after the defeat of Wrangelʹs army, ANISIMOV, along with other officers, emigrated abroad. From the end of 1920 to March 1922 he lived in Constantinople and became close friends with the generals and colonels of the Wrangel army ‐ LAZAREV, MILKOVSKY, KORVIN‐KRUKOVSKY, KANTARADZ, BARATOV, TILLY, SHATILOV and others.

In Constantinople, under the leadership of General LAZAREV, his ‐ ANISIMOV and Colonel SOKOLOVSKY, an officer monarchical organization was created called the Union of Former Russian Soldiers in Turkey, which, on the instructions of KUTEPOV, waged an active struggle against Soviet power by preparing intervention and espionage, transferring officers to the Soviet Union to create a monarchist organization in the Union.

In the same 1922, ANISIMOV was recruited for espionage work in favor of France as an assistant to the head of the French Bureau ʺPolis Interalsʺ in Constantinople.

Then, in 1922, ANISIMOV was offered secret cooperation in favor of the Soviet intelligence. In agreement with KUTEPOVIM and French intelligence, he agreed.

In the summer of 1923, on the instructions of Kutepov and French intelligence, ANISIMOV staged his failure and, with the consent of BUTLEROV, ʺfledʺ to the USSR. Upon arrival at the Union, ANISIMOV appeared in the RKKA RU and was left at work by BERZIN (at that time the head of the 2nd department of the RKKA RU).

Leaving for the USSR, ANISIMOV received a report from the French intelligence service to GRIGORIEV, a former officer who at that time was working as the head of the technical unit of the RKKA RU.

Upon arrival in Moscow, ANISIMOV contacted the former. officer

GRIGORIEV and until 1926 transmitted all espionage information through him to French intelligence.

In 1926, ANISIMOV was sent through the RKKA RU to Harbin, where he became close friends with Gekker, who was then a member of the board of the CER, and was recruited by him into Japanese intelligence. In Harbin, Gekker and Anisimov organized the failure of the intelligence agency in China.

Arriving in the Soviet Union, ANISIMOV continued his espionage activities in favor of Japan until 1928, being connected in Chita with the secretary of the Japanese consulate.

In 1929, on the instructions of the RU RKKA, ANISIMOV was sent to Paris and contacted KUTEPOV and SHATILOV, to whom he gave information about the activities of the officer‐monarchist organization in Moscow and spy materials about the state of the Red Army.

In Paris, along the line of the Intelligence Agency, ANISIMOV was associated with VITOLIN, who was at the same time a representative of German intelligence.

On behalf of VITOLIN ANISIMOV, at the end of 1929 or at the beginning of 1930, he traveled to Berlin, where he contacted the German intelligence in the person of Major YUSTA and gave him spy materials on the French army, as well as a report on the organization and operation of the Parisian intelligence network.

From 1933 to 1937, ANISIMOV lived in Moscow and served in the Intelligence Agency, worked for the German intelligence service, to which he was recruited. officer of the Intelligence Agency BIDDER E.G., now a teacher of the Air Force Academy of the Red Army.

Through foreign intelligence services, ANISIMOV was associated with:

1) for French intelligence ‐ with an employee of the VOLIA Intelligence Department; 2) on Japanese intelligence, except for GEEKER, with intelligence    officers RODIONOV,      LEIFERT              and        the          Latvian TALBERG; 3) on German intelligence ‐ with the Latvian GRUZDUP and VISHNEV ‐ a researcher at the Academy of Sciences.

As a member of the officersʹ monarchist organization, ANISIMOV was associated with its ruling center in Moscow: with the former. Colonel GLAGOLEV ‐ brigade commander of the Red Army, former. Colonel

LAZAREVICH,     b. General     Svechin,     b. General      VERKHOVSKY,

b. Colonel SOLOGUB, b. officer KRASOVSKY M.Ya. and across Leningrad ‐ with LAZAREV.

In 1929‐30, while in Paris, ANISIMOV received an assignment from KUTEPOV and SHATILOV for an officerʹs monarchist organization to subvert work in the Red Army, create terrorist groups, and commit terrorist acts against party and government leaders.

ANISIMOV conveyed these directives to the leaders of the center of the officersʹ monarchist organization in Moscow ‐ VERKHOVSKY, Svechin and in Leningrad ‐ LAZAREV.

Anisimov knows from Svechin and Verkhovsky that in 1935‐36 they. terrorist groups were created in Moscow to carry out terrorist acts against comrades. STALIN, MOLOTOV and VOROSHILOV. In Leningrad, such groups were created by LAZAREV.

2. SEMENOV, former USSR military attaché in France. Interrogated by: KAZAKEVICH, PETROVSKY.

He confessed that since 1936 he has been a participant in an anti‐Soviet military conspiracy, into which he was recruited by the former head of the RU RKKA URITSKY. According to the conspiracy, through URITSKY, he was associated with TUKHACHEVSKY, UBOREVICH, YAKIR and others.

On a special assignment from the center of the military conspiracy, through URITSKY, I established contact with General SHWEITSGUT (deputy head of the French General Staff) and negotiated with him about the existence of the remnants of the anti‐Soviet military conspiracy and about the French support for the conspirators who remained at large.

SEMENOV collaborated with the French intelligence service, transferring it spy materials about the situation in the USSR, the Red Army and the work of the Intelligence Agency abroad, receiving special materials from URITSKY.

Conducted systematically disinformation of the command of the Red Army and the government of the USSR about the situation in France, using for this purpose the double agents in France associated with him.

3. TYLTYN , which was at the disposal of the RU RKKA. Interrogated by YAMNITSKII, IVANOV.

Additionally, he showed that he was a confidant from the center of the Latvian organization in America and concentrated in his hands all the threads going from the branch of the nationalist organization in America to the center of the Latvian organization and back.

URITSKY (former head of the RKKA RU) was associated with the center of the spy nationalist organization, gave instructions to organize sabotage in the supply of military materials from America to Republican Spain. The organization of the sabotage was entrusted to TYLTYN and SHMIDT (specially sent by the URITSKY to America from the USSR).

In America, members of the organization were involved: Robert

KYUZE (a native of Latvia), KATS (agent BERZINA), VORONKOV‐

BEN (employee of the Canadian station of the RU RKKA) [8] .

Robert KUSET, using the Hearst press, made a fuss about military supplies for Republican Spain (which in fact was not).

At the same time, Robert KUZET and SCHMIDT purchased 3 planes taken from passenger lines in America as unusable, and proceeded to load them onto the Spanish steamer Mar‐Cantabrico.

The well‐informed US authorities took advantage of the ʺhypeʺ and urgently passed legislation in the Senate to ban military supplies to Republican Spain.

ʺMar‐Cantabricoʺ managed to leave the coast in the United States, was not detained, however, the same KUZE warned the press about the route of the steamer and that it should first go to Mexico, where it would have to take on board artillery equipment and ammunition.

In Mexico, the steamer received the KATS, where it loaded up and followed to the coast of Spain. Off the Spanish coast, ʺMar Cantabricoʺ was captured by the Nazis and taken to its port.

BERZIN ‐ b. early RU RKKA, being the main adviser in Spain, was supposed to organize a meeting of the steamer, but did not.

4.  AUZAN , former head of military acceptance at TsAGI. Interrogated:


He confessed that in 1935 he was recruited by BAZENKOV into an antiSoviet military conspiracy and, at the direction of the latter, carried out sabotage work on the experimental construction of the Air Force.

In 1936, AUZAN was involved by ALKSNIS in the Latvian nationalistfascist organization and carried out subversive and recruiting work on his orders. In the Latvian organization he recruited the head of the aircraft department of the UMTS GALDIN [9] .

5.  YANSON        K.I., brigade        commander. Interrogated:            LUKIN, STEPANTSEV.

In addition, he showed that he has been an agent of German intelligence since 1925. He was recruited in Rome when he was a military attaché there by the German intelligence officer von BULLOV and gave him secret materials that he received from the intelligence apparatus of the Intelligence Agency.

In 1934, JANSON contacted the agents of the German and Latvian intelligence services GRIKMAN, an employee of the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and GANZIN, an employee of Grammplastmasstrest, to whom from 1934 to 1937 he handed over a number of spy materials about the state of the Red Army.

In 1935, JANSON recruited an employee of the Civil Air Fleet Directorate ‐ DAVID, whom he had recruited earlier into a Latvian organization, to spy work. DAVID, in turn, recruited an engineer from TsAGI GUFT [10] .

DAVID and GUFT were transferred by YANSON for communication to GRIKMAN and GANZIN and through them supplied the German and Latvian intelligence with secret data on the state of the Red Army air forces. GRIKMAN communicated with Germany through the diplomatic service of the NKID, GANZIN in Moscow was associated with the Latvian mission.

In addition, JANSON shows that the center of the Latvian organization carried out work on the instructions of sabotage and insurgent groups in the western border zone. This work was supervised by EIDEMAN, the former division commander KALNIN, ex. corps commander ZOMBERG and former. early Intelligence department of the BVO APPEN.

In 1935, KALNIN informed JANSON that in the Pskov region, under the guise of Osoaviakhimʹs organizations, three sabotage and insurgent detachments were created from Latvian nationalist collective farmers, supplied with weapons from the funds of Osoaviakhim. One detachment, up to 120 people, was well trained in the Bezhitsa area, the second sabotage group was organized at the station. Vitebsk. [eleven]

In 1936, JANSON was associated with this group through the commander of the 190th rifle regiment TETEREVSKY (Latvian), who was recruited by him into the organization.

In the Pskov region, a member of the organization, the former head of the Intelligence Department of the LVO KESSIS, also organized sabotage and insurgent groups.

In the summer of 1934, YANSON learned about the terrorist missions from a member of the BIKA organization (formerly authorized by the RSFSR Peopleʹs Commissariat for Heavy Industry).

The leader and organizer of the terrorist groups over Comrade STALIN was BERNOVSKY, an employee of the Prometey publishing house.

A terrorist group led by BERNOVSKY, called the ʺForest Brothersʺ, gathered in the area of ʺPrometheusʺ dachas at the station. Ilyinskoe. From its staff named ROSENTAL ‐ an employee of

NKZem [12] .

The second terrorist group was organized by a member of the organization KURCHEVSKY, an engineer at the military plant No. 8 and who often visited RUDZUTAKʹs dacha. JANSON, ROSENTHAL, BEIKA and LENTSMAN knew about the existence of the Kurchevsky terrorist group.

Members of the MEYER organization, an employee of the NKID and an assistant, also prepared themselves for terrorist activities. commander of the 190 regiment OZOLIN.

6. HALEPSKY, former Peopleʹs Commissar of Communications of the USSR. Interrogated: USHAKOV.

In addition, he testified that in connection with the UVO maneuvers in 1934, GEEKER (formerly the head of the department of external relations) sought to obtain complete data on the mechanized corps through HALEPSKY and DUBOVOE.

From TUKHACHEVSKY KHALEPSKY it became known that GEEKER was a spy and that he agreed to take the position of head of the department of external relations of an NGO because this gave him the opportunity to carry out special assignments of TUKHACHEVSKY on espionage.

During the Belarusian maneuvers, which were attended by the British and French, GEEKER, on behalf of TUKHACHEVSKY, organized two separate meetings for him with the British Colonel MARTEL and with the French general, who is the right hand of Pierre KOTA.

GECKER also helped Tukhachevsky arrange secret meetings with the German intelligence officer HARTMAN.

Gekker personally brought HALEPSKY together once on an

ʺemergencyʺ with HARTMAN and once with the aforementioned Colonel MARTEL.

TUKHACHEVSKY told KHALEPSKY the following about the special role of TAIROV in the conspiracy: through TAIROV, while he was in OKDVA, there was a connection between the conspiracy and the

Japanese headquarters. Tukhachevskyʹs initial fear that it would be difficult for TAIROV to carry out this connection from the MPR soon dissipated.

All the defeatist plans of the center of the military conspiracy later went through TAIROV. TAIROV received information from GRYAZNOV for the Japanese on the deployment of the Daursk group and at the same time insisted that Gryaznov take measures before Moscow to stop sending Soviet units to the Mongolian Peopleʹs Republic.

In 1934, KHALEPSKY learned from KAMENEV that LISOVSKY (deputy commander of the Troops of the Zab. Group) was involved in a conspiracy and was personally recruited by him. In November of this year, KHALEPSKY, when meeting [13] with LISOVSKY, started a conversation with him about the arrest of Gryaznov. LISOVSKY expressed fears that he could be arrested. [14]

7.                   GAZARKH , assistant to the head of the department of external orders of the NGO. Interrogated: BUDAREV, TATUSHIN.

Gave initial testimony about his espionage activities in favor of Germany.

GAZARKH, working in the engineering department of the trade mission in Berlin, was recruited in 1926 by the representative of the German intelligence POTS, to whom he transmitted espionage information on the trade mission until 1930.

Returning to the USSR, GAZARKH was connected by POTS with the resident of the German intelligence service SUKHOPLESKO, formerly. an employee of the external orders department, currently a teacher at the Osoaviakhim school, to whom he handed over spy materials until the day of his arrest.

8.                   STRZHALKOVSKY, head of the communications service of the Red Army Naval Forces Directorate. Interrogated by: Ratner, Petrov.

Gave initial testimony that in 1926, being a flag communications officer in the Black Sea Fleet, he was recruited for espionage activities in favor of Poland by Dr. ...

In 1927, Strzhalkovsky, who was then working in the Directorate of

Naval Forces, was contacted through the Polish intelligence by SINYAVSKY ‐ formerly. early communications of the Red Army, who warned STRZHALKOVSKY about an agreement on this issue with LYASKOVSKY.

STRZHALKOVSKY systematically passed on espionage materials to SINYAVSKY [15] .

In 1932‐33. STRZHALKOVSKY established contact with the Polish military attaché in Moscow HARLAND.

Sinyavsky informed Strzhalkovsky about the presence of a Polish military organization in the USSR. Of the active participants in this organization,                SINYAVSKY      named MUKLEVICH    ‐ b. early Glavmorprom, LONGVA,           BORDOVSKOGO             ‐ former. early Tekhupra RKKA, * LITVINSKY * [16] ‐ early. of the technical department of the Central laboratory of wire communication in Leningrad.

Through SINYAVSKY, STRZHALKOVSKY in 1931 established an espionage connection with LONGVA.

Communication between STRZHALKOVSKY, SINYAVSKY and LONGVA lasted almost until the end of 1937.

On the instructions of SINYAVSKY and LONGVA, STRZHALKOVSKY carried out sabotage work in the communications service of the Naval Forces until the day of his arrest.

** In 1935 b. then the chief of armaments of the Directorate of the Naval Forces, Leonov, informed STRZHALKOVSKY about the existence of an anti‐Soviet military conspiracy and offered to contact him with sabotage work. STRZHALKOVSKY was also associated with GRINENKO‐IVANOV, a flag communications officer of the Baltic Fleet, KRUPSKY was also connected with an anti‐Soviet conspiracy. Communications Department of the Naval Academy, BERGOM ‐ early. Scientific Research Institute of Maritime Communications, and TUBEL ‐ early. liaison offices of the Armaments

Directorate of the UMC RKKA. ** [17]

For the 6th DEPARTMENT

1. VITOL, former deputy head of the Political Department of the Southern Railway, formerly deputy head of the Political Department of the Leningrad Military District. Interrogated: BENENSON.

VITOL confessed to belonging to a Latvian counter‐revolutionary organization. He began to testify about his sabotage and espionage work on assignments of the Latvian intelligence.

He showed that he was recruited in 1921 by the instructor of the political department of the Latvian rifle division VALBAH. On his instructions, he contacted the Latvian spy STRAUS, who had sneaked into the party, who was at that time in Moscow on leading party work.

In 1923, VITOL was transferred to the 23rd Infantry Division in Kharkov and for about a year was associated with the Latvian scout DOBOL who arrived from Moscow, the director of the local Latvian club.

After the appointment of VITOL in 1929, Latvian residents contacted

VITOL in the Leningrad Military District: FELDMAN ‐ head. The Leningrad House of Latprosvet, and a major spy YANSON, who

illegally arrived in 1928 from Latvia.

VITOL connected JANSON with TUKHACHEVSKY, who in 1929 sent him on some assignment to Latvia.

JANSON never returned to the USSR, and VITOL continued his espionage work first with FELDMAN, in 1932 VITOL contacted the manager of the Leningrad trade port LEITSMAN on counterrevolutionary espionage work.

While working in Leningrad, VITOL personally recruited the Latvian ASSE, a military commissar of the 8th Rifle Corps, parts of which were stationed in Novgorod at that time, for espionage, GRINBERGA ‐ assistant. the commander of the mechanized corps for political affairs, and ADIJNEK, a former Latvian rifleman who permanently resides in

Pskov near the Latvian border.

ASSE, GRINBERG, ADIJNEK, in turn, recruited 14 people to work in the Latvian intelligence service.

After VITOL switched to transport, he recruited a number of Latvians for espionage work: DARGIS ‐ pom. early rifle guard NKPS, South road, KREVSA ‐ former secretary of the political department of Art. Belgorod, and others.

According to the testimony of VITOL, DARGIS recruited a group of 10 shooters for sabotage work.

Working on the South Road, VITOL was connected with the resident of the Latvian intelligence service ROSENTAL, who arrived from Latvia and was in charge of the Latvian club in Kharkov.

VITOL testified that ROSENTALʹs spy agents in Kharkov included:

DZERVE ‐ employee of the Kharkov Aviation Plant No. 183,

PAEGLIT ‐ an employee of the Electromechanical Plant named after Stalin.

Alexandrii, who worked at the NKVD mechanical plant. And one more

Latvian, known in Kharkov under the nickname ʺKritusʺ (VITOL does not remember his surname).

VITOL testified that over a long period of his espionage work, he transferred to the Latvian intelligence a large number of various military inventions, especially tanks, detailed information about the condition and operation of the South Road.

In wartime, VITOL expected to commit a number of preliminary acts, in particular, he set himself the task of infiltrating the work of the headquarters of any large military formation in order to seize operational plans for the war in a certain area and hand them over to the enemy.

According to VITOLAʹs testimony, in Moscow there was a center of the Latvians of a counter‐revolutionary organization, which included:

RUDZUTAK, ALKSNIS, EIDEMAN, LEITSMAN (former manager of the Leningrad port) and the Latvian writer CEILIS, one of the leaders of the Latvian society ʺPrometheusʺ.

All Latvian spies named by VITOL are installed.

2. DASHKO, head of the road to them. Voroshilov. Until 1936 he worked in the organs of the OGPU, was the head of the DTO of the road to them. Voroshilov. Interrogated: SOKOLOV.

DASHKO began to testify about belonging to an anti‐Soviet Pravotrotskyist organization and his sabotage and sabotage work in transport.

He showed that he was recruited into an anti‐Soviet organization in 1935 by RUD ‐ the former early. PP of the OGPU for the North Caucasus Territory (arrested), on the instructions of SHEBOLDAEV. When recruiting, he received assignments for terror and sabotage.

In order to fulfill these tasks, he created a number of sabotage and terrorist groups on the railway site. d. lines Tuapse‐Sochi. Recruited deputy. early Tuapse branch of RASPADOVSKY (Pole, his arrest is being prepared), which created several terrorist groups on the TuapseMatsesta line.

In order to arrange massive train crashes and accidents, the members of the anti‐Soviet organization introduced a wrecking train schedule, which inevitably led to collisions and the reception of trains on busy tracks.

In July 1936, members of the organization arranged a collision of a passenger train at the station. Matsesta. A large number of passengers were killed and wounded in the collision.

At St. Tikhoretskaya, which is a large junction of great defensive importance, a turning circle was sabotaged for sabotage purposes. As a result of this sabotage, steam locomotives fell down while passing. 10 steam locomotives were disabled. At the same station, a locomotive depot overlap was sabotaged. The calculation of this sabotage was that at the right moment it was possible to easily bring down the floors, which would lead to the disabling of the depot.

Along with this, a lot of sabotage work was carried out, aimed mainly at disrupting the loading of the main state cargoes of grain and coal, as well as disrupting oil transportation.

DASHKO testified that he was disrupting the loading on a direct order from LEVCHENKO (former deputy commissar, arrested).

3. EREMEEV, former head of the Ashgabat road. Interrogated: MINAKOV.

EREMEEV confessed to belonging to the anti‐Soviet Trotskyist organization and sabotage and sabotage activities in transport.

He showed that he was recruited by LIVSHITS in 1933 while studying at the Kharkov Institute of Transport Engineers.

Upon graduation, he was appointed early. Debaltseve branch of the movement and on the instructions of LIVSHITS launched sabotage work to disrupt the export of coal from Donbass. This was achieved through a systematic shortage of empty supplies, untimely supply of steam locomotives for coal trains, and delays in the advancement of coal routes.

In 1936, EREMEEV, at the insistence of LIVSHITS, was appointed head of the Ashgabat road. Received the task to organize a number of sabotage groups on the road from the White Guard, SocialistRevolutionary, kulak and other anti‐Soviet elements.

Fulfilling this task, he contacted the Trotskyist VERSTONOV ‐ the former beginning. PODORA. At his suggestion, at the NKPS, he secured the appointment of a number of members of the anti‐Soviet organization to the Ashgabat road, whom he appointed heads of the main services of the Road Administration (NEKRASOV, KUGUSHEV, EFIMOV, LEDOVSKIKH ‐ arrested).

With the assistance of these persons, EREMEEV created on the road a large sabotage and sabotage organization, numbering over 25 people.

The members of the organization systematically destroyed the locomotive and carriage facilities, created emergency centers on the most dangerous sections of the track. According to the testimony of EREMEEVA [18] , as a result of the demolition work carried out under his leadership, 23 diesel locomotives were put out of action, up to 40% of the total steam locomotive fleet was destroyed and rendered unusable, 13 train crashes were committed, transportation of bread and oil was largely disrupted.

The investigation continues.

4. LEPPE, ex. head of the cargo service of the Moscow‐Kiev road, previously head of the central security department of the NKPS. Interrogated: KARAGANOV.

LEPPE gave new testimony about the circumstances of his recruitment into the Latvian anti‐Soviet organization.

He testified that he was recruited in 1925 by an agent of the Latvian intelligence BORMAN, a former secretary of the medical commission of the society of old Bolsheviks.

LEPPE gave BORMAN a number of espionage information about the composition, strength and armament of the NKPS rifle guard. LEPPEʹs connection with Borman in espionage work continued until 1934.

In his additional testimony, LEPPE named the members of the Latvian anti‐Soviet organization ‐ SALYNIA and PETERSON (former employees of the NKVD, arrested).


1. DUPLITSKY D.S., former head of the Mobile Department of the


b. member VKP (b). Interrogated: ZVEZDICH.

Gave additional evidence that:

1)    From 1922 and before participating in the naval conspiracy, he participated in the underground Trotskyite‐Zinoviev group ZOFAMUKLEVICH, which included KURKOV, NAUMOV, ORLOV, LUDRI and others.

2)    In 1922‐1925. under the directives of TROTSKY and ZOFA, he

conducted anti‐Soviet work aimed at isolating the fleet from the armed forces of the Soviet Union, creating discontent in the fleet with the leadership of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the government and opposing the Komsomol sailors to the party. To this end, he spoke at a number of meetings and played a leading role in the selection and placement of Trotskyist cadres.

3)    From 1925 to 1930, he took part in a number of underground gatherings that took place at ZOFA, KURKOV, KUKLIN and NAUMOV, at which the tactics of the Trotskyite‐Zinoviev underground were developed.

4)    Since 1930, on the instructions of MUKLEVICH, he contacted an officer‐sabotage group at the Naval Academy and, together with it, carried out sabotage work.

5)    Aware of the fact that his brothers, ex. the nobles ‐ Alexei and Peter (former Kolchak officer) DUPLITSKY, who live in Leningrad, are part of the anti‐Soviet group and, being irreconcilable enemies of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet regime, carry on counter‐revolutionary work.

6)    In Poland there are his relatives ‐ white emigrants: brother Mikhail and brother‐in‐law PROKHOROV, both former officers of the tsarist army, with whom the brothers living in Leningrad kept in touch.

Head of the Secretariat of the NKVD USSR Art. Major of State Security SHAPIRO

[1]         On the first page there is a note: “ T. Yezhov. See my comments in the text. I. Stalin ʺ.

[2]         On the sheet there is Stalinʹs note: “ Arrest Bochkarev. Art. ʺ

[3]         There is a litter of Stalin: “ Where is Surin? ʺ

[4]         On the sheet there is Stalinʹs note : ʺ Biriga must be ar‐t

[5]         ʺ... Glavselmag and ...ʺ ‐ this is the source.

[6]         On the right margin there is Stalinʹs litter: ʺ Borisova ar‐t ʺ.

[7]         * ‐ * On the right margin there is Stalinʹs mark: ʺ Ar‐t both ʺ.

[8]         On the right margin there is Stalinʹs note: “ Where are they? ʺ

[9]         On the right margin there is Stalinʹs mark: ʺ Ar‐t ʺ.

[10]      On the right margin there is Stalinʹs note: “ Where are they? ʺ

[11]      On the right margin there is Stalinʹs note: ʺ Find out this case and inform me

[12]      On the right margin there is Stalinʹs note: “ Where is he? ʺ

[13]      ʺ... at meetings and ...ʺ ‐ so in the source.

[14]      On the right margin there is Stalinʹs note: “ Where is

Lisovsky? Arrest him! ʺ

[15]      On the right margin there is Stalinʹs litter: ʺ Arrest Sinyavsky

[16]      * ‐ * The surname is circled and there is a label of Stalin: ʺ Ar‐t ʺ.

[17]      ** ‐ ** The paragraph is underlined with two vertical lines and there is a note of Stalin: ʺWe ʹll have to all this bastard ar‐t ʺ.

[18]      ʺ... EREM ITS VA ...ʺ ‐ so in the source.