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   To Stalin Top Secret Summaries Of The most important testimonies Of Those arrested 1937‐ 1938

A summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR for April 13, 1938

Archive: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 408. L. 23‐44

April 16, 1938


I am sending you a summary of the most important testimonies of those arrested by the GUGB NKVD of the USSR for April 13, 1938.

Peopleʹs Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Peopleʹs Commissar for State Security (EZHOV)

Top secret

For the 4th DEPARTMENT

1. BANGA V.O. , B. colonel, b. deputy. early UPVO of Kazakhstan. Interrogated: ABAKUMOV, DENAU.

BANGA confessed that he was a member of a military conspiracy and a spy of the German‐Japanese intelligence services.

BANGA testified that he had served in the police for three and a half years, that he had never joined the party, and in 1917, according to a note from KNORIN, who was then the secretary of the Minsk district committee of the party, received a party card.

In 1918, after being occupied by German troops in the mountains Minsk, was recruited by the German police under the nickname ʺBruderʺ.

In 1923‐24. working as the head of the 14th border detachment in Timkovichi on the Polish border, through the Polish headman he transmitted information about the deployment, number, armament of border guard units and measures to protect the border for German intelligence.

In 1927, while working as the head of the border service department of the operational unit of the UPVO DVK, he established contact with Japanese intelligence, to which he transferred spy materials about state of the border guard of the DVK.

In 1931, he helped the Japanese to withdraw the Soviet boat, in 1932, during the accident of the Soviet steamer Stalingrad, he provoked a conflict between the Soviet and Japanese authorities.

BANGA further testified that in 1935 he was involved by GAEM in an anti‐Soviet military conspiracy.

The participants in the military conspiracy, according to BANG, were also: BARKAN ‐ the former deputy head of the Operations Department of the GUPVO, ZARIN ‐ the former head of the Organizational Department of the GUPVO, and ROTERMEL ‐ the head of the UPVO of Kazakhstan. In addition, from the words of ROTHERMEL, he knows that the participants in the anti‐Soviet military conspiracy are Kruchinkin and LEPIN.

The counter‐revolutionary activities of a group of conspirators in the NKVD troops were aimed at weakening the combat capability of the border guard units.

2.                   Korneev G.N., former head of the educational department of the KUKS NKVD. Interrogated: ABAKUMOV, DENAU.

KORNEEV admitted that he was a participant in an anti‐Soviet conspiracy in the NKVD troops, in which he was involved in 1935 by the former head of rifle training of the VPSh VELIKOV.

He called Kruchinkin and KORENKOV, the head of the school department of the GUPVO, a participant in the anti‐Soviet conspiracy.

The practical counterrevolutionary activities of the participants in the anti‐Soviet conspiracy were aimed at undermining the combat capability of the border and internal troops of the NKVD, deliberately delaying the retraining period for commanding personnel, reducing the quality of the contingent being released and curtailing research work.

3.                   DAKSHIN AN , former head of the military equipment department. Interrogated: ABAKUMOV, DENAU.

DAKSHIN confessed that he was a member of a counter‐revolutionary conspiratorial group in the NKVD troops, in which Kruchinkin was involved in 1935.

This group also included BARKAN, the former deputy head of the Operations Department of the GUPVO, KELLERMAN, the former head of the Marine Department, BUROV, the head of the 2nd department, and ZARIN, the former head of the 2nd department.

The groupʹs counter‐revolutionary activities were aimed at undermining the protection of the borders of the USSR.

DAKSHIN testified that he had repeatedly received from Kruchinkin sabotage installations to undermine the artillery supplies of the border and internal troops of the NKVD.

DAKSHIN also testified that he knew that Kruchinkin was organizationally connected with the leaders of the conspiracy, Egorov and Belov.

4. Desyatov A.S. , Former head of the combat training department of the GUVO. Interrogated: VLADZIMIRSKY, COOPER.

The tenth confessed that he was a member of an anti‐Soviet conspiratorial organization in the NKVD troops, to which he was recruited in 1935 by Kruchinkin.

In addition, since 1935, he has been an agent of German intelligence, being recruited by the head of the Naval Department of the Main Directorate of the Directorate of the Directorate of the Directorate of the Air Defense Forces G.G.

The organization set as its goal the overthrow of Soviet power and the restoration of capitalism. The organization carried out subversive sabotage activities aimed at reducing the combat readiness of the border and internal security of the NKVD.

In terms of anti‐Soviet activity, DESYATOV was associated with the members of the organization CRAFT ‐ assistant to the head of the GUPVO, DAKSHIN ‐ early. department of military equipment,


5. NI KORENKOV, former head of the school department of


KORENKOV confessed that he was a member of a conspiratorial antiSoviet organization aimed at overthrowing Soviet power and restoring capitalism on the basis of the establishment of a military‐fascist dictatorship. He was recruited into the organization in 1936 by the head of the command department of the GUPVO AUGUL, who, having compromising material against him, on behalf of Kruchinkin invited him to join the organization.

According to the testimony of KORENKOV, the following persons were included in the conspiratorial organization: Kruchinkin, Augul, Barkan ‐ the head of the Operations Department, KELLERMAN ‐ the head of the Marine Department, DESYATOV ‐ vrid. early combat training department, and REICHENSHTEIN ‐ early. branches of the Operations Department.

The main means of the anti‐Soviet work of the organization were the clogging of the command personnel of the NKVD troops with alien elements, a decrease in the quality of training of troops, and a weakening of their power.

6.                   BUROV , colonel, former head of the 2nd department of the GUPVO, former lieutenant of the tsarist army. Interrogated: ILYUSHIN, PAVLOVSKY.

He showed that he was a member of an anti‐Soviet conspiratorial organization in the NKVD troops, to which he was recruited in 1934 by Kruchinkin.

BUROV further testified that he knew from Kruchinkin that the organization was connected with Egorov and Belov and was preparing the arrest of members of the Politburo and the government and the opening of the borders at the time of the outbreak of the war.

Among the participants in the organization, BUROV named the employees of the GUPVO DAKSHINA, LEVIN, ZARIN, MATVEEV,


7.                   MILOV KN, the former chief of the mobile department of the GUPVO, a former major, served as an ensign in the tsarist army, in 1920 he served in the army of Kolchak. Interrogated: ILYUSHIN, PAVLOVSKY.

MILOV testified that in 1935 he was recruited by an employee of the General Staff of the Red Army BAMBULEVICH (arrested) to work in favor of the Polish intelligence, to which he passed on spy information about the GUPVO mob‐plans.

MILOV further testified that in 1936 he was recruited by Kruchinkin into the conspiratorial group of the GUPVO and, on his instructions, carried out sabotage in the development of mob plans for the NKVD troops.

8.                   SI            KONDRATYEV ,              former deputy commandant      of            the Kremlin. Interrogated: KOGAN, GERZON.

He showed that he was a member of an anti‐Soviet conspiracy, in which he was involved by YAGODA at the end of 1931. Subsequently, for anti‐Soviet activities, he was associated with Bulanov.

In 1932, BULANOV linked him with a participant in the anti‐Soviet conspiracy Kruchinkin.

Kondratyev further testified that he personally involved the following persons in the anti‐Soviet conspiracy: GOLKHOV BC ‐ the former head of the Political Department of the Special Purpose Division, GOZEN ‐ former. the commander of the cavalry regiment of the Special Purpose division, and MASLOVSKY ‐ a former Trotskyist, chief of staff of the division.

In 1936, as Kondratʹev shows, when he was appointed deputy commandant of the Kremlin, Bulanov informed him that the Kremlin commandant TKALUN, his deputy IMYANINNIKOV, Colonel VASILIEV and Major AZARKIN are participants in a military conspiracy, but they are connected with the conspirators from the RKKA headquarters, therefore IAGO his man so that at the moment when the question of the arrest of members of the government arises, he can act through him and not be dependent on the military


conspiratorial group from the headquarters of the Red Army. As a result of the measures taken by YAGODA, the entire security of the Kremlin was concentrated at the disposal of Kondratʹev.

For the 5th DEPARTMENT

1. SP URITSKY, former deputy commander of the Moscow Military District, former head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. Interrogated: AGAS.

URITSKY additionally named a number of spies and conspirators with whom he was associated during his work in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army.

At the end of 1935 or the beginning of 1936, URITSKY contacted an RU worker who worked in the trade mission in London as the head of the engineering department, brigadengineer WEINBERG, whom BERZIN reported to him as an English spy.

This connection was established on behalf of BELOV, who in the fall of 1935 suggested to URITSKY to ensure the possibility of transferring materials to the British. According to BELOV, the center of the Right had established ʺdefinite relationsʺ with some British government circles, had constant contact with them, but just in case it is necessary to have another line of communication.

Having contacted WEINBERG, URITSKY agreed with him that he would, as necessary, transfer materials to him for transfer to the British. WEINBERG told URITSKY that he was connected with British intelligence through one of the Vickers engineers.

Sometime after establishing contact with VEINBERG, BELOV, on behalf of the center of the Rights, gave URITSKY a number of materials to be handed over to the British.

Among these materials were photographs of the minutes of one of the plenary sessions of the Central Committee for 1935, information about the industry, mainly metalworking, information about the composition of the units of the Leningrad Military District.

In the summer of 1936, new material was sent to the British through WEINBERG by the URITSKY, also received from BELOV. These materials contained information on the composition of the Moscow Military District and data (summary of the Central Committee) on the results of the agricultural year.

In the winter of 1936, URITSKY, through a recruited RU worker, Colonel ZNAMENSKY, sent the third and last material to Weinberg for transfer to the British, also received from the center of the Right, through BELOV. This material contained the minutes of the two plenums of the Central Committee for 1936 and information about the aircraft industry of the USSR.

In the spring of 1937, WEINBERG was removed from his job in London by LOGANOVSKY, who had arrived there.

According to the testimony of URITSKY, WEINBERG, a former Trotskyist, was associated with a former employee of the Intelligence Directorate, the Trotskyist TOLOKONSKY, a former consul in New York, dismissed from RU in 1935.

In the winter of 1936, URITSKY organized a trip to Znamensky to France, England and America and instructed him to transfer the materials already mentioned to WEINBERG.

URITSKY recruited an officer of the RU seaman MARTINSON for espionage work, about whom, according to TYLTYN, he knew that he was involved in organizing the Latvians.

During 1936 and early 1937, MARTINSON, on the instructions of Uritskiy, prepared, and the latter handed over to the French the following materials: information about the USSR naval aviation, information about the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, a summary of information about the German front [1] .

According to the testimony of URITSKY, he recruited a former employee of the USSR military attaché in the United States, YAKIMYCHEV, to establish contact with the American military circles. When recruiting, URITSKY, according to YAKIMYCHEV, found out that the latter was a spy for American intelligence. URITSKY, through YAKIMYCHEV, transmitted to the Americans a number of spy information about the RKKF and the American fleet and aviation.

In the summer of 1936, Uritsky recruited one of the old employees of the Intelligence Directorate, Colonel IDELSON.

IDELBSON, on the instructions of Uritsky, repeatedly prepared various information for transmission to the French and was associated with FRADKIN and WOLFSON, giving them the necessary information for French intelligence.

2. TRIZNA DD, former head of the artillery department of the Red Army, division commander. Interrogated: MALYSHEV, BOLOTIN.

He confessed to his participation in an anti‐Soviet military‐fascist conspiracy and gave initial testimony that:

1)                   he was recruited into the conspiracy in 1934, while working in Leningrad, the head of the Artillery Academy, the former head of the RKKA artillery department ROGOVSKY (arrested);

2)                   ROGOVSKY told him that he was recruited into a military‐fascist conspiracy, the pomp of the artillery academy, divisional commissar GENIN (arrested) and the chief of staff of the Artillery Academy, brigade commander MOLODKOV (arrested);

3)                   TRIZNA recruited into a military conspiracy: the chief of the tactical cycle of the art academy brigade MIKHAILOV S.G. (arrested), Art. the teacher of tactics of the Art academy, brigade commander GOLUBINTSEVA E.M. (not arrested), head of the Art academy course, major BROVERMAN (not arrested), head of the mechanical technology department of the Art academy, military engineer 1st rank KOPYEV (not arrested), head of the art academy department, military engineer 1st rank SNITKO (arrested).

3. SEVEROV‐ODOEVSKY, former head of the foreign department of the Civil Air Fleet. Interrogated by ROGACHEV, YUKHIMOVICH.

The arrested SEVEROV‐ODOEVSKY, who had previously confessed to participation in the Socialist‐Revolutionary organization and espionage, additionally testified that in 1929, as deputy chairman of the Aviatrest, he was sent to Paris on official business. A member of the Central Committee of the Left SRs KOLEGAEV, with whom he had known earlier, having learned about his upcoming trip to Paris, instructed him to contact in Paris with the emigrant SR NIKOLAEV, a former active participant in the SR organization in Leningrad, giving him an appearance at one of the restaurants in Paris for st. Saint‐Michel (address to be confirmed) and password ʺYasha is healthyʺ.

SEVEROV‐ODOEVSKY, using this password, contacted Nikolayev in Paris, who told him that a detailed instruction letter had already been sent to KOLEGAEV. The content of this letter is unknown to ODOEVSKY.

Sometime later, upon returning from Paris, SEVEROV‐ODOEVSKY met with ALEXEEV, who was at that time the head of the Information Department of the OGPU, an active Socialist‐Revolutionary, who, in a conversation, let him know that he knew about his meeting with Nikolayev on behalf of KOLEGAEV, and recommended KOLEGAEV as a major political authority among the Social Revolutionaries, whose opinion ʺmust be listened to and reckoned with.ʺ

Not finding a basis for Odoevskyʹs work in Moscow, KOLEGAEV believed that Odoevsky, as a former Borotbist, needed to go to Ukraine, where the Borotbists and Socialist‐Revolutionaries, having united, strengthened not only in the Soviet, but also in the party apparatus to participate in the underground anti‐Soviet work to rally anti‐Soviet frames.

ODOEVSKY agreed, but could not get a transfer to Ukraine through the service line. In connection with the secondment of KOLEGAEV to Ukraine, ODOEVSKY lost contact with him, which he restored only in 1934, by chance meeting with KOLEGAEV in the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee. KOLEGAEV asked about the possibilities of his moving to Ukraine. ODOEVSKY answered him that he did not have such opportunities in the service line.

Sometime later, at the beginning of 1935, ODOEVSKY met with his former old acquaintance TARANYUK, the head of the Kiev Institute of Aeroflot, who told him that there was a large Social Revolutionary organization in Ukraine, which included a number of local Borotbist groups united by a single leadership, and that they have connections with the Socialist‐Revolutionary underground in Moscow, and asked him to assist in establishing this connection.

In March 1937, the Borotbist GONCHARENKO came to ODOEVSKY from TARANYUK, who asked him what he managed to do to establish contact with the Socialist‐Revolutionary underground in Moscow. Having received an unsatisfactory answer,

GONCHARENKO said that in this case he should go to Ukraine and get involved in underground work. ODOEVSKY, having agreed in principle, referred to the difficulty of carrying out the coup in the line of duty. GONCHARENKO advised him to write a letter to LEVCHENKO, which would be warned about him.

4. MIROSHNIKOV EI, former director of plant No. 21. Interrogated by:


He additionally showed that in order to worsen the maneuverability of the I‐16 M‐25 aircraft, at the suggestion of ALKSNIS and LONGVA, the RSN radio station was installed on the aircraft. LONGVA and ALKSNIS at a government meeting reported that the station was tested on state tests. When this station was mounted on an airplane, it turned out that it was completely inoperative. In addition, during figured flights, the antenna, breaking off, enveloped the rudders and tail, which led to disasters. Subsequently, this drawback was eliminated, but an unusable expensive station, which requires a lot of time for installation, is still being installed on I‐16 aircraft.

Upon the arrival of aircraft at the unit, the pilots, without risking flying with it, throw the radio installation out of the aircraft.

MIROSHNIKOV shows that ALKSNIS, BAZENKOV and BAZHANOV for a long time, despite the government decree on the lightening of the aircraft, in every possible way made it heavier under the guise of strengthening parts, assemblies, etc.

Instruments and equipment introduced to the fighter were also accepted by the Air Force without taking into account their weight.

5. LUBENSKY LI, former head of the department of offshore coastal construction of the Office of the Red Armyʹs naval forces. Interrogated:


The arrested LUBENSKY gave initial testimony that since 1925, as a student at the Military Engineering Academy, he was an active participant in the Trotskyist organization, which he hid until recently.

The former head of the Department of the ports of the UMS of the

RKKA ANKUDINOV (convicted) in 1935 was involved in an antiSoviet military conspiracy. According to his assignments and assignments, LUDRI (former deputy chief of the Red Army Naval Forces, convicted) LUBENSKY drew up a wrecking plan for sea construction, deliberately excluding from it the most important work on the reconstruction of old bases, overhaul of existing buildings and structures and the construction of warehouses for valuable equipment.

This construction plan LUBENSKY made on the basis of the wrecking dislocation, according to which it was planned:

1)   the basing of submarines in the Kaborga (Ochakov) area, which is clearly unsuitable for this purpose due to freezing conditions, remoteness from areas with sufficient depths, etc..;

2)   basing light forces in the bending of the sleeve of the river. Rion

(Poti), which causes an unnecessary expenditure of up to 40‐50 million rubles and creates a trap for the fleet in conditions of hostilities, especially during air raids;

3)   the basing of submarines in Vzenga (Northern Fleet), where the harbor is barely sufficient for anchorage of surface ships.

In addition, LUBENSKY did harm in drawing up projects for the construction of buildings for naval schools (the building for the training detachment of the communications school in Oranienbaum and the building of the naval school in Sevastopol).

6. BOLOTIN IM , former employee of the Intelligence Directorate of the

Red Army. Interrogated by: YAMNITSKII, KHANNIKOV.

He confessed that, while at work in the Intelligence Department of the Belarusian Military District, he was recruited by the Polish intelligence and spent all the years before his arrest in espionage work in favor of the Poles.

In his espionage activities, he was associated with ARONSTAM (former head of the BSSR PUOKR) who collaborated with the Polish intelligence service.

BOLOTIN named spies known to him who worked for Polish intelligence: RAPOPORT ‐ the former head of the OGPU PP in Minsk, Grodis ‐ the former deputy of the OGPU PP in Minsk, ANULOV ‐ an employee of the RKKA RU (to be established).

7. IV DAVYDOV, former head of the department of the RKKA Intelligence Directorate. Interrogated: PAVLOVSKY, GOLOVLEV.

DAVYDOV gave initial testimony that he has been a Japanese spy since 1932 and since 1935 a participant in a military‐fascist conspiracy.

For espionage work in favor of Japanese intelligence, DAVYDOV was recruited by a former member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Mongolian Peopleʹs Republic, Darizap (arrested) and chief of staff of the Mongolian Peopleʹs Republic SHEKO (arrested), on whose instructions he took part in drawing up a plan for the capture of Mongolia by Japan and sabotage work in the Mongolian Peopleʹs Army.

In 1933, to carry out espionage work, DAVYDOV from Mongolia was sent to Moscow, where he contacted DARIZAP, the latter supplied the latter with espionage materials on the Comrade Frunze Military Academy.

With the transfer of DAVYDOV to work in the Foreign Relations Department of the RKKA Intelligence Directorate by DARIZAP, he was transferred to contact the former deputy of the Foreign Relations Department, the Japanese spy PANYUKOV (arrested).

DAVYDOV, through PANYUKOV, passed on to Japanese intelligence spy information on the Foreign Relations Department about persons working abroad, lists of all Mongol students in military and civilian educational institutions, as well as lists of instructors in the Mongolian Peopleʹs Republic of Armenia.

In 1934, DAVYDOV was transferred to work in the 5th Department of the Intelligence Directorate of the RKKA for God (convicted) ‐ a participant in a military‐fascist conspiracy, who, through PANYUKOV, contacted DAVYDOV as a spy and recruited him into a military‐fascist conspiracy.

Davydov, together with GODOV, for a number of years actively carried out espionage and sabotage work in the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army.

For the 6th DEPARTMENT

1. KV TRETYAKOV, former head of the aviation department of the Central Council of Osoaviakhim, regimental commissar. Interrogated by: KARPEYSKY, DERGACHEV.

He confessed that in 1933 he was recruited by EIDEMAN into an antiSoviet military conspiracy. On the instructions of EIDEMAN TRETYAKOV, he placed the participants in the conspiracy on leading positions in the aviation of Osoaviakhim, disrupted the training of flight technical personnel.

TRETYAKOV was connected through anti‐Soviet work with the participants in the military conspiracy BELITSKY ‐ the former deputy chairman of the Central Council of Osoaviakhim (arrested), UVAROV ‐ the former head of the Aviation Directorate of Osoaviakhim (arrested), MARSKI ‐ the former chief of aviation of the Osoaviakhim of the Leningrad region (convicted) Moscow Regional Council Osoaviakhim (arrested), POLONSKY ‐ ex. Head of Aviation of the Osoaviakhim of the Gorky Territory, then the head of the flying club of the Kirovsky district of Moscow (not arrested), MINOV ‐ the head of the glider department of the Central Council of the Osoaviakhim of the USSR (not arrested), and VINOGRADOV ‐ formerly. head of the Moscow regional flight‐gliding school (established).

In 1933 and 1934. TRETYAKOV, on the instructions of EIDEMAN, transmitted information about the aviation of Osoaviakhim to the German intelligence agent MEERT, who was at that time in the USSR as a foreign correspondent. In 1936, on espionage work, TRETYAKOV contacted the director of the Gypsy theater in Leningrad, KURTS (established), through which he continued to transmit information about the state of aviation to German intelligence.

For the 7th DEPARTMENT

1. ALEXANDROV VL, professor, former head of TsAGI department for aerodynamics and propeller design. Interrogated by GRUZDEV, NIKOLAEV.

He confessed that since 1932 he was a member of the anti‐Soviet group of former officers of the Kolchak army who worked in various positions at TsAGI.

In addition to ALEXANDROV, this group also included:

1)  A.I. SIDOROV ‐ a former TsAGI engineer, repressed by the NKVD in 1925;

2)  PODSEKALOV HH ‐ former engineer of TsAGI;

3)  S.A. NOZDROVSKY ‐ former head of section of the 1st department of TsAGI;

4)  K. P. Sveshnikov ‐ a former engineer of the plant number 156, now works at the plant number 22.

In 1934, ALEXANDROV joined the anti‐Soviet sabotage organization that existed in TsAGI, headed by A.N. Tupolev. and KHARLAMOV N.M. (both arrested).

The participants of the anti‐Soviet sabotage organization in TsAGI, in addition to TUPOLEV and KHARLAMOV, ALEXANDROV indicated G.A. OZEROV, V.M. PETLYAKOV, E.I. POGOSSKOGO. (all arrested). Under   the leadership           and        instructions         of            TUPOLEV           and KHARLAMOV ALEXANDROV, the following acts of sabotage were carried out:

1)                   in 1934, in connection with the release of the powerful M‐34 engine for the TB‐3 and R‐6 aircraft by the plant No. 24, TsAGI was proposed to design new propellers for this engine.

ALEXANDROV, being the head of the propeller design department, gave factory # 28 (screw) such a design of propellers and hubs, in which the manufactured propellers, when installed on airplanes at factory # 22 (aircraft), gave cracks, and the hub was punctured. Despite the obvious defectiveness of the propellers, the former military inspector of the plant No. 22 GORELITS (later the director of the plant No. 125, now arrested), accepting them, sent aircraft with unusable propellers to military units.

As a result of this wrecking act in 1935, when checking in the military units of the TB‐3 aircraft, it turned out that out of 689 propellers, 131 propellers were completely unsuitable for flying and 383 propellers required major repairs. On R‐6 aircraft, out of 92 propellers, 18 propellers were completely unusable, and 61 propellers required repair.

2)                   In connection with the transition in 1933 of the entire aviation of the capitalist countries to the use of a metal propeller with a variable pitch in flight, TsAGI in 1935 it was proposed to remove the blueprints from the metal propellers with a variable pitch from Hamilton purchased in America.

ALEXANDROV took measures to slow down the use of these propellers in Soviet aviation.

For this, when making a copy of the purchased Hamilton propellers, ALEXANDROV introduced a number of sabotage changes into their design, and the VISH‐1 propeller manufactured according to these drawings at the plant No. 28 was rejected. It took additional time to make the blueprints for a benign metal screw called ʺVISH‐2ʺ, and the equipment of military aircraft with metal screws was delayed.

In 1936, the government decided to buy technical assistance in America for the Gamalton screw. ALEXANDROV, who left for America for this purpose, together with KHARLAMOV, foreseeing that the purchase of American technical assistance would significantly accelerate the introduction of the Galminton propeller into mass production and supply of military aviation, thwarted the purchase of technical assistance for this propeller in America.

As a result of this wrecking act, plant No. 28 was forced to manufacture screws in a handicraft way and thwarted the government‐approved program for 1937, producing only 1036 screws instead of 6500 screws.

The consequence of this was that variable pitch propellers were installed only on SB and KhAI‐5 aircraft, while the installation of propellers on I‐15, I‐16, DB‐3, DBA and MBR‐2 aircraft was disrupted.

3) In addition, sabotage work was carried out in the research part, in particular, the submission of work on the design of propellers and a vibrating blade was delayed, work was deliberately not carried out on testing propeller models in a wind tunnel, which caused harm in the selection of the necessary propeller designs for newly designed aircraft.

2. BABUSHKIN NV, former secretary of the party committee of the All‐

Union        Communist        Party       (Bolsheviks)       of       the       Central

Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI). Interrogated by: KUZNETSOV, KONDAKOV.

He testified that since 1933 he had been a member of the Pravotrotskyist organization, having established contact with it through the former secretary of the Bauman district committee of the CPSU (b) MARGOLIN (arrested).

In the summer of 1933, Babushkin, but at the suggestion of MARGOLIN, was appointed as the secretary of the party committee of the CPSU (b) in TsAGI. Upon entering TsAGI, BABUSHKIN, at the direction of MARGOLIN, established an organizational relationship with the leaders of the anti‐Soviet organization that existed in TsAGI, KHARLAMOV and TUPOLEV, to jointly carry out sabotage and subversive work in the field of aircraft construction.

BABUSHKIN, as a member of an anti‐Soviet organization, was entrusted with the duty to deploy sabotage personnel in the most important areas of TsAGIʹs work and to mask their subversive work.

Of the members of the anti‐Soviet organization in TsAGI, BABUSHKIN indicated:

1)     N.M. KHARLAMOVA ‐ the former head of TsAGI (arrested);

2)     A. I. TUPOLEV ‐ Former chief designer of TsAGI (arrested);

3)     A.I. Nekrasova ‐ Former deputy head of TsAGI (arrested);

4)     V.M. PETLYAKOVA ‐ former deputy chief designer (arrested);

5)     AA ARKHANGELSKY ‐ former deputy chief designer;

6)     Sokolova A.N. ‐ the former head of the EGO (arrested);

7)     A.A. OSIPOVA ‐ the former director of the ZOK (arrested);

8)     STOKLITSKY ‐ former assistant to the chief designer;

9)     IZAKSONA A.M. ‐ the former head of the special design bureau (arrested);

10)  N. DEDKOVA ‐ Former Deputy Secretary of the TsAGI Party Committee;

11)  FURMANOVA E.M. ‐ Former party organizer of the design department (arrested);

12)  DUSHINA ‐ secretary of the party committee of TsAGI;

13)  I. P. SHAFOROSTOVA ‐ Former secretary of the Ramenskoye construction party committee.

Of these persons, DEDKOV, FURMANOV and DUSHIN personally involved BABUSHKIN in the anti‐Soviet organization.

As a member of an anti‐Soviet organization, BABUSHKIN, together with KHARLAMOV and TUPOLEV, placed members of the anti‐Soviet organization in the most important areas of TsAGIʹs work, slowed down the erection of young workers, eliminating them from experimental and research work, and suppressed criticism of the party activists for sabotage work carried out at TsAGI by members of the antiSoviet organization.

At the end of 1936, in connection with his appointment as a party organizer of the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at plant No. 24, BABUSHKIN, on the instructions of KHARLAMOV and MARGOLIN, established contact with the head of the Pravotrotskyist organization that carried out subversive work at this plant, the director of the plant, KE MARYAMOV. (arrested), together with whom he carried out sabotage activities at Plant No. 24 to disrupt the production of aircraft engines for the Red Army Air Force.

3. GALPERIN DI, former deputy chief engineer of the 11th Main Directorate           of            the          NKOP. Interrogated by:          KVASSOV, BELOGORODSKY.

He confessed that since 1934 he was a member of an anti‐Soviet organization in the military chemical industry and carried out sabotage work to disrupt the production of explosives at military powder factories.

For sabotage work, GALPERIN established contacts with the chief engineer of the Glavkhimprom KAZINITSKY and the chairman of the All‐Union Military Chemical Trust D.Ya. (both arrested).

In 1935, for sabotage purposes, GALPERIN was appointed by KOTOM as the technical director of the largest gunpowder plant No. 204 in Tambov with a special task to destroy and disrupt the work of the plant.

As a result of GALPERINʹs sabotage work at the plant No. 204, the technological process of the production of gunpowder was upset, the plant systematically did not fulfill the program and produced gunpowder with low ballistic properties.

In the same way, GALPERIN upset the production of pyroxylin.

In addition to sabotage aimed at disrupting the program and releasing poor‐quality gunpowder and pyroxylin by Plant No. 204, GALPERIN, at the direction of KOTA, thwarted the construction of new production buildings at Plant No. 204 by means of capitalization deliberately directed at the construction of secondary facilities. As a result of this sabotage, plant No. 204 was not provided with a mine dryer, sludge, pumping facilities. The most important acid workshops for production remained unreconstructed, and this deprived the plant of its own acid base, which further exacerbated the catastrophic situation of the plant and finally undermined its production capabilities.

For the 8th DEPARTMENT

1. KNOTS L.M., former head of the Intourist construction department, German, expelled from the CPSU (b). Interrogated by: DEGTYAREV, SHCHERBAKOV.

He testified that in March 1935 he was recruited by the former. Chairman of the Board of ʺIntouristʺ KURTSEM in the German fascist organization.

According to the testimony of KNOTS, this organization was connected with the fascist center of Germany and received directives from GEBBELS to create a spy network of sabotage and terrorist groups on the territory of the USSR for wartime.

KNOTS was a member of the fascist‐espionage group ʺIntouristʺ and, on the instructions of KURTSA, carried out sabotage on the construction of a new hotel ʺIntouristʺ.

The KNOC named 7 people as members of the fascist organization, 6 of whom were arrested.

Head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR, senior major of state security (SHAPIRO)