Stalin to Molotov

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Letter 55
[Earlier than 20 April 1930] 1
We must reckon with Com. Bauman's categorical statement that he is not an advocate for any special line in our party, although he is the one who tolerated appeasement of the "leftist" deviationists.
Is that passage from my concluding speech suitable for the Moscow Party Committee?
Perhaps it should be said more forcefully that Bauman doesn't have a special line?

[V. Molotov]

Of course, it has to be said more bluntly that he doesn't have any special line, that he himself is not a "leftist" deviationist, but there are (or have been) only some examples of appeasement of "leftist" deviationists.2

[J. Stalin]

1. A note from Molotov (most likely written at one of the Politburomeetings) and Stalin's reply on the back of the note.
2. On 18 April 1930, the Politburo polled its members regardingthe statement by the Moscow Regional Party Committee secretary,
K. Bauman, in which he admitted the mistakes made by the Moscow Committee during collectivization and asked to be relieved from the post of secretary of the Moscow Committee. The Politburo noted that Bauman had "in practice displayed appeasement toward 'leftist' deviationists" and resolved (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 783, ll. 12, 13):
1) To satisfy the request of Com. Bauman regarding his release from the duties of secretary of the Moscow Regional organization. 2) To transfer Com. Bauman to work at the Central Committee in the capacity of a secretary. 3) To recommend that Com. Kaganovich take the post of first secretary of the Moscow Regional organization while maintaining his position as Central Committee secretary.
On 20 April 1930, the Politburo assigned Molotov to report to the plenum of the Moscow and Moscow Regional party committees on this resolution (ibid., l. 14).
On 22 April 1930, the joint plenum of the Moscow and Moscow Regional party committees "satisfied [Bauman's] request."
Letter 56
[2 August 1930]
You have probably already received the new testimonies of
Groman, Kondratiev, and Makarov. Yagoda brought them to show me. I think that all these testimonies plus Groman's first testimony should be sent to all members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission and also the most active of our economic managers. 1 These are documents of primary importance.


1. On 10 August 1930, the Politburo resolved to distribute the testimonies of the persons arrested in the Toiling Peasants' Party case to members and candidate members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission and to high-level economic managers (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 792, l. 11).
Letter 57
[No earlier than 6 August 1930]
Received your letter of 8/6.
1) I'm against transferring Mirzoian to the Profintern [Trade UnionInternational] because I have always been against and will continue to be against looting provinces, especially a province like the Urals, which is growing by leaps and bounds and is in need of officials.2
2) The results of the battle against the coin shortage are almostnonexistent. 280,000 rubles is nonsense. They probably clamped down on a few cashiers and let it go at that. But it's not only a question of cashiers. It's a question of Piatakov, Briukhanov, and their entourage. Both Piatakov and Briukhanov were for importing silver. Both Piatakov and Briukhanov preached the need to import silver and pushed a resolution to that effect through the conference of the deputies (or the Labor Defense Council)a resolution we rejected at Monday's meeting, after branding them "blind followers" [khvostiki] of the financial wreckers. Now it's obvious even to the blind that Yurovskii directed Finance's measures (and not Briukhanov) and that wrecker elements from the Gosbank bureaucracy (and not Piatakov) directed the Gosbank "policy," as inspired by the "government" of Kondratiev-Groman. It is thus important to a) fundamentally purge the Finance and Gosbank bureaucracy, despite the wails of dubious Communists like Briukhanov-Piatakov; b) definitely shoot two or three dozen wreckers from these apparaty, including several dozen common cashiers; c) continue OGPU operations throughout the USSR that are aimed at seizing small change (silver).
3) I think that the investigation into the Kondratiev-GromanSadyrin affair must be continuedvery thoroughly and without haste. This is a very important matter. All documents concerning this case should be sent to members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. I don't doubt that a direct connection will be discovered (through Sokolnikov and Teodorovich) between these gentlemen and the rightists (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomskii). Kondratiev, Groman, and a few other scoundrels must definitely be shot.
4) A whole group of wreckers in the meat industry must definitelybe shot and their names published in the press.
5) Is it true that you have decided to issue nickel coins right now?If that's true, it's a mistake. You should wait with that. 3
6) Is it true that we imported shoes from England (for severalmillion rubles)? If that's true, it's a mistake.
7) It's good that the United States has permitted the importation ofour timber.4 Our patience bore fruit. Wait on Bogdanov for the time being.5
8) The treaty with Italy6 is a plus. Germany will follow suit. By the way, how are things with the German credits?7
9) Force the export of grain to the maximum. If we can exportgrain, the credits will come.
10) Pay attention to the Stalingrad and Leningrad tractor factories.
Things are bad there.8
Well, regards,
1. In the upper left-hand corner, Molotov has noted: "1930=?"
2. On 21 August 1930, the Politburo confirmed Mirzoian as thirdsecretary of the Ural Regional Committee (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 793, l. 17).
3. On 20 August 1930, the Politburo rejected the proposal from thePolitburo commission headed by Rudzutak on minting nickel coins
(ibid., l. 12).
4. In 1930, the United States imposed barriers against Sovietexports of matches, timber, anthracite, manganese ore, and asbestos. On 25 July 1930, the U.S. Department of Commerce declared an embargo on the import of timber from the USSR. On 28 July, two ships carrying timber from the USSR were refused permission to unload. Following protests from the Soviet government and from a number of American companies, the Department of Commerce withdrew the embargo. But Soviet goods continued to be boycotted in the United States and other countries. The reasons for the embargoes and boycotts were allegations that the Soviets employed slave labor (in labor camps for the timber and mining industries) and dumped these products on the world market at below cost.
5. P. A. Bogdanov was director of Amtorg (American TradingCorporation) from 1930 to 1934. On 30 July 1930, the Politburo reviewed Bogdanov's statements. The decision was sent to the Special File (ibid., d. 791, l. 10). On 20 August 1930, the Politburo passed a resolution, "On Amtorg," noting that the Worker-Peasant Inspection had discovered substantial overpayments for oil and other products from America, and prescribed measures for "eliminating the shortcomings indicated" (ibid., d. 793, ll. 11, 32, 33).
6. The agreement between the governments of the USSR and Italyon the discount purchase of Italian products on a "most favored" basis was signed on 2 August 1930 (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR [Documents of USSR foreign policy], vol. 13 [Moscow, 1967], 43941).
7. Talks on Germany's granting of credits to the USSR culminatedin the signing, on 14 April 1931, of an agreement between the Supreme Economic Council and German industrial representatives that granted the Soviet Union substantial credits for the purpose of making large purchases from Germany (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 14 [Moscow, 1968], 24648).
8. On 25 August 1930, the Politburo discussed the question oftractor manufacture at the Stalingrad and Putilov factories. The resolution emphasized the need to fulfill the 19301931 manufacturing goals set for the factories. A commission that included Rykov, Kuibyshev, Osinskii, and others was formed to discuss the practical measures needed to fulfill this resolution (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 793, l. 3).

Page 202
Letter 58
[13 August 1930]
1) Doesn't it seem more than odd to you that the Siberians keptmum and didn't demand Eikhe's removal when the Siberian Regional Committee embraced both halves of Siberia, but now that
Siberia has been divided into two sections and the Siberian
Committee's sphere of activity has been halved (that is, the Siberian Committee's job has been made easier), 1 Eikhe suddenly turns out to be "unable to cope" with his assignments? I have no doubt that this is a crudely masked attempt to deceive the Central Committee and create "their own" artel-like regional committee based on mutual protection. I advise you to kick out all the intriguers and, above all, Klimenko (the Ukrainian "methods" of plotting!), along with all the Bazovskiis, Liaksutkins, Kuznetsovs, and so on and put full trust in Eikhe, in order to teach those intriguers never again to slander honest officials and deceive the Central Committee.2
2) The Central Committee's resolution on Azerbaidzhan should bepublished in full (in Pravda). Those clever ones from the Caucasus so twisted things in their own resolution (it has already been published) that Gikalo comes out looking like the main culprit (since he's at the head of the list of those recalled), and the [real] main culprits (Amas et al.) come out looking like secondary culprits, practically disciples of Gikalo. In order to smash this cleverness (this swindle), the Central Committee resolution must be published.3
3) The Politburo did absolutely the right thing in separatingMaykop from Groznyi.4 That's all for now.

J. Stalin
P.S. I'm getting better bit by bit.

1. In July 1930, changes were made in the administrative andterritorial partitioning of Siberia. The Eastern Siberian Region was separated from the Siberian and Far Eastern regions.
2. In late July 1930, Kuznetsov, Bazovskii, Yeger, Klimenko,members of the Western Siberian Regional Party Committee; Liaksutkin, chairman of the Regional Control Commission; and others sent Stalin a letter criticizing the work of Eikhe, first secretary of the Siberian Regional Committee, and calling for his immediate replacement (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 793, ll. 2123).
On 19 August 1930, this statement was discussed at the Politburo.
For "unprincipled cliquishness and unparty-like behavior"
Klimenko, Kuznetsov, Bazovskii, and Yeger were reprimanded and dismissed from office (ibid., l. 7).
3. The internal party situation in Azerbaidzhan was reviewed atPolitburo sessions on 20 July and 3 August 1930. The decree passed stated in part (ibid., d. 790, l. 8, and d. 791, ll. 23, 24):
Gossip, unprincipled cliquishness, intrigue, and counterintrigue have spread among the chief party activists, demoralizing the rank and file of the organization and disrupting the positive work of the party-Soviet and economic-cooperative bodies. . . .
Although Com. Gikalo launched a large and energetic campaign to correct . . . those shortcomings, he was not able to sufficiently rally the basic mass of the party activists for further successful development of the work of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party (largely because he was prevented from doing so by the abovementioned cliques).
Gikalo, Bagirov, Amas, and others were recalled from work in Azerbaidzhan.
4. On 10 August 1930, the Politburo received a report on the fire in Maykop. The resolution passed noted that in view of the absence of elementary vigilance in the matter of protecting industries in Maykop it was necessary to "punish the guilty most severely." Since in the Politburo's view, Grozneft did not devote sufficient attention to Maykop's industries, they were removed and grouped in an independent organization (ibid., d. 792, l. 7 [Grozneft is the Russian acronym for the state organization that ran the Groznyi oil industry. Groznyi is the capital of what is now the Chechnia Republic of the Russian Federation, formerly the ChechenIngushetian Autonomous Republic of the RSFSRTrans.]). On 10
September 1930, the Politburo accepted proposals from the Worker-Peasant Inspection and the Central Control Commission to institute legal and party proceedings against Grozneft manager Ganshin and other officials (ibid., d. 796, ll. 10, 38, 39).

Letter 59
[No earlier than 23 August 1930]
Viacheslav, 1
The total for ten months is only 26 percent growth in state industry
(instead of 32 percent). This is a worrisome total. You speak of the counterplan for industry and finance and the Central Committee manifesto.2 I think we should be prepared to do anything to get that 3032 percent growth. I'm afraid it's late to be speaking about this nowno major changes can be introduced before October (the end of the year) in any event. But perhaps we could try? Let's give it a shotwe really ought to try.
2) We have one and a half months left to export grain: starting inlate October (perhaps even earlier), American grain will come on to the market in massive quantities, and we won't be able to withstand that. If we don't export 130150 million poods of grain in these six weeks, our hard currency situation could become really desperate. Once again: We must force through grain exports with all our might.
3) Sukhanov, Bazarov, and Ramzin must definitely be arrested.Sukhanov's wife should be probed (she's a Communist!): she couldn't help but know about the outrages going on at their house. All testimonies without exception (both the basic and the supplementary) must be distributed to Central Committee members.3 There can be no doubt that Kalinin has sinned. Everything reported about Kalinin in the testimonies is the absolute truth. The Central Committee must definitely be informed about this in order to teach Kalinin never to get mixed up with such rascals again.4
4) Received Osinskii's letter about the Automobile and AutomotiveScientific Research Institute. Osinskii's wrong. I stand by my opinion. Klim [Voroshilov] will tell you about my reasons. Just like Osinskii's impudence.5

5) Am sending a clipping on the Mariupol Iron and Steel Factory. 6
This is the fourth of those provocateurs' escapades at that damned Metallurgical Institute. Can't the guilty parties be punished as an object lesson?
(It's Pravda, 23 August 1930) Well, that's all for now.

J. Stalin

1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "8/1930."
2. The passing of the counterplan was organized in the fall of 1930. The Central Committee's appeal "On the Third Year of the FiveYear Plan" was published on 3 September 1930. This appeal called for using "storm" methods in an effort to complete the largely unfulfilled plan.
3. On 6 September 1930, the Central Committee passed aresolution to distribute the additional testimonies of Kondratiev, Groman, Sukhanov, and others (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 795, l. 6). See also the earlier decision to distribute testimonies mentioned in note 1 to letter 56.
4. While under arrest, Kondratiev testified that Kalinin was one ofhis sources of information about the political situation and internal party affairs.
5. The dispute between Osinskii, Supreme Economic Councildeputy chairman, on the one hand, and Stalin and Voroshilov, on the other hand, arose in connection with the transfer of the aviation industry from the Supreme Economic Council to the Commissariat of War. On 20 August 1930 the Politburo charged Kuibyshev, chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, with "ensuring that the Automobile and Automotive Institute fully satisfies the needs of the military regarding the manufacture of airplane motors" (ibid., d. 793, l. 8.)
6. On 23 August 1930, Pravda carried a brief notice that the board of the State Institute for the Design of Metallurgical Factories had reviewed a proposal for a new factory in Mariupol. It was to be the largest metallurgical factory in the USSR and was expected to produce 816,000 tons of iron and 1,100,000 tons of steel.

Letter 60
[24 August 1930]
1) It's very good that you have taken Gosbank and its "director"1 under special supervision. This very important matter should have been taken care of long ago. Kaktyn and Karklin have apparently not brought anything new to Gosbank. As for Piatakov, all indications are that he has remained the same as always, that is, a poor commissar alongside a specialist (or specialists) who are no better. He is a hostage to his bureaucracy. You really get to know people in practice, in daily work, in "trivial" matters. And here, in the practical matters of financial (and credit!) management, Piatakov has shown his true colors as a poor commissar alongside poor specialists. And I have to tell you that this type of Communist economic manager is the most harmful for us at this time.

Conclusion: he must be removed. Someone else (from the WorkerPeasant Inspection or OGPU) must be put in his place. We'll talk about it in October. 2
2) Mikoian reports that grain procurements are growing, and eachday we are shipping 1 to 1.5 million poods of grain. I think that's not enough. The quota for daily shipments (now) should be raised to 34 million poods at a minimum. Otherwise we risk being left without our new iron and steel and machine-building factories (Avtozavod, Cheliabzavod, etc.). Some clever people will come along and propose holding off on the shipments until the price of grain on the world market rises ''to its ceiling." There are quite a few of these clever people in Trade. They ought to be horsewhipped, because they're dragging us into a trap. In order to hold off, we must have hard currency reserves. But we don't have them. In order to hold off, we would have to have a secure position on the international grain exchange. And we haven't had any position at all for a long time therewe'll only obtain it now if we can exploit conditions that have arisen at the present moment and are particularly favorable to us.
In short, we must push grain exports furiously.
3) Mikoian requests that Riabovol be appointed head of Neftexport[Central Oil Export Agency].3 Lomov won't let him because he's already appointed Riabovol head of the production department of the oil syndicate. I think that in this case Lomov is more concerned about ensuring his own convenience inside the syndicate (the oil association) than about pushing exports. It would be better to put Riabovol in charge of the Oil Export Agency. The Oil Export Agency is sick, it has to be cured; the current directors of the Oil Export Agency have failed.4
4) We should replace Tumanov, who has completely rotted away.Does the Central Committee really hope to reform him in a French setting?5
5) How are things with the Chinese?
6) How is "Lena Goldfields"?6
I'm a little under the weather (strep throat!), but it'll pass soon.
Oh, I almost forgot. We keep forgetting about a certain "trivial matter," that is, that Trade is now one of the most important commissariats (and one of the most complicated, if not the most complicated of all). And what do we find? At the head of this commissariat is a person who is not coping with a job that, in general, is difficult, if not impossible, for one person to handle. Either we must remove Mikoian, which shouldn't be assumed, or we should prop him up with outstanding deputies which, I think, won't meet with any objection. That would all seem to be correct. The only question is: Why don't we immediately go from word to deed? Why? What are we waiting for? Why shouldn't we give Rozengolts to Mikoian (where else are we going to get outstanding people if not from the Worker-Peasant Inspection?) instead of Khinchuk, who has been an utter failure at running foreign trade? What more evidence is needed of Khinchuk's failure? Do people pity Khinchuk? But the cause should be pitied even more. Do they not want to offend Sergo? But what about the causecan such an important and serious matter be offended?
I propose (formally):
1) to appoint Com. Rozengolts deputy of trade (for foreign trade) and to release him from his position at the Worker-Peasant Inspection.
2) to relieve Khinchuk from his position as deputy of trade andappoint him either as Ukhanov's assistant for the Moscow Soviet or as chairman of Grain Export.
If Sergo yells, give him Klimenko from Siberia in exchange. Rozengolts should be transferred to Trade no matter what. Trade has to be cured. It would be a crime to wait any longer. 7
J. Stalin
1. At the 16 August 1930 session of the Council of Commissars, adecree was passed on reports from the Worker-Peasant Inspection and Gosbank on the credit reform. On 30 August 1930, the Politburo approved this decree and noted that Gosbank's implementation of the credit reform had been unsatisfactory (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 794, l. 5).
2. On the reorganization of Gosbank, see note 2 for document 63.
3. Soiuzneftexport, the Russian acronym for All-Union Associationfor the Export of Oil and Oil Products, also called Exportneft by StalinTrans.
4. On 18 January 1931, the Orgburo appointed Riabovol deputychairman of the board of Soiuzneft. On 20 January 1931, the Politburo reviewed the issue of the management of oil export and resolved "to remove the export of oil from the jurisdiction of
Soiuzneft and to transfer oil exports to the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade" (ibid., d. 811, l. 8). On 25 January 1931, Riabovol was appointed director of oil export (ibid., l. 3).
5. On 25 November 1930, the Politburo discussed Tumanov'srequest to be relieved of his duties as Soviet trade representative in France. Tumanov was removed from this position but remained at the disposal of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade (ibid., d. 805, l. 3).
6. Lena Goldfields was a British stock company that signed aconcession agreement in 1925 with the Soviet government to mine and refine gold, copper, iron, and mixed metals in a number of regions in Siberia, the Urals, and the Altai Mountains. In early 1930, Lena Goldfields filed a suit against the Soviet government in arbitration court. After negotiations to settle the accounts, an agreement was signed in 1934 resolving mutual claims. The Lena Goldfields matter was decided by a polling of Politburo members on 6 September 1930. The resolution was sent to the Special File (ibid., d. 795, l. 6).
7. On 10 September 1930, Rozengolts was appointed deputycommissar of trade. In the same resolution, Khinchuk was made chairman of Exportkhleb while retaining his post at Trade (ibid., d. 796, l. 9). On 15 September 1930, however, the Politburo changed its mind and appointed Khinchuk ambassador to Berlin (ibid., l. 4). On 15 November 1930, the Politburo discussed the reorganization of the Commissariat of Trade. It was divided into two independent commissariats: Commissariat of Provisionment and Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Rozengolts was appointed commissar of foreign trade and Mikoian was appointed commissar of provisionment
(ibid., d. 804, l. 6).

Letter 61
[Late AugustEarly September 1930]
Viacheslav, 1
Received your latest letter.
1) I am completely in favor of moving up the collective agreementsfrom January to October. There should be no delay! And for this we certainly don't need a Central Committee plenum.2
2) I'm against moving the Central Committee plenum to earlyOctober. In order to move the plenum to early October, we should have the target figures ready (no later than) mid-September. Obviously the target figures won't be ready in time. In addition, the plenum and its new decrees aren't the pointwe've made a hellish number of decrees already. The new "appeals" and "proclamations" are even less the point: each issue of Pravda is an "appeal" or "proclamation.'' What's important now is to have a thorough and continuous monitoring, checking up on fulfillment. Until checking up on fulfillment is in order, our economic and trade union bodies, and consequently the fulfillment of plans, will be unsatisfactory. I think the most that can be done in terms of accelerating the plenum is to move it to late October, and only if government agencies will have the target figures fully in hand in early October.
3) You seem very unconcerned about the statute for settlementassociations and the accompanying agitation in the press.3 Keep in mind that this illomened statute was offered to us as the new word, which claims to be setting itself up against the "old" word, i.e., the statute for the agricultural artel [basic form of a collective farm]. And the whole point of the settlement (new) statute is the desire to give the individual the possibility of "improving his (individual) farm." What kind of nonsense is this? Here we have the collective farm movement advancing in a growing wave, and then the clever ones from the Commissariat of Agriculture and from the agricultural cooperative societies want to evade the question of collective farms and busy themselves with "improving" the individual peasant farm! It seems to me that the rightists have achieved some sort of revenge here, sneaking in this statute on settlement associations, because people in the Central Committee, since they're overburdened with work, haven't noticed the little trick.
4) Regarding the plenum's agenda, I already stated my opinion bycoded telegram. I think it could be beneficial only if the Central
Committee plenums were to move away from general decrees on general issues and hear reportsreal reportsfrom the economic commissariats that are doing badly. At present, provisions for workers are one of the most urgent questions. Consequently, the plenum cannot disregard this question. The consumer cooperatives must be turned upside down and bureaucratism shaken out of them. The meat supply must be checked and the relevant economic organizations must be improved. Hence my agenda proposal.4

5) It is best to appoint Khinchuk to Berlin. He is an economicadministrator and will be more suited there than Surits, who isn't well versed in economic problems. Turkey is an important area for us. They like him there very much. I think it would be a mistake to remove him from that position. People from Grain Export will be found (Fridrikhson, Zalmanov, current deputies at Grain Export). 5 Khlebexport will do all right if only there is grain.
6) I propose [M. M.] Kaganovich from the Worker-PeasantInspection6 as the candidate for head of civil aviation.
7) What about Rozengolts's appointment?
That's it for now.

J. Stalin

P.S. I am getting back on my feet bit by bit.
1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "9/1930=?"
2. On 10 September 1930, the Politburo decreed that the newcollective agreements to take effect on 1 October should be closely coordinated with the fulfillment of economic plans (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 796, l. 9).
3. The regulations on the settlement associations were published inthe press on 30 August 1930.
4. Four issues were placed on the Central Committee plenum for1721 December 1930: the national economic plan for 1931; the summary report of the Commissariat of Provisionment, along with a report from the Worker-Peasant Inspection on meat and vegetable supplies; the summary report from the Central Union of Consumer Organizations on the work of the consumers' cooperative associations, accompanied by a supplementary report by the Worker-Peasant Inspection; and new elections to the soviets.
5. The appointment of Surits as ambassador to Germany wasconfirmed on 10 September 1930 (ibid., l. 9). On this appointment controversy, see also note 7 to letter 60.
6. On 15 October 1930, A. Z. Goltsman was confirmed by thePolitburo as head of the Civil Aviation Association (ibid., d. 800, l. 7).
Letter 62
[1 September 1930]
Pay attention (for the time being) to two things:
1) The Poles are certain to be putting together (if they have notalready done so) a bloc of Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Finland) in anticipation of a war against the USSR. I think they won't go to war with the USSR until they have created this bloc. This means that they will go to war as soon as they have secured the bloc (they'll find an excuse). To repulse both the Polish-Romanians and the Balts we should prepare to deploy (in the event of war) no fewer than 150 to 160 infantry divisions, that is, (at least) 40 to 50 divisions more than are provided for under our current guidelines. This means that we'll have to bring our current army reserves up from 640,000 to 700,000 men. Without this "reform," it won't be possible to guarantee the defense of Leningrad and right-bank Ukraine 1 (in the event of a Polish-Baltic bloc). In my opinion, this is beyond doubt. And conversely, by this "reform" we would ensure the victorious defense of the USSR. But this "reform'' will require considerable amounts of funds (a great quantity of ammunition, a great deal of hardware, and a surplus of officers, additional expenditures on uniforms and rations). Where can we find the money? I think vodka production should be expanded (to the extent possible). We need to get rid of a false sense of shame and directly and openly promote the greatest expansion of vodka production possible for the sake of a real and serious defense of our country. Consequently, this matter has to be taken into account immediately. The relevant raw material for vodka production should be formally included in the national budget for 19301931. Keep in mind that a serious upgrade of civil aviation will also require a lot of money, and for that purpose we'll have to resort again to vodka.2
2) We have a tremendous need for road-building machingery, equipment for bread factories, and laundries. The manufacture of these machines is a simple and quite manageable job for our plants. No one ever gives it serious attention (thinking it "trivial"), and therefore we are forced to spend hard currency. Ukhanov takes this matter seriously, but the Supreme Economic Council gives him no opportunity to do anythingit's like a dog in the manger, not doing anything itself but not letting others do anything either. We must put an end to this muddle. We must address this issue at the Central Committee and make it incumbent upon Ukhanov (Moscow Soviet) to become involved immediately in the manufacture of equipment for large-scale mechanized bakeries and laundries (and road-building machines as well). Some financial backing will have to be provided. But we must make up our minds to do it if we want to get this matter moving.3

J. Stalin
P.S. I just received the Central Committee's "Appeal" concerning the industrial-financial plan and the Central Committee's "decree" on the practical means of implementing the "Appeal." It turned out better than I would have expected. Very good.4
J. Stalin

1. "Right-bank Ukraine" refers to that part of Ukraine that lies westof the Dnepr RiverU.S. Ed.
2. On 2 July 1930, the Commissariat of Finance proposed a priceincrease for vodka. The Politburo rejected it (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 788, l. 5). On 15 September 1930, the Politburo reviewed the matter of increasing vodka production. The decision was sent to the Special File (ibid., d. 796, l. 7).
3. On 25 September 1930, the Central Committee established acommittee consisting of Kuibyshev, Ukhanov, and others to address all of these issues (ibid., d. 798, l. 5). Stalin's proposals were taken into consideration in the Politburo resolution "On the construction of road machinery" of 15 October 1930 (ibid., d. 800, ll. 3, 2022).
4. On the Central Committee's appeal, see note 2 to letter 59.

Letter 63
[2 September 1930]
1) I agree to Tomskii's "resignation": he is doing nothing for us inthe chemical industry. 1
2) An explanation of Kondratiev's "case" in the press would beappropriate only in the event that we intend to put this "case" on trial. Are we ready for this? Do we consider it necessary to take this "case'' to trial? Perhaps it will be difficult to dispense with a trial.
By the way, how about Messrs. Defendants admitting their mistakes and disgracing themselves politically, while simultaneously acknowledging the strength of the Soviet government and the correctness of the method of collectivization? It wouldn't be a bad thing if they did.
3) Regarding the prosecution of Communists who renderedassistance to the Gromans and Kondratievs, I agree, but what is to be done with Rykov (who unquestionably helped them) and Kalinin (who evidently has been implicated in this "affair" by the scoundrel Teodorovich)? We need to think about this.
4)It is very good that you have finally taken in hand the "loose cannons" from Gosbank and Finance (which is rotten to the core). What are Karklin, Kaktyn, and others doing in Gosbank? Do they really echo Piatakov's every word? In my opinion, the leadership of Gosbank and Finance has to be replaced with people from the OGPU and the Worker-Peasant Inspection once these latter bodies have conducted some inspecting and checking up by punching people in the face.2
5) I don't think it's correct to triumphantly publish the new charter of the settlement associations and advertise it in the press.3 There will be an impression that the slogan "Everyone into the settlement associations!" runs counter to the slogan "Everyone into the collective farms!" An illusion has arisen of a retreat from the slogan "For the collective farms!" to the slogan "For the settlement associations"! It doesn't matter what they want in Moscowin practice there's been a switch from the vital and triumphant slogan "For or against the collective farms" to the mongrel, artificial slogan "For or against the settlement associations." And all of this at a time when we have a growing surge of peasants into the collective farms! I think this attempt to make us retreat from a collective farm movement that is increasingly on the rise will confuse people and will weaken the influx into the collective farms. I already sent you a telegram on this. Maybe I shouldn't have sent it, but please do not berate me for this: it seemed to me that the earlier I informed you about my opinion the better.
I don't know whether you agree with me, but if you do, we can immediately start putting the brakes on this entire "settlement" ballyhoo. In my opinion, we should, first, give an internal directive to local party committees not to get carried away with settlement associations and not to substitute the slogan "Into the settlement associations" for the slogan "Into the collective farms" and to focus all their attention on organizing the movement into the collective farms. 4 In the second place, it would be well to overhaul Pravda and all of our press in the spirit of the slogan "Into the collective farms" and to oblige them to systematically devote at least one page every day to facts about the surge into the collective farms, facts about advantages of collective farms over individual peasant farms. In doing so, these facts, reports, letters, and the like should not be printed in small print somewhere in the back pages but should have prominent coverage. In a word, [we should] launch a systematic and persistent campaign in the press for the collective farm movement, which is the major and decisive factor in our current agricultural policy.
Well, that's all for now.

J. Stalin

1. In 1929, Tomskii was appointed chairman of the All-Union
Chemical Industry Association. On 6 September 1930, the Politburo fulfilled Tomskii's request to relieve him of this post because of illness (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 795, l. 5). On 25 September, Goltsman was appointed chairman of the chemical industry (ibid., d. 798, l. 3). On 15 October 1930, this post was given to Piatakov (ibid., d. 800, l. 7).
2. On 26 September 1930, the Orgburo reviewed the issue of "theradical improvement of Gosbank personnel in the center and provinces" and noted that "some improvement in the work of the Gosbank staff was achieved by thoroughly purging its personnel as well as by routinely eliminating those elements selected over a period of years by the former right-opportunist administration of Gosbank." The Orgburo's decree stipulated further shuffling of personnel at Gosbank. On 15 October 1930, by order of the Central Committee, Piatakov was relieved of his position as head of Gosbank and Briukhanov was relieved of his duties at Finance. Kalmanovich was appointed chairman of Gosbank, and Grinko was appointed commissar of finance (ibid., ll. 7, 8).
3. The regulations on the settlement associations were published inthe press on 30 August 1930.
4. On 24 September 1930, the Politburo approved a letter oncollectivization drafted by the Central Committee and addressed to all regional and provincial committees. An excerpt follows (KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh [Resolutions of the CPSU], vol. 5 [Moscow, 1984], 215):
The Central Committee warns against an erroneous tendency observable in some organizations, namely, to substitute agricultural cooperative associations for artels. While restoring the agricultural cooperative associations in areas with a weak
collective farm movement, we must firmly and persistently organize agricultural artels as the basic form of the collective farm movement at this stage.

Letter 64
[7 September 1930]
There are two issues:
1) I'm told that Rykov and Kviring want to squelch the matter ofthe northern canal, contrary to the Politburo's decisions. They should be taken down a peg and given a slap on the wrists. Yes, the financial plan has to be cut as much as possible, but it's still a crime to squelch this matter. 1
2) I'm told they want to take criminals (with sentences of more thanthree years) away from OGPU and give them to the [republican] NKVDs. This is an intrigue orchestrated by Tolmachev, who is rotten through and through. Syrtsov, to whom Rykov has been
playing up, also has a hand in it. I think the Politburo's decisions should be implemented and the NKVDs should be closed down.2
J. Stalin
1. On 5 May 1930, the Politburo approved the idea of constructing the entire Baltic-White Sea Canal. The resolution ran as follows (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 784, l. 2):
Calculations for the construction plan for the southern section of the canal should be based on the following requirements:
1) Construction work on this canal section (from Leningrad to Lake Onega) should start at the beginning of the next economic year and be completed within two years; 2) the canal should be dug to a depth that will allow the passage of ships drawing 18 feet.
The total cost of all construction work on the southern canal section should not exceed 60 million rubles.
The Commissariat of Transport with the participation of the armed forces and the OGPU should be charged with conducting a geological survey for the digging of the northern canal section (from Lake Onega to the White Sea).
The possibility of using prisoners in this work was used in determining the cost of the construction work on the northern section of the canal.
A note of Stalin's has been preserved, most likely written during this Politburo meeting (ibid., f. 558, op. 1, d. 5388, l. 150):
I think that it's possible to build it to Onega. As for the northern section of the canal, we should limit ourselves to surveying for now; I have in mind relying mainly on GPU [i.e., prisoners Trans.]. At the same time, we must assign someone to calculate yet again the expenses in building this first section. 20 million plus 70 million. Too much.
On the back of the note is Molotov's reply:
I have my doubts about the expediency of building the canal. I read your note. The economic side is not thought through (it's not clear). Shouldn't this project be thought through first?

On 5 October 1930, the Politburo told the OGPU that it should be guided by the decision of 5 May 1930, and the question of appropriations for the Baltic-White Sea Canal should be put off until consideration of the target figures for 1931 was completed (ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 799, l. 5).
2. On 27 June 1929, the Politburo approved the decree "On the use of the labor of criminal prisoners." It stipulated that persons sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three or more years should be transferred to prison camps run by the OGPU. To handle these prisoners, the existing concentration camps were to be expanded and new ones were to be established (around Ukhta [a town in northern Russia] and in other remote regions) "for the purpose of colonizing these regions and tapping their natural resources through the exploitation of prisoner manpower." Persons sentenced to terms of imprisonment of one to three years would remain in the custody of the NKVD of the Soviet republics and would be used by them for agricultural and industrial work (ibid., d. 746, ll. 2, 11).
These NKVDs, however, resisted the transfer of the prisoners with terms longer than three years, attempting to use them for their own economic projects. Early in August 1930, Shirvindt, deputy chairman of internal affairs of the Russian republic, sent a memo to the government asking for reconsideration of the decision to transfer prisoners to OGPU camps. This request was supported by Syrtsov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Commissars. On 31 August 1930, the following decision was made by the Conference of Deputies chaired by Rykov: "Persons sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than three years shall remain under the jurisdiction of [the police of the republics] if they can be used for work in colonies and factories" (GARF f. 5446, op. 6, d. 725, ll. 13, 13).
After receiving Stalin's letter, on 5 October 1930 the Politburo changed its mind and decided to go back to letting OGPU use these prisoners (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 799, l. 5).

Letter 65
[13 September 1930]
Viacheslav, 1

1) We must immediately publish all the testimonies of all thewreckers of the supplies of meat, fish, tinned goods, and vegetables. For what purpose are we preserving them, why the "secrets"? We should publish them along with an announcement that the Central Executive Committee or the Council of Commissars has turned over the matter to the OGPU collegium (it's a kind of judicial body in our system) and after a week have the OGPU announce that all these scoundrels will be executed by firing squad. They should all be shot.2
2) It would also be good to publish the testimonies of the "Intelligence Service" agents Neander, Gordon, Bondarenko, Akkerman, Bobrovshchikov, and others about the subversive activity of the Vickers employees, who have bombed, set fire to, and damaged our factories and buildings (Jackson, Lomans, Leap, and others).3 Why is this rich material being kept secret? Now that negotiations with the British on debts and concessions are being opened, it would be most advantageous for us to publish Akkerman's and others' testimonies, precisely as testimony (as indisputable documents). These documents could be published (after careful preparation) five days after the publication of the testimonies of the wreckers in meat, fish, etc. For the time being, it is best to concentrate on their publication and not mention anything about the trial and execution.
3) It is quite clear that both the first and the second group oftestimonies should not be published "just like that" but should be accompanied by an 
introduction from the OGPU (or from Justice) and with a specific interpretation by our press. (The leitmotif of this interpretation should be: we have revealed everything, we know everything about the intrigues of the bourgeoisie and its robber-arsonists and wreckers, and we plan to rake them over the coals.) Early testimonies given by Pokrovskii, Strizhov, and others may be added to Akkerman's and other people's testimonies about the Anglo-scoundrels from the Intelligence Service.
4) I already sent you a coded telegram about Riutin. 4
5) Our top Soviet hierarchy (Labor Defense Council, Council ofCommissars, Conference of Deputies) suffers from a fatal disease. The Labor Defense Council has been transformed from an active, businesslike body into an idle parliament. The Council of Commissars is paralyzed by Rykov's insipid and basically antiparty speeches. The Conference of Deputies, which was previously the headquarters of Rykov-Sokolnikov-Sheinman, has now tended to become the headquarters of Rykov-Piatakov-Kviring or Bogolepov (I don't see a big difference between the last two) and is now opposing itself to the Central Committee. Clearly this can't go on. Radical measures are needed. As to what kindI'll tell you when I get to Moscow. For the present, Piatakov should be watched closely. He is a genuine rightist Trotskyist (another Sokolnikov), and he now represents the most harmful element in the RykovPiatakov bloc plus the Kondratiev-defeatist sentiments of the bureaucrats from the soviet apparat. It would be good to accelerate Sergo's and Mikoian's return from vacation; together with Rudzutak and Kuibyshev (and also Voroshilov), they will be able to isolate Rykov and Piatakov in the Labor Defense Council and the Conference of Deputies. 6) I am now completely recovered.

J. Stalin

1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "9/13/30"
2. On 20 September 1930, the Politburo passed the resolution "Onwreckers in meat et al." (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 798, l. 12):
a) Publish immediately the testimonies of the wreckers concerned with the sabotage of meat, fish, canned food, and vegetables.
Accompany this material with a brief introduction from the OGPU indicating that the case has been submitted by the Central Executive Committee and Council of Commissars to the OGPU for review.
b) Publish articles clarifying the implications of this case,demonstrating that the work of this counterrevolutionary gang is totally unmasked and that all measures have been taken to undo the damage of wrecking. Set aside a page and a half for this material in the major newspapers on 22 September 1930. c) Charge a commission staffed by Coms. Menzhinskii, Yaroslavskii, Rykov, and Postyshev to review the material and introductory text from the OGPU prior to publication.
The testimonies of members of the so-called organization of wreckers of workers' food supply were published in newspapers on 22 September 1930, with an introductory statement that the "Central Executive Committee and the Council of Commissars submitted this case for review by the OGPU collegium," as Stalin had proposed.

On 25 September, newspapers carried a notice that the OGPU collegium had sentenced forty-eight "wreckers of workers' supply" to be shot and that the sentence had been executed.
3. Material on this issue has not been found.
4. Stalin's coded telegram was not found. On 23 September 1930,
Riutin's file was reviewed by the Central Executive Committee (ibid., f. 613, op. 1, d. 142, l. 90). Riutin was condemned for sharply criticizing Stalin. A. S. Nemov's statement to the Central Committee formed the basis for the accusation against Riutin. The Central Control Commission ruled to expel Riutin from the party. On 5 October 1930, the Politburo passed a similar resolution (ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 799, l. 7). Shortly thereafter, Riutin was arrested for "counterrevolutionary agitation and propaganda."

Letter 66
[13 September 1930]
This is in addition to my other letter today.
1) With regard to Riutin, it seems to me that it's impossible to limitourselves to expelling him from the party. When some time has passed after his expulsion, he will have to be exiled somewhere as far as possible from Moscow. This counterrevolutionary scum [nechist'] should be completely disarmed.
2) I talked to Ganshin. I think that the oil issue is certain to beraised in the Politburo in September in terms of an increase in the number of refineries for gasoline production. Without this, we'll get into big trouble. If we wait until October, it will be too late. 1
3) For God's sake, stop the press's squawking about "breakdownsright and left," "endless failures," "disruptions," and other such nonsense. This hysterical Trotskyist-right-deviationist tone is not justified by the facts and is unbecoming to Bolsheviks. Ekonomicheskaia zhizn' [Economic life], Pravda, Za industrializatsiiu [For industrialization], and, to a certain extent, Izvestiia are all being particularly shrill. They screech about the "falling" in [production] rates or the migration of workers but they don't explain what's behind it. Indeed, where did this ''sudden" flow of workers to the countryside come from, this "disastrous" turnover? What can account for it? Perhaps a poor food supply? But were people supplied any better last year compared to this year? Why wasn't such a turnover, such a flight, observed last year? Isn't it clear that the workers went to the countryside for the harvest? They want to ensure that the collective farms won't short them when they distribute the harvest; they want to work for a few months in the collective farm in full view of everyone and thus guarantee their right to a full collective farm share. Why don't the newspapers write about that, instead of just squeaking in panic? By the way, the Central Committee's "Appeal" left out this point.
Well, bye for now.
J. Stalin 9/13/30

1. The Supreme Economic Council's proposals on developing oil refineries in the USSR were submitted to the Politburo on 25 September 1930 (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 798, l. 16). The Politburo approved most of these proposals at its 5 October 1930 session (ibid., d. 799, ll. 2, 3).

Letter 67
[No later than 15 September 1930]
Viacheslav, 1
Just received your letter.
1) It is very good that the Politburo has opened fire on Rykov andCo. Although Bukharin, so it seems, is invisible in this matter, he is undoubtedly the key instigator and rabble-rouser against the party. It is quite clear that he would feel better in a Sukhanov-Kondratiev party, where he (Bukharin) would be on the "extreme left," than in the Communist Party, where he can only be a rotten defeatist and a pathetic opportunist. Bogolepov should be driven right out, of course.2 But the matter can't stop there. In addition, the disciples of Bogolepov-Groman-Sokolnikov-Kondratiev should be turned out. This means that Rykov and his lot must go as well. This is now inevitable. It is impossible to go on tolerating this rottenness in government economic management. But for the time being, this is just between you and me.
2) The Central Committee's directives on procurements are verygood. Procurement will take off.3
3) I think Amosov's replacement by Semenov would fix things.4
4) You ought to hold off on your vacation. Without you there (at
the Politburo), it will be very difficult. I will be in Moscow in midOctober. If you cannot postpone your vacation until then, wait at least until Sergo comes back.5 Otherwise, there may be a predicament.
5) How is Voroshilov? Did he get back already? Say hello to him.

J. Stalin

P.S. If Rykov and Co. try to stick their noses in again, beat them over the head. We have spared them enough. It would be a crime to spare them now.
P.P.S. I propose that we distribute the statement by Kuznetsov
(from Gosplan) to members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.6
1. In the upper right-hand corner is Molotov's notation: "1930=?"
2. On 30 November 1930, the Politburo passed Gosplan's proposal"On Prof. M. I. Bogolepov's dismissal from his post in the Gosplan presidium" (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 806, l. 13).
3. The grain procurement directives were approved on 15 September 1930 by the Politburo, which noted that the 1930 harvest exceeded those of past years and that the market potential of the grain crops had increased considerably. The Central Committee resolved to increase procurement by 117 million poods by increasing the annual grain procurement plan of republics, regions, and provinces (ibid., d. 796, ll. 5, 2227).

4. On 16 August 1930, the Orgburo reviewed the preparation of thetransportation system for fall and winter freight. The resolution urged all party, trade union, and economic transportation organizations to note the highly unsatisfactory implementation of the Central Committee's 8 May decision on this issue. Molotov demanded that all executives on leave be recalled. On 17 August, Postyshev sent an express telegram to Amosov urging him to return immediately (ibid., op. 114, d. 181, ll. 1, 2, 38, 58, 59). On 10 September 1930, the Politburo reviewed reports on the fall-winter deliveries and railroad accidents. Because of poor performance in transportation, the trade unions in particular were criticized (ibid., op. 3, d. 796, ll. 8, 3037). Perhaps this was the reason that Stalin wrote about replacing Amosov, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Rail Workers' Union.
5. By a decision of the Politburo on 11 October 1930, Molotov wasgranted a leave. Originally scheduled to begin on 15 September, it was postponed until 16 October 1930 (ibid., d. 791, l. 16, and d. 800, l. 14). On 20 July 1930, Ordzhonikidze was given a twomonth leave to begin 21 July, and Voroshilov was granted leave from 1 August to 15 September 1930 (ibid., d. 790, l. 14).
6. The statement was not found. Subsequently, on 5 December
1930, in deciding the issue of the deputy chairman of Gosplan, the Politburo decreed: "To relieve Com. Kuznetsov of his duties as deputy chairman of USSR Gosplan, in view of his transfer to other work. The decision should be made official after Com. Kuznetsov is appointed to the board of the Chinese Eastern Railway" (ibid., d.
806, l. 15).

Letter 68
[22 September 1930]
22 September 1930

1) It seems to me that the issue of the top government hierarchy should be finally resolved by the fall. This will also provide the solution to the matter of leadership in general, because the party and soviet authorities are closely interwoven and inseparable from each other. My opinion on that score is as follows:
a) Rykov and Shmidt need to be relieved of their posts, and all their bureaucratic advisory and secretarial staff should be sent packing. b) You'll have to take over Rykov's place as chairman of the Council of Commissars and Labor Defense Council. This is necessary. Otherwise, there will be a split between the soviet and the party leadership. With such a setup, we'll have complete unity between soviet and party leaders, and this will unquestionably double our strength.
c) The Labor Defense Council should be converted from a body ofchatterers into a militant and viable economic management body, and the number of Labor Defense Council members should be reduced to about ten or eleven (a chairman, two deputies, the chairman of Gosplan, the Commissariats of Finance and Labor, the Supreme Economic Council, the Commissariats of Transport, War, Trade, and Agriculture).
d) Under the Council of Commissars, a standing commission("Commission on Fulfillment") should be established for the sole purpose of systematically checking up on the fulfillment of the center's decisions. It should have the right to call both party members as well as nonparty people to answer, rapidly and directly, for bureaucratism, nonfulfillment, mismanagement, or evasion of the center's resolutions, and so on. This commission should have the right to make direct use of the services of the Worker-Peasant Inspection (in the first place) and the GPU, Procuracy, and press. Without such an authoritative and rapidly acting commission, we will not be able to break through the wall of bureaucratism and [improve] the slipshod performance in our bureaucracies. Without such reforms, the center's directives will remain completely on paper. Sergo ought to be put at the head of the commission (as the deputy chairman of the Council of Commissars and the head of WorkerPeasant Inspection).

Thus the Council of Commissars will have three important commissions: Gosplan, Labor Defense Council, and the Commission on Fulfillment.
e) The existing Conference of Deputies should be dismantled, and the chairman of the Council of Commissars should be allowed to consult with his deputies (bringing in various officials) at his own discretion.

All of this is just between you and me for the time being. We'll speak in more detail in the fall. Meanwhile, consult with our closest friends and report on any objections.

2) Things are going badly in the Urals. Millions of pounds of oreare lying in the pits, but there's nothing to haul the ore out with. The whole problem is that there isn't any track that can be used to run spur lines and branch lines through factories. Why couldn't we suspend new rail construction for a year, somewhere in Ukraine or elsewhere and take about 200300 versts of track and give it immediately to the Urals? I think we could do this. That would save the Ural iron works from dependency (a cursed dependency!) on horses, oats, and other idiocy. Can you push this?

Why isn't Kosior going to Sverdlovsk? 1

3) Rozengolts was here to see me. He asked me to help himtransfer to the Supreme Economic Council (instead of Trade). I answered that I would fight for him to stay at Trade. Then he asked me to help him to take three or four officials along with him from the Worker-Peasant Inspection (Sudin, Belenkiian engineer, Izrailovich, and another person whose name I can't recall). I promised my support and said that I'd tell you about it.2

4) Hold off on the question of turning over the Kondratiev affair tothe courts. This matter is not completely without risk. Wait until the fall to resolve this issue. We'll decide this question together in midOctober. There are certain reasons I have for not turning it over. Well, so long.

Best regards,

1. On 25 July 1930, the Politburo confirmed I. V. Kosior aschairman of Eastern Steel in Sverdlovsk (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 790, l. 4). On 20 December 1930, the Politburo reversed its decision and left Kosior in his position as assistant chairman of the Supreme Economic Council (ibid., d. 808, l. 13).

2. On 28 November 1930, the Politburo confirmed the membershipof the collegium of the Commissariat of Trade; Sudin was included (ibid., f. 17, op. 3, d. 806, l. 6).

Letter 69
[28 September 1930]
1) Have you received my letter of 9/22? I sent it through Yagoda.
In it I wrote, among other things, about the creation of a "Commission on Fulfillment." I think that if Sergo for some reason refuses the post of chairman of this commission, you would have to assume the post and Sergo could then be your assistant for checking up on fulfillment. I consider such a commission to be absolutely essential as a means of invigorating our apparat and our struggle against the bureaucratism that is consuming us.

2) However, [creating] the "Commission on Fulfillment" addressesjust one side of the matter, turning its edge against the bureaucratism of our apparat. But in order to get our construction of socialism fully on track, we must incorporate yet another aspect of the matter. I mean the "turnover" at enterprises, "transients," labor discipline, the shrinking cadre of permanent employees, socialist competition, and shock work, organizing supplies for workers. As the situation now stands, some of the workers labor honestly in accordance with socialist competition; others (the majority) are irresponsible and transient, yet the latter are as well provisioned as the first (if not better), enjoy the same privileges of vacations, sanatoria, insurance, etc., as the first. Is this not an outrage? This can undermine any real foundation for socialist competition and shock work! In addition to this outrage, we are essentially tearing away from production ("upward mobility"!) all the workers who show some initiative and handing them over to some office or other where they die of boredom in unfamiliar surroundings, decimating in this way the basic core of workers involved in production. That is, once again we are undermining the foundations of socialist competition and weakening its army.

To accept this sort of thing is to go against the interests of the construction of socialism.

What should we do?

We need to:

a) Reserve supplies for workers in the basic and decisive districts(the special list) and, accordingly, reorganize the cooperative and trade organizations in these districts (and, if need be, break them up and establish new ones) in order to supply workers rapidly and fullykeeping these districts under special observation by members of the Central Committee (special list).

b) Separate out the shock workers at each enterprise and supplythem fully and in first order [of priority] with food and clothing as well as housing; fully guarantee them all rights of insurance.

c) Divide the non-shock workers into two categories, those whohave worked at a specific enterprise for at least a year and those who have worked for less than a year, in order to supply the former with goods and housing in second order [of priority] but in full measure and the latter in third order [of priority] and in reduced amounts. Regarding insurance for sickness, etc., tell them approximately the following: If you have worked at an enterprise for less than a year, you are pleased to "be a transient," so please do not expect full wages in the event of illness, but, let's say, twothirds, and those who have worked at least a year, let them receive full wages. And so on. 1

d) Prohibit the promotion [vydvizhenie] of workers from the shop floor to any and all bureaucracies, and encourage their promotion only within production (or perhaps within the trade unions). Let workers from the shop floor (who know their trade) be promoted to assistant craftsmen, craftsmen, shop stewards, and so on. This is the kind of promotion we need now like air and water. Without it, we will squander our entire basic core of industrial workers and hand over our factories to parasitical spongers.2

e) Break with Tomskii's petit bourgeois traditions regardingabsenteeism and labor discipline; eliminate every single "legal" loophole for absentees (putting them in a privileged position relative to honest and hardworking workers) and make extensive use of workers' courts and expulsion from trade unions for absenteeism.

f) Break with Tomskii's petit bourgeois traditions regarding theunemployed, by organizing a functioning register of genuinely unemployed people and systematically purging the lists of people unemployed for specious reasons or elements unquestionably not unemployed. Establish a regime where an unemployed person who has already twice refused offers of work will automatically be denied the right to receive unemployment compensation.3 g) And so forth and so on.

I do not doubt that these and similar measures will find great support among the workers.

This is, of course, a serious and complicated matter. We should think about it from all angles. Whether or not these measures can be applied immediately in all branches of industry is also disputable. Still, this entire matter is extremely necessary and unavoidable.

Think this matter over (and also the question of the "Commission on Fulfillment") in a small circle of our closest friends and afterward inform me of their opinion.

Keep in mind, however, that Syrtsov's commission on workers' provisionment will not be able to provide any help along these lines. A new commission is needed, created on different principles. I could be on such a commission if necessary.4

J. Stalin 9/28/30

P.S. Just received your letter from the Donbass. It looks like Shvarts wasn't suitable for such a big job. 5

1. A decree, "On provisions for workers," that incorporated Stalin'sbasic proposals was approved by the Politburo on 15 December 1930 (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 807, l. 5).
2. On 25 March 1931, the Council of Commissars and the CentralCommittee passed the resolution " On the full termination of the mobilization of workers from the shop floor for ongoing campaigns by local party, soviet, and other organizations" (Spravochink partiynogo rabotnika [Party worker reference manual], 8th ed. [Moscow, 1934], 38586).
3. On 20 October 1930, the Central Committee passed the decree"On measures for planned provision of manpower and for the struggle against worker turnover" (ibid., op. 3, d. 801, l. 9). The decree noted in particular that the Commissariat of Labor "exhibited a clearly bureaucratic attitude toward economic issues and instead of efficiently organizing, assigning, and using the requisite manpower or combating transients or malingerers, it paid tens of millions of rubles in stipends to hundreds of thousands of 'unemployed.'" The decree stipulated that "in the event that registered persons refuse available work, they should be immediately removed from the lists of labor agencies . . . deserters and transients should be denied the right to be sent to work at industrial plants for a six-month period" (Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika, 39698).
4. On 6 September 1930, the issue of supplying meat to Moscowwas discussed at a Politburo meeting. It was decided to examine how goods in short supply were distributed and to institute unconditional punitive measures against "counterrevolutionary and speculator elements" who disorganized the work of the supply apparat.
A commission made up of Syrtsov (chairman), Postyshev, Shvernik, Yanson, Khlopliankin, Eismont, and others was assigned to draft measures for improving methods for workers' provisionment (eliminating queues, monitoring workers in the cooperative system, and so forth). The commission was told to report on the results of its work twice a month (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 795, l. 5).
On 15 October 1930, the Politburo's commission on workers' provision was joined by Stalin and L. Kaganovich (ibid., d. 800, l. 3).
5. On 25 July 1930, Shvarts was confirmed as chairman of theboard of Soiuzugol [Union coal] for the south (ibid., d. 790, l. 4). The status of the coal industry was often discussed by the Politburo during August and September. On 19 August 1930, the Politburo passed the decree "On the Donbass coal industry": "The coalmining situation and the fulfillment of basic production goals in the Donbass is most ominous and requires the passing of a number of immediate, urgent measures" (ibid., d. 793, ll. 8, 2729).
In September 1930, the Central Committee received information about a speech Shvarts made at a meeting of Rutchenkovka workers and specialists; on 20 September, the Politburo decreed: "To consider the nature of this speech . . . unacceptable . . . for a
Communist economic manager" (ibid., d. 798, ll. 2, 3). On 5 October 1930, the Politburo relieved Shvarts from his duties as chairman of the board of Soiuzugol (ibid., d. 799, l. 6).

Letter 70
[10 October 1930]
Received your letter of 10/6.

1) Your work on the Donbass turned out well.1 You've achieved a sample of Leninist checking up on fulfillment. If it is required, let me congratulate you on your success.

2) The proposal to reinforce the planning agencies is good. I'msending it back with a few of my corrections. The only thing needed is to "outfit" the planning agencies with students, not wholesale, or indiscriminately, but through a comprehensive individual screening and without speeding everything up, as [they do] in the movies. 2
3) I'm sending you Ganshin's letter with some other materials. If it'strue that the Politburo is bringing legal charges against him, then I think Ganshin will have to be removed from executive work, and we will lose him for a time. Can't the Politburo decision be mitigated and the phrase "brought up on legal charges" be removed from his record? I'm personally for that. It would be much better to remove Lomov from the oil agency (he doesn't know the oil business and never will) and put Ganshin in his place.3 That would be much better. We'll talk about this in more detail when I get to Moscow.
Well, bye for now.

J. Stalin
I'm sending you Koba's letter from yesterday. We'll put Ganshin on the Politburo agenda for 10/15 and soften the previous decision.
Return Koba's letter and the "draft" with his corrections.

1. In September 1930, Molotov took a trip to the Donbass. On 25 September 1930, the Politburo discussed Molotov's telegram from the Donbass (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 798, ll. 3, 19):
Given the significant increases in the coal-mining effort since October, especially considering the need to compensate for this year's shortfall, and given the certain possibility of significantly increasing the mechanical extraction of coal, the matter of mechanizing the Donbass has become an extremely urgent task. . . . It is necessary for the economic, party, and trade union organizations to focus immediately on mechanizing the

Donbass. . . . In fulfilling the October, quarterly, and annual industrial plans for the Donbass, we must broaden the struggle for a new, mechanized, and genuinely socialist Donbass. . . . In the event [my proposal] is approved, we will move directly to working out a series of practical measures for economic, party, and trade union agencies, since the work of all Donbass organizations will have to be restructured.
Molotov's proposal was approved by the Politburo.

2. On 15 October 1930, the Politburo passed the resolution "On theimprovement of state planning" (ibid., d. 800, l. 15):
a) Immediately strengthen the qualified party and nonparty staff of Gosplan and of the planning agencies of the commissariatsSupreme Economic Council, Transport, Agriculture, Tradeand cooperative organizations, etc., by transferring a significant group of senior students from the economic faculties for this work (offering the students assigned to the commissariats the additional opportunity of continuing their theoretical work in the relevant institutions of higher education).

b) Establish a planning academy in Moscow. Along with the permanent cadre of studentsqualified party members who are economic managerscomrades working in the economic commissariats should also take a number of basic courses (accounting, improvement of production methods, economic geography, the theory of planning, the five-year plan and its fulfillment).

3. For an earlier decision about Ganshin, see note 4 for letter 58.

On 15 October 1930 the Politburo retracted its decision of 10 September 1930 to turn Ganshin over to the courts and decided to limit his punishment to a party reprimand (ibid., d. 800, l. 7). On 15 November 1930, Ganshin was appointed chairman of Soiuzneft
(ibid., d. 804, l. 8).

4. Molotov's note to Ordzhonikidze was attached to Stalin's letter.

Letter 71
[23 October 1930]
1) I'm sending you two reports from Reznikov on Syrtsov's andLominadze's anti-party (essentially right-deviationist) factional group. It's unimaginable vileness. Everything goes to show that Reznikov's reports correspond with reality. They played at staging a coup; they played at being the Politburo and went to the lowest depths.

2) As for the T-chevskii affair, 1 he turns out to be 100 percent clean. That's very good.

3) Things are going more or less all right for us. Lezhava andKviring were removed (from Agriculture). We will formalize it one of these days.2,3
How are things going for you?


1. The facts remain unclear. The reference is probably toTukhachevskii.
2. On 20 October 1930, the Politburo passed a resolution recallingKviring and relieving Lezhava from his duties as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Commissars (RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 801, l. 11). Soon afterward, Lezhava was appointed chairman of
Union Fisheries and given a high position in the Commissariat of Trade. On 30 June 1931, Kviring was confirmed as chairman of the Credit Guarantee Bank in Berlin (ibid., op. 114, d. 243, l. 226).
3. Er. Kviring should not be confused with the Emmanuil Kviringwho excited Stalin's anger in earlier letters. Er. Kviring was a minor official who Stalin may have mentioned only because he had worked as Molotov's assistant in the mid-1920sU.S. Ed.