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Review of the political state of the USSR
Review of the political and economic state of the USSR in April ‐ May 1923
Archive source: ʺTop Secretʺ: Lubyanka to Stalin on the situation in the country (1922‐1934), v.1 1922‐1923, part 2, Moscow, 2001
Archive: TSA FSB F. 2. Op. 1.D. 794. L. 86‐112. Certified copy.
July 16, 1923
The political economic state of the Republic in April‐May is characterized by the following main points: 1) deterioration of the economic state of the Republic; 2) an anxious mood under the impression of a serious illness comrade. Lenin, and then an English ultimatum and the possibility of an imminent war; finally, 3) the development of banditry, characteristic of the spring period.
Deterioration of the economic condition. The most important issue of the moment is a sharp deterioration in the state of our industry, which manifested itself in the curtailment of enterprises in many of its branches as a result of the lack of sales and raw materials, the resulting financial crisis. The crisis had an especially strong impact on the state of enterprises that feed on imported raw materials (textile), and in small‐scale industry enterprises that depend directly on the market.
The collapse of industry worsened the material situation of workers, causing, on the one hand, a halt in the growth of wages, and on the other, increasing unemployment.
The political state of the Republic. Despite the growing industrial crisis, the mood of the proletarian masses must still be recognized as stable. This was revealed in a number of campaigns conducted in the reporting months: the 25th anniversary of the RCP, May Day, anti‐religious propaganda. The complication in the international position of the Republic caused by the English note even created a certain upsurge in the mood of the working masses.
The attitude of the peasantry to a possible war was revealed almost everywhere as completely negative. At the same time, in some places peasant gatherings passed resolutions of protest against British policy.
Banditry. The revival of banditry with the onset of spring is observed in Ukraine, the Far Eastern Republic, as well as in Turkestan, where the remains of the Basmak detachments have survived. Everywhere political banditry is fed from abroad by both recruits and organizers. In Ukraine, banditry is predominantly of a criminal nature, but here, too, one can feel the leadership of counterrevolutionary organizations from abroad.
The state of the industry. The political economy of the workers is determined primarily by the difficult situation experienced by our industry. The reporting period was characterized by the curtailment of industry in a significant part of the provinces. Most of the enterprises are closed in order to concentrate the industry (factories of the former Dobrovs and Nabgolts, Gustav Liszt in Moscow), some due to a lack of raw materials and a sales crisis, and some due to the onset of the summer months and the provision of collective vacations for workers.
Fincrisis. The main reason for the curtailment of industry is the financial crisis caused by the lack of sales of production products ‐ a consequence of the difficult economic situation that the countryside is currently experiencing.
Lack of sales. The sales crisis as the direct reason for the closure of enterprises is noted by a number of provinces with medium and weak industrial development, which is explained by the direct dependence of these regions on the market. A sales crisis is typical in these provinces for metal enterprises, in particular, agricultural plants, and, secondly, for textile enterprises (Poltava, Vyatka, Tsaritsyn, Saratov, Novgorod, Kuba‐Black Sea, Tomsk, Akmola and
Lack of raw materials. The financial crisis entails the lack of raw materials for enterprises. This is especially acute in the textile industry (for the summer period a number of large factories in Moscow, Ivanovo‐Voznesensk, Tver and Smolensk provinces are closed, including such enterprises as the Bolshaya Proletarskaya mra with the number of workers exceeding 10 thousand), sewing, food and a number of other industries. There is information about the closure of enterprises due to the lack of raw materials for most of the provinces of the Center, all the provinces of the West and parts of the provinces of the Urals, Ukraine, Siberia, the Caucasus and the North‐West.
Enterprise equipment. The closure of enterprises is often caused by unsatisfactory equipment, which is also noted in a significant part of the provinces (Vyatka, Arkhangelsk, Transbaikal, Altai, in the latter the Korkinsky mines were closed).
Mismanagement of the administration. Enterprises often experience financial crises due to mismanagement of the administration. Mismanagement is most often caused by the inexperience of enterprise managers. So, in the Saratov province. due to the mismanagement of the administration, the flour‐grinding industry is declining; in Simbirsk (cartridge plant) and Tomsk province. mismanagement of the administration is the cause of unrelenting unrest among the workers; in Chernihiv, enterprises are making clearly unprofitable deals. The closure of factories due to unprofitability is noted by some provinces of the Urals (South Ural Trust), Novonikolaevskaya Gubernia, Priamurskaya Gubernia. and Georgia (Gosvintrest).
Sabotage and ex officio crimes. The closure of enterprises is also often caused by the sabotage of the administration and a certain desire to bring the enterprise into a state of unprofitability in order to lease it (Omsk, the Omechalit plant, Crimea and Krasnoyarsk). This circumstance is often the source of acute conflicts between workers and management. In the City Republic, the sabotaging administration deliberately raised wages disproportionately to the real resources. In a number of provinces, embezzlement and theft of factory property were registered (Kubano‐Chernomor‐skayaobl. — Factories in Yurmen and the city of Maikop; in Tatrespublika, Donetsk province — factories “A” and “B”; in Crimea, a tenant of a private tobacco factory sold factory inventory; 14 administrative persons were arrested in Saratov for embezzlement in the enterprises of the State Service).
Political unreliability of the administration. The political unreliability of the administration should be recognized as a serious factor influencing the state of industry in certain regions. The conflicts created on this basis between the administration and the party and trade‐union organizations, causing ferment among the workers, respond badly to the state of industrial enterprises.
In the Tatrespublika, the director of the Mekhzavod, a former White Guard, surrounding himself with his own people, whom he discharges from Siberia; in the Tyumen province. the director of the sawmill, a former Kolchak resident, seeks to survive the communists; in Novonikolaevskaya lips. the administration of the Horlivka mines dismisses the communists. The mistrustful attitude of workers towards the administration, in view of its political unreliability, is noted in the Votskaya and Cherepovets provinces. (enterprises Sevsudostroy and Sheksnostroy).
The material situation of the workers. The improvement in the material situation of the workers, which began to appear before May, is suspended at the end of May, and even in some places there is a certain deterioration in it. The reason is the lack of rates, noted by all industrial provinces, and the indebtedness of enterprises to workers.
Delayed pay. Issues of wages and their timely payment are the main reasons for workersʹ discontent. Systematic salary delays (often for 2‐3 months) are typical for Petrograd, Nizhny Novgorod province. (factories of the Sormovsky and Vyksa regions), for Georgia (tobacco factories), all the provinces of the Urals, Donetsk province. and parts of Siberia (mainly in the coal industry). Payment of wages in kind and bonuses. The replacement of wages with factories and bonds 268 (orders to the shops of factories), lowering for the most part the workerʹs earnings, in turn causes discontent noted in a number of provinces. It is noted in a number of enterprises in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod (cloth factories), the Mari region. and the Baikal province. ‐ on the basis of the issuance of manufactured products; in Ivanovo‐Voznesensk, Irkutsk, Vyatka provinces, Karelia and in the Crimea ‐ on the basis of the payment of wages by bonuses.
Deductions. Dissatisfaction on the basis of excessive deductions, often reaching 25% of the salary, is noted in the provinces of the Center (Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, Tambov), North‐West
(Petrogradskaya, Cherepovets), as well as in the provinces of Chernigov, Stavropol and Altai.
Living conditions. The housing issue, despite the onset of spring, continues to figure prominently in the causes of worker discontent. It is especially acute at the enterprises of Severles in the northwestern provinces, as well as in Siberia (Irkutsk ‐ Cheremkhovsky mines, Tomskaya ‐ Leninsky mines), in the Urals and in the Crimea. In the Vyatka lips. at the Dol‐Gushensky plant, workers live extremely crowded, and due to the coexistence of men and women in the same barracks, prostitution is highly developed.
Other reasons for dissatisfaction. Among the reasons for dissatisfaction should be noted the excessive lengthening of the working day (in Vyatka Gubernia and Mari Region); accidents with workers due to the poor condition of equipment (for example, in Vyatka province, at some Izhevsk factories, hundreds of damages were noted on this basis); self‐supply of the administration at the expense of enterprises (in Tyumen Gubernia at the enterprises of the Kamo‐Uralsk trust) and the rudeness of certain persons of the administration, for example, in a number of enterprises in Moscow, Petrograd, Kharkov, Yekaterinoslav and Crimea.
Long‐term conflicts. Low rates and systematic delay in salaries are the main causes of conflicts, sometimes very long and often even turning into strikes. These are the conflicts at the enterprises of the Moscow province: ʺTrestputʺ (where workers carried out an ʺItalianʺ strike on the basis of non‐payment of wages, and only communists and members of the RKSM worked), at the Mytishchi carriage‐building plant, at the Sickle and Hammer plant (on the same basis there were partial and periodic strikes) and at the factory of the former Dobrov and Nabgolts, where long‐term discontent was caused by the inattentive attitude of the trust, which did not take measures to explain to the workers the reasons for the closure of the plant. In the Tatrespublika (a shoe factory) and in the Crimea (a tobacco factory), there have been cases when workers, due to nonpayment of wages, deliberately spoiled the material.
Strikes. The growing material insecurity of workers is also causing an increase in the number of strikes.
The number of strikes in the reporting period, compared to March, increased significantly: March ‐ 19 strikes, April ‐ 38 (except for a number of strikes at the Petrograd metallurgical and Vitebsk tanneries, the number of which is not specified), May ‐ 28. The decrease in strikes in May is explained by the fact the upsurge in the mood of the workers, which was caused by the English note and the murder of Comrade. Thief 269.
Most of the strikes are given by the provinces: Moscow (April ‐ 4, May ‐ 8), Kharkov (April ‐ 7), Donetsk (April ‐ 4), Nizhny Novgorod and Astrakhan (4 each), Bryansk and Novgorod (3 each).
Reasons for strikes. The reasons for strikes are shown in the following table:
Late payment salaries
50% of all strikes
25% ‐ ʺ‐
Increasing production rates
The table does not include the
Non‐payment for overtime and
Issuance of wages by bonuses
Distrust of the
Elimination methods. The following table shows ways to eliminate strikes:
The threat of dismissal of the strikers
and Vitebsk lips.
Business closure threat
Explanations of the administration and trade union organizations
Most of the strikes last several hours. There were strikes lasting 3 days ‐ 2.4 days ‐ 2.5 days ‐ 1.
Agitation of anti‐Soviet elements was established in strikes: at the Abakan iron‐making plant in Krasnoyarsk province. (Mensheviks and factory intelligentsia), in the sawtooth workshop of the Izhevsk factories, Votsk region. (Menshevik and maximalist) and at the Kirsinsky metalworking plant in Votskaya province. (anarchists).
The spread of the strike movement. In some places, the strike tendencies take on a long‐term character and spread to neighboring enterprises. In Donetsk province. on the basis of non‐payment of salaries, the Bayrak mine (1300 workers) went on strike one after another (in May), and after them the mines: 1, 5 and 8 (in general, for all three to 5 thousand workers).
In the Kharkov province. The strikes that began in the Makeyevsky Combine at the Chaikino and Ivan mines on the basis of nonpayment of wages are being transferred to the Konstantinovsky District (Glass Factory) and Lisichansky (Dagmara and Capital mines, Skolkovsky and Shcherbinovka mines). In Moscow, Ruskabel plants No. 2 and No. 3 joined the strike of the Hammer and Sickle plant on the basis of an increase in the production rate.
The political mood of the workers and their attitude to the RCP. In general, during the period under review, the mood of the workers, due to a number of political moments (the 25th anniversary of the RCP, the celebration of May 1, the English note and the murder of Vorovsky), remains stable and even a certain upsurge is noticed in it. The attitude towards the RCP is becoming more and more favorable. Characteristic is the increase in the level of productivity of workers in many enterprises, reaching in some places the pre‐war level, while their provision is only 50‐60% of the pre‐war time.
Attitude towards war. Attitude to a possible war, in connection with the English note and the murder of Comrade. Vorovsky, was revolutionary‐conscious. Only among the backward workers associated with the countryside, at a number of large enterprises in Ukraine (Kharkov), was the influence of the countryside noted, namely, a sharply negative attitude towards the war, and there were even statements that the countryside would oppose Soviet power in case of war.
The influence of anti‐Soviet parties. The deterioration of the economic situation by the jobs provided the ground for the development of anti‐Soviet agitation. The influence of anti‐Soviet parties among the workers is noted in Moscow among printers (where, under the influence of the Mensheviks, re‐elections of factory committees in printing houses 7, 11, 39 and Novaya Derevny were disrupted in May) and at the Cotton Printing Factory, where the workers are under the influence of a religious groups. Anti‐Soviet agitation at enterprises. Anti‐Soviet agitation of persons of unknown party coloring is noted at a number of enterprises in Petrograd, Kiev, Kharkov (leaflets with anti‐Soviet content were distributed among workers), in Yekaterinoslav, Odessa, Perm (at the Motovilikhinsky factories), Chelyabinsk and Amur provinces. (Max 270, Socialist‐Revolutionaries and Anarchists).
Anti‐religious campaign. The anti‐religious campaign carried out during the reporting period was successful in most provinces. Resolutions were adopted everywhere on the closure of the churches located in the region and on their use for cultural and educational purposes. However, in some places there is also discontent on this basis. Such information is available for Kiev, Donetsk (Taganrog), Yekaterinoslavskaya provinces. and across the Crimea.
Anti‐Semitism. Anti‐Semitism among workers is noted in the Kiev province. (tram, water supply), Arkhangelsk, Kharkov, Primorskaya (among loaders) and Tatrespublika.
Drunkenness. Drunkenness among workers is developed in the Arkhangelsk province, Kiev (hostipography), Yekaterinoslav (at the Marx and bone‐processing factories), Bashrespublika (textile workers and chemists), Primorskaya and Tyumenskaya.
The situation of workers in private enterprises. In conclusion, it is necessary to dwell on the situation of workers in private enterprises. If in some places the material situation of these workers is even more favorable than in state‐owned enterprises, then almost everywhere in private enterprises they are subjected to cruel exploitation. In the Mari region. in some enterprises the working day is 12‐15 hours. Often, entrepreneurs, in order to avoid paying insurance premiums, organize workers into fictitious artels. Almost everywhere, workers in private enterprises are not organized and are politically passive. Recently, however, some shift has been noticed here as well. Strikes, which arose in a number of private enterprises with the support of trade unions, were successful everywhere and raised workersʹ interest in professional and political life.
Unemployment. The curtailment of industry, interruptions in the work of enterprises, their weak load due to a lack of raw materials ‐ all this leads to a continuous increase in the number of unemployed. Unemployment is mitigated in part by the outflow of workers to field work and the provision of collective leave. However, the number of unemployed at labor exchanges remains significant even after the purge. For most provinces with an average industrial development by the end of the reporting period, it ranges from 3‐6 thousand, and for the following provinces it gives figures: Petrograd and Moscow ‐ 100 thousand, IvanovoVoznesensk ‐ 25 500, Georgia ‐ 23 thousand, Azerbaijan ‐ 15 thousand, Saratov ‐ more than 14 thousand, Chelyabinsk ‐ about 12 thousand, Belarus ‐ 12 thousand and Crimea ‐ more than 8 thousand.
Help for the unemployed. In the provinces, which are not quite safe in terms of food, the cadre of the unemployed is increasing by the influx of ruined peasants looking for work in the city.
The situation of the unemployed is critical everywhere. The organization of public works is hampered by a lack of funds. Assistance to the unemployed in terms of benefits and free meals is extremely insignificant.
Unrest of the unemployed. The mass of the unemployed is the most favorable material for anti‐Soviet agitation. The unemployed are used primarily by anarchists. A deputation of unemployed food workers is organized in Moscow, which appears at the All‐Russian Congress of the Union of Food Workers as representatives from the unemployed and tries to organize a demonstration before the Congress. A similar attempt in Vladivostok was promptly prevented by the arrest of 23 leaders from anarcho‐
maximalists. Unrest of the unemployed was noted, in addition, in Arkhangelsk, Kiev and Crimea. conclusions
The political mood of the workers in April and May should be considered stable.
Some deterioration in the economic situation of workers is due to the crisis in industry.
There has been an increase in conflicts between workers and the administration, mainly on economic grounds.
The growth in the number of unemployed is a serious issue of the moment in the sense that their cadres are favorable material for antiSoviet agitation.
Sowing campaign. The main issue that occupied all the attention of the peasantry in the reporting spring months was the question of the sowing campaign. The peasants felt an acute shortage of sowing material everywhere. The Peopleʹs Commissariat of Agriculture has developed a great deal of work to provide seed aid. In general, the sowing campaign this year was more intensive than in previous years. Aid was rendered mainly to the poor and middle peasants.
However, it was not without the fact that in some areas the received semomaterial by the kulak executive committees and seeding committees was distributed among the more prosperous peasants. As a result of the campaign, an improvement in the political mood of the peasantry (except for the kulaks) should be noted, which in the past months was not so favorable for the Soviet regime due to a number of economic reasons.
Lack of seed. In spite of the wide‐spread task of helping the peasantry with seed material, part of the peasantry was not provided with this assistance. Due to the inadequacy of the released Semssud, due to the insufficient efficiency of the village councils for the implementation of the orders for the Semssud, and because of the already noted capture of seeds by kulak elements, the poorest and middle peasants of 25 provinces either did not receive seed material, or received it insufficiently. The largest number of such provinces falls on the Central Region ‐ 9 provinces, the Kyrgyz Territory ‐ 5, the Caucasus ‐ 3, Siberia ‐ 2, the Western Territory ‐ 2, one province each of the North‐West, Volga, South‐East and the Far East region.
Abnormalities during the sowing campaign. As a very large defect in the campaign, it is necessary to note the often‐encountered poor quality of the released semomaterial (weediness, inconsistency of some special crops for regions, such as flaxseeds for Pskov province) and excessive charges when returning a loan (often 50%), on what basis the peasants, in need of a semssud, they often refused it.
Lack of inventory. In addition, the course of the sowing campaign was influenced by the general crisis in the state of agricultural implements ‐ dead everywhere, and alive ‐ especially in the regions affected by famine last year. In some provinces of the Volga region, peasants cultivated the fields with the most primitive implements and often with hoes (Mari oblast). Other unfavorable factors will be indicated in the general description of the condition of the crop.
Expansion of the crop area. Only the stubborn striving of the peasantry to expand the sown area could largely defeat the above unfavorable factors. The peasantry made all kinds of sacrifices, feeding on surrogates in order to save more grain for sowing, buying from the kulaks and even selling household belongings to purchase seeds. As a result, with the exception of only a few regions (mainly in the North‐West), an increase in the cultivated area is observed everywhere, in other cases up to the size of 1917.
Industrial crops. Along with the increase in the sown area, there is an increase in the area of valuable crops (for example, the expansion of flax sowing in the North‐West and West and cotton in Turkestan, Armenia and Azerbaijan). In a number of provinces, the peasants are switching to four‐field and even multi‐field cultivation of the land.
Land management. The attitude of peasants to land management issues has improved significantly. In the village, group and bran evictions are very popular. However, in the land management campaign carried out this year by the Peopleʹs Commissariat for Land Management, due to the lack of technical forces, there were large gaps. In some provinces, on this basis, troubles arose in the village, often poured out into bloody massacres at the borders. This was facilitated by the presence in the lower apparatus of the NKZ elements that were not entirely reliable in political terms.
Types of crops. Pests ‐ locusts, mice, ground squirrels ‐ are a great danger to the future harvest. There are places where 80% of the cultivated area is infected with them (Azerbaijan). In the Stavropol province. damaged 1 million dessiatins, in Dagestan ‐ 350 thousand dessiatines; 2 regions of Crimea were infected (Barakovsky and Sinalinsky were affected by 20%), the Chuvash Republic, Armenia partially, partially all the provinces of the Volga region and the adjacent regions of Central Russia. Bodies of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Agriculture are actively fighting pests everywhere, but, however, only in certain points, the most threatened, where positive results are achieved (Caucasus, Stavropol
Gubernia). However, in the rest of the regions, the struggle proceeds with a complete lack of funds among the Zemorgans, which creates a hopeless mood among the local authorities and complete apathy among the peasantries. Where the struggle is intense, the peasants actively participate in it. In the North and North‐West, the sowing campaign was negatively affected by: late and cold spring, strong river spills and incessant cold rains. In some places, the sowing could not be completed, and the winter crops did not emerge and they have to be re‐sown.
All these reasons by the end of May sharply worsened the prospects for the harvest in most of the provinces.
The financial situation of the peasantry at the present moment. The material situation of the peasantry (except for the kulaks) at the present moment is rather sad. Having paid the tax in kind, the peasants of many provinces were left without bread themselves, feeding on surrogates, semi‐surrogates (Altai, Baikal, Tersk, Vyatka,
Ryazan, Amur, Oryol, Cherepovets, Severo‐Dvinsk and
Semipalatinsk and partially a number of other provinces).
The situation of the poor. Especially difficult is the material situation of the poor, horseless, without seeds for sowing and often bread for feeding. This situation pushes the poor into the arms of their fists. On this basis, farming develops, and the poor, hiring as workers, are often forced to lease their land.
Side earnings. In search of ways to improve their material conditions, the poor peasantry turns to side earnings. In some areas (northern provinces), these earnings are the only source of livelihood, and the end of the forest harvesting at the present time dooms the local population to starvation. In other areas, the poor rush to the city, where they increase the number of unemployed.
It should also be noted that there is a growing desire in the nonproducing provinces (western and northwestern) to relocate to the Volga region.
Dissatisfaction with taxes. The reporting period saw the end of the most important tax campaigns ‐ the most difficult moment for the peasantry. The plurality, unsystematicity, excessive tax rates, short terms ‐ all this, coinciding with the sowing campaign, worsened the economic situation of the peasantry, who were often forced to sell their last grain and even implements.
Other reasons for dissatisfaction. There are other serious motives that arouse peasantsʹ dissatisfaction with the collection of taxes. These are: the practice of many gubernia food committees to issue bonuses to their employees in large quantities of grain in kind (sometimes up to 100‐150 poods per employee); then a large debt of state agencies to the peasants (for logging and cartage, mainly for the railways), which is usually liquidated with a huge delay without compensation for the fall in the exchange rate of money, while large penalties are collected from the peasants for a slight delay in the tax payment.
Unified agricultural tax 271. The peasants greeted the unified agricultural tax with sympathy, although in some places (Vitebsk, Yaroslavl, Tyumen [gubernias]) the peasantry considered the single tax excessive in the course of accounting.
The peasantry is strongly outraged by the repressive measures applied to defaulters, such as confiscation of property, arrests, etc. When confiscating property from defaulters, excesses by peasants
(beating of financial inspectors) are not uncommon.
Financial tax. In view of the current monetary crisis, the financial tax is especially difficult for the countryside.
The discontent of the peasantry with financial taxes, for which the village is forced to sell grain at extremely cheap prices, was noted in 7 provinces of the Central Region, 4 provinces of Siberia, 3 provinces of the Volga region, 3 provinces of the North‐West, 2 provinces of the South‐East, 2 provinces of the West, 2 provinces of the Urals, 1 province of the Kyrgyz Territory and in the Crimea.
Inconsistency of prices for agricultural products with prices for manufactured products. As a result of the financial taxes, the discrepancy between prices for agricultural products and goods of factory production is becoming more and more pronounced, since by the time the tax is collected, the peasantry throws out the largest amount of products on the market, which devalues agricultural products.
Hunger. As an inevitable economic factor, one should focus on hunger. The largest number of starving provinces gives, as in previous months, the Volga region ‐ 9, (Bashrespublika ‐ 800,000 people, Saratov ‐ 90,000 people, Tsaritsyn ‐ 45,000, Chuvash region ‐ 315,000, Mari ‐ 55,000, Samara, Votskaya, Tatrespublika and
Nemkommuna ‐ there are no exact figures), then there is the NorthWest Territory ‐ 5 provinces (Arkhangelsk, Pskov, Vologda, Cherepovets and Karelia), 3 Ural provinces (Chelyabinsk ‐ 400,000 people; of which 50% are children, Tyumen ‐ 45,000 people and Perm), all three republics of the Caucasus, 3 provinces of the Far East (Amur, Baikal and Transbaikal), Crimea, Dagestan region. in the South‐East, Akmola province, Kirkrai, Samarkand region. in Turkestan and Yekaterinoslavskaya province. in Ukraine ‐ only 32 provinces and republics. The starving eat surrogates and carrion (Omsk province). In Karelia, pine bark is added to bread. In the Baikal province. on the basis of hunger, a typhoid epidemic develops. Cases of death from starvation were noted in Chelyabinsk province, in Armenia, Nizhny Novgorod province. Help for the hungry is decreasing. Due to the depletion of food resources, the absolute number of hungry people has slightly increased in some areas compared to previous reporting periods.
Political mood and attitude towards Soviet power. The focused attention of the peasants on sowing campaigns and the assistance provided by the state create, in comparison with the previous reporting period, a more stable mood of the peasantry.
The attitude of the peasants towards Soviet power, with the exception of the kulaks, is mostly favorable. Information about this is available for 47 provinces: 10 central, 8 ‐ starving Volga region, 6 ‐ North‐Western region, 5 ‐ Far East, 4 ‐ Kirkrai, 4 ‐ South‐East, 4 ‐
Western region, 2 ‐ Caucasus, 1 ‐ Ukraine, 1 ‐ Turkrespublika, Crimea and 1 province of the Urals.
Attitude towards war. The attitude of the peasants to rumors about the war, which penetrated into the countryside not through our press, but by perverted philistine and anti‐Soviet groups (in Ukraine ‐ by former Wrangel and Petliurists, in the South‐East and the Caucasus ‐ by officers, clergy, etc.), should be recognized for most provinces negative. In this case, only a few provinces, more industrial ones, where a corresponding campaign was carried out, reacted more calmly and favorably to the Soviet government. On the contrary, in a number of other provinces there is a tendency among the wealthier groups of the peasantry: in the event of war, to use it to oppose Soviet power.
The kulaks. The kulaks are almost universally hostile to Soviet power; in some places it is campaigning against taxes and is the main breeding ground for all kinds of provocative rumors, which is especially affected in connection with the recent events.
Penetrating into village councils, committees of mutual assistance and peasant conferences, the kulaks are trying to acquire a dominant position in the countryside; in places, it achieves major successes, especially where party work is weak and the authority of the clergy is strong. This is most affected in the suburbs, among the peasantry of the national republics: here mullahs 272 and local fists affect not only the ordinary peasants, but also on part‐ and Soviet officials (the Caucasus, Turkestan and Kirkray).
Drunkenness. Drunkenness must also be pointed out as an unrequited everyday phenomenon in the countryside. However, this phenomenon, due to the objective conditions of the reporting period (depletion of grain reserves, sowing campaign), is gradually decreasing. The peasantry began to relate more sympathetically to the struggle against moonshine. The decrease in drunken provinces occurred by half: in March ‐ 44, in May ‐ 23 (Siberia ‐ 5 provinces, Central Region ‐ 3, Volga Region ‐ 3, North‐West Territory ‐ 2, SouthEast ‐ 2, Kirkrai ‐ 2 and 1 each provinces in the Far East, the Urals, the Caucasus, Crimea and the Western Territory).
Activity of village councils. The lack of organization of the Soviet apparatus affects most of all in the outskirts, where it is revealed in the absence of good workers, often in the dominance of the kulak element, abusing their power, taking bribes, etc. This is written from the Central region ‐ 5 provinces, Siberia ‐ 4, Volga ‐ 5, Northwest Territory ‐ 3, Far Eastern Republic ‐ 2, Kirkrai ‐ 2, Turkestan ‐ 2, as well as from the Crimea and the Caucasus.
The material insecurity of the workers of the lower apparatus of the Soviet government forces the poor to avoid work in the district and village councils, leaving the kulaks to do business.
Mutual Aid Committees. The reporting period is characterized by the powerful development of the committees of peasant mutual assistance, actively participating in the sowing campaign, in the fight against pests, providing significant assistance to the poor, the families of the Red Army, collective cultivation of their lands, etc. Only where the dominance of the kulaks is significant, their activities are not so intense.
Cooperatives. The role of cooperatives in the countryside is insignificant and is not popular with the peasantry. The cooperatives are unable to compete with private trade in the countryside. The dominant element in cooperation is the well‐to‐do peasantry. conclusions
1. The mood in the countryside, with the exception of the kulak strata, is on the whole favorable to Soviet power.
2. On the outskirts, especially with a Muslim population, the influence of the kulaks and the clergy definitely prevails.
3. The material situation of the peasantry, in connection with the depletion of food supplies from the poor and middle peasants, has deteriorated. In some provinces, partial famine develops.
4. The end of the reporting period is characterized by a deterioration in crop species in the North, North‐West and South‐East.
Financial situation. The financial situation of the Red Army units in the months under review has hardly changed compared to previous months (with the exception of the issue of uniforms, which is less acute at the present moment due to the onset of heat).
Food. With rare exceptions, units of the Red Army are supplied with food sufficiently and regularly. The insufficient food ration is indicated only by the border provinces distant from the center: Omsk, Priamurskaya, Primorskaya lips. (in the last border unit).
The delay in obtaining food seems to be eliminated. By the end of the reporting period, only Dagoblast writes about the untimely distribution of food.
The situation is worse with regard to the good quality of the products. So, the poor quality of the products issued to the military units are reported by: Tat‐republic, Murmansk, Pskov, Vyatka,
Transbaikal and Vitebsk provinces. (border units).
Food supply is lame, mainly in the border zone, where the delivery of food is significantly hampered by purely technical conditions, and during the reporting period by flooding of rivers.
Outfit. An acute shortage of uniforms is experienced by the military units of Transbaikalia, Votskaya Gubernia, Priamurye (in the 16th railway battalion there is a complete lack of uniforms); in the Samara province. the lack is equal to 55% of the required amount; in Georgia, Vitebsk and Voronezh provinces. lacks 50%, Irkutsk ‐ 40%, Pskov ‐ 30%, Kostanay and Krasnoyarsk ‐ 25%. A partial lack of uniforms is felt in Arkhangelsk, Vyatka, Omsk, Cherepovets, Karelia, Primorsk, Murmansk, Tersk, Fergana, Kuban, Baikal, Perm, Mari, Ryazan, Altai, Tyumen, Tver, Severo‐Dvinsk, Yaroslavl, Kursk‐republics, Ivanovo‐Voznesensk and Tula (34 provinces in total).
Footwear. The lack of shoes is especially acute. It reaches in parts: Voronezh lips. ‐ 88%, Transbaikalia, Severo‐Dvinskaya, Vyatskaya, Tatrespubliki ‐ 50% need, Georgiaʹs border units ‐ 40%, Fergana ‐ 25%. The need for shoes is also experienced by parts of Ryazan (the Red Army men wear bast shoes), Irkutsk, Vitebsk, Amur, Vologda, Yaroslavl, Tyumen, Pskov, Kursk, Votsk, Omsk, Mari, Primorsk provinces. and Karelia (21 provinces in total). The most unsecured here, too, are the border units of the Red Army.
Linen. Fewer military units feel a lack of underwear. It is lacking in Fergana, Georgia, Tatrespublika, Amur, Akmola, Votskaya, Vyatka, Yekaterinoslav, Tula, Perm, Yaroslavl, Vitebsk, Kursk and Novorossiysk provinces. The deficit ranges from 25% to 70% (Vitebsk province).
There is absolutely no bed linen in parts of the Vyatka lips. and Samarkand region. A significant shortage in Murmansk, Votskaya (88%), Gomel (80%) provinces, Crimea (50%), Tatrespublika (40%), Georgia, Tomsk and Priamurskaya provinces, Karelia, Severo‐
Dvinskaya, Ryazan, Yaroslavl and Akmola province.
Scabies develops in places due to the lack of linen (Turkestan). Barracks. With the onset of warmth, the issue of barracks is less acute. In a number of provinces, barracks are being repaired with the help of chiefs.
Condition. Unsatisfactory state of health is noted: in the
Samarkand, Primorsk, Fergana provinces, the Chuvash republic, Vyatka, Murmansk, Samara, Gomel provinces. and Crimea. Due to the climatic conditions unusual for the Russian Red Army men and poor nutrition among parts of Turkestan, the South‐East and Siberia, malaria (Dagoblast ‐ 25% and Votskaya ‐ 50% in some parts) and scurvy (parts of Siberia and the Far Eastern Republic) are developed.
Salary. Delays in the issuance of salaries to units are observed mainly in the outskirts (Tomsk, Kuban, Kustanai, Primorsk, Dagestan provinces, Georgia and Crimea).
Command and administrative staff receive significantly less civil servants and therefore both have a strong desire to demobilize (Georgia, Gomel, Transbaikal and Votskaya provinces).
Chefs. The help of the chiefs to the Red Army units is not diminishing. Only the Tatar Republic does nothing for its sponsored units, and insignificant assistance is provided by the chiefs of the Murmansk, Priamurskaya and Bryansk provinces.
Overloaded with outfits. The situation of the Red Army men, along with the lack of uniforms, footwear, underwear, and sometimes the untimely distribution of food, is deteriorating all the time by overloading of outfits. This issue should be considered unresolved, again, mainly on the outskirts: Georgia, Priamurskaya, Fergana, Tyumenskaya (where soldiers are sent from the guard without rest to drill), in Transbaikal, Novonikolaevskaya, Irkutsk, Omsk, Crimea, Severo‐Dvinskaya and Smolensk lips. Overloading with outfits is one of the reasons for the desertion of the Red Army.
Relationship with the command staff. In most parts of the relationship between the Red Army and the command staff continue to remain normal. But there is an increase in the number of cases of rough treatment of the command and even the administrative staff with the Red Army men and the use of orderlies for personal services. In Armenia, some commanders display old officer habits in relation to messengers. The same is indicated by reports from Primorye and Trans‐Baikal lips. Rough treatment is reported from Vitebsk Gubernia, the Tatrespublika, Akmola (drunken
commanders are extremely rude to the Red Army soldiers in drill), Primorsk Gubernia, Crimea, Penza Gubernia, Vyatka, Dagestan Gubernia.
In some places, the bureaucracy of the command staff is revealed, reaching the point of tyranny: in Georgia, the head of the department of the Separate Caucasian Brigade demands from the employees that they get up every time he appears; similar prerevolutionary habits are manifested in the Samara and Nizhny Novgorod provinces. There were even isolated cases of massacre (in Armenia and Primorskaya province), and in Georgia, the commander of the 2nd regiment drunkenly beat the Red Army men.
Drunkenness. Where drunkenness exists in the Red Army, it is developed mainly among the command staff. Commanders often appear drunk on drill (Akmola, Georgia, etc.). Mass drunkenness is developed mainly in the border regions and especially in the West. In Karelia, thanks to the drunkenness of border guards, smuggling is developing. Drunkenness of the commanders of the Primorsky lips. creates fertile ground for espionage. The development of smuggling on the basis of drunkenness is also reported from Vitebsk and Amur provinces. Drunkenness of command personnel is also noted in Krasnoyarsk, Samara, Vitebsk provinces, Samarkand and Fergana regions.
Negligence of the command staff. The negligent attitude of the command staff to the duties is caused mainly by the difficult financial situation. Failure to attend combat training by the commanding officers, isolation from the Red Army masses ‐ all this is often Archive source of discontent among the Red Army soldiers.
Political staff. The political composition of many units, especially on the outskirts, is extremely weak politically and culturally [not] developed (Crimea, Amur region, Primorsk, Mari, Fergana and other provinces), and in some units it is close to the command personnel, drinking with them. It is not uncommon for the command staff to ignore political workers and try to survive
(Dagrespublika, Bukhara, Primorskaya province).
Political and cultural work. The lack of trained political and cultural workers entails in a significant part of the provinces poor organization of political, cultural and educational work in units. This is the situation in parts of the Crimea, Amur, Murmansk, Tyumen, Akmola, Amur, Smolensk, Penza, Vitebsk, Bryansk, Ivanovo‐Voznesensk and Ryazan provinces, Mari and Fergana regions. and Georgia. The absence of any political and cultural work is noted in parts of Krasnoyarsk, Altai and Novonikolaevsk provinces, and in the Tatrespublika and Nizhny Novgorod provinces. in all small parts.
Cadets. The financial situation of the komkursy is far from being satisfactory everywhere (there is a report about this from the Ivanovo‐Voznesensk province ‐ the 27th Pekh School, Simferopol ‐ Kavkurs and 63rd Pekhkurs, and the Tatrespublika ‐ joint courses). Those who graduate from the courses often do not receive relevant appointments in parts of the course, as a result of which a demobilization mood is created in the courses (Vitebsk komkursy).
Political mood. The political mood of the Red Army in the overwhelming majority of provinces is satisfactory. Their attitude to the Soviet government and the RCP is quite favorable, this was fully revealed in the months under review, when the possibility of war, in connection with the note from England and other political events, increased significantly. The threat of war did not cause an increase in desertion among the Red Army. Dissatisfaction with the Soviet power takes place in Yekaterinoslavskaya province, among the Terek Cossacks who had previously served in the White Army.
Demobilization mood. The spring sowing campaign, the poor financial situation of the families left in the village, the lack of workers in the village, in some places the poor financial situation (lack of uniforms and footwear) and the rude attitude of the command personnel cause demobilization moods that were observed in Yekaterinoslav, Gomel, Penza, Vitebsk, Arkhangelsk, Severo‐Dvinskaya , Omsk, Primorskaya, Fergana, Priamurskaya, Novo Nikolaevskaya, Murmanskaya provinces, Crimea, Georgia,
Karelia and Tatrespublika.
Desertion. As a result of these reasons, desertion develops in places. In Vyatka, 203 deserters were detained, who arrived from nowhere. In Georgia, 515 Red Army men and 17 officers deserted in three months because of the poor financial situation and rough treatment of the officers. Desertion takes place in Ryazan lips. and in parts of the City Republic.
Anti‐Soviet agitation. Anti‐Soviet agitation took place in parts of the North Caucasian Military District (the commanding officers of the medical unit of the 4th division and the 25th regiment of the 9th division are conducting counterrevolutionary agitation), in Akmola province. and at the school of telegraph operators in Primorskaya province; in some places, religious agitation (Baptists and evangelicals) is developed, especially in Ukraine and Siberia (26th and 35th divisions). And anti‐Semitism is highly developed among parts of Ukraine.
Discipline and combat capability. Due to the negligent attitude towards the drill of command personnel, discipline in some units falls. The reason for this is often the overload of outfits. A decrease in discipline, due to overloading of outfits, is reported from the Amur, Fergana, Transbaikal, Amur, Omsk, Ural, Tatrespublika, Georgia, the City Republic, Vyatka, Ivanovo‐Voznesensk, Gomel, Vitebsk and Severo‐Dvinsk provinces. In a number of units, there is a lack of weapons (in the 49th regiment of the 17th division ‐ 35%, in the 5th Vitebsk ‐ 50%, in the 27th ‐ 35%). The 17th division lacks 70% of machine guns, and the 5th and 27th divisions lack 50‐60% of the communications equipment. In the 2nd separate cavalry brigade, 35% of the weapons require repair; in some parts the weapon is completely unsuitable for firing (Vyatka province and
Crimes. In general, crimes of a political nature are rare. In units of the 1st Cavalry Corps in Ukraine, several attempts were made to transfer the Red Army soldiers to gangs with weapons and horses. An attempt of the same kind was prevented in the Priamurskaya lips. In the Amur lips. theft of uniforms and weapons and their sale were noted. conclusions
1. The political mood and attitude of the Red Army men to the Soviet power and the RCP is quite satisfactory.
2. The financial situation of the Red Army is generally satisfactory, there is only a shortage of uniforms and footwear (10‐40% of the need).
3. The weakness of political work in a significant number of Red
Army units due to the lack of trained workers is stated.
The activities of the Mensheviks, temporarily disrupted by the operations of the GPU, revived again. This is evidenced by their publishing work. During the reporting period, they issued: 4th and 5th issues of ʺSocial Democratʺ, No. 4 ʺBulletin of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLPʺ, leaflets: ʺRuhr eventsʺ, ʺBy May 1ʺ, ʺEnglish ultimatumʺ, ʺAppeal to Amsterdam Congress ʺ. Newspapers are also published in Petrograd, Kharkov, Odessa at the expense of the foreign Mensheviks, with whom close ties are maintained from Russia.
Menshevik agitation has a hidden character, is conducted mainly among workers and students, and in the Caucasus and among peasants. The enterprises use insufficient material security of workers, delayed wages, etc. to excite the strike mood. There is reason to believe that strikes at state‐owned enterprises are often carried out under the secret leadership of the Mensheviks. The efforts of Menshevik agitators sometimes fail the lists of communists in elections to factory committees (in Moscow printing houses Nos. 7, 11, 39 and Novaya Derevanie). Cases of anti‐Soviet agitation were also noted among the unemployed (especially in Moscow). There is a Menshevik youth organization in Petrograd, which consists mainly of students and has a Bureau of Social Democratic Working Youth.
The largest concentration point for Mensheviks is still Georgia. After the defeat of the Menshevik organizations (arrests of the presidium of the regional Tiflis committee and the Abkhaz district), their activities revived again. Apparently, there is a connection between the Georgian Mensheviks and the nationalists of Georgia and Turkey; there is information that the Mensheviks are organizing fighting squads together with the leaders of the Muslim national movement.
Although during the period under review there have been mass withdrawals from the Menshevik Party (195 people in Georgia, 59 in the Crimea, and in small groups in different cities), this circumstance still cannot be given serious importance.
Anarcho‐communists. The anarcho‐communist movement, led by the VFA (All‐Russian Federation of Anarchists), conducts work among students and peasants, with almost no connection with the workers. Some of the work is done legally.
The peasantry is supplied with literature (Vladimir and Gomel provinces), in some places contact is established with the KSM cells in the villages (Akmola province). Agricultural communes (Primorskaya) are being organized.
In recent months, the All‐Russian Federation of Anarchists has been trying to contact provincial organizations from Moscow (Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, North Dvinsk, Omsk, Vladimir, Perm, Semipalatinsk, Ryazan) by sending information letters, instructions, correspondence, etc.
Anarcho‐syndicalists. The WFA is much stronger than the syndicalist anarchists. They are associated with the German syndicalists, receive funds from them for the work, have their own printing houses, book warehouses and shops. This group operates both legally and underground. At the head are emigrants. The work is carried out mainly among the students.
The syndicalists, being better organized and economically stronger than the WFA, take into account all the benefits of uniting anarchist groups and draw the WFA into joint work, despite some programmatic differences. Partially in the provinces, the general activity of the anarcho‐communists and syndicalists in the underground is revealed.
In general, the work of the anarchists states the following: the desire for unification, the cleansing of their ranks from alien and unreliable elements (KGB), ʺreassessment of valuesʺ, that is, the revision of the theoretical foundations of anarchism, their change and addition, the expansion of the ideological hegemony of anarchism the masses by spreading demagogic slogans against the measures of the Soviet power.
Left SRs and Maximalists
The activity of the Left Social Revolutionaries, blocking with the maximalists, is developing mainly in the Far East, in the Crimea and Saratov province. Not limiting themselves to distributing newspapers (Vladivostok), brochures (Primorye), they agitate among the Saratov peasantry, using discontent with taxes, spreading rumors that taxes are being used to prepare for a future war. Also, the Social Revolutionaries collect funds on subscription lists to send delegates to the All‐Russian Congress. In the Amur lips. Socialist‐Revolutionaries and Maximalists are campaigning among the unemployed under the slogan ʺSoviets without Communists.ʺ
The successful agitation of these groups is reported only from the Baikal lips. (among the miners) and the St. Petersburg plant
ʺOkhtaʺ. The activity of maximalists in the Far East is especially distinguished among loaders and the unemployed. An attempt was recorded to organize a demonstration of the unemployed in Vladivostok. But along with this there is information that in the Samara, Poltava and Nikolaev provinces. a number of Left SR groups submitted applications for joining the platform worked out by the All‐Russian Congress of SRs in Moscow.
The Right Social Revolutionaries showed very weak activity in the months under review. Only in Kiev they published one issue of the newspaper ʺThe Banner of Struggleʺ, and in Vitebsk, they pasted two appeals about the tax campaign and the celebration of May 1. In Odessa, the GPU authorities arrested members of the southern regional committee of the AKP, took the archive and liquidated two printing houses of the Odessa committee. Then the organization in Nikolaev was liquidated. Arrests were also made in Moscow.
NATIONALIST PARTIES AND GROUPS
Ukrainian Communist Party. Under the cover of the communist flag, the UCP conducts anti‐Soviet work in Ukraine, distributing proclamations calling for an active opposition to communists and Jews. The most prominent members of the party openly speak out among the Ukrainian population. However, the party had already begun to collapse, especially after some members of the Central Committee left it.
Zionists. Among the Zionist organizations ʺGekholutsʺ, ʺMaccabiʺ and ʺTseire Zionʺ, the desire for unification is revealed. For this purpose, a city‐wide conference of young Zionist organizations with representatives from Gekholuts, Maccabi and others was convened in Minsk on April 15.
Zionism is gaining strength in the Kiev province, where instructors visit local organizations. As a result of the work of the Zionists, who have influence among the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, there is an increase in emigration to Palestine. 100 families left Dagrespublika, they also leave Poltava. The Zionists enjoy some success among the Jewish youth in the Kiev province, where an artel ʺGekholutsaʺ of 100 people is organized. However, no noticeable influence of the Zionists on the Jewish working masses was noted.
At the same time, some of the Zionists tend to exist legally. Thus, the Russian ʺGekholutsʺ at a meeting of its Central Committee decided to refuse to participate in the 13th World Zionist Congress, because this could prevent ʺGekholutsʺ from being legalized. It was immediately decided to address the future congress with a letter not to allow speeches in favor of the Russian “Gekholuts” at the congress, so as not to compromise it in the eyes of the Soviet government; if the congress will allocate funds for ʺGekholutsʺ, then in no case should it be written about in the official reports.
Crimean nationalists. On the territory of Crimea, the activities of nationalists are revived. In the group of milifirkovtsy 273 clergy and teachers united. The All‐Crimean Congress of Education Workers, which took place back in February, was held with the close participation of this organization.
The group seeks to free Tatars students from communist influence and to strengthen the influence of the clergy.
The work of the militiamen is carried out in circles, and their main apparatus is the Tatar agricultural cooperation ʺShirpetʺ. The Tatar dark masses see the organs of this cooperation as a kind of power. Often even the police obey them. In connection with the adoption by the regional committee of the RCP of the resolution on the merger of the Tatar cooperative with the Crimean Agricultural Union, the board of ʺShirpetʺ issued a protest.
Dashnaks. In Armenia, in the Rada of Dashnaks, a collapse and the formation of a number of independent groups that do not agree with the general line of conduct of the Central Committee of the party are noted. Some of these groups seek to work in contact with the Soviet government and the Communist Party.
Azerbaijani nationalists. The activity of pan‐Islamists and Turkish agents is increasing in Azerbaijan. The work is aimed at restoring the population against Soviet power. In the counties, rebel cells are being created, which are to provide assistance to the Turks in case of their war with Russia.
Turkestan nationalists. The strongest nationalist group in Turkestan is Munavar Kari. In the activities of the national groups of Turkestan, after the liquidation of Enver, a sharp change is noticed; their work is changing in the direction of enlightening the indigenous masses, in particular, they set themselves the task of educating and uniting Muslim youth, especially the Uzbek population. For this purpose, on the initiative of Munawar Kari, the legally existing society Nashri Maarif (dissemination of education) was created, officially headed by a communist, but actually led by nationalists ‐ Abdurashit and others. Most of the public educators are under the influence of this society.
In parallel with this society, the spiritual associations ʺMakhKameyʺ and ʺShariaʺ, which are not officially approved, are working.
Kyrgyz nationalists. During the reporting period saw the revitalization of alashordintsev 274 right‐wing. It is aimed at the organized strengthening of its ranks and the spread of its influence on the liberal part of the Alashorda people, on non‐party Kyrgyz workers and even on a certain part of the Kyrgyz party youth. The right‐wing Alashorda seek to infiltrate cooperative, scientific and other organizations.
Panmongolist movement. To understand the nationalist movement in the Far East, one should take into account the relationship of class groups that emerged after the revolution in Mongolia. The most powerful economic groups of feudal princes ‐ secular and lamas, having ceded political power to the petty nobility and bureaucracy (the third estate), still retained their influence on the rest of the population, thus having real strength against revolutionary groups. On this basis, the idea of pan‐mongolism develops, close to which is the theocratic movement in Buryatia. Panmongolism seeks to recreate a new ʺGreat Mongoliaʺ embracing Mongolian and Turkic peoples. Objective conditions (the old Russian colonialist policy and exploitation of the local population) created fertile ground for the awakening of national identity among a number of peoples of Western Mongolia and Russia.
Orthodox churchmen. Some of the Orthodox clergy who have not joined the Renovationist trend are developing anti‐Soviet agitation in a number of places. In the Donbass, priests have been arrested who united in an underground organization and kept weapons in one of the churches. In the Baikal province. money was collected from subscription lists, allegedly for diocesan needs. The initiator was a local monarchist. In the Krasnoyarsk province. the agitation of the clergy led to the fact that during the tax campaign the village council was evicted from the premises it occupied. In Chechnya and the Circassian‐Adyghe region. the clergy seeks to attract young people to their side. They also noted the desire to penetrate into the cells of the KSM of Ukraine on the part of the Kiev clergy. AntiSoviet activity also takes place in the provinces of Yekaterinoslavskaya, Ivanovo‐Voznesenskaya, Cherepovetskaya, Saratovskaya, Chernigovskaya and some others. However, the work of the reactionary part of the clergy is undermined to a great extent from two sides: by a successful anti‐religious campaign, as well as by the process that is taking place among the clergy itself ‐ the process of decay and disintegration. Drunkenness (Saratov), the making of moonshine (Tatrespublika) drop the priestʹs authority in the village. On the other hand, there are more frequent cases of voluntary removal from oneself of the spiritual title. Many are kept from this step only by the fear of being left without means of livelihood.
Sectarians. In the months under review, there is some revival among the sectarians. The number of sects is growing. A sect of Baptists was organized in Dagoblast (it included 60 workers).
In the Amur region, 400 sectarians are developing anti‐Soviet agitation, which is corrupting the military unit located here. In Crimea, Baptists, Mennonites 275, evangelicals and Mohammedan clergy are working in the countryside. The activity of Molokans (2 thousand of them) has revived in Armenia. In Donbass, evangelicals are popular among workers. In the Amur lips. school workers organized a sect of Baptists. In connection with the arrest of priests in the volosts of the Tyumen province. there were attempts on the part of the peasantry to organize themselves into “Christian communities”. Sects strive to unite around themselves and youth. This is noted by Petrograd, the Chuvash and Mountain republics, the Amur and Gomel provinces.
Muslim clergy. The question of the Muslim clergy continues to remain as serious as in the past months. His reactionary influence on the masses, especially the peasants, is extremely strong. In the first place in the sense of complete subordination to the clergy are: Dagestan, Chechnya and Adyghe region. Local executive committees are awash with unwanted elements; theological seminaries, Sharia courts are carrying out anti‐Soviet activities, the strengthening of which is facilitated by the uncontrolled congresses of mullahs.
In the Republic of Tatarstan, the clergy insists on introducing the teaching of the Koran in schools, intensifies work on training mullahs and in every possible way develops book publishing activities, and all attention is paid to the publication of books of a religious and national character. The situation is exactly the same in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Professorship. There was no anti‐Soviet activity among the professors during the reporting period.
The speeches of individual professors, liberals and monarchists by convictions are insignificant and sporadic; they consisted only in isolated attacks at lectures (Petrograd). In the same place, the reactionary part of the professors, united around the House of Scientists and the KUBU, in every possible way resists the innovations and measures of the Chief Professionals, postponing their implementation. The friction between the professors and representatives of the student body occurs on the basis of purely academic issues in Tomsk. An open struggle against the RCP cell and the student committee is being waged by the professors of the Yekaterinoslav province.
Studentship. There are only few anti‐Soviet groups among the student body and their influence on the mass of students is insignificant. In the St. Petersburg Geographic Institute, there is a group of anarchists ‐ followers of Kropotkin 276. In the same place, in some universities, the influence of the Mensheviks on a part of the student body, organized into community groups, is noted. Agitation aims to influence the workersʹ faculty, and the slogan is the autonomy of higher education.
The influence of anti‐Soviet groups in Ukrainian universities is more significant. They are addressed from Czechoslovakia with counterrevolutionary appeals from the Ukrainian Huge Committee, urging them to fight the Moscow occupation, which threatens to destroy the Ukrainian national culture. In the universities of Yekaterinoslav, anti‐Semitic agitation was noted, caused by rumors about the appointment of Zinoviev 277 as the chief Soviet peopleʹs commissar due to Leninʹs illness. Among the Podolsk students, Petliura agitation is well developed.
In general, the mood of the overwhelming mass of students is entirely on the side of Soviet power, which was especially clearly manifested in the May Day demonstrations, in connection with the English note. Students who come from the petty bourgeoisie willingly join the trade sections organized in universities.
Boy Scoutism. Boy Scout organizations, which mainly bring together student youth, are fairly common. In Petrograd there is an underground boy scout organization associated with the center of the scout movement in Moscow. In Ukraine, Boy Scouts are under the leadership of former officers and are imbued with a spirit of irreconcilable hostility to the Soviet regime (especially in Kiev and Kharkov province). In Donbass, at the end of March, an illegal congress of the chiefs of scout units was even supposed to take place. Separately, there are Jewish Boy Scouts, they are in a nationalist mood.
Influence of the communists. The re‐elections held in a number of provinces contributed to the improvement of the personnel of the cooperative organs. The predominance of the communists in the leading positions of the cooperative was achieved through reelections in the provinces of Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Penza, Saratov, Simbirsk, Vyatka, Tver, Ivanovo‐Voznesensk,
Novonikolaevskaya, Chelyabinsk, Akmola, Ural, Tyumen, Pskov, Ibolskaya, Severo‐Karelian republics. In the Gomel province. the number of communists on the boards of the primary organs of cooperation increased fivefold, and only in the Novozybkov union is the influence of the Social Revolutionaries still firm.
Cleaning up cooperative organizations. In a number of provinces, a purge of anti‐Soviet elements was carried out by removing the unreliable and introducing members of the RCP to the board. Thus, the Socialist‐Revolutionary elements in Armenia were seized. In the Tyumen province. 4 Mensheviks were removed, in Omsk ‐ SocialistRevolutionary and Menshevik elements were removed, in Voronezh province. 12 monarchist cooperators were arrested in the Annensky district department, accused of a number of crimes; in the
Tomsk province. removed 3 Mensheviks and 8 Socialist‐
Revolutionaries. In the Siberian rural union, it is planned to dismiss 25 anti‐Soviet workers.
The influence of anti‐Soviet elements on cooperation. The influence of anti‐Soviet elements in cooperation is still quite significant in Siberia. In the Siberian branch of the Tsentrosoyuz, old cooperative specialists are very influential. In the Irkutsk province. there are only 7 responsible communist workers, and the SRs ‐ 10, the Mensheviks ‐ 9 and other anti‐Soviet groups ‐ 7. The gubernial faction is under the influence of anti‐Soviet elements, as more qualified. For the most part, the workers sent to the board by the gubernia committee of the RCP are scrubbed by specialists. There are many Social Revolutionaries working in the Novonikolaevsk Gubernia Union. Local gubernatorial and rural union instructors are working to exacerbate the relationship between both types of cooperation (i.e., consumer and agricultural). In the Uraltsentrosoyuz (Yekaterinburg), out of 150 workers, only 6 are communists, and at the same time there are two anti‐Soviet groups: Socialist‐Revolutionary Menshevik and nationalist (monarchists and Zionists). In the Kuban‐Black Sea and Don regions, in the Stavropol province. there are also anti‐Soviet groups in the boards of the gubernia unions.
Stronger influence of anti‐Soviet groups in the cooperation of industrial, agricultural and credit, where in some places there is almost no influence of the Communists. This is the situation in the Ryazan province. (there are no communists at all in agricultural cooperatives), in the Vladimir province. The handicraft cooperatives are led by a board consisting of two Right and one Left SocialistRevolutionaries, two Mensheviks and three anarchists. In the Voronezh province. the board of the gubernia credit union includes 3 peopleʹs socialists, an SR, a Menshevik and a Cadet; in the Cherepovets lips. in some places in the industrial cooperatives there are no communists at all, and the work is directed by anti‐Soviet elements. In the integral cooperation of the Oirot region. of the 5 board members, three are non‐party members who sympathize with the Socialist‐Revolutionaries.
Political banditry. Political banditry in the reporting months, as in the past, concentrated on the outskirts of the Union. With the onset of spring, the most favorable time for banditry, there is an increase in the bandit movement, especially in Ukraine, the South‐East, the Caucasus, Turkestan and the Far East. Political banditry usually feeds on organizers and recruits from abroad, and therefore is most typical for border areas. Such is the banditry of Ukraine, fueled by Poland and Romania, Transcaucasia ‐ by nationalist elements from Turkey, Basmachism of Turkestan ‐ Bukhara and Belobanda and Khunhuza in the Far Eastern Region. ‐ from China. In Eastern Siberia and Transcaucasia, an energetic fight against banditry has yielded positive results, and banditry has decreased in these areas. As for Turkestan, although there is a noticeable decrease in open bashcht activities,
Criminal banditry. The remnants of gangsters and a local unreliable element organize criminal banditry, the goal is to rob trains, the population of villages and cities, etc. The growth of criminal banditry is observed in some places in the Central region, in the Ukraine, in the Volga region, in the Urals and in the St. Petersburg region, and in Karelia, in addition, there is an intensive training of officers for future political actions of bandit detachments.
In the regions, the picture of the movement of banditry in April‐May is as follows.
Central District. The number of criminal gangs increased to 15, from 10 to 15 people each. Criminal banditry is especially developed in the Voronezh and Tula provinces.
Northwest Territory. Karelian gangs are not active. They are intensively training officers for future performances. Political banditry in the Petrograd district itself decreased, but criminal banditry increased. There are 20 gangs (164 bandits) in total.
Western edge. Local banditry and its activity is increasing. Most of them are small gangs (remnants of the Savinkovskys, from 5 to 12 people in a group). The activities of the bandits are aimed mainly at terrorizing Soviet and party workers and plundering civilians. A large increase in banditry is observed in Belarus ‐ 10 bands (110 bandits). In total, 21 gangs operate in the Western Region, a total of 180 bandits. Border banditry is also developing. New gangs (Savinkovites) are formed, enjoying the patronage of the Polish government (8 gangs, 260 bandits).
Ukraine. Transferring to Ukraine and partly to Gomel and Bryansk provinces. gangs from Poland and Romania terrorize party workers and prepare an uprising, expected on June 1 or July 10 by the time of the harvest. At the congress held in Tarlov, representatives of all the gangs were present: Petliura, Tyutyunik, General Yanchenko, the British and the French, the latter promising to bring 500,000 sets of uniforms to the bandits through Poland, and the British ‐ ammunition and ammunition. In general, the countries of the Greater and Lesser Entente are actively assisting the bandit movement in the Southwest. 278
The internal political situation of Ukraine, characterized by the hostile attitude of a significant part of the peasantry to the Soviet regime, thanks to the vigorous activity of the clergy and kulaks, as well as counterrevolutionary elements sitting in Soviet institutions and working in the rebel Petliura organizations, is very favorable for the development of banditry. The peasantry in some places even financially supports the bandits. The Petliurites, who are being transferred from Poland, are organizing bandit detachments in Ukraine, destroying railway transport, bridges, fire depots and Soviet enterprises. At the same time, terror is intensifying in relation to joint and party workers. The goal of the movement is to disorganize the Soviet apparatus and paralyze economic life. Banditry is especially increasing in the Volyn, Podolsk, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov and Poltava provinces. There are 57 gangs with 458 bandits in Ukraine. In addition, there is information about the organization of new bandit detachments of infantry and cavalry.
Southeast. Criminal gangsterism in the republics of the North Caucasus is used by nationalist groups that involve the mountain population in their anti‐Soviet activities. The activity of banditry here is still insignificant in comparison with previous months, but it is quite likely that it will intensify. The signs are the increased spread of underground proclamations and provocative rumors in the province. In Dagrespublik, the population is called upon to revolt against Soviet power. In total, there are 28 bands in the region, including 1015 bayonets and sabers and 6 machine guns.
It should be noted the intensification of activities in Chechnya and
Dagestan, a very popular and authoritative among the population, the organizer of the gangs Gotsinsky, who seeks to gather armed forces to oppose Soviet power.
Transcaucasia. The active struggle of the organs of Soviet power (GPU and ChON) against the bandit movement in Transcaucasia yielded positive results. Guided by the Mensheviks, bandit detachments organized an uprising in Geokchay u. Azerbaijan. With the murder of the closest associates of the former mastermind of this movement, Enver, calm was restored. The preparation for organizing uprisings in other regions of Transcaucasia is also revealed, and the connection of the Georgian Mensheviks with Constantinople and Ankara is established. The most saturated with political banditry with a Menshevik coloration is Svaneti, where gangs enjoy the confidence of the population. There are 200 bandits in Transcaucasia, organized in 19 gangs.
Volga region. There is no political band in the Volga region. There are three criminal gangs with a total of 19 cavalry and 8 bayonets. Population of Elansky u. Saratov province, dissatisfied with taxes and having weapons, provides a fertile ground for antiSoviet protests.
Ural. Remnants of the Kolchak region degenerated into criminal gangs, of which there are two in the region, with a total number of 18‐20 people. The gangs are elusive, as the peasants terrorized by them are afraid to betray the bandits. The peasantry here is awakened, in addition, by the kulaks and other elements alien to Soviet power, which is especially favored by the difficult material situation of the population after the famine they have experienced.
Kyrgyzstan. Bandit gangs went underground. The agitation of the clergy and former whites, as well as the proximity of Siberia, exacerbate the possibility of organizing a counter‐revolutionary movement here. In Kashirinsky district Orenburg province. a gang of 200 people operates. There are gangs in Aktobe, Ural, Akmola and Semipalatinsk provinces.
Turkestan. In Turkestan, the increasing in numbers (16,000 in May against 10,000 Basmachi in March), the Basmach movement under the pressure of the Red Army units in April‐May was less active than in March. The Basmachi detachments in every possible way avoid clashes with the Russian troops, gathering their forces and, obviously, preparing for new battles. The Basmachi of Eastern Bukhara are mobilizing the population and horses. Weapons are prepared in an artisanal way, buying Berdan locks in Afghanistan. There are rumors that the arrival of the Emir of Bukhara is planned to lead the Basmach movement. At the same time, there is a unification of individual gangs under the general leadership and command.
Siberia. The discontent of the Siberian peasantry with taxes is used by counter‐revolutionary elements to raise an uprising. The revival of banditry is explained by the transfer of gangs from the East Siberian District. Numerically, banditry has grown significantly. In May, 8 bands (164 bandits) operated against 5 bands (80 bandits) in March. The most dangerous are Tomsk and Novo Nikolaevskaya lips. and Oyrot region.
In Eastern Siberia, the increase in banditry that was outlined in March by the end of the reporting period is falling. The defeated Pepeliaevʹs gangs retreat to Sakhalin and Kamchatka, closer to Japan. There are 15 different small gangs, with a total number of about 600 people.
Far East. The Far East, in the strip bordering China and Japan, is teeming with gangs of hunghuzes crossing from abroad. These gangs are in reality the unofficial intelligence units of China and Japan. Their service is paid by these states. The political banditry of our defeated White Guards has not yet been revealed in any active protests and hopes only for help from Japan and China.
COUNTER‐REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS OUTSIDE CORDON
Applicants. Disease comrade Lenin, the aggressive policy of France towards Russia and Fochʹs trip to Poland caused a stir among foreign monarchists. Among these groups stand out: 1) Kirillovites, grouping around the ʺguardian of the Russian throneʺ Kirill Vladimirovich,
2) the Navy (Supreme Monarchical Council), headed by Markov, and, finally,
3) grouped around Nikolai Nikolaevich and his nephew Roman Petrovich, a pretender to the Russian throne. The activities of Cyrilʹs supporters after his unsuccessful trip to Maria Feodorovna in England (he was not received by her) died down. At the same time, Roman Petrovich went to see Maria Feodorovna.
United National Front. The change in the political situation prompted the desire to create a united national front. The Navy has developed a platform for national unification. This platform recognizes the possibility of unification only on the condition that Nikolai Nikolaevich becomes the head, and the parties are supposed to be admitted to the union, including the Cadets and Savinkovites, at the same time, preventing elements that recognize the revolution and its conquests. The peasantry are given promises, in the event of the restoration of the monarchy, to observe its land interests and to grant forgiveness for the crimes they committed against the motherland and the throne.
Intervention plans. The navy reacted negatively to the intervention plan worked out by the French commercial and military circles, which consisted in attracting Poland (Lithuania, Memel and Mitava was transferred to it) and Romania (part of Podolia was transferred to it) for active actions against Soviet power (Livonia was transferred to Russia according to the same plan and Estland.) The plan of intervention, worked out by the Russian monarchists, provides for a demonstration of the offensive of Poland, Romania and Latvia and Wrangelʹs landing in Odessa and Novorossiya; at the same time, volunteer detachments of the French, Swedes and Czechs are moving towards Petrograd, and the bases are guarded by several ʺblackʺ corps. By the same time, Wrangel promises an uprising within Russia. Operations are expected to be completed by Christmas.
Fascism. At the heart of its activities in Russia, the Navy seeks to use the idea and practice of fascism in Italy, to which France sympathizes. Wrangel introduces his units to the ideas of fascism. A group of fascists was created in Shanghai, headed by General
Work in Russia. There is no serious work of monarchists in Russia. Due to the lack of funds, the connection of monarchist organizations with Russia is weak and is supported only by irregular correspondence.
Monarchist organizations were found in Khabarovsk and Tyumen. The organization liquidated in Khabarovsk numbered 40 people.
Behind the cordon. In the Hesse group, there was a tendency to liquidate the Cadet party. Miliukov supports this idea, meaning to create a Republican‐Democratic Party from the Left Cadets. A characteristic feature of the tactics of the Cadet Party is the recognition of the inexpediency of intervention, which can only strengthen the Bolsheviks, and the need to use the slogan ʺSoviets without Communistsʺ.
In Russia. There is no noticeable activity among the cadets. According to the widespread opinion among them, at present in Russia there can be no other government except the Soviets, and only the economic situation will force the communists to make concessions to the West in a few years.
Deputy Chairman of the GPU Unshlikht
Deputy Head of the GPU Information Department