Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIV SECRET REVIEWS 1934

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  Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIV SECRET REVIEWS 1934


Red Army

Special message of the OGPU about the shortcomings in the air defense system of the BSSR. January 2, 1934

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1.D. 869. L. 261‐264. Copy

January 2, 1934

No. 100166

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Stalin,

Peopleʹs Commissariat for Military Affairs, Comrade Voroshilov

The data received by the OGPU OGPU indicate that the state of the air defense of the cities of the BSSR today is clearly unsatisfactory. The funds allocated for the air defense of the cities of the BSSR are used not for their intended purpose or remain completely unused. So: in 1932, 2,300 thousand rubles were allocated for air defense activities of the BSSR, of which 740,100 rubles were spent. or 32.2%, moreover, 281 thousand rubles of these funds were spent not for the intended purpose; in 1933, 2 051 thousand rubles were allocated for air defense, of which 985 thousand rubles have been issued in advance today for various events, but no reports were received on them. There are no plans to implement the remaining appropriation.

The non‐use of funds allocated for air defense is largely due to the fact that the air defense department of the BVO did not have specific plans for the implementation of these allocations, did not have plans for new construction and additional equipment of air defense posts, as well as insufficient provision of building materials. The air defense department distributed and redistributed the received building materials several times, which caused confusion in this matter. So, for example: construction on the Zhlobin air defense point is planned for the amount of 31 thousand rubles. Of this amount, as of November 1, an advance payment of 1 thousand rubles was issued. for the equipment of the medical center at the hospital the rest of the planned construction projects have not been started due to the lack of required building materials.

In the city of Mogilev, no measures are being taken to equip an air defense point and there are no funds for this.

For the construction of an air defense point in Gomel, Zhlobin, Bobruisk and other cities, building materials were distributed from local funds, and subsequently, by order of the BVO Air Defense Department, all these building materials were sent for construction to Minsk.

In 1933, construction was planned for the Bobruisk air defense point for 66 thousand rubles. To date, an advance has been issued only for 19,400 rubles. Of all the planned works, only work has begun on the re‐equipment of the command post, anti‐aircraft artillery position areas and the construction of access roads to anti‐aircraft artillery. The rest of the objects were not started by construction due to the lack of required materials.

The order for building materials for air defense activities is given to economic agencies that cannot satisfy applications. So, for example: The State Planning Committee of the BSSR to ensure the construction of the Bobruisk point sent a cement order to the department of the Belgossnab, but there was no cement there and was not there. For the equipment of the air defense point in Zhlobin there is no: water pipes, cement, glass and other building materials. The State Planning Commission did not give any answers to the applications and supplies of the point through the regional executive committee.

Over the past two years, not a single important strategic point has raised the air defense to the proper height. The training of personnel and air defense teams is extremely poorly delivered, despite the fact that large funds are allocated to the BVO Air Defense Department for these activities.

In the city of Mogilev, the head of the air defense point, the commander of the 16th anti‐aircraft artillery battalion, does not carry out any work on the item. Throughout the summer period of 1933, the OSO did not give any instructions on the work of air defense to the objects and the district council, he did not appear at any object for the whole summer with the exception of a silk factory and is not at all interested in this matter. On repeated invitations of the constricted composition of the REC, he did not appear. As a result of such work of the headquarters of the point, the work of air defense at such enterprises as the Krasny Vozrozhdenets plant, a garment factory, a silk factory is extremely poorly organized. Various teams, organized at one time at these enterprises, fell apart, tk. no one is working with them.

The school of the junior air defense command staff in the city of Mogilev, due to the negligence of the head of the air defense point, is not staffed. instead of 60 people, he sent only 16.

In the town of Zhlobin, the chief of the air defense, the commander of the 85th anti‐aircraft artillery battalion, is not interested in the work of the point. There are no air defense teams, there are no work plans and programs, there is no leadership along the Osoaviakhim line, as a result, neither the services nor the teams are prepared for the item. During the existence of the point, the Air Defense Directorate of the BVO has never examined the state of work and apparently has little interest in this matter.

Due to the lack of interest in the work of the workers of the air defense point in Bobruisk, at large facilities, not to mention small ones, work on training personnel and accumulating the necessary materials is extremely insufficient. So, for example: the woodworking plant is not prepared for air defense. The organized 8 teams with coverage of 242 people are performing poorly. Classes are often disrupted, leaders are not prepared, as a result, members of these teams are reluctant to go to classes. By decree of the STO of the USSR in 1932, an air defense point was organized in Ospipovichi, but so far it has not launched any such work. All work is carried out only on the railway. The BVO Air Defense Commission, which in 1933 carried out an inspection of the work of the railway. air defense facility was not interested in the state of work of the air defense point and did not pay attention to the lack of a work plan for the point.

Due to the lack of leadership of the air defense points by the BVO Air Defense Directorate on the ground, there is irresponsibility and disinterest in increasing the air defense of the points, and in a number of cases there is no work of any kind both on military and civil lines, due to which the planned measures of the Government of the USSR and the BSSR are extremely insufficient to strengthen the air defense of the cities of the BSSR. The anti‐aircraft artillery units formed over the past period in the BSSR, due to insufficient materiel, do not provide air defense of cities. So, for example: the 4th air defense regiment is staffed with 48 anti‐aircraft guns, there are 32 available. The 121st Minsk artillery battalion has 6 guns, the state has 12.85 Zhlobin artillery battalion has 6 guns available, it is supposed to be in the state 12. The situation is similar in other parts. A number of cities and strategically important railways. nodes like Mogilev, Orsha, Zhlobin are extremely insufficiently provided with active air defense systems. The situation is especially unfavorable with the provision of active air defense systems to the city of Minsk as an important political center of the BSSR. The air defense of Minsk is based on the 121st artillery battalion, which has 6 76‐mm cannons and 6 anti‐aircraft machine guns. There are no other active air defense systems in Minsk. It is impossible to rely on the funds of the field units stationed at the present time in Minsk, because on the first day of mobilization, they must all leave the city of Minsk.

On the part of the Air Defense Directorate of the RKKA, there is no proper leadership of the Air Defense Department of the BSSR, as well as control over the implementation of air defense measures in the cities of the BSSR.

Pom. Head of the OGPU OGPU Dobroditsky

Dispatched: 1) Voroshilov; 2) Tukhachevsky; 3) Gamarnik; 4)

Egorov; 5) Feldman; 6) Medvedev; 7) Kuibyshev; 8) OO PP OGPU



F. 3. Op. 1.D. 869. L. 261‐264. Copy.


Report of the OGPU OGPU on the work of special departments in the Red Army in 1933 17 February 1934

Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 210. L. 1‐78. Script

February 17, 1934

Top secret

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU t. Yagoda

At the same time, I present a report on the work of special departments in the Red Army in 1933. Since the report is fundamental in its content, I ask you to approve it and authorize its distribution to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), members of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the PP of the OGPU.

Head of PA OGPU Guy

Table of contents

1.  The work of foreign intelligence services in the rear and in parts of the Red Army

2.  Kulak‐insurgent counter‐revolution in the army

3.  Fascist manifestations in the Red Army

4.  Escapes from the cordon and attempts to them

5.  A / c the activities of Trotskyist elements

6.  Mismanagement, theft and sabotage

7.  Negative moods and manifestations in the Red Army

8.  Diagrams *

9.  Appendices *

The work of foreign intelligence services in the rear and in parts of the Red Army Opened and liquidated during 1933, the activities of the candidaterepublican formations (organizations and groups) of the sabotage and espionage network, in comparison with the materials at the disposal of the OGPU, is characterized as clearly expressed preparation for intervention against the USSR.

The activities of foreign centers of counterrevolution, sabotage and espionage, which we identified on the basis of these data, are characterized, first of all, by their independence from the official foreign policy of their states and are still subordinated to the main task ‐ reconnaissance and sabotage preparations for intervention.

Of particular note is the expansion of the activities of the general staffs of the states bordering on us (Poland, Finland and Romania), which has taken on the character of preparing a broad insurrectionary movement in our rear and throughout the border zone.

Throughout 1933, the contact or attempts at it between the emerging inside the USSR Ph.D. organizations and groups, especially national ones, and agents of foreign headquarters and centers seeking connections with these elements for the purpose of espionage and sabotage.

The Red Army, its command and enlisted personnel and at the same time the entire apparatus and means of defense ‐ Osoaviakhim, military factories, fortifications and strategic railways. ‐ to a greater extent than ever before, they were the object of the activity of internal and external forces and means of counter‐revolution.

Decisive socio‐political shifts in the country, an improvement in the social and party stratum of the cadre of the Red Army, an increase in the working stratum in the army from 38.7% in 1932 to 44.7%, with a simultaneous decrease in the peasant stratum by 7% and an increase in the number of collective farmers by junior command personnel to 81.9% (1932 ‐ 63.8%) and in the rank and file up to 75.3% (1932 ‐ 63.4%), narrowed the possibilities of hostile activity in the army of c. organizations and individuals, as well as sabotage and espionage agents.

Due to such an increase in the internal resistance of the ranks of the Red Army, the cases that were discovered and liquidated in 1933 are characterized by the following.

The total number of those attracted for various contractors. crimes committed by military personnel decreased.


1932 g.

1933 g.

Military personnel involved



Liquidated K.‐R. groupings




Conclusion: in 1933 there is a quantitative dispersion of c. formations in the army, i.e., decrease in the number of persons included in each separate k.‐r. a group with more organized and conspiratorial methods of activity of the counter‐revolution in the units.

It should be especially noted that with all the desire of foreign intelligence services to introduce their agents directly in the Red Army, they manage to accomplish this task in a relatively small number of cases. Although in 1933 the number of servicemen arrested for espionage and sabotage work doubled in absolute terms, in relation to the entire mass of those arrested for these types of crimes, the percentage of servicemen is small and in 1933 gives a noticeable decrease (0.9% against 1, 3%). The overwhelming majority of intelligence connections were brought only to the encirclement of the command and rank of the Red Army, i.e., their relatives and friends.

In 1932, through special departments, 8599 people were arrested for espionage and sabotage and insurrectionary activities related to the work of foreign intelligence, of which 112 were servicemen, i.e., 1.3% of the total number of those arrested. In 1933 ‐ 23 190 people, of which 224 were servicemen, i.e., 0.9% of the total number of those arrested.

The overwhelming majority of those arrested fall on the line of intelligence work:


1932 g.

1933 g.


1447 people

2239 people


113 people

410 people


5631 people

15 461 people


302 people

1841 people


7493 people

19 951 people


 The vast majority of the revealed insurgency‐sabotage organizations and espionage stations fall on the border military districts (UVO, BVO, LVO, DVK), for which, in total, in 1933 were opened: sabotage‐insurgent organizations ‐ 51; espionage stations ‐ 106. In total, in these four military districts in 1933, arrested for these organizations and residencies, as well as for single intelligence connections ‐ 20,133 people, incl. 445 intelligence agents who arrived directly from the cordon.

Such an increase in the activity of foreign intelligence services is especially significant due to the fact that, as we have documented, these intelligence services are in conventional cooperation with Japanese intelligence, which is expressed in providing the Japanese with all military intelligence materials on the USSR obtained by them, as well as in practical daily consultation and assistance to Japanese intelligence on the deployment of intelligence work on our territory and the fight against our counterintelligence.

The activities of the opened and liquidated in 1933 national k.‐r. organizations are characterized, first of all, by their ideological and organizational connection with the work of the general staffs: Japanese, German, Polish and Finnish, who took all measures to intensify their activities on the territory of the USSR and establish contact with them for their strategic purposes, by organizing an insurrectionary movement in our rear, sabotage and espionage.

In this respect, it is especially noted:

a)                   a significant intensification of the work of the agents of the Japanese headquarters among the class‐hostile elements of the Buryat‐Mongol (Buryat‐Mongolian ASSR), the Turkic‐Tatar population of Siberia, Tatarstan and Bashkiria, carried out by increasing the activity of the centers of national emigration, especially the Tatar in Manchuria, Poland and Finland ( opened by us during the liquidation of the revolutionary organization ʺPeasant Ittifakʺ in Tataria‐Bashkiria, ʺTurkmen‐Azat‐Lygiʺ in Turkmenistan, ʺTuranian Socialist Partyʺ in Kyrgyzstan, ʺIttikhat Sharkʺ in

Tajikistan, ʺUnion of Siberian Turksʺ in Western Siberia).

b)                  the activities of the Nazi fascist centers, which, upon coming to power, began to organize through the already existing connections, mainly in the German colonies in the south of the USSR and in the large cities of fascist organizations of a pan‐German character, using for this the central committee of the German colonists in Russia ʺAusland‐Deitsche ʺ,ʺ Union of German Engineers ʺ,ʺ Caucasian National Committee in Germany ʺand the entire apparatus of the Lutheran and Catholic Church.

In this direction, in addition to the sabotage and espionage work of the Reichswehr headquarters and the Hitlerite party apparatus and, in parallel with this work, in the North Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Ukraine, Moscow and Leningrad, a number of purely fascist organizations and groups that set themselves the task of creating cells a nationalist party among Soviet citizens of German origin (Baltic Germans) and rebel organizations in the German countryside. The activities of these fascist groups and organizations infiltrated a number of factories of military significance and military units through conscripts of territorial districts (sabotage and intelligence organization of the national [ional] socialists under the cover of the German company Control‐Co in Moscow, Nikolaev; fascist‐espionage organization led by Zeisler in AChK; sabotage organization on Krammashstroy; reconnaissance and sabotage station headed by an employee of the Austrian embassy in Moscow; a national socialist organization with branches in Moscow, Stalingrad and Nizhny Tagil; a large insurgent German organization in the Odessa region, etc.).

c)                   the activities of the Polish main headquarters expressed during 1933 in the activation of the central apparatus of the Polish military organization (ʺPOVʺ) in Moscow, Ukraine and Belarus for sabotage and espionage purposes and conducting national‐patriotic work among the Polish population throughout the USSR.

d)                  the activities of the Finnish General Staff, which began at the end of 1932 and 1933 to intensify its influence and connections among the c. elements of Finnish peoples inhabiting the USSR (FinnoUgric), the Northern Territory, the Gorky Territory, the Middle Volga and the Urals.

The Finnish General Staff in 1933 especially stepped up the work of the Karelian and Ingrian committees in order to prepare a repetition of the Karelian adventure, i.e., massive insurgent and sabotage actions in the area of our northwestern defensive fortifications. It was established that the operational plan of the Finnish General Staff was built with the inclusion of partisan sabotage actions in Karelia in the main calculations (the Union for the Liberation of Finnish Nationalities, the sabotage and insurgent organization of the Finnish [] General Staff, the organization of combat squads in Karelia, etc.).

To illustrate the specific espionage and sabotage activities of the above‐mentioned intelligence services, which were most active in 1933, we present brief data on the most typical espionage and sabotage organizations and residencies.

Japanese espionage

Japanese intelligence, seeking to encompass the OKDVA units with a spy network, organized massive transfers of its agents to the territory of the USSR, most of them staffed from the Red Army conscripts and Soviet citizens living in Manchuria.

OO OKDVA opened and liquidated a broad espionage and sabotage organization, which consisted of three groups, a total of 30 people, transferred to the USSR by a Japanese intelligence point in HanDazkhetsi. In accordance with the assignments, 10 people of them entered various parts of the OKDVA and working under the leadership of the resident Telesnitsky, transmitted information about the Red Army to Japanese intelligence. During the liquidation of this organization, they were exposed as agents of Japanese intelligence: kr [asnoarme] ets of the 26th division Anikin, platoon commander of the 8th cavalry division Mikhed, kr [asnoarme] ets of the 26th division Eremenko, kr [asnoarme] ets of the 1st division Belov and dr.

In the Krasnoyarsk division, the station of the Japanese intelligence service was liquidated, which included the Red Army soldiers: Mordvinov, Ostashev and Shigonin, natives of Harbin. This stationmaintained contact with Japanese intelligence through couriers who came illegally from behind the cordon, one of whom, Banyuk, was arrested. This station transmitted to Japanese intelligence a number of materials on the division, including information about the saprote, the time of arrival in the division of the change‐overs, the order of dispatch of the 108th regiment, etc. Mordvinov, Ostashev and Shigonin were recruited back in Harbin before being drafted into the Red Army.

Along with the activities of foreign bodies of Japanese intelligence on planting agents in parts of the Red Army, an increasing activity in this direction of Japanese consulates in the DCK has been established. In addition to purely reconnaissance tasks, the employees of the consulates entrusted their agents with the distribution of c. literature for the purpose of decomposition and processing of military personnel and committing acts of sabotage.

In the 12th division of OKDVA, the espionage station created by the kr [asnoarmey] of the communications company Yegorkin was eliminated. Yegorkin was recruited by an employee of the Japanese consulate in Blagoveshchensk and, acting on his instructions, recruited the artillery regiment commander Mironov, Kotov and Makarov, who supplied him with information on the artillery regiment for a monetary reward. This station provided the Japanese with information about the political and moral state of the unit, combat training, discipline, the protection of warehouses, etc. Egorkin received from the Japanese consulate for distribution to the unit the newspaper ʺHarbin Timeʺ, seven copies of which were seized upon his arrest.

OO OKDVA arrested Japanese agent‐saboteur Yakov Bukher, who served as head. garage in military construction. In 1930, he was deployed by Japanese intelligence as part of a sabotage group in the USSR, penetrated the OKDVA and set fire to the garage, as a result of which all the property located there burned down. Along with this, Bucher was collecting spy information. His apartment served as a safe house for spies and saboteurs arriving from behind the cordon.

Japanese intelligence makes extensive use of the White émigré organizations existing behind the cordon.

In Moscow, the NGO MVO has liquidated an espionage station of

17 people, created by Japanese intelligence in conjunction with the Harbin branch of the White Guard organization ʺBrotherhood of Russian Pravdaʺ. The residency included a platoon commander of a separate battalion of the Scientific and Testing Institute of Communications Tikhonov and a one‐year‐old of the 108th artillery regiment, the son of a former officer, Menynagin. Tikhonov had been a member of the BRP since April 1929 and was recruited by the Japanese back in Harbin. Menynagin joined the ʺBRPʺ even before serving in the army and working as an assistant electrical engineer on the Vladivostok‐Harbin train, transported ʺBRPʺ materials across the border. This residency received from the people it recruited at the aircraft factories and transmitted to the Japanese information

about the products of aircraft factories Nos. 22, 39, 18.

An espionage station in the Trans‐Baikal Group of Forces, headed by the storekeeper of the warehouse at Art. Chita‐1 Kushner, who, having previously lived in Northern Manchuria, in 1931 was recruited by an agent of Japanese intelligence and an active figure in the ʺBRPʺ Tverdokhlebov. Kushner, in turn, recruited the Red Army men of the 36th artillery regiment Zuev, Zhitnev and Skabkin, who supplied him with materials for the regiment.

A large sabotage station with a total of 68 people was discovered and liquidated, created by Japanese intelligence from Soviet citizens who were in Manchuria under arrest and transferred by the Japanese after being recruited to the USSR under the guise of being deported for their disloyalty to the government of Manchukuo. This station had the task of penetrating the railway. transport, in particular, to strategic lines going to the East, and defense factories, and managed to cover the Ural Heavy Machine Building Plant in Sverdlovsk, the Gorky Automobile Plant, the Central Institute of

Aviation Engine Building, a number of NKPS offices in Moscow and M. railway, where it created sabotage groups.

In Kamchatka, a sabotage‐insurgent organization created by Japanese intelligence was discovered, which had the task of active operations at the beginning of the war and helping the capture of Kamchatka by Japanese troops. The organization conducted extensive recruitment work and received weapons and ammunition from the Japanese. The fact of delivery for the organization by the Japanese destroyer of 150 pieces was established. rifles, 10 machine guns, 100 boxes. cartridge and grenades. Before the liquidation, the organization had already begun to carry out acts of sabotage. In January 1933, members of the organization set fire to the Ust‐

Bolsheretsk base of the civil fleet.

On the Tomsk and Omsk railways. the sabotage organization of Japanese intelligence was liquidated, which at the time of the declaration of war was supposed to disorganize the work of transport and thereby disrupt military transport. The organization consisted of 96 people. It covered the Taiginsky, Topkinsky, Krasnoyarsk and Nizhneudinsky railways. districts, as well as stations Oyash and Taskaevo of the Omsk railway. The organization was headed by the leading employees of the railway: the head of the track service engineer Ivanov, the head of the locomotive part Abramov, deputy. head of the operation service engineer Reut, deputy. the chief of the economic material department Oborotistov, and others. Separate cells of the organization were led by agents of Japanese intelligence, who arrived directly for this purpose from beyond the cordon. The organization began to partially implement the planned sabotage plan. In the summer and autumn of 1933.

Polish espionage

For the activities of the Polish intelligence in covering the network of sabotage organizations and espionage stations of the main strategic directions, the railway nodes and a system of fortifications along the western border and penetration into parts of the Red Army are characterized by the following examples.

On the territory of the Mozyr fortified area (BVO), a sabotage organization created by agents of the 2nd department of the Polglavshtab Flerko, Gorbal and Zhuravsky, a total of 192 people, consisting of 22 cells, was liquidated. The organization was divided into 4 regions, each of which included separate cells located at the firing points and individual defensive structures of the fortified area. The organization was assigned the following tasks: in peacetime ‐ wide recruitment of new members into the organization, training of sabotage personnel, collection of espionage information and their transfer to Poland; in wartime ‐ the capture of firing points of the fortified area and the deployment of widespread sabotage. The destruction of the railway was planned. in the Yelsk region, narrow‐gauge railways in part of the fortified area and the explosion of a group of Zlodinsky bridges connecting the Mozyr‐Lelchitsy tract. According to a previously developed plan, after committing acts of sabotage, the organization was supposed to switch to insurrectionary actions to disrupt mobilization in the frontline zone and deploy a guerrilla war in the rear of the Red Army. The rout of Soviet institutions, state enterprises and mass terror over Soviet and party activists were envisaged. For the orderliness of partisan actions and the convenience of the leadership, it was planned to bring the organization into two independent partisan detachments. During the liquidation of this organization, five emissaries of the 2nd section of the Polglavshtab, who had arrived from Poland to direct its activities, were captured.

The sabotage organization with the center in the village. A drawing of the Senozhatkovsky Polish National Village Council, which had cells in Zhlobin, Gomel and Osipovichi railways. nodes, a total of 82 people, of which 20 are railways. employees. The main composition of the organization is former active members of the Polish sabotage gang of Lieutenant Klets, which operated in the Zhlobin region during the Soviet‐Polish war. The organization was created by agents Parkhimovich, Lipsky, Zakrzhevsky and others specially sent to the USSR by the 2nd department of the Polglavshtab.

The organization was assigned tasks: in peacetime, along with the collection of espionage information, planting sabotage cells on the railway; in wartime ‐ carrying out widespread sabotage, mainly in transport. In particular, an explosion of the railway was planned. bridge across the Dnieper, damage to the railway. canvases on a number of sections of the Western railway, explosions of the Gomel power plant and the Bykhov art town. After committing acts of sabotage, this organization had to switch to partisan actions. The organization managed to deploy extensive espionage work. The investigation established that she gave the Poles an almost complete copy of the mobplan of the Gomel Railway. node and a number of information about the state of the carriage plant. Lancutsky in Gomel.

On the Vasilevichi‐Khoiniki section of the Western Railway a sabotage organization with a center at st. Avraamovskaya, which had cells on the territory of the Mozyr fortified area. 84 members of the organization were arrested, including 24 railways. employees. The head of the organization was assistant. chief of art.

Avraamovskaya Tabulin, recruited by the 2nd department of the Polglavshtab. During the war, the organization was to completely stop movement on the Vasilevichi‐Khoiniki line through a series of acts of sabotage. In accordance with this, when training sabotage cadres, the organization recruited mainly the railway. employees: station attendants, switchmen, water pump drivers, repair workers, locomotive drivers. It is characteristic that the organization had instructions to act only during the war, without showing itself in any way. 40 kg of ammonal and 100 pcs. Were found and confiscated from the head of the Tabulin organization. capsules designed for sabotage purposes. During the liquidation, 2 emissaries of the Polish intelligence were captured, who regularly transferred from Poland to lead the organization.

In the Polotsk fortified area, a sabotage organization created by an agent of Polish intelligence Kuntsevich and numbering 49 people was eliminated. The main task of the organization was sabotage activities during the war on the territory of the Polotsk fortified area, the explosion of the railway. bridges, railway linens and military warehouses. In the city of Vitebsk, the organization created a special cell for the preparation of acts of sabotage against the Vitebsk airfield. Along with this, the organization carried out espionage work and managed to transfer materials to the Polish intelligence service about the state of the 13th tank regiment and the location of the location of the firing points of the fortified area.

At the Korosten Defense Building (UVO), the station created by the agent of the Polish intelligence Rafalskiy was eliminated, which included the hydraulic engineer of the 5th section of the UNR‐51 Vankholsky and the foreman Ocheretny, who handed over to the Polish intelligence the plan of hydraulic structures for the 1st and 5th sections of the UNR‐ 51. Explanatory notes were attached to the drawings, indicating the approaches to the defensive points and the degree of passability of the swampy zone. The station was preparing the transfer of a similar scheme for the 6th section of the UNR‐51.

At the Shepetivka sector of military construction, the station, headed by the technician of the Military Construction Department of the UVO Klang, was eliminated. The residency included the engineer of the Petersdorf section and his brother Eduard, an employee of the railway. battalion in Shepetivka. Petersdorf through Klang transferred the general plan of the military construction site to the Polish intelligence service.

In the city of Borisov (BVO), the station of Vileika reconnaissance was liquidated, created by the Polish agent Kunovsky and headed by the clerk of the 21st military construction site, Anna Nazarevskaya. Lazarevskaya gave the Polish intelligence detailed information on the progress of work on the construction and data on the state of the Borisov garrison.

In the city of Smolensk, the station of the Vileiskaya reconnaissance party was discovered, consisting of demobilized Red Army soldiers from the Smolensk garrison. Being natives of the border zone, they were recruited by the Polish intelligence service even before being drafted into the army, on whose instructions they remained in the city of Smolensk after demobilization and got a job at defense factories and military intelligence institutions. For espionage work, this station recruited a military pilot of the 9th air squadron Matveyev and a minder at the Seshchinsky airport Lyatetsky. The station provided the Polish intelligence with materials about the state of the 64th Infantry Division, military depots of the Smolensk garrison, air units located in Smolensk, and aircraft plant number 35.

In Leningrad, a Polish intelligence station was opened, created by an agent Vitinovich who had arrived from Zakordon, who recruited the commander of a group of torpedo boats Yakubovich and his relative, the commander of a machine‐gun company in Slutsk Paulin. Yakubovich and Paulin gave Polish intelligence detailed information about torpedo boats, their combat properties and about the units of the Slutsk garrison.

In the city of Minsk, a station created by the former detached commander of the 2nd artillery regiment Suchek, who, after his withdrawal as a fist from the army, fled to Poland, was recruited there by Polish intelligence and transferred back to the Soviet side for intelligence work, was opened. Suchek recruited the junior commander of the 2nd artillery regiment Trofimovich, from whom he received a secret topographic map of the Minsk region, a description of the Degtyarev machine gun and a number of information about the regiment.

In the city of Minsk, among the civilian encirclement of the 2nd rifle division, an espionage station of 12 people was eliminated. This station was headed by a Polish agent Andrei Kositsky, who recruited the rear militia of the Minsk garrison rear militia brigade. The residency also included Borchuk, an employee of the canteen of the 241st rifle regiment, who was collecting materials on this regiment, and the accountant of the 97th rifle regiment, Kositsky.

In Vinnitsa, the station created by the former Red Army soldier of the 135th Rifle Regiment Tsekhmistryuk, who had fled to Poland, was liquidated, and he was sent by the Polish intelligence back to the USSR for recruiting and organizing residency. After recruiting among his connections in Ukraine, Tsekhmistryuk went to Moscow, where he penetrated the construction of the Moninsk airfield in order to organize a residency there.

Finnish espionage

The sabotage and insurrectionary activity of the Finnish General Staff, as one of the means of preparing the future theater of war, was most actively deployed on the territory of Karelia and the northern regions of the Leningrad Region.

On this territory, a sabotage and insurgent organization was liquidated, covering 15 districts of Karelia and 8 districts of the Leningrad region. with a total of 1 641 participants. The recruitment of personnel, the creation of cells and preparation for action were carried out under the slogan of ʺGreater Finlandʺ by special emissaries of the Finnish General Staff who arrived from abroad. The task of the organization in wartime was the mastery of the railway. highway and the deployment of partisan actions in the rear of our army, which was supposed to facilitate the invasion of Finnish troops into Karelia. As the direct leaders of the uprising being prepared, 101 saboteurs who had previously passed a special school in Vyborg were transferred to Karelia from Finland. Immediately after the defeat of this organization in 1933, the Finnish General Staff began intensive work to re‐create the destroyed sabotage and insurgency network. Through the emissaries of Finnish intelligence transferred to the Soviet side, the Finnish General Staff managed to create 9 combat squads with a total of 92 people, which were also eliminated by the LPO at the end of 1933.

Finnish intelligence work in espionage is concentrated mainly in the LVO, where the Finns create a widespread intelligence network. An example of such activities of the Finnish intelligence can serve as the following most significant residencies that we liquidated.

Residency at the International Military School in Leningrad, which included a bombing teacher at the Oranienbaum Military Pilot School Tamminen, a platoon commander of the Separate Jaeger Battalion Virkki and a former commander of the Red Army, an agent of Finnish intelligence, Nakkari, who fled to Finland in 1930 and systematically transferred from there to lead acting residencies. This residency, along with the extraction of materials on the school, was tasked with recruiting military personnel for intelligence work and introducing them through the school to various parts of the Red Army.

Residency in the Separate Karelian Jaeger Brigade, headed by the company commander Vuorinen and the Finnish intelligence agent Sutelainen, who was specially transferred from behind the cordon, who, on intelligence instructions, entered the International Military School in Leningrad, and after graduation continued to serve in the Separate Karelian Jaeger Brigade. In addition to the Separate Karelian Jaeger Brigade, part of the 15th division in Novgorod, the 56th division in Pskov, the Shlisselburg garrison and Okhten gunpowder factories in Leningrad were covered by the activities of the residency.

Finnish intelligence station in Leningrad, headed by the head. Bureau of Labor Economics of the Leningrad‐Warsaw Railway engineer Naumov and included a number of former officers who had connections in the army. Dymov, a teacher at the Naval Academy, was recruited from among the servicemen by this station. The station received and transmitted materials on the railways to the Finnish intelligence service. battalion, airfield and pilot school in Oranienbaum, the Naval Academy, submarines, as well as along the Leningrad railway. node.

Residency in the 4th department of the headquarters of the LVO, led by the agent of Finnish intelligence Utriainen Armas, who until May 1932 worked directly in the management apparatus of the 4th department of the headquarters of the LVO. Utriainen from 1923 to 1927 worked in the foreign office of the 4th Directorate and in the Finnish Communist Party, at the same time being an agent of the Finnish intelligence service and acting on its instructions. In 1927, on the instructions of Finnish intelligence, Utriainen returned to Soviet territory, where, while working in the apparatus of the 4th department of the headquarters of the LVO, he supplied Finnish intelligence with materials about the network of the 4th department behind the cordon.

The residency in the Baltic Fleet Navigation Safety Directorate, which consisted of 6 pilots: Polley, Santalainen, Ridalevsky and others. The Finnish intelligence communicated with this station and directed its activities through the captain of the Finnish steamer Altai, Finnish intelligence agent Putus, who came with regular flights to Leningrad ... The station provided the Finnish intelligence with materials on the modernization of the battleship Marat, new submarines, torpedo boats, new forts at Pulkovo and new antiaircraft batteries.

The station of Estonian intelligence was also liquidated there, which included the pilot Belorussov, recruited during his stay in Estonia in foreign voyages, the agent of Estonian intelligence, the tuner of musical instruments Blaubruck, who systematically visited ships, forts and parts of the Baltic Fleet under the pretext of tuning instruments, and the conductor of the battleship Marat ʺ, A former officer of the Austrian army Gostinek. This residency transmitted the information it collected about the Baltic Fleet to Estonian intelligence through the Estonian consul in Leningrad, Lokhka.

Residency in the Kronstadt fire brigade, led by the Finnish

intelligence agent, the driver of this team, Otsolainen. This station included Finnish intelligence agent Beckman, a former participant in the Kronstadt rebellion, who had fled to Finland at one time, where he was recruited by the Finnish secret police and, after the announcement of amnesty to the Kronstadt rebels, was transferred to the USSR under the guise of returning. This station provided Finnish intelligence with a number of information about the Baltic Fleet, in particular, about the armament of the battleship Marat, types of submarines, the location of units, warehouses and headquarters of the Kronstadt fortress, etc. The station prepared for the recruitment of Red Navy men on ships.

German espionage

The activities of German intelligence in the field of organizing espionage and sabotage both directly in the army and at defense factories are characterized by the following data on the liquidated espionage and sabotage stations.

The network of sabotage and reconnaissance stations of the National Socialist Party and the Reichswehr headquarters, which worked under the cover of the Kontrol‐Ko company, was discovered. These residencies covered the military shipbuilding plants named after. Marty and [them.] 61 [Kommunara], fire mine depots in Nikolaev, the Central Telegraph and the radio station. Comintern in Moscow and a number of defense enterprises in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. At these factories, sabotage groups were created with the task of committing sabotage acts during the war. The main sabotage work was aimed at disrupting the submarine shipbuilding, and the investigation established that, by agreement with the Japanese, the sabotage station in Nikolaev on October 22, 1933 set fire to the covered slipway of the shipbuilding plant. Marty, as a result of which two submarines were knocked out. The opened sabotage cell in the firing and mine depots in Nikolaev consisted of Red Army men and junior commanders of the 36th battalion ‐ Mennonite Germans. The activities of these residencies were directed by Otto Sachs, an agent of the Reichswehr headquarters (formerly a court‐martial for espionage in tsarist Russia), who was in Hamburg as a confidant of Control‐Co. He exercised leadership through the German intelligence agent Bernard, a Belgian citizen, who was in Moscow as the chief manager of the Kontrol‐Co office in the USSR. The residency in Nikolaev was headed by an agent of the German General Staff since 1908, Berman, who worked as an engineer at the plant. Marty. The residencies obtained and transmitted to the German General Staff data on the mobilization plan of the plants named after. Marty and [im.] 61 [communard], recipes for armored special steels, produced at the plant. Ilyich in Mariupol, data on the defense workshops of Azovstal, the air defense plan of Moscow, a mobilization plan for the deployment of a telegraph and telephone network in the Moscow region.

A sabotage and reconnaissance station in Moscow, headed by an agent of German intelligence, an employee of the Austrian mission, Meyer, a total of 30 people. The residency was working to create sabotage cells at factories No. 8 in Podlipki, No. 19 and Aviakhim No. 1. She recruited the head. instrumental section of shop No. 2 of plant No. 8 Eifer; Head department of material supply of Aviakhim plant No. 1 Hubert and supervisor of plant No. 19 Bauer. Along with this, Meyer tried to make a number of recruits among the military personnel of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets in order to receive intelligence materials from them.

The reconnaissance station of the German headquarters created and directed by the doctor of the German embassy in Moscow Ling, which covered Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Gorky, Novgorod and the Republic of Volga Germans. The main task of the residency was Ph.D. Job. Along with this, the station had 23 of its agents at the plant in Leningrad, represented by the designers of this plant ‐ Smolyaninov and Sukhotin, who supplied Ling with spy materials on this plant.

The sabotage station of 15 people on Krammashstroy, created by an agent of the German General Staff, a member of the National Socialist Party engineer Zurmollen from the German kulaks who settled in industrial enterprises, was liquidated. The task of the residency was to blow up the Kramatorsk power plant and, thus, disable the Kramkombinat during the war.

In the Kronstadt fortress, an agent of German intelligence, a carpenter of the 41st artillery regiment of the air defense brigade of the MSBM Waldau, was arrested, who was transferring spy materials on coastal defense. Along with reconnaissance work, Waldau worked on preparing the explosion of an ammunition depot in Kronstadt.

In parts of the 13th Infantry Division (SKVO), a spy network of German intelligence was opened, which included 7 Red Army soldiers recruited by the Red Army Zimmerman, who was associated with German intelligence officers ‐ employees of the Druzag concession ‐ Erich and Stefan, from whom he received an assignment before being drafted into the Red Army on the organization of espionage.

In Moscow, the reconnaissance station, working under the cover of the representative office of the German shipping company ʺHamburg Lineʺ and led by the captain of the German service, Müller, was liquidated. With its network, it covered Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa and a number of other points, with the task, along with conducting intelligence work now, to prepare the network for wartime.

For reconnaissance work, among others, Vorberg and Koch, teachers of foreign languages of the RVS directorates, were recruited, Olsen was the reserve commander registered with the 4th Directorate of the Red Army headquarters, Dmitrievsky was the head of the administrative department of the Glavaviaprom. The residency obtained a number of valuable information on the directorates of the RVS and the aviation industry.

Kulak insurrectionary counter‐revolution in the army

The remnants of the defeated class hostile groups (the unbroken kulaks, the former white officers, the ASE from the former people), led in a number of cases because of the cordon, showed tremendous activity in the reporting year in the c. work in the army.

The desire of these groups to penetrate the army, in comparison with the past, has increased enormously, which is clearly evidenced by the fact that in 1933 in the units of the Red Army almost six times more alien elements were identified and seized than in 1932. 3889 people were seized; in 1933 ‐ 22,308 people.

According to their composition, those removed from the parts are subdivided as follows: kulaks ‐ 11 103; former clergy ‐ 427; a politically unreliable element ‐ 8828; others ‐ 2400.

In total ‐ 22308.

The main place among all types of k.‐r. activity in parts of the Red Army is occupied by the kulak‐insurrectionary counter‐revolution. Of the total number of servicemen brought to justice in 1933 for various c.‐r. crimes, the majority are persons who have been active in the rebel agitation, organizing rebel cells, stealing weapons and ammunition, etc., and their number, compared to 1932, has increased markedly.

Of the 2390 servicemen brought to justice in 1933 for k.‐r. crimes, 77% were involved for specific insurrectionary activities, i.e., 1842 people. In 1932, 1,588 people were involved in insurrectionary activity. Thus, the number of persons convicted of being run by an active candidate ‐ r. insurrectionary work in units, increased in comparison with 1932 by 16%.

Along with the activation of K.‐R. work in units, its organization has significantly increased, which is clearly evidenced by the increase in the number of uncovered kulak insurgent groups. In 1932, 208 groups were liquidated, in 1933 ‐ 369, i.e., an increase of 77%. The overwhelming majority of the social composition of these groups is kulaks, former officers and other socially alien elements who have penetrated into the army.

Almost all, without exception, the non‐army conservatives liquidated in 1933. groups and organizations set themselves the task of infiltrating the army. Their work in military units went in the direction of:

a)                   plantations in parts of k.‐r. cells and the involvement of military personnel in insurgency;

b)                  procurement of weapons and ammunition for insurgent actions through the military;

c)                   weakening the combat power of the Red Army through political and moral decomposition of units and organization of sabotage.

On the same lines, the work of the internal army c. elements. Particularly intensive work was carried out in the units located on the western and eastern borders, i.e., in areas of probable theaters of military operations. This is vividly confirmed by the liquidation in these areas of a number of insurgent organizations, in one way or another, associated with the army.

BVO. On the territory of the Smolevichi region (BSSR), the k.‐r. a rebel organization associated with Zakordon and possessing foreign currency, fake documents, which set as its task the deployment of counter‐revolution in the army. The organization recruited a Red Army soldier of the 6th Brigade Regiment, Vercheichik, who was tasked with leading c. work in the regiment.

In the Krichevsky region (BSSR), the insurgent c. an organization led by former officers and kulaks, planning an uprising at the time of the war, which had a connection with Poland through one of the members of the Gorbatovsky kulak organization. Almost all members of the organization were armed with revolvers, the ammunition for which was obtained through a Red Army platoon of the 110th regiment of Slizkovsky who was recruited into the organization, who at the same time led the regiment of K.‐R. work and recruited the battalion chief of staff Filippov and platoon commander Safonov and Shaiduk into the organization. A Red Army soldier of the 32nd Cavalry Regiment Rodin, a member of the rebel organization of the Midovsky District (BSSR), kidnapped a revolver on the instructions of the latter.

Similar to. ‐r. insurgent organizations were opened and liquidated in Meshchovsky, Dubrovensky, Orshansky, Elninsky,

Ekimovichsky districts of the BVO.

UVO. The broad c.‐r. was liquidated. an insurgent organization that covered Gorodnyanskiy, Chernigovskiy, Repkinskiy and other regions, preparing an armed uprising under the slogan of Ukraineʹs secession from the USSR. 643 people were arrested. The organization involved Donenko and Razumny, non‐party members of the 67th str. Regiment of the 23rd division. work in the unit, recruited 3 more yearlings of the same regiment.

In the 138th with the [trelkovy] p [olku] opened the K.‐R. a grouping of commanding personnel of 6 people, which had ties with a gang [it] element. The leader of the group is the head. Yurʹs weapons depot ‐ stole weapons for a bandit group. During a search of his apartment, several rifles and revolvers were found.

KKA. The head of the Baku military port Derbenev was convicted and confessed to stealing 45 revolvers, 1 Browning and cartridges, showing that he was selling weapons to gangs [it] elements.

SAVO. One‐year‐old of the 1st Turkmen Cavalry Regiment (city of Merv) Angalakov, b / p, an employee, stole two rifles from the armory and buried them in the ground. The investigation established that Angalakov acted on behalf of and in community with the son of Mullah Araz‐Mamed and the nephew of Ishan Gurkos, from whom he received 150 rubles as a deposit for rifles.

OKDVA. In the city of Chita, Ph.D. a rebel kulak group of 12 people, led by the son of a kulak, Kurkov, Pavel, who has crept into the party. This group was preparing for an armed uprising against the Soviet regime in conjunction with K.‐R. rebel organization that existed in the Svobodnensky District of the DCK. The group was timed to coincide with the armed clash between the USSR and Japan, for this purpose it was looking for weapons, preparing a plan for an attack on military depots located in Peschanka, and was working to involve new members in the c. organization.

Zab [Aikal] group of troops. In the 106th with the [trelkovy] regiment, the c. a group of one‐year‐olds in the number of 8 people, organized by the fist Prokunin. All members of the group, natives of the socially h [uzhda] environment, in the past members of the liquidated k.‐r. organizations and groups. The group set itself the task of creating a k.‐r. insurgent organization, for which it planned the recruitment of new members, the distribution of c. leaflets, etc. K.‐r. the groupʹs activities were carried out in the direction of the decomposition of the Red Army mass through systematic antiSoviet agitation, calling for collective actions against discipline, undermining the authority and discrediting the command personnel.

Siberian Military District. A large contractor was liquidated. insurgent organization with a center in Novosibirsk and branches in Omsk, Tomsk, Barnaul, Minusinsk, Prokopyevsk, Rubtsovsk, etc., covering 44 populated areas, with 2,114 members. The organization was headed by the former general Boldyrev, who was directly associated with the acting Japanese consul in Novosibirsk Nakamura. According to the directives of the latter, Boldyrev was to use this organization to raise an uprising in Siberia at the time of the beginning of the Japanese [sk] o‐Soviet war. During the liquidation of the organization, 547 weapons were seized.

LVO. Liquidated K.‐R. grouping at the Military Medical Academy. The group consisted of: 1. Martirosyan A.S. ‐ b / p, from employees; 2. Ter‐Poghosyan G.Ya. ‐ candidate of the CPSU (b), from the peasants; 3. Martirosyan ‐ b / p, from the peasants; 4. Shadikyan P.S. ‐ b / p, from merchants; 5. Proshin A.T. ‐ candidate of the CPSU (b), from the peasants; 6. Sarabli D.A. ‐ b / p, former officer; 7. Agishev

M.Kh. ‐ a member of the CPSU (b), from the peasants; 8. Bakuradze

V.I. ‐ Member of the CPSU (b), employee.

The leader of the group was Ter‐Poghosyan. At conspiratorial meetings of the group, political issues and methods of anti‐Soviet work were discussed in an anti‐Soviet context. Its participants conducted anti‐Soviet agitation among the listeners. The group discussed the issue of desertion from the academy and flight abroad, in particular, to France. A member of the group, Alexander Martirosyan, crossed the border with Finland in January 1932, was recruited by financial intelligence and sent back with the task of carrying out terrorist attacks against comrades. Stalin, Voroshilov and Kirov.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that an attempt was made to rob the treasure of the emergency reserve that took place in the 101st squadron (LVO): a group of 4 Red Army men of the 101st squadron (locality Smychkovo, Luga region) entered the emergency store from aim to steal a weapon. The kidnapping failed. The investigation established that the group intended to defect behind the cordon and transmit information about the state of the squadron to the enemy.

On the other hand, a number of K.‐R. groupings discovered in the army, sought to establish contact with extra‐army c. organizations for contacting them with their actions, and also showed tendencies to be involved in c.‐r. the work of the military personnel of other units.

UVO. Participants Ph.D. In order to create a wide organization and plant cells in other military units, the insurgent group, discovered in the 3rd Cavalry Division, consisting of 8 middle commanding personnel, was written off with their former colleagues in other military units. Thus, the leaders of the group, the platoon commanders Kosyakov and Molchanov, processed a number of platoon commanders for recruitment into the organization.

PrivO. In the 246th regiment, the regiment was eliminated. a grouping of 3 servicemen and a student of the Kungur Pedagogical College: 1) a cadet of the regiment of the [ovoy] school Petrushenko, b / p, a single middle class; 2) a Red Army soldier khozrota Simovskikh, b / n, previously convicted for a / c agitation; 3) clerk of Bukharovʹs headquarters, b / p; and 4) student Kulakov, the son of a priest, who, being anti‐Soviet, led Ph.D. work to put together a broad insurgent organization to oppose Soviet power. To this end, they worked on the Red Army men, and in addition, they tried to find a c.‐r. existing somewhere. an organization for joint action. To this end, Petrushenko turned to his comrade (anti‐Soviet) in Ukraine to establish contact with the remnants of the defeated c. organization ʺSVUʺ. Besides, the group planned to use a socially alien element in the insurgency ‐ the exiled kulaks. The group also planned to commit terrorist acts, in particular, the assassination of com [andir] by the troops of comrade Fedko.

Military Academy. Frunze. PA OGPU was arrested for active candidates ‐ r. actions student of the Academy Kolko A.I. (expelled from the CPSU (b) for promoting right‐wing opportunist views), who believes that ʺthe dictatorship of the working class in the USSR has degenerated into a dictatorship against the workers and peasantsʺ, that the way out of this is in an ʺarmy coup.ʺ Having set out to create a wide K.‐R. organization, Kolko processed listeners. He showed this: “With the aim of creating at the Academy of. organization, I thought about which of the listeners expressed dissatisfaction or, according to their past, could become my likeminded person. I had a careful conversation with such listeners. ʺ Further, Kolko showed that “he set the task of contacting any existing Ph.D. organization outside the Academy ʺ, as well as to establish contact with Ph.D. element in other parts: “I thought

A number of candidates liquidated in the Red Army units. groupings had a pronounced nationalist character (UVO, SKVO, KKA, PrivO). The emergence of these groups is the result of:

1.                   Penetration into the army by K.‐R. nationalist (kulak‐bai, Petliura, etc.) elements;

2.                   Organized work of the remnants of underground nationalist organizations (SVU, UVO, Dashnaks, Musavatists, etc.).

UVO. In the 25th section of the division, a Ukrainian insurgent group of cadets of the regiment [ovo] school of the 79th section of the regiment was revealed, consisting of 6 people, led by the son of a kulak Zhimaila, including 3 kulaks, 1 teacher, 1 shoemaker, who set the task of creating an insurgent organization of the Petliura‐type to fight the Soviet regime. The members of the group, according to their units, were processing and recruiting military personnel, and for agitation they used food difficulties in Ukraine.

The investigation established that the members of the group, even before serving in the army, were members of the candidate‐r. national [ichic] youth group in the village. Kovalevka. Before they left for the army, the group gave them an assignment: 1. To work among the Red Army men in order to involve them in the c. performances. 2. Acquire weapons. 6 people were arrested.

The Kiev OGPU department in the territory of Volyn liquidated the candidate of the republics. rebel organization. The investigation established that a group of Ukrainian cadets of the Military Naval School named after Frunze in Leningrad ‐ Kalenyuk, Volneansky, Yevtushenko and others, being dissatisfied with the events held in the village, took the path of the organized K.‐R. work. In March 1933, Kalenyuk and Yevtushenko were expelled from the party and demobilized for a / c work. Before their departure to their homeland, a meeting of the groupʹs members was held, and Kalenyuk was instructed to organize rebel cells in Ukraine. Kalenyuk laid the foundation in Zhitomir among the university youth of 11 c. cells. The main program organizations boiled down to the fact that “Ukraine, both before the revolution and under Soviet rule, is a colony, oppressed economically and politically. The riches of Ukraine are the result of the labor of past generations of the Ukrainian people, and therefore only the Ukrainian people should enjoy the fruits of these labors, that the Soviet regime is not acceptable for the Ukrainian people, because it is undemocratic, etc. ʺ The organization was made by Ph.D. leaflets to be reproduced and distributed. Some of the leaflets were confiscated from Kalenyuk during his arrest. 27 people were arrested.

PrivO. In the 11th Cavalry Division, K.‐R. a grouping of cadets of the regiment [ovoy] school of the 44th regiment, which consisted of national Tatars. The group consisted of 10 people, incl. 7 Komsomol members and 2 party members (all excluded prior to arrest). Among them: Urmancheev ‐ the son of a large plant owner, who had up to 750 hired workers; Gumarov is the son of an active participant in the White bandit movement in Bashkiria; Syrtionov, has a brother ‐ a minister of worship, now exiled.

The members of the group conducted open chauvinistic agitation and sought to unite around themselves the cadets of the national Tatar platoon of the regimental school, called for insubordination to the Russian command, incited nationalist hatred up to open threats against individual commanders, persuaded the unstable Red Army soldiers to desertion, campaigned against the policy of the party and the Soviet government ... The group was in connection with the nationally minded youth of the Orenburg Tatar‐Bashkir

Pedagogical College, where at one time, Ph.D. the national grouping of the Sultan‐Galiev type.

Transcaucasia. In the Vagharshapat district military enlistment office (Armenia), a member of the Dashnak candidate‐r. organizations Melkonyan Mushegh, a native of Nakhichevan region, b / p, artisan. Back in 1927, Melkonyan in Erivan, together with a certain Lapnyan, emigrants from Greece, organized a group of the ʺDashnak Youth Unionʺ.

The group compiled and released a number of K.‐R. appeals calling for terror over the leaders of the party and the Soviet government: Appeals on behalf of the ʺOrganization of Armenian Revolutionary Dashnak Youthʺ were addressed to the working people of the city and countryside, the Red Army and ʺthe entire Armenian intelligentsia.ʺ

In 1930, Melkonyan, being sent to work in Vagharshapat as an accountant of a woodworking workshop, organized a new Dashnak group of 3 people: 1) Tonoyan (exposed and expelled), 2) Yegia (hiding) and 3) Khachik (fled to Persia). This group was led by K.‐R. work for 2 years, and Melkonyan linked her with the Erivan Dashnak organization.

SKVO. In the 3rd company of the 82nd from the [trelkovy] p [olka], a deserter‐bandit group of 5 Red Army nationals (4 Chechens and 1 Ingush), headed by the Red Armyman Khakimov, a Chechen, an individual farmer expelled from the Komsomol, was identified.

The members of the group, having relatives among the gang members of the national regions and being themselves anti‐Soviet, were preparing for an organized escape with weapons from the army and for leaving the gang. The group intensively spread rumors about the appearance in the Vedensky district of the Chechen region. imam, around whom ʺmany people gathered who do not want Soviet power.ʺ One of the members of the group, Zoitov, being in unauthorized absence, had a meeting with a relative, a bandit, with whom he agreed to join the gang. The escape was prevented by the arrest of a member of the group.

For some of the K.‐R. The groups liquidated in the army in 1933 are characterized by the presence of more or less clearly developed political programs, theses, slogans, names, as well as the desire to deeply conspire about their work, which was expressed in the organization of organizations on the principle of fives, the use of codes, etc.

PrivO. In the Saratov armored school, an insurgent‐terrorist group of command personnel was opened, headed by teacher Bystrov, expelled from the CPSU (b), with the participation of a former teacher Sapozhnikov, a comrade from the Unegov school, a schoolteacher Machikhin, a former librarian of the school Sharova, etc.

These persons embarked on the path of the active candidate‐r. work and decided to create an underground party, had several meetings at which they elected a committee composed of Bystrov, Unegov and Sharova, and began active recruiting and campaigning work. Bystrov drew up a draft program for the party they were organizing, first called the ʺRussian Party of the Progress of the Revolutionʺ and then renamed the ʺAll‐Union Party for the Economic Revival of the Countryʺ and wrote an ʺAppeal to All Working People of the USSRʺ intended for distribution among the population and military personnel. The main installation of this K.‐R. group was the removal from the leadership of the country of the current Central Committee of the CPSU (b). At the meetings of the group, the issue of involving a number of new persons in the organization, mainly those who had proven themselves negatively, was discussed. and the involvement of a typesetter in the organization to print appeals. For correspondence between members of the organization, there was a code (testimony of Unegov). An outline of the program and an appeal are attached *.

Military Academy. Frunze. The aforementioned arrested student of the Kolko Military Academy, who was working on the creation of Ph.D. organization, showed: “I meant to create the organization in the academy on the principle of fives, proceeding from the fact that in the current conditions large groups cannot maintain sufficient secrecy. In addition, the principle of fives allows, if one of them fails, to retain the largest number of members of the organization. ʺ

Baltflot. In September 1933, K.‐R. a rebel group of Red Navy men of the electrical division of the battleship October Revolution, which called itself the Fascist Party. The group consisted exclusively of people from a socially alien environment (exposed and expelled from the party and the Komsomol). The groupʹs main task was to prepare an insurgency in the fleet. At the conspiratorial meetings, the methods of conspiratorial work were established, in particular, the stay in the CPSU (b) was used ʺas a screen for conducting a / c workʺ (from the testimony of Ustinov and Koreshkov).

This is also evidenced by Ph.D. the groupings cited in other sections of the report (the case of Zinin et al., the Romeiko‐Gurko case and others, the Bukhteev case, and others).

Finally, it should be noted that some (insignificant) increase in terrorist tendencies in the reporting year on the part of the most embittered and active c. elements.

MVO. OO MVO liquidated Ph.D. a terrorist group headed by the head of the garage of the searchlight regiment Dzyatko (former psalmist), with the participation of: political instructor l‐ro from the [trelkovy] p [olka] of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Gilfman (active

Trotskyist), doctor of the 2nd from [trelkovo] regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Klochkov, master of Goznak Zalessky, priest of Okhotsk and soldier of searchlight] regiment Babko. These persons set themselves the goal of committing terrorist acts.

MVO. In the 85th artillery regiment, the artillery regiment was opened. a group of 7 people, consisting of kulaks and decomposed persons, led by a kulak Polupanov, head. ZVK, which planned to carry out a terrorist attack on May 1. 2 revolvers and 60 cartridges for them were confiscated from members of the group.

SKVO. On June 2, near the building of the Prosecutorʹs Office at the 10th Cavalry Division (Pyatigorsk), a package was found addressed to the commander of the 89th Cavalry Regiment and an authorized OO, which contained two anonymous notes listing a number of facts of self‐supply of the command personnel of the 89th Cavalry Regiment and Resolution No. 2 ʺ Bureau of the Underground Committee ʺ, which instructs the emergency troika to kill the top command and party activists of the regiment.

As a result of the investigation of the OO of the division, the regiment was opened and liquidated by K.‐R. a group that included a clerk: Dashko, a poor man, a former student of the Veterinary Institute, was expelled from the CPSU (b) and twice from the Komsomol, and Semyonov, the officerʹs son, was expelled from the Komsomol. The group set itself the task of spreading the K.‐R. appeals, planned to set fire to the division headquarters and to commit a terrorist act over the division commander and some command personnel. In case of failure, the members of the group intended to fabricate forged documents for themselves and desert with weapons to Ukraine.

LVO. Opened and liquidated K.‐R. organization, headed by the former prince Bebutov, who carried out the candidate‐r. work in parts of the 19th corps and in rural areas of the AKSSR. The organization consisted mainly of former people: nobles, officers, landowners, etc. With the ultimate goal of overthrowing Soviet power by means of an armed uprising and restoration of the monarchical system, the organization set itself the task of:

a)                   the organization of the insurgent c. groups in different regions of the USSR. In particular, it was planned to create insurgent groups in the Kuban from among the Cossacks and in the regions of the


b)                  the organization of acts of sabotage, for which work was carried out to extract ammunition and weapons. Found 5 kg of dynamite, 2 skeins of fuse cord, 35 pcs. detonators;

c)                   organization of terrorist acts against leading party and government officials.

The head of the organization, Bebutov, by his own admission, was looking for connections with Ph.D. White Finnish groups in Karelia and White emigre circles in Finland. Among the members of the organization were servicemen Ermolenko, the son of a merchant, a clerk of the headquarters of the 10th corps and a short‐term officer of the same corps, Danko, the son of an employee. In total, 36 people were arrested in the case.

Terrorist tendencies also had the aforementioned groupings, uncovered at the Saratov Armored School (PrivO), the Military Dog Breeding School and the Central Discovery Center (MVO). In a number of parts, terrorist tendencies were noted on the part of the

K.‐R. loners.

Fascist manifestations in the Red Army

It is especially necessary to dwell on the growth of popularity characteristic of 1933 among the c. element both in the country in general and in the Red Army, the ideas of fascism. This growth is in direct connection with the seizure of power by the fascists in Germany and their openly aggressive plans in relation to the USSR. During the reporting year, special bodies of the OGPU liquidated a number of extra‐army c.‐r. organizations of the fascist type, which, striving for the armed overthrow of Soviet power and the establishment of a fascist dictatorship, worked hard to involve the soldiers of the Red Army in fascist activities. At the same time, fascist groups arose directly in the units of the Red Army.

The program and tactical guidelines of the exposed fascist groups, along with the tasks of creating mass fascist organizations, invariably included terror against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government. Terrorist attacks were supposed to serve as signals for open armed uprisings.

MVO. Opened and liquidated K.‐R. a group that called itself the

ʺRussian Fascist Partyʺ headed by VN Akhov, a member of the AllUnion Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1918, a former SocialistRevolutionary revolutionary, a teacher at the Military Engineering Academy, and in the past head of the mobilization department of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR. In addition to him, the group included: Toporkov A.K., professor‐editor of the philosophy department of Econ. Social Giza, b / p; B.V. Yakovlev, former white officer, former Socialist‐Revolutionary, member of the Metishinpromsoyuz presidium; Telegin N.V., son of a former merchant, b / p, economist of Metishinpromsoyuz; Shepelev A.N., b / p, foreman of MKH; Shepelev I.N., b / p, without certain occupations; Mikhov M.D., a former member of the All‐Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), expelled for anti‐party actions, without specific occupation; Tatulin AR, b / p, locksmith of the ʺDynamoʺ plant, etc., only 10 people.

The group set itself the task of creating a fascist party, the armed overthrow of Soviet power and the establishment of a fascist dictatorship. At a number of illegal meetings, the group members discussed the issue of terror. Considering it necessary to organize mass terror, the group planned to blow up the party congress, for this it was supposed to arrange up to 10 of their like‐minded people in the Bolshoi Theater as workers serving the theater (the group believed that the party congress would take place at the Bolshoi Theater). The members of the group also discussed the issue of

organizing a number of expropriations in order to obtain financial resources for the deployment of c.‐r. work, the task was to establish contact with abroad and create a central leadership of the fascist party there.

During the liquidation of the group, the program of the ʺRussian Fascist Partyʺ, compiled by VN Akhov, was discovered. and two

Nagant revolvers with live ammunition. The program is attached *.

PP OGPU Moscow region A fascist‐terrorist organization of 22 people, called the Union of Russian Patriots, was liquidated, which set its tasks as:

the overthrow of the Soviet system by armed means and the establishment of the Russian fascist dictatorship;

terror against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and members of the Soviet government.

The organization was built on the principle of deeply conspiratorial links with a leading ʺfiveʺ at the head and carried out extensive recruiting work. One of the leaders of the organization was the pilotinstructor of the 9th school of pilots and observers (Kharkov) Solomatin Mikhail Ivanovich, who came to Moscow several times and took an active part in the activities of the organization.

In the Moscow District School of Military Dog Breeding, Dr. the grouping of command personnel, headed by the school doctor Zinin, which included: instructor Khakov, lekpom Abroshin, instructor Samoilov and former veterinarian of this school Strukov, who set as their task the creation of a mass fascist party. During a search of Zininʹs apartment, the following were found: diary with K.‐R. terrorist recordings against party leaders; the project of ʺRussian fascismʺ developed personally by Zinin.

Zinin, outlining organizational and tactical actions in this program, believed that the only correct method in the struggle against Soviet power should be a line to blow up the USSR from within. For this, in his opinion, it is necessary to take into account and involve the dispossessed, expelled from the party, etc. to active work. so that, having organized them in the future, go over to the path of open armed struggle against the Soviet regime.

MSBM. At the Naval School, Ph.D. a group of cadets of the 1st special course, called the ʺCircle of Golden Youthʺ, which included:

Romeiko‐Gurko, the son of a priest, a member of the Komsomol, has an uncle ‐ a former general in London, often visited the club of foreign sailors;

Chebykin, son of the [military] prosecutor of the tsarist army, member of the Komsomol;

Shpotto, son of a Ukrainian landowner, member of the CPSU (b), and others.

These persons, hiding their social origin, managed to crawl into the VMU and cling to the party and the Komsomol under the guise of workers. In Leningrad, there was a safe house where members of the group gathered. A code was developed for the correspondence. The tasks of the group are visible from the following provisions developed by the organizer of the group Romeiko‐Gurko. “Focus on the west, which is waiting for the worst moment. Carry out decomposition in the fleet. Create a state like Hitler or Mussolini, dividing into 3 castes: upper, middle and ʺcattleʺ; cattle ʺto cover up the eyes, allowing to fill the belly.ʺ Create a labor aristocracy, use types like the Kalinyuk, Solovukhin, Shkolnikov, who, being stupid, can still play into the hands. Connect with stronger organizations. There wonʹt be any special excesses ‐ no more than 500 gallows will be required. ʺ

In some parts of the Red Army, there were facts of propaganda of fascist ideas both orally and through the dissemination of K.‐R. appeals.

PrivO. “Well done, Germans, they drove their communists into the chimney. Hitler is not a fool; he will soon get to our communists. It will completely destroy    this         infection”             (reserve commander Seldemirov).

Baltflot. Glavvoenport. Assistant to the head of the technical sector Rozov, b / p, a nobleman, said: “Hitler’s measure concerning the burning of Bolshevik junk (books) is absolutely correct and logical ... We should have done this too, since apart from harm, this literature does nothing ... Hitler is a clever girl, but he shouldnʹt be pushing against France, he would, in my opinion, need to forge a strong alliance with France and jointly act against the communists. The communists in Germany will finally die because Hitler will make them do it with his drastic measures. In addition, the Jews in Germany will not be given any rest and they will all be swept out of there. ʺ

Baltflot. Crew. Engineer Tsidilin, b / p, from among the employees, among the command personnel said: “Hitlerʹs coming to power in Germany is a big event, now Germany is again becoming a large country. Hitler is correctly implementing the decree banning the Communist Party. ʺ

MVO. In the House Administration of the Moscow Military District at Korovievy Brod No. 1, a fascist appeal from the Central National Committee Russia was discovered, calling for the organization of a National Army to overthrow the Soviet regime in the name of the “three‐color national banner” with the slogan “Russia for the Russians”.

It was established that the appeal was disseminated by the former platoon commander of the 3rd section of the regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Bukhteev, b / p, who was out of work. Bukhteev was arrested. The same appeal was found in the dormitory of the Military Academy. Frunze and the Military Engineering Academy. A thorough investigation is being carried out in the direction of opening the organization distributing these appeals. See the appeal in the appendix *.

BVO. 6th artillery regiment. The Red Army soldier Kurashenov, b / p, individual farmer, said: ʺIn Germany, the slogan was thrown out:ʺ Kill the Jews ‐ save Europe. ʺ We will soon have this slogan as well.

KKA. “The premises of the Reichstag were set on fire by workers under the leadership of Thälmann. I am glad that the German government arrested Telman and other [ugikh] communists” (Mirzoyan, Red Army soldier of the 3rd from the [treble] p [olk] of the Armenian division, b / p, individual farmer).

Runaways for the cordon and attempts to them

In 1933, the special agencies liquidated, according to incomplete data, 17 c. gangs and arrested a number of k.‐r. lonely military personnel preparing to flee the cordon. Most of these groups fall on the border districts: LVO ‐ 4; VO ‐ 4; BVO ‐ 3; OKDVA ‐ 2 (data are not complete); KKA ‐ 1. In 1933, 17 servicemen managed to escape beyond the cordon (two of them flew away by plane). In 1932, 15 people fled for the cordon. Servicemen who fled abroad, as a rule, are recruited by foreign intelligence officers, trained in special courses, and transferred to the USSR with reconnaissance and sabotage missions.

OKDVA. On August 15, in the Nikolsk‐Ussuriysk camp, when Antipov, an authorized representative of the Vladivostok division, was killed, a third‐year cadet of the Vladivostok infantry school Leshchinsky, who stole 2 rifles and 250 propellers of [full‐time] live ammunition, was killed in an attempt to escape abroad. Together with the stolen weapon, a two‐page map of the Nikolsk‐Ussuriysk region, a map of Manchuria, a letter to K.‐R. content of 5 liters. and Ph.D. appeal‐appeal to the cadets.

It was established that Leshchinsky was headed by Ph.D. a group of cadets, which included: Mazalov, b / p, a peasant; Tikhonov, expelled from the party, an employee; Kachura, worker; Romanenko, worker. The group was preparing to escape for the cordon, for which they developed an escape plan, arming the participants and stealing horses. The implementation of this plan was delayed. Then Leshchinsky decided to escape independently of the group, which he did. All members of the group are arrested.

UVO. PA UVO arrested the clerk of the headquarters of the 137th artillery regiment (Chuguev) Medynsky, b / p, a poor peasant, a native of Romania, who was preparing an escape for the cordon. During a search, 56 pieces were found at Medynsky. various blank forms, incl. travel letters. It was established that Medynsky was trying to persuade the manager to escape together. office work of the same regiment of the former member of the CPSU (b) Myasnikov. According to Medynskyʹs testimony, he intended to flee to Romania with the help of smugglers known to him and to transfer to the Romanian gendarmerie all the information he knew about the Red Army.

In the 137th regiment of the 46th division, a group of 4 Red Army men and one private citizen was eliminated, preparing an organized care for the cordon. The arrested confessed and testified that before leaving the cordon they intended to carry out a number of armed robberies, and that they knew about the presence of other Red Army men in the regiment who also intended to flee beyond the cordon.

The OO of the 23rd division (Kharkov) liquidated a group of 3 Red Army men of the 3rd communications regiment (two of them collective farmers), who set themselves the goal of deserting the cordon. One of the members of the group (Dyukov) conspired with the others to leave for Poland, hoping to work abroad. Another (Salenko) intended to tell him everything he knew about our radio stations and military equipment, believing that after that he would be well arranged in Poland. The investigation established that the idea of escape for the cordon arose among the members of the group under the influence of the stories of a Red Army soldier of the same regiment Kardashev (a native of Bessarabia) about a good life abroad.

Air defense. A group of 9 Red Army soldiers of the 1st corps [usa] of the artillery regiment, led by the Latvians Bitte and Rusman, who were in contact with relatives in Latvia, was preparing an organized escape to Latvia.

In the event of a collision with the border guards, it was supposed to ʺfight their way throughʺ, for which all members of the group stocked up with revolvers stolen from the regimentʹs warehouse through a member of the group Smirnov. Bitte intended to transfer information about the combat state of the Red Army to the Latvian authorities.

BVO. On February 21, 1933, the junior aircraft technician of the 91st air [via] e [skadrilyi] Strizhov Mikhail Ivanovich, born in 1910, expelled in 1932 from the Komsomol for drunkenness, flew to Poland from the Bobruisk airfield on an I‐5 aircraft.

BVO. On March 26, 1933 from the Smolensk airfield on a P‐5 plane, the pilot of the 57th air [via] o [detachment] Kuchin K. flew to Poland with Letnab Strigin. Strigin, not wanting to stay in Poland and having got there forcibly, returned to the USSR. In December Kuchin was transferred by Polish intelligence to our side and was killed while crossing the state border.

On April 9, 1933, the former commanders of the 98th regiment Shashkov, who served forced labor for drunkenness and brawl, and the chief of staff of the same battalion Moiseenko, a member of the Komsomol, fled. The investigation established that they belonged to K.‐R. the grouping, which included, in addition, the commanders of the same regiment Slavkovich and the chief of staff of the battalion Rokhmanenko. The group intended to make an organized escape to Poland, but Moiseenko and Shashkov deserted earlier than planned due to committing misconduct and fear of being arrested for them.

After the transfer of all that he knew about the parts of the Red Army to the Polish intelligence, Moiseenko was recruited for intelligence work in the USSR, received forged documents, weapons and 2 thousand rubles. money and transferred to the USSR on October 8 with the task of recruiting comrades from the same regiment of Slavkovich. On November 13, Moiseenko was found and arrested. At the section of the 17th frontier detachment, Zosimovich, who fled to Poland in February 1934 after being discharged from the army for anti‐moral actions, was detained by finishing 16 pulbat, quartered in Polotsk, Zosimovich. The latter confessed that upon his arrival in Poland he was sent to the Vilna exhibition and lived in Vilna in a safe house, where he was preparing for intelligence activities. On June 10, I received 1100 rubles from the exhibition. in Soviet currency, the revolver was sent across the border with the task of creating a residency in the Polotsk garrison.

Deserted from the 2nd artillery regiment (Minsk) by finishing Kurek, a Komsomol member, a collective farmer, as it turned out later, fled to Poland, was also recruited by Polish intelligence and transferred back to the USSR. During interrogation, he testified that he had indeed been recruited by Polish intelligence, but allegedly did not agree to the recruitment.

MSFM. A former instructor of the Black Sea Fleet, Ivanov Yakov Ivanovich, was detained in Novorossiysk. Ivanov confessed that in October 1933 he fled from Sevastopol to Romania and in the city of Akkerman conveyed information on the navy, port, coastal fortifications and hydro‐aviation to the Romanian intelligence service. Ivanov was recruited by Romanian intelligence and transferred to Soviet territory on a military‐intelligence mission.

A / c activities of Trotskyist elements

Throughout the reporting year, in various parts of the Red Army, there were single k.‐r. Trotskyist speeches with demagogic attacks against the policy of the party and its leadership. Most of these speeches were the result of the influence on the servicemen of the extra‐army k.‐r. Trotskyist element.

In addition to the Trotskyist agitation on the part of K.‐R. Trotskyist elements in a number of units identified and exposed attempts to group and organized K.‐R. work among the military, but they did not have any success.

Military Academy of Fur [Aniki] and Motorization. ‐ Sorokin, student of the industrial faculty, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1925, a former Trotskyist, was engaged in Trotskyist agitation at the

Academy. During his arrest, a letter from the famous Trotskyist I.N. Smirnov was found in his possession, with whom, as established, he kept in touch all the time. In addition, a Trotskyist platform was discovered at Sorokin.

MVO. OO of the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division for K.‐R. Trotskyist agitation and the distribution of Trotskyist literature among the Red Army men were arrested: The Red Army soldier of the artillery regiment Ivanov, from the workers, b / n, and the Trotskyist Niselson, who was in communication with him (expelled from the CPSU (b) in 1924). Ivanov showed that, under the influence of Niselson, he adopted Trotskyist views and began to conduct a / c agitation with him. Niselson gave him Trotskyist literature, in particular, Trotskyʹs book ʺNew Courseʺ, which Ivanov brought to the barracks to read to the Red Army men. During the search, 12 copies of Trotskyist literature were seized.

Military Engineering Academy. The arrested OGPU OGPU engineer of the research department of the academy Belov II, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1917, testified that as a Trotskyist, from 1931 until the day of his arrest, he had been leading an illegal candidate‐r. Trotskyist work together with a group of Trotskyists, incl. Polonsky (now a teacher in one of the educational institutions), Gaevsky and Toporishchev, who are currently working in Lenzoloto, Siberia, Bychkin, Titov, and others (civil servants). These persons gathered with each other and discussed the policy of the Central Committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the methods of their Ph.D. work.

About the latter Belov showed: “In view of the impossibility of conducting open work against the general line of the party, we all switched to a hidden, illegal struggle. For this purpose, when carrying out K.‐R. Trotskyist agitation, we used all the difficulties that the country is experiencing, excesses in the countryside, discussed the five‐year plan, the role of Stalin and the entire leadership of the Central Committee. In addition, Belov tried to establish contacts with the well‐known oppositionist Timofei Sapronov through the latterʹs brother, who was a student at the same academy, in order to provide him with material assistance.

Siberian Military District. Poploukhin, a one‐year‐old student of the

217th regiment of the 73rd division, conducted conversations of a Trotskyist character among the military personnel of the regiment. Checking Poploukhin established that before being drafted into the

Red Army, he was familiar with the exiled Trotskyist and was under his influence. Poploukhin did not find sympathy among the Red Army soldiers.

Trotskyist groups were also exposed: in the 30th battery of the Baltic Fleet, in the Tula Arms School, in the 194th artillery regiment, in the Vladivostok infantry [otnaya] school, in the 18th pulbat of the BVO, in the Ryazan infantry [otno] school and other [ugikh] units ...

Mismanagement, theft, sabotage

As in previous years, in the reporting year, in many units and institutions of the Red Army there were numerous facts of mismanagement, criminal negligence, malfeasance and embezzlement. For mismanagement and other official and official crimes in 1933, 1488 servicemen were brought to justice, i.e., 26.5% of those involved in all types of crimes in the Red Army. Of these: command personnel ‐ 514 people, Red Army soldiers ‐ 974 people. 121 predatory groups were liquidated, which is 20% of all uncovered groups in the army. Of the numerous facts, we cite:

VOKHIMU. The horse gas masks impregnated according to the VOKHIMU recipe in the strategic cavalry units of the BVO become unusable. Out of 15 thousand impregnated gas masks, 7500 deteriorated after 3‐4 months of storage due to the fact that the rubber interdental pads dissolved under the influence of the impregnation composition. It was found that the impregnation formula, as well as the storage conditions, were not properly worked out by VOKHIMU.

Communications Department of the Red Army. The communications department of the RKKA accepted from the Krasnaya Zarya plant an automatic telephone exchange ordered for OKDVA, despite the plantʹs warning about the impossibility of producing it in a satisfactory form and a note in the acceptance certificate that he did not vouch for the stationʹs work. The station, which cost the Voenvedu 50 thousand rubles, was sent to OKDVA, but three months later it was returned due to its complete unusability. The OKDVA headquarters was left without a station.

UVO and BVO. The OGPU established that over 4,500 thousand rubles were overspent for the construction of the NovogradVolynsky and Minsk fortified areas, a significant part of which was plundered. Due to the lack of proper control and the chaotic state of accounting and reporting at construction, there were massive thefts, ʺadvancesʺ, benefits, etc. were widely issued.

UNI RKKA. A group of 4 people led by pom. the head of the sector Zanoli‐Likhovetsky, who plundered state funds. Through forgeries, Zanoli and persons associated with him appropriated about 20 thousand rubles.

UVI RKKA. A group of false inventors consisting of the former homeowner Ievlev, the former Colonel Zateplinsky, the former military official Gortinsky and the impostor doctor Kachugin managed to get about 150 thousand rubles from the UVI RKKA. to work on deliberately quack proposals.

Research Institute of the Air Force. The head of the 24th sector, Orekhov, a member of the CPSU (b), was convicted of bribery. Transferring the development of technical projects to the owner of a private office Obukhov, Orekhov received from him a total of 30 thousand rubles for this, using a number of private citizens as dummies.

BVO. Due to criminal negligence, lack of control and extreme negligence in the work of warehouse No. 40 (Rzhev) pom. the head of the warehouse, Grishuk, a former Menshevik; the head of the workshop, Lyakhov, the son of a large owner, and a number of other warehouse workers, systematically sent to the units faulty weapons that were being repaired in the warehouse workshop. So, they directed: 10 598 defective rifles, 198 machine guns, 52 guns. In addition, for a number of years, the warehouse had kept obviously unusable weapons, which were listed as suitable: 19 thousand rifles, 496 machine guns.

In the 87th regiment, owing to the extremely chaotic state of accounting and reporting, self‐supply, plundering of uniforms and food products flourished widely in the economic unit. Treasurer Preobrazhensky spent up to 2 thousand rubles, a shortage of a large number of food funds was discovered.

The case involved 18 command personnel headed by pom. regiment commander Marakin, who had a close connection with a socially alien element from the civilian environment.

UNAS‐6‐Orsha. The chief of transport Grudzinsky, forager Martynovsky, the son of a kulak, and the storekeeper Borodaychuk, the son of a kulak, systematically plundered and sold fodder, as a result of which 16 horses fell, and of the remaining 50% were out of order from exhaustion.

LVO. In the Oskonburo, the chief of the Red Armyʹs armaments, a group of workers including 7 people, including 3 former officers, 1 nobleman, 1 former merchant and 2 employees, being bound by mutual responsibility, squandered funds, appropriated them by forgeries, tk. there was no control. More than 50 thousand rubles were stolen. The experimental plant under construction, without being completed, was mothballed, the machines and equipment purchased for it turned out to be unusable.

Significant defects were also noted in the work of the military acceptance. At a number of factories, representatives of the military intelligence allowed substandard (with major defects) military products for supply and armament of the Red Army.

At the plant them. Voroshilov repeatedly recorded cases of acceptance into service of T‐26 tanks with large defects. The 4th Mechanized Regiment received 16 tanks of this type, which could not be put into operation due to defects. The dynamo roll of a tank from the last batch received by the regiment was blown off due to the fact that [the roll] was made of two different parts.

From factory # 40 to warehouse # 36, 44 thousand 122‐mm charges of increased volume were received, as a result of which they do not fit into the sleeve (passed by the military acceptance).

The representative of GAU Dubrovsky, having entered into contact with the technical staff of plant No. 3, received 25% of the marriage among 9 million rifle cartridges.

It should be especially noted the huge thefts in military units and in the system of military cooperation of food funds and clothing allowances. In some cases, the stolen goods amount to hundreds and thousands of tons. The materials on these cases point to the clogging of the military equipment of units and military cooperation with a socially alien element.

Only in the first half of 1933 in the BVO, according to far from complete data, was squandered and plundered: flour ‐ 395 tons of fat ‐ 2 tons of cereals ‐ 31 tons of meat ‐ 37 tons of vegetables ‐ 777 tons of sugar ‐ 6 tons of hay and oats ‐ 815 tons of boots ‐ 925 pairs of greatcoats ‐ 433 pcs. tunics ‐ 1275 pcs.

wide trousers ‐ 1023 pcs. etc. In the MVO for the same time: flour ‐ 318 tons of cereals ‐ 34 tons of sugar ‐ 17 tons of hay and oats ‐ 646 tons of boots ‐ 710 pairs of greatcoats ‐ 371 pcs.

In the OKDVA, 2108 tons of flour were stolen during the same time.

Of the large number of group predatory cases uncovered by special bodies, we cite:

LVO. In the Vologda ZVK, a massive systematic theft of acutely scarce products and goods was discovered. Among the employees of the board, the apparatus of enterprises and retail outlets of the ZVK, there was a mutual guarantee on the basis of embezzlement and joint drinking. All fixed assets intended for the supply of command personnel were plundered and sold to Novgorod speculators. Accounting and reporting started. 21 people were involved in the case, incl. 8 members of the CPSU (b).

MVO. During the construction of Moninskosh and Shchelkovsky airfields, a group of predators from socially alien elements with the participation of members of the CPSU (b) was identified, which systematically squandered and stole building materials, manufactured goods and food funds. 43 people were involved in the case. More than 2 million rubles were stolen.

In the Voronezh ZVK, a group of employees engaged in systematic theft was discovered. In total, goods were plundered for 700 thousand rubles. The ZVK apparatus was littered with a socially alien element. 34 people were involved in the case.

Along with these, the facts of K.‐R. sabotage, group and single (small), by the most active c.‐r. elements that have infiltrated the army.

Armed Forces of the Red Army. In the Armed Forces of the Red Army, the head of the naval sector Sukhinich, a former white officer and engineer Baranovsky, who carried out sabotage work in the construction of gas depots and means of supplying the army with liquid fuel, was arrested. As a result, they disrupted this construction. Both were convicted.

SKVO. On the plane, which was preparing for departure from the 35th aircraft plant (Taganrog), a break in the ignition and lighting wires was discovered, disguised with insulating tape. It was established that the electrician of the Skorobogatov plant did it with a sabotage purpose.

UVO. In the 18th air brigade, bayonet punctures were found on the planes and rudder of the TB‐3 ship. The investigation found that the punctures were made by the Red Army soldier Cherednichenko, b / n, anti‐Soviet, who expressed threats to the command personnel.

Negative moods and manifestations in the Red Army. Dynamics and characteristics of negative manifestations

The political condition of the overwhelming majority of servicemen is quite healthy and stable. The number of people with negative attitudes in individual constituencies ranges from 2 to 4% in relation to the entire personnel of the okrug.

During the first three quarters of 1933, there was a certain quantitative increase in negative sentiments, while the last quarter gave a sharp turn towards their reduction.

Facts of manifestation of negative moods and discontent were taken into account:

IV quarter 1932 ‐ 69 689 or 100%

I       [quarter] 1933 ‐ 89 774 or 128%

II     [quarter] 1933 ‐ 101 389 or 145%

III   [quarter] 1933 ‐ 103 301 or 148%

IV  [quarter] 1933 ‐ 52,247 or 75%

The growth of negative sentiments at the beginning and in the middle of 1933 was caused by the strengthening of the K.‐R. work aimed at disintegrating the army on the part of class‐hostile elements in the country, especially during the period of manifestation of kulak sabotage in certain regions during the grain procurement and spring sowing campaigns of 1933.

This was especially reflected in the variable composition, among which a significant number of people with sharply negative sentiments came to the army from the countryside, which were transmitted, to a certain extent, to the cadre composition.

By official position, those expressing negative sentiments represent:


1932 g.

1933 g.

Rank and file



Junior [hellish] commanders



Chief staff



 In terms of social composition, peasants predominate among the negatively‐minded, but their share decreased from 67.5% in 1932 to 62.6% in 1933, while the share of workers increased from 20.1% in

1932. up to 28.6% in 1933 


1932 g.

1933 g.











100 %


 Party members in the total number of negatively disposed [in] 1933: party members ‐ 17%; Komsomol members ‐ 15.1%.

For the most part, these are young Party Komsomol members from peasants associated with the countryside, or workers with little production     experience,          politically            underdeveloped               and insufficiently stable. The manifestations of negative sentiments are mainly:

a)                   a / c statements against the policy of the party and the government, mainly in the field of rebuilding the countryside, accounting for 60.5% of all facts of negative sentiments in 1933 against 61.8% in 1932;

b)                  dissatisfaction and complaints about the unsatisfactory service and living conditions in the army, especially about supplies and food. Service and domestic discontent in 1933 accounted for 39.5% of all negative manifestations against 38.2% in 1932;

c)                   the number of insurgent statements by individuals decreased in the reporting year by 18% against 1932 (4148 facts against 5054). Threats to command personnel decreased by 10% (5574 facts versus 6191).

Anti‐Semitic manifestations in the past that were recorded quite often in the reporting year were isolated. The most striking of these was the following:

BVO. On March 19, 1934, OBVSh cadet Khaletsky, a member of the Komsomol, a member of the presidium of the bureau of the cell, taking off his equipment, threw it around the neck of the undressed (before bedtime) cadet Vilensky, a Jewish national, secretary of the Komsomol cell, threw him on his bed and began to strangle him, saying: ʺWe need to train, maybe you have to push.ʺ The jumpedup cadet Plevako, a member of the CPSU (b), secretary of the party cell, hit Vilensky several times with his hand, and then, grabbing him by the penis, shouted: ʺWe must circumcise a circumcised.ʺ Several cadets gathered at the noise and laughed at this. Then the chief of the platoon of management Kulik, a member of the Komsomol, who appeared, took an active part in this matter, removing his belt, began to beat Vilensky on his bare back. Cadets Kulik, Plevako and Khaletsky were arrested.

In a number of parts, the inadequacy of the fight against the influence of K.‐R. elements from the political apparatus. Examples:

BVO. In the 4th company of the 71st pulbat, due to the lack of party mass work, insufficient care for everyday life and the separation of command personnel, a significant part of the Red Army soldiers decomposed. The Red Army men began to systematically get drunk, contacted the ASE, and systematically violated discipline. The company command reacted to these phenomena with rough administrative measures, and the party bureau treated them opportunistically.

Comroty Lobanok, arresting the Red Army soldier Pavlov, ordered him to remove the Red Army badge, but the latter refused to do so. There was a fight between them, during which they knocked down a pyramid with rifles.

In the Smolensk autotractor workshops at the beginning of 1933, a number of unhealthy phenomena were noted: the presence of negative political attitudes, a large number of violations of discipline, a significant accident rate, mass discontent of the Red Army about the unsatisfactory food, decomposition of part of the command staff. An investigation by the NGO BVO established that the head of the workshops Firsovich and his pompolit Ivanov, instead of a proper fight against these phenomena, show complete inaction, and Ivanov personally takes part in widespread drunkenness. The head of the repair shop Bondarenko, drinking himself, draws young Red Army men into drinking, among whom discipline has dropped to extremely low limits.

During drunkenness, the commander Kustarev was killed, a policeman was wounded, who tried to detain the rowdy, the commander of the platoon Pashuro intended to commit suicide or kill someone to get rid of the service. The tank commander Bovarevich tried to shoot his wife. There was no social, political and educational         work      in            the auto‐tractor         workshops.         Public

organizations were inactive.

In the 156th and 158th artillery regiments of the 7th sector of the air defense, an increase in a / s and corps was recorded. moods. The special department informed the political sector about this, but the latter did not pay serious attention to it. Later, in the 157th artillery regiment, the regiment was opened. grouping with the participation of party members. Then the political] sector expelled a number of servicemen from the party (in the 156th regiment ‐ 13 people and in the 158th regiment ‐ 17 people)

PrivO. In the bakery of the Sverdlovsk garrison, K.‐R. a group of 4 Red Army men engaged in a / c agitation, under whose influence other Red Army men also fell, because there was no political work among them. This was established by the investigation. The military prosecutor in this case gave the following conclusion: ʺThe said persons committed their crimes due to the lack of educational work.ʺ

On March 2, 1934, the executive secretary of the party collective of the 11th local battalion, Kozhevnikov, a member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1928, in the Red Army since 1920, committed suicide. on the basis of fear of party responsibility for the connection with an alien class element, for admitting persons of alien origin to the party when he was the secretary of a cell, and for the presence of drunkenness among the communists in the party organization. The battalion commander‐commissar Serebrov, pompolit Pischalnikov did not pay due attention to political work in the battalion, and the divisionʹs political department also did not feel proper leadership. The party bureau was disbanded, Serebrov was removed from office and brought to justice.

SKVO. 78th cavalry regiment. Commander‐1 ** Ivashko, a member of the All‐Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), with the complete inaction of the pompolit Nutryakov and the secretary of the party cell com [Andir] Mashenko, openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the partyʹs policy in the countryside, and especially against measures to break the kulak sabotage in the Kuban. In working with a variable staff, he took an openly opportunistic line, as a result of which the original staff was not mobilized to fight the kulak sabotage and lagged behind in grain delivery. The same opportunism of Ivashko was allowed in the combat training of the squadron, due to which the squadron was largely decomposed. Ivashko, Nutryakov and Mashenko were expelled from the party and brought to justice.

In the 8th communications regiment, a number of facts of the complete disintegration of the command personnel of the hozaparat headed by pom. the regiment commander for the households Orlov, a member of the CPSU (b), engaged in theft of property, systematic drunkenness, gold trade and connected on this basis with socially alien elements. The Party organization, having lost its class vigilance, failed to expose these outrages, as well as a number of a / c speeches by members of the group. 11 people were arrested in the case, incl. 8 members of the CPSU (b).

Dissatisfaction with the service and living conditions in the majority is the result of major problems and shortcomings in the economic work of the unit command and insufficient attention to the needs and living conditions of both the Red Army men and the commanding] personnel on the part of the command.

In the units throughout the year, there were numerous cases of food theft (see previous sections), cutting rations, arbitrary reduction in the norms of food supplied to the boiler, unsanitary conditions of canteens and food, which caused poisoning, all this contributed to the emergence of acute discontent among the military.

BVO. In the 5th corps [usnom] the artillery regiment was systematically under‐supplied to the Red Army cauldron up to 500 g of meat per day.

KKA. In the 3rd artillery regiment, 3 g of cereals per person and 20% of the required potatoes were not given out daily for the Red Army cauldron.

UVO. 3rd cavalry division. In the 13th and 14th regiments in May 1934, the norm of food sold for the Red Army food was reduced by

50%. At the same time, contrary to the order of the RVS UVO, 35 ^ 40% of the civilian personnel were on the Red Army rations.

The same reduction in the norms of products was carried out in the 100th artillery regiment by the personal order of the head of the VCD.

PrivO. 85th page div [Iziya]. In the 253rd with the [trelkovy] p [olku], during the transition of units to winter apartments, the command ʺforgotʺ about 227 change workers who worked in the subsidiary plots, and therefore 68 people, despite the onset of cold weather, were housed in tents without beds supplies, some of the Red Army soldiers spent the night in vegetable stores. Mass lice appeared among the Red Army men, their hands were cracked, etc.

In the UVO in 28 military units, 1367 people were affected by mass poisoning. There were 4 deaths. Long‐term treatment was required for 400 people.

According to the Moscow Military District: there were 20 cases of mass poisoning during July‐August, with a total of 1136 people affected.

BVO. On August 1, in units of the 4th Cavalry Division, acute intestinal diseases broke out due to food poisoning. Until the end, 387 people were ill. 6 of the poisoned Red Army soldiers died.

UVO. In the 20th line of the regiment of the 7th division, due to the inaction of the ZVK and the inattention of the regiment command to the issues of material and everyday services for the command personnel, the public catering of the latter significantly deteriorated. On this basis, facts of malnutrition were noted. For example, Grigoriev was at home hungry for several days and did not attend classes. After informing the command of the regiment by the special detachment, being summoned and questioned by the commander of the regiment, he replied: “Yes, I really went on hunger strike with my wife for several days. I had no money, and the salaries were not paid. And I didnʹt want to turn to you (the regiment commander) for help, knowing that you would refuse me anyway. ʺ

Due to malnutrition and poor living conditions, wife pom. Komroty Sagaidachny, a member of the CPSU (b), openly stated: “Why am I going to suffer in hunger and cold and torment my child. There is no further strength, I will ruin myself and poison the children. ʺ The check established that indeed Sahaidachny, in addition to poor material conditions, until November 28, 1933, had not a log of firewood and was sitting with his family in a cold apartment.

The chief of the regimentʹs ammunition supply, Volevakhin, b / p, worker, when asked what kind of wounds he had on his face, openly, in the presence of assistant. the regiment commander and other [ugikh] persons of the command personnel replied: ʺI am starving, and this is from malnutrition, and I will suffer with this until the nutrition is improved.ʺ

A number of similar facts of malnutrition have been noted. As a result, among the command personnel, especially the middle ones, there is anger towards the regiment command, who is considered the main culprit of the poor financial situation: “I eat once a day, I will soon disappear, and my neighbor Grigoriev is completely hungry. The question is, where is the exit, what to do. These parasites (command) eat like drones ʺ(company commander Dubrovin, member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in the command group with the support of commanderin‐chief Yaroshevsky and Zakharchenko, members of the CPSU (b)).

In addition, there were shortcomings in cultural and household provision, in particular, the lack and unsettledness of apartments, especially in OKDVA.

OKDVA. In the garrison of De‐Kastri, cultural and social services and living conditions are difficult. Club work is not well organized, there are no baths and laundry facilities, the command staff is forced either not to wash, or to wash in their apartments, most of which represent a small room where he is accommodated with a family of

2‐3 people.

The houses of the command personnel are two‐story, hastily built, and have no filing under the floor of the second floor. There are no brick stoves in the apartments, the apartments are heated with iron stoves.

In the air town of the 251st air brigade (Chita), residential buildings satisfy only 50% of the needs. 50% of the command staff are forced to rent private apartments at an expensive price. The eviction of private citizens from the homes of the military is extremely slow. In addition, the town is not well‐equipped: the entire territory is polluted with garbage and garbage; residential buildings are cold, electrical wiring is not available everywhere, there is no running water, water is delivered in barrels. It is not uncommon for the command personnel to sit without water and light.

MVO. 17th str. Division. In the garrison of the city of Gorky, 320 servicemen are not provided with apartments, most of them are junior command personnel who remained on long‐term service, and average commanders who have arrived from schools. Due to the lack of apartments, several cases of submission of demobilization reports were noted.

The unsatisfactory work of military cooperation should be especially noted. The plan for the turnover of 646 million rubles, projected by the Central Exhibition Center for 1933. systematically underfulfilled, despite its decrease by 43 million rubles. The irrational use of funds led to the fact that in many districts the funds that were issued centrally for the supply of military personnel were not fully used.

The plan of decentralized procurement was not fulfilled by a number of counties. VKU PrivO fulfilled the plan only by 60%, VKU SKVO ‐ the plan of the first quarter by 50%, the second ‐ by 46%, etc.

BVO. Borisov garrison. During the first quarter of 1933, the ZVK received from the products intended for supply in a centralized order: flour ‐ 59%, cereals ‐ 66%, sugar ‐ 69%, makhorka ‐ 37%, and products such as fish, fats, vegetable oil and canned food was not received at all.

UVO. In parts of the 95th division, due to unsatisfactory catering and deteriorating supplies through the ZVK, up to 70% of the command personnel refused to eat in canteens during November and took rations in their hands.

A similar situation exists in the 46th and 99th divisions.

Discipline state

Discipline in the units of the Red Army in comparison with 1932 has improved and strengthened. Collectives, desertions and suicides significantly decreased in the reporting year:


1932 g.

1933 g.














 However, attention is drawn to the still large percentage of party members and Komsomol members. According to the data for 1933, there were: among the participants of the collective [willows] ‐ 19%; deserters ‐ 28%; suicide and attempted suicide ‐ 50%.

In most cases, the cause of these phenomena was the moral decay of servicemen, and in some cases it was due to the absence or insufficiency of political and educational work.

Siberian Military District. In the 232nd regiment of the 73rd regiment of the division, a command personnel group called the ʺSociety of Bachelorsʺ was discovered, consisting of 5 non‐party commanders, two commanders, members of the All‐Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and 2 non‐party company commanders. The chairman of the ʺSocietyʺ was the commander of the platoon Popryadukhin. ʺSocietyʺ set the task of ʺprotecting bachelors from diseases of venereal diseases.ʺ

Most of the band members are morally corrupt people.

On December 29, one of the members of the group, platoon commander Kaminsky, a member of the CPSU (b), committed suicide.

BVO. In the 16th separate sapbat, 18 Red Army men of the 6th company refused to go to physical exercises. This was preceded by a number of violations of discipline in the company, which was facilitated by the lack of party‐political work among the Red Army soldiers. The party bureau was disbanded, the secretary of the cell was expelled from the party, the political leader of the company and the commissar of the battalion were reprimanded.

KKA. Investigation into the suicide of the treasurer‐clerk of the department of the cavalry [alerist] squadron of the 1st k [avalist] d [viziya] Astashev established that in 1931 he was expelled from the party for drunkenness, but was reinstated by the army [eisk] party committee. In party [ino] ‐ political work he was passive. I treated the service with negligence.

The squadron almost never understood the question of his drunkenness, the command was limited to periodic calls.

In addition, the investigation revealed that in the squadron, group drunkenness among the party commanders is systematic.

Despite the fact that the OO representative signaled about these phenomena, the commander‐in‐chief Sevastyanov, as well as the party organization, did not take any measures, glossing over these phenomena.


F. 2. Op. 11.D. 210. L. 1‐78. The original.

*  Not published.

*  So, in the document.