Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIV SECRET REVIEWS 1934

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  Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIV SECRET REVIEWS 1934

Report of the OGPU about the facts of fraud during sowing. July 9, 1934

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1.D. 68. L. 246‐253. Certified copy, No. 50990

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Stalin

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Kaganovich

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Zhdanov

Chairman of the SNK USSR t. Molotov

I am sending you special messages:

About the facts of fraud during sowing and weeding in some areas of the Stalingrad Territory;

About the facts of fraud during the sowing and hilling of cotton in some regions of Central Asia.

Deputy OGPU Chairman Agranov

Special message from Stalingrad

A special check revealed numerous facts of exaggerated digital data on the performance of sowing and weeding operations, both from the heads of collective farms and some regional leaders.

In the Kamyshinsky district, out of 6 collective farms taken for a sample ‐ in the Iskra Socialism collective farms, information on the implementation of the sowing plan was increased by 354 hectares, Pchelka ‐ by 63 hectares, and Elshanskoe ‐ by 98 hectares.

Exaggerated data were given with the knowledge of the head of the district Kanova. The chairman of the collective farm ʺ2nd Five‐Year Planʺ of the Olkhovsky District, Galkin, increased the data on the implementation of the sowing plan by 94 hectares. Galkin, at the direction of the secretary of the district committee, Lozovoy, announced on June 1 that the sowing of wheat was stopped, and in fact, sowing continued after June 1. (Galkin said that Lozovoy did not give him direct instructions about this, but hinted that this should be done). The chairman of the 2nd Lipovsky collective farm Kamenkov says: ʺThere is nothing to hide that Evdokimov (deputy secretary of the district committee) and I decided to include exaggerated data in the reportsʺ (on May 31, 69 hectares were sown, 105.8 hectares were reported). The Krasny Fighter collective farm of the Novo‐Anninsky region reported that 195 hectares were weeded, but in fact only 25 hectares were weeded. The secretary of the district committee Maslov gave instructions that the information should include, as weeded, [and] the area, not requiring weeding. Based on this, the head. District Khitrov increased the information of collective farms from 19,054 hectares to 20,000 hectares in the district‐wide summary of June 5. On June 10, an additional 30,000 hectares of private land were included as weeded. By order of Khitrov and the chairman of the RIK Polovnikov, a summary was given to the region about the end of sowing, when 600 hectares were still not sown. Deputy Secretary of the regional committee Leonov, contrary to the decision of the regional committee, gave the chairmen of collective farms to plow with bookers, and to plow them so that ʺno one could see them.ʺ Head Raizo of the Ilovlinsky region Volkodavov suggested to the statistician Rubtsov to attribute to the report for May 25 unseeded 1,600 hectares. In addition, Volkodavov forced the chairman of the Kolotsk kolkhoz to show 100 hectares of melons planted, while their planting had not yet begun. (By the decision of the regional committee, the Volkodavs were removed from work with a severe reprimand). On May 1, the director of the Domovskaya MTS informed the district committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that the sowing had been completed, while most of the collective farms continued sowing until May 4. Similar facts on a smaller scale were registered in the Kletsky, Rudnyansky and Kalacheyevsky districts, where the verification of primary materials continues. For all the facts of fraud, the perpetrators were brought to justice. No. 155139.

Sarin

Special message from Tashkent

In the course of preparation for sowing, the sowing itself and the hilling of cotton in the republics of Central Asia (especially Uzbekistan), numerous facts of fraud were noted. The practice of scrubbing in preparation for sowing cotton was expressed in an increase in information about the quantity and quality of plowing, fertilized sown areas, the degree of readiness for sowing of implements, livestock, seeds, measures for crop rotation and training of personnel for sowing (Bukhara, Molotovsky, Vobkentsky, Baumansky, Balykchy regions of Uzbekistan, Burdalyk, Khalach regions of Turkmenistan; Yangi‐Bazar region of Tajikistan, etc.). Board of the collective farm. Khodzhaeva (Vobkent district, Uzbekistan) on April 10 reported that plowing was 100% complete, and an inspection found that by that time there were 200 hectares of unplowed area.

In the course of sowing, the deceit was expressed in the exaggeration of data on the number of areas sown with cotton, the quality and timing of sowing plans. In a number of cases, it was reported that the sowing was completed ahead of schedule, when, in fact, sowing continued or was deliberately suspended.

For 17 districts of Uzbekistan, 4 districts of Kyrgyzstan, 3 districts of

Turkmenistan, 2 districts of Tajikistan, and 2 districts of KaraKalpakia, taken for a sample, it was revealed that eyewash in the course of sowing cotton was given on an area of 2000 hectares.

The director of the MTS Yangi‐Kurgan region of Uzbekistan, Dzhalyalov, having an undersowing of cotton on collective farms of 270 hectares, ordered to provide a summary of the end of sowing. By order of the agronomist of this MTS Pogrebenko, information on the amount of the transplanted area was increased by 555 hectares. Political commissioners for the Jandar agro‐site (Rometan district, Uzbekistan) Alimov and Ibadullaev reported on May 3 that the sowing had been completed, but in fact, as of May 10, 31 hectares were still not sown on the Madaniyat and Kzyl collective farms. On April 30, the political commissioner for the Mirzayan section of the same district, Rozykov, reported on the completion of sowing and the organization of a brigade to help individual collective farms of the Dzhandar agro‐section, while in the collective farms named after Stalin and Voroshilovʹs cotton sowing was not completed by May 10. The secretary of the Yakkabag regional party committee (Uzbekistan) Tatzhiev suggested to the chairman of the First KyzylUzbekistan collective farm, Khaitov, to redo the sowing summary, indicating that 95 hectares were sown instead of 61 hectares actually sown. At the same time, Tadzhiev proposed in the summary for May 10 to show 100% of the planʹs fulfillment, warning the collective farm that he could sow until May 15. Agronomist of the Mitansky agro‐site (Mitansky district of Uzbekistan) Tzhuraev, without the knowledge of the chairman of the village council Sultanov, said that sowing according to the village council was over, while 37 hectares had not yet been sown. The secretary of the primary party organization of the Khanabad s / s of the Voroshilovsky district, Kariev, together with the political plenipotentiary from the district committee of the party, Berdyev, reported on the end of sowing, while sowing on an area of 26 hectares had not yet begun.

A measurement carried out on June 1, 1934 for the Yangi‐Bazar site of the Novo‐Urgench region revealed an undersowing of cotton on an area of 102 hectares. Meanwhile, the Yangi‐Bazar site reported on the end of cotton sowing on May 15. Fraud was sanctioned by the political commissioner for sowing ‐ the secretary of the district party committee Rakhimov. Deputy Chairman of the Kzyl‐Tan collective farm Buriev said: “As of May 10 of this year. I gave a report on the completion of cotton sowing at the suggestion of the secretary of the district committee Rakhimov, meanwhile, on that day, the collective farm had 30 hectares of under‐sowing. Rakhimov told me to submit a report on the end of sowing, and cover the undersowing afterwards. ʺ

On May 1, the regional organizations of the Karakul region (Uzbekistan) reported the end of sowing, while only 170 hectares were not planted on 7 collective farms. For the sole sector, the sowing plan was fulfilled by 60%, and they reported about 100% of the plan. Collective farm them. Voroshilov (Gijduvan district of Uzbekistan) gave a summary that he plowed 78 hectares for the first time, and the seeds are 100% cleaned. The inspection found that only 32 hectares were plowed and 60% of the seeds were cleared. The culprit ‐ collective farm chairman Muratov ‐ has been dismissed.

Commissioner for sowing in the Chaushunsky plot Saidov, a member of the district party committee, gathered representatives of collective farms and gave them the following directive: ʺRegardless of the end of sowing, all chairmen of collective farms must submit a report on the end of sowing by April 28. According to this setting, the collective farms. Molotov, Lenin, Stalin and others presented a report on the end of sowing on April 28, while sowing continued until May 12. Assistant Director of the MTS Bukhara region of Uzbekistan Salaev reported on 100% fulfillment of the sowing plan for the Kharaibadchinsky and Kasants‐Makhmedsky plots, while 150 hectares remained under‐seeded in the first plot, and 80 ha in the second.

On May 15, the director of the MTS Nausskiy district of Tajikistan, Kazharov, reported on the fulfillment of the plan for sowing cotton, while there were 133 hectares unseeded. The foreman of the Komsomol collective farm of the Tashauz district of Turkmenistan,

Nurulaev, exaggerated the data on the progress of cotton sowing on 22 hectares. Assistant to the director of Yangi‐Bazarskaya MTS (Tajikistan) Karaulov and agronomist Kugachev gave eyewash data on the hilling of 108 hectares of cotton. The senior agronomist of the MTS of the Molotov region of Uzbekistan gave the Traktorocenter a report that 303 people were allowed through the courses of field cultivators‐chemicalizers, that the courses worked for 10 days, and in fact the courses worked for 4 days, the attendance was only 40%.

Similar facts of fraud were registered in the Staro‐Bukhara, Kuva,

Gurlenskiy, Deynausskiy, Mangitskiy, Kaganovichskiy, KassanSayskiy, Molotovskiy, Ak‐Darʹinskiy, Katta‐Kurgan, Shakhrinauskiy regions of Uzbekistan; Uzgen district of Kyrgyzstan; Kulyab, Faizabad regions of Tajikistan and a number of other regions.

For the purpose of fraud, unfavorable climatic conditions of the spring of the current year were largely used, under the cover of which the undersowing was often included in the information as a lost crop from excessive precipitation. The uncultivated area was used for non‐cotton crops, and cotton seeds were used for oil distillation.

The sowing commissioner for the Faizabad s / s (Faizabad district of Tajikistan) Babaev, a party member, in order to conceal the undersowing, gave the regional party committee information about the death of 30 hectares of cotton crops allegedly due to rains, while 3 hectares actually died from the rains. 

Noteworthy are the facts of giving exaggerated data on the number of re‐sown dead cotton areas, on the repeated death of crops that did not actually re‐sow after the first death (Namangan region of Uzbekistan and other regions).

With the reversal of the cotton hillock, the facts of giving eyewash data on the quantity and quality of the work done, replacing the hillock with a shelf, thinning cotton, light hoeing, etc. began to be recorded. Collective farm them. Stalin of the Old Bukhara region, having covered 190 hectares, gave a summary of 221 hectares; the collective farm ʺLenin‐Yulaʺ, respectively ‐ 90 and 140 hectares; the collective farm ʺKzyl‐Tolkupʺ gave information about the hilling of 31 hectares of cotton for the first time, at a time when it did not start hilling at all; collective farm them. Of the 3rd International, having covered 56 hectares, he gave a summary of 80 hectares.

For all the above facts of fraud, the perpetrators were brought to justice. Among those involved: 25 sowing commissioners, 30 collective farm chairmen, 10 brigade leaders, 2 secretaries of the regional committee of the All‐Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks, 1 chairman of the RIK, 6 directors of MTS. No. 146055.

Zelentsov

Correct: Commissioner of the 2nd branch of the OGPU SPO

Makovetskaya

The message of the NKVD of the USSR on the progress of the harvest and the political mood of collective farmers and individual farmers in the national regions of the JCC, as of July 10, 1934.

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1.D. 61. L. 297‐304. Certified copy

July 14, 1934

No. 30035

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Stalin

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Kaganovich

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Zhdanov

Chairman of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR c. Molotov

I am sending you a postal telegram on the progress of the harvest and the political mood of collective farmers and individual farmers in the national regions of the NCC.

Deputy Peopleʹs Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Prokofiev

T. Yagoda, Prokofiev, Agranov, Molchanov

From the second half of July, Dagestan, certain districts of Kabarda and Chechnya began harvesting grain crops. At the same time, threshing and bread‐giving were unfolded. An extremely variegated yield is revealed due to uneven rainfall and uneven sowing quality everywhere. On average, the yield of winter wheat and barley gives 6‐7‐8 centners per hectare. Irrigated lands give a rich harvest ‐ from 15 to 25 centners per hectare in the Kizlyar region. After the precipitation, the breads recovered significantly. The actual threshing usually yields more than the yield commissions projected.

Most of the collective farms and the MTS themselves joined in the harvesting inadequately prepared. The complex cleaning equipment is poorly repaired; for the majority of MTS, the repair of the complex equipment is far from complete. For a number of MTS, an unfavorable situation with personnel is being clarified. Kalmykovskaya MTS, for example (in Kabarda), received 2 combine harvesters, and the combine operators are not prepared. Shelkovskaya MTS in the DSSR uses for the first time this year sheaf binders and does not use them well, because did not prepare people.

There are many facts of unpreparedness of containers, barns, currents, a lack of various kinds of materials and small equipment, and an inept balance of forces. This circumstance, as the deadlines for harvesting grain crops approach, forces many MTS to resort to ʺfireʺ measures (manual mowing, release of poorly repaired machines into the field, etc.) to the detriment of the quality of harvesting.

The fight against losses is unsatisfactory. Most of the harvesting machines are without grain catchers. The picking of ears is in many cases ignored (especially in Chechnya).

Threshing is not always safe. Some of the threshers have not been prepared and introduced into the field. Some cases of downtime of threshers from the very first days of work as a result of poor‐quality repairs were noted. In some places, there is a tendency to ignore the accumulation and stacking (especially noticeable in Dagestan).

The bread supply is developing satisfactorily. Most of the collective farms seek to pay off the obligation immediately and in full. In Dagestan, individual collective farms even surrender the stocks of last yearʹs harvest on account of grain deliveries.

Deputy the chiefs of political departments launched a great work to protect the harvest. The guards, accountants, and weighers were cleared of socially alien, unscrupulous elements. A number of demonstrative comradely courts were organized over persons who were negligent in their duties. Cases of theft, however, are already taking place and are mainly due to the members of the families of the repressed element.

The general rate of weeding work on technical row crops, with a sharp lag in the first half of June, leveled off everywhere. However, during weeding, the following shortcomings were noted:

a)                   the work is poorly organized, there is not enough struggle for quality, there are facts of pursuit of quantitative indicators

(Kabarda), cases of fraud (Chechnya);

b)                  most of the communists and collective‐farm and rural leaders do not go to work and do not let their families in, which causes discontent among the collective farmers;

c)                   women in most cases do not stay overnight in the field: husbands categorically forbid, there are facts of beating of wives by their husbands on this basis;

d)                  poorly organized public catering, supply of basic necessities (soap, makhorka, etc.) in the field. A number of cases of acute gastric diseases (Ossetia, Kabarda, Cherkessia) were noted on the basis of the supply of poor‐quality food products;

e)                   there are many shortcomings and distortions in accounting for production rates and recording workdays: egalitarian tendencies, the calculation of workdays by eye, overspending of planned outlines, illegal accrual of workdays to administrative and technical personnel.

The extremely weak work of the institute of quality inspectors is noted everywhere, the leadership of which has been extremely weakened by political departments and local organizations.

Crops of maize, which occupy almost two ‐thirds of the total cultivated area of the national regions, have improved significantly as a result of periodic rains in most regions. Drought losses are significant mainly in areas of low‐quality sowing.

In Baksansky, M [alo] ‐Kabardinsky and Nalchiksky districts of Kabarda, there is a decrease in the types of crops by 40%. In Checheno‐Ingushetia, due to drought, 4,545 hectares of crops perished, or 1.3% of the total sown area. Across all national regions, there are 5,000 hectares of crops seriously damaged by hail, pests and damage.

Favorable crop prospects have significantly improved the political mood in the countryside.

a)   with the onset of the rains, production growth on the collective farms increased;

b)  excluding Chechen‐Ingushetia, field work on collective farms and in the individual sector is high;

c)   the emerging tendency to dump non‐socialized livestock has stopped;

d)  religious activity was dormant everywhere.

The moods noted for leaving the collective farms during the drought (leaving for production) also subsided significantly. On the contrary, the organization of irrigation measures on the collective farms and the improvement in this regard in the types of crops caused in a number of places the attraction of individual farmers to the collective farms.

130 individual farms entered the Ullubieva collective farm of the Makhach‐Kalinsky district of the DSSR from June 5 to 20. In addition, a new collective farm ʺPolitical ownerʺ was organized from 23 farms. Application submission continues.

Negative moods are mainly due to the insensitive, rude attitude towards collective farmers and individual farmers on the part of some heads of collective farms and aulsovets and inept management on their part. Cases of poor organization of public catering (Circassia and Kabarda) cause significant discontent everywhere. In some places, complaints of collective farmers about fatigue are recorded, accompanied by demands to establish a day of rest, ʺlike the workers of the cityʺ (Kabarda, Kalmykovskaya MTS).

 

The situation in Chechen‐Ingushetia should be especially noted, in the flat part of which the following points deserve attention:

As a mass phenomenon, the cultivators have significantly expanded their individual crops this year. In some places, this has created a tense situation with pastures and hayfields. As a rule, these crops are hidden from accounting. In a number of cases, the practice of expanding individual crops was widely promoted by the management of TOZs and aulsovets, which allocated ʺhouseholdʺ lands from 1 to 3 hectares.

In this regard, mass absenteeism in TOZs for weeding work is noted, tk. a significant part of the growers is engaged in the processing of individual crops (mainly maize is sown).

Absenteeism for weeding is also due to the reluctance of the farmers ‐ owners of horses and implements ‐ to work in the field on a par with horseless ones, the desire to shift the burden of weeding work to the latter.

All these phenomena are based on fears of a repetition of the results of the last year, lack of faith in the economic abilities of the management of TOZs, and the desire to insure themselves at the expense of individual crops. These sentiments are also due to numerous organizational and economic problems in TOZs (a lot of disgraceful things about accounting and recording workdays, public catering in the field, organization of work).

The fight against absenteeism is hampered by the weak mobilization of the asset, which in many cases gives the worst examples of indiscipline. Mass explanatory work is often replaced by bare administration. In the village of Starye Atagi of the Urus‐Martan district, the village council arrested 30 tozniks and individual farmers for being absent from work on June 14. On June 15, 15 people were arrested. In Nizhniy Naur, Nadterechny region, armed militiamen are forced to work by force in the morning. In connection with this, 10 farms of the aul moved to other areas.

In the village of Beno‐Yurt in the same district, the village council confiscates property from both collective farmers and individual farmers, including sewing machines and water jugs, for absence from work. The last selected up to 40 pieces. For all these facts, the perpetrators were brought to justice. The heads of TOZs, in response to the aspirations of the poor individual peasants to join the TOZ, declare: ʺBuy a horse ‐ we will accept.ʺ

Also noteworthy is the situation in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, where, in connection with the widespread land management work, a significant aggravation of the class struggle is noted.

The kulaks are actively organizing resistance to land management, provoking old land disputes, terrorizing land surveyors and the poor who receive land from kulak funds, organizing the waste of selective hayfields, disrupting meetings on land management issues, trying to bribe individual village leaders in order to hide the land through them and complicate the work of land management parties.

The activities of the kulaks are facilitated by numerous cases of perversion in the collection of funds for land management. Aulsovets often take away the last foodstuffs, household items from the insolvent poor, collect heavy fines, etc.

In this regard, the rise in the mood of the landless poor, noted by the beginning of land management work, has been replaced by the last time with disbelief in the success of land management. In June, due to the lack of settlement of land management issues, one injury, 3 beatings, 4 cases of disruption of meetings and 5 land clashes were registered. In connection with the aggravation of the old land disputes between individual societies, extremely hostile relations developed. Operational workers were sent to the site. Provocative rumors about the war, accompanied by insurgent calls in places (Chechnya), continue to be widespread. K. R. the element skillfully uses for this purpose the registration of persons liable for military service and the registration of livestock. In some places, under the influence of kulak agitation, there has been a massive shelter of livestock, especially in Chechnya.

According to the manifestations of the organized candidate ‐ r. The most disadvantaged area of the activity of kulak‐anti‐Soviet elements is the junction of the Gudermes, Shalinsky, NozhaiYurtovsky and Vedensky regions of Chechnya, where a number of organizing, partly linked, centers of kulak‐mulʹs and sectarian counter‐revolution have been identified. Attention is drawn to the intensification of bandit elements in the area. The old cadre bandit groups of Khasein Istamulov, Mikhail Gazgireev and Taramov are becoming more active. An operation is underway to eliminate the bandit groups. No. 2952.

Kursk

F. 3. Op. 1.D. 61. L. 297‐304. Certified copy.

 

SPO GUGB NKVD USSR about food difficulties in collective farms, according to deputy. chiefs of political departments of MTS. July 23, 1934

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1.D. 779. L. 545‐547. Copy

July 23, 1934

Top Secret

Tartary

Yutazinskaya MTS. On the collective farms ʺUnited Laborʺ, ʺUbaʺ, ʺMarsʺ acute food difficulties arose. There have been cases of swelling and death among adults and children. In the collective farm ʺMarsʺ 5 people died in five days. Infant mortality from diarrhea has significantly increased on this collective farm. The collective farm has no food supplies.

In recent days, a nursery for 50 children has been organized on the

Mars collective farm, and a medical center has also been organized. Regional organizations do not have bread to provide food aid to these collective farms (report of the head of the STR of the NKVD Directorate in Tatarstan, comrade Avtonomov, dated July 17 [1934]). Ukraine

Bratslav MTS Vinnitsa region On the Shevchenko collective farm, in the first days of mass harvesting, members of the 5th brigade left work at 12 noon due to the lack of catering. The food supplies of collective farmers are extremely limited and the lack of public catering is significant for them. It is characteristic that the initiators of leaving work are themselves provided with food (report from the deputy head of the department of the MTS, comrade Petrov).

Dvurechenskaya MTS, Kharkiv region. In the Budennovsky collective farm named after Many collective farmers of the political department are in dire need of food.

Under the influence of kulak agitation, a member of the collective farm Muratov at the grave of his brother, who died of an ulcer, nailed a plaque to the cross with the following inscription: ʺIn memory of the collective farmer, who died of hunger, Murat Pavlo Stepanovich, ruined by parasites.ʺ

The deceased worked on the collective farm on the delivery of fuel to the tractor columns, received public meals and 600 g of bread a day (report from the deputy chief of the department of the MTS, comrade Shapiro, dated July 19, 1934).

Azov‐Black Sea region

Novo‐Shcherbinovskaya MTS. With public catering for those working in the field, in almost all collective farms, it is unfavorable. Systematic interruptions in the supply of grain to collective farmers. For welding, grout without oil or porridge from rotten corn is invariably given.

In the collective farm No. 3 of the Red Army resettlement in the first brigade of 45 people work 30, the rest are sick (report of the deputy head of the department of the MTS Comrade Prudnik of July 13, 1934).

Sverdlovsk region.

Kiyasovskaya MTS. In the collective farm named after M. Gorky serious food difficulties. The collective farmers ate two dead horses, which, according to the instructions of the veterinary assistant, were to be given to feed the pigs. Beginning the PO took measures to supply the collective farmers with grain by borrowing grain from another collective farm, (report of the deputy head of the p [olit] ‐o [section] of the MTS, comrade Mikheev).

Saratov region

M.‐Serdobinskaya MTS. In all collective farms without exception, there is no grain, in connection with which there is a massive departure of collective farmers to state farms. The output to work is 60‐70%, 40‐50% of collective farmers go to seasonal work.

90% of collective farmers in the villages of Sapsigi, Makaryevsky,

Nikolaevsky, Teplovsky eat exclusively substitutes, mainly greenery. A large number of facts of cutting spikelets were noted (report of the deputy chief of the department of the MTS, comrade

Botikov, dated July 19, 1934).

Head of the 5th department of the STR of the GUGB

Gerasimov

F. 3. Op. 1.D. 779. L. 545‐547. Copy.  

 

Special report of the NKVD of the USSR on the progress of grain deliveries in the Union, as of September 20, 1934

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1 D. 924. L. 1259‐1268. Certified copy

September 27, 1934

No. 30600

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Stalin

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) c. Kaganovich

Chairman of the Council of Peopleʹs Commissars of the USSR c. Molotov

Chairman. Com [ittet] of the Soviet counter [ol] to Comrade Kuibyshev

The organization of acceptance and storage of grain and the struggle for its quality by the Zagotzerno apparatus is unsatisfactory.

Receiving bread

An inspection carried out by the NKVD authorities revealed numerous facts when, through the fault of the workers of Zagotzerno, huge queues are created at the reception points, reaching up to hundreds of carts that stand idle all day waiting for the acceptance of grain. This takes place at the North Caucasian points of Zagotzerno: in Mineralnye Vody, Yessentuki and Pyatigorsk. At these points, the main operations: laboratory research, acceptance of grain, issuance of receipts and, finally, cash payments, are carried out in various places spaced from each other at a distance of 2 to 6 km.

Thus, grain givers stand idle in queues when determining the quality of grain, when weighing it, when receiving receipts, and then at the cash desk for receiving money. As a result of this, at the Zagotzerno point in Yessentuki, many bread‐bearers, having already gone through operations for the delivery of bread and having received a receipt for this, refused to queue up again to receive money and went home without waiting for reckoning.

In the Northern Territory, in the Lalsky District, at the Tselyakovsky point of Zagotzerno, over 100 carts with bread have accumulated. As a result of the untimely reception of bread from the collective farmers of the Anikinsky s / s, the grain was soaked by rain and they were forced to carry the bread back 30 km for drying.

In the Cherevkovsky district of the same region, at the Zabortsky point of Zagotzerno, a large number of carts stood at the point for two days and, not finding the head. point Misikhin, returned home without handing over the grain.

In the Gryazovets district, a wagon train with grain from the state farm. I waited for the 17th party conference for 24 hours to hand over the grain.

In the Vokhomsky district at the Pokrovsky grain station, a large number of carts stood for a whole day, waiting for the receipt of bread. The storekeepers of the Kargopol point of Makarov and the Kotlas point of Nizovtsev systematically drink and do not go to work. As a result, many supplies flow at the reception points and large queues are formed.

In the BSSR in the Klichevsky region at times. Dearly, due to the overload of warehouses, the collective farmers who delivered grain on 50 carts were forced to stand for 24 hours waiting, looking for a new storage area and receiving grain from them. Similar phenomena also took place at st. Drissa and other regions of Belarus.

In the Gorky Territory, at the Zagotzerno point in Cheboksary (Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), due to the lack of lighting, the bread‐bearers who delivered their bread in 100 carts were forced to stay overnight at the procurement point.

Grain storage

Due to the scarcity of storage space, large quantities of grain are dumped outside the warehouses, in riots at the sites and even directly on bare ground in the open air.

So, for example: in the Kursk region. over one million poods. bread is placed in completely unsuitable premises, in riots, and lies in the open air. At the Oboyansk point, 25 thousand poods were poured in the open air. of bread. At the Konyshevsky point lies on the ground [and] 12 thousand poods are not covered. of bread. At

Babarykinskiy point, 10 thousand poods are kept in this position. of bread. At the Zmievsky point, 30 thousand poods are stored in riots. of bread. At the Yashchensky point, where the entire storage capacity is 570 thousand poods, about 700 thousand poods have already been accepted. of bread. At the Svobodinsky point, the storage capacity is designed for 40 thousand poods. Received the same 55 thousand poods. The bread is poured directly onto the ground under the open sky.

In the Voronezh region. the general deficit of warehouse space reaches 5 million poods. At the Tambov point of Zagotzerno, due to overloaded warehouses, 26 thousand poods were poured onto the ground under the open sky. grains.

In the North Caucasus, due to a shortage of warehouses, even highquality grain is poured into simple sheds, etc. corn sites, covered with wooden roofs with large slits and walls of wicker vines. In Essentuki, 100 thousand poods were poured directly onto the ground and not covered. In Mineralnye Vody, 120 thousand poods are stored in the same condition. of bread. In Pyatigorsk, 100 thousand poods were also scattered on the ground. grains.

In the AChK on the territory of the Yeisk elevator lies in riots and in an embankment in the open, not covered, 30 thousand poods grains. At the Persiyanovsk point, 72 thousand poods were poured onto the site. of bread. The canopy of this site is full of holes, which is why the bread floods with water during rains. At the PrimorskoAkhtarsky elevator, 60 thousand poods were poured on the ground and not covered. of bread. At the Rivne elevator, 50 thousand poods are also stored not hidden on the ground. of bread.

In the Gorky Territory, the tensest situation with grain storage takes place in the Udmurt Region, where the deficit of storage capacity is 460 thousand poods.

Construction and repair of warehouses

The situation with warehouse space is in some cases aggravated by the low quality of newly built and renovated warehouses. In the Kursk region. at the Zolotukhinsky point, a new warehouse collapsed when filling grain.

In the Northern Territory, at the Gryazovetsky point of Zagotzerno, a newly built warehouse with a capacity of 120 thousand poods. proceeds, as a result of which the past rain soaked up to 84 thousand poods grains.

At the Zagotzerno point in Veliky Ustyug, 7 new warehouses have roofs leaking, the floors have cracks, the windows are not glazed. As a result, the warehouses are not suitable for receiving bread.

In the Ustyansky district, at the Chadromsky point, the repair of two warehouses was made so poorly that after the first filling of grain, huge cracks formed in them, through which the grain was poured directly onto the street.

A newly built warehouse with a capacity of 120 thousand poods at the ZSK in Bogotolsky district at the Zagotzerno point. when filling it with grain, it collapsed. Its walls were drained, and the roof was leaking.

In the Moscow region. at Teplo‐Ogarevsky point, in many warehouses, the grain mound has a layer height of up to 6 m. Two warehouses of this point are in danger of collapse due to their poor quality.

In Kazakhstan, at the Goloshchekinsky elevator, after filling it with bread, the walls sounded 8 cm.

In the Chelyabinsk region. the repairs at the Chelyabinsk elevator were completely unsatisfactory. After the first rain, the roofs started to leak and the grain stored in it got wet. Water also penetrated through the faulty foundation into the basement. The bread in the silos is wet from the rain and is prone to self‐heating.

Grain quality

The quality state of the grain also continues to be low. Significant lots of bread are infected with mites, have a high percentage of moisture and are subject to self‐heating. As of September 20, 1934, the 1st degree tick infected 209 million 418 thousand poods grains. A tick of II and III degrees infected 27 million 775 thousand 400 poods.

In total, 237 million 193 thousand 400 poods are infected with a tick. of bread. Of the above amount of mite‐infected grain: wet there are 118 million 165 thousand poods, raw ‐ 24 million 961 thousand 380 poods, heated (according to incomplete data) ‐ 15 million 783 thousand 300 poods, spoiled ‐ 440 thousand poods. In some areas and edges, mite infestation of grain is massive.

So, for example: in the Voronezh region. the amount of grain infected with a tick of I and II degrees is determined in the amount of 8 million 400 thousand poods.

The inspection found that at the same time it is subject to selfheating: at the Zagotzerno point in Rossosh ‐ up to 225 thousand poods grains; at st. Mud ‐ 45 thousand poods. grain, at the point Zagotzerno in Shirinkin ‐ 20 thousand poods grains, at st. Baigor ‐ 30 thousand poods grains.

In the Saratov Territory at the Balakovo point, up to 35 thousand poods are subjected to self‐heating. wheat and up to 15 thousand poods of rye.

According to the SVK at 15 checked points, over 620 thousand poods are infected with a tick. grains. At the Bashmakovsky point of Zagotzerno, a tick infestation of I and II degrees of about 7000 poods was detected. grains. The infection of grain with a mite occurred through the fault of the grain inspector Kopeikin (previously convicted of participating in theft), who mixed the infected grain with healthy grain without first checking the quality of the grain.

At the Samara elevator, 18 thousand poods are infected with a tick. wheat and over 140 thousand poods. rye. 32 thousand poods arrived at the same elevator from Ukraine. oats, and 4 thousand pounds, infected with a tick of the II degree.

In the North Caucasus, at 57 points (out of a total of 87), an infected with a tick of I and II degrees was detected ‐ 11 million 700 thousand poods grains. For a number of points (Nezlobinsky,

Blagodarnensky, Essentuksky, Prikumsky, Chernoyarsky, etc.), up to 75% of the total amount of grain is infected with a tick of I and II degrees.

At the Essentuki elevator, due to contamination and self‐heating, it turned out to be unsuitable for seeds of 30 thousand poods. varietal wheat.

In Tataria, at the Zagotzerno point in Naberezhnye Chelny, warehouse No. 6 is subject to self‐heating up to 18 thousand poods grains at temperatures up to 32 .

At warehouse No. 18, nested self‐heating of 9500 poods was found. grains at temperatures up to 35 . Up to 14 thousand poods were stored in warehouse No. 17 at the dryer. heating grain at temperatures up to 35 .

At 15 warehouses of this point 255 thousand poods were found. grains wet, warming and at the same time infected with mites of I and II degrees. At the Shemordansky point, as a result of improper storage, over 50 thousand poods were subjected to self‐heating. grains at temperatures up to 33 . A similar phenomenon takes place at Krasnovidovsky, Aktanyshsky, Arsky and other points.

In the Gorky Territory, at the Mozhginsky point, heating covered 300 thousand poods. grain, on Balezinsky point 200 thousand poods. etc. Tick infected: at Mozhginsky point ‐ 500 thousand poods grains; at the point of the Golyushurminsky winery ‐ 230 thousand poods; at Yarsk point ‐ 40 thousand poods; at the Murom point infected with a tick up to 90 thousand poods grains.

In Khlebny Gorod (Kanavino), all 32 grain warehouses are infected with a mite, which passes into the II degree. At the same time, the grain is subjected to self‐heating.

In the Moscow region. at the Kalininsky point, Zagotzerno is infected with a tick and subjected to strong warming of 300 thousand poods grains.

NKVD measures to preserve grain from damage and possible death.

The NKVD bodies in the field and the commandants at the points and elevators of Zagotzerno adopted a number of measures to preserve the grain from damage and possible death.

For example: in the Kursk region, with the direct participation of the commandants of the points, a warehouse area with a capacity of 4 million 500 thousand poods was additionally mobilized.

Along the Terbunsky Point, where the entire available storage area was loaded with grain, the commandant mobilized warehouses: in the regional consumer union for 15 thousand poods. grain, in Poultry Product ‐ 10 thousand poods, in MTS ‐ 100 thousand poods, church ‐ 15 thousand poods.

In the Naberezhansky point, where all the warehouses were also overflowing with grain, warehouses were mobilized: in the consumer union for 6,000 poods, the raymel plant for 8,000 poods, the Soyuzplodoovoschi site for 15 thousand poods, and the warehouse of the Oborona Strany collective farm for 20 thousand poods.

In the Voronezh region. the NKVD authorities mobilized additional storage facilities for 4 million 380 thousand poods. At the same time,

11,535 pieces were found and mobilized. bags and 64 tarps.

 

In Kazakhstan, in Aktobe, South and Alma‐Ata regions, 65 operational officers of the NKVD Directorate specially sent to provide practical assistance have found, mobilized and transferred to Zagotzerno warehouse area with a capacity of 2 million 431 thousand 300 poods. Warehouses with a capacity of 36 thousand poods were repaired, 22 806 items were found. bags.

In addition, by the measures taken, 600 thousand poods were ground, winnowed, dried and brought into a conditioned state. grain subject to spoilage. They also unloaded 300 thousand poods. grain stored in the open air.

In the Northern Territory, the commandants of the stations repaired and prepared 10 warehouses for receiving grain. 11 warehouses were disinfected, 26 warehouses were provided with fire‐fighting equipment. About 10 thousand poods of grain were shoveled and cleaned.

In the West [adno] ‐Sib [Irsk] Territory, commandants of the points mobilized an additional warehouse space for 180 thousand poods. Scales and weighing equipment received reciprocally from other organizations. The guard is cleared of socially alien people.

In the Moscow region. the measures taken dried and shoveled 5 million 41 thousand 20 poods. defective grain.

In Crimea, the commandants prevented up to 500 cases of attempts on the part of grain suppliers to hand over clearly defective, miteinfected grain to the stations.

Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Prokofiev

 

F. 3. Op. 1 D. 924. L. 1259‐1268. Certified copy.