Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIV SECRET REVIEWS 1934

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  Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIV SECRET REVIEWS 1934

Memorandum of the TO OGPU on the results of work to increase the loading and advance of oil from Stalingrad from December 26 to December 31, 1933 January 1, 1934

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1.D. 602.L. 143‐144. Copy

January 1, 1934, No. 050/2

Top secret

I am reporting the results of work on increasing the loading and promotion of oil from Stalingrad from December 26 to December 31, inclusive:

1)                   the actual check of all oil products at the disposal of Rheineftetorg throughout the Stalingrad junction as of January 1, 1934 was completed. The check showed that the statement by Rheineftetorg about the availability of 7,500 tanks of various oil products for export does not correspond to reality. In fact, 2954 cisterns and kerosene 657 cisterns can be presented for the export of oil fuel.

In addition, 25 cisterns of different oils can be shipped daily, which make up the average daily output of the oil cooker available in Stalingrad. The stocks of raw materials for this oil cooker are equal to the five‐month demand and amount to 55,943 tons. The oil cooker does not have any stocks of products, because everything that it produces daily is completely exported;

2)                   a turning point was created in the fulfillment of the plan for loading oil products. During the 6th five‐day period of December, 917 tanks were poured against the plan ‐ 780, or 117.6%. The average daily filling was [for] the last five days of December 183 tanks against the plan 156. For December 31, 295 tanks were filled, or 189% of the plan.

3)                   in the Stalingrad region, frosts reach 25‐30 degrees. A strong snowstorm that lasted December 28‐29 threatened a number of difficulties for the work of the stations of Stalingrad, Sarepta,

Bannaya and Solyanaya.

The measures taken by the OGPU TO posts with the assistance of the City Council mobilized the necessary number of workers and carts; snow blowers were launched. Within 24 hours, all station tracks were cleared of snow, which ensured uninterrupted operation of the Stalingrad junction;

4)                   the forced loading of oil products in the last five days of December was found by Rheineftetorg at st. Sarepta, where loading takes place directly from barges, completely unprepared. Despite the obvious visibility that the available oil reserves in the Desna, Druzhba and Rion barges equipped for unloading will be pumped out by December 29, Reineftetorg was slow to equip the other three barges

Tom, Alfa, Kemchuk, referring to the lack of pipes, labor and so on.

In view of the threat of stopping the loading of Sarepta, I ordered the OGPU post of Sarepta to begin work directly. Through the OGPU, the necessary pipes, materials, labor were found. During the day, up to 400 m of a steam and oil pipeline was laid to the new barges, which ensured further uninterrupted loading along Sarepta;

5)                   the measures taken have improved the position of the tank farm in the Stalingrad region. The working fleet has grown from an average daily availability of 919 in the 5th five‐day period of December to 1231 tanks in the sixth five‐day period. The average daily empty supply increased from 457 to 656 tanks. The tank car turnover has improved, reaching 7.53 days instead of 7.80 in the fifth five‐day period;

6)                   idle 8 units for washing tanks at st. Gumrak renovated and put into operation. The delays at this station during the technical inspection of tanks have been eliminated;

7)                   the unproductive race of shunting steam locomotives for a set of fuel from st. Bannaya to Stalingrad by organizing the receipt of fuel from Neftetorg on Bannaya;

8)                   Comrade Molotovʹs assignment to ship 600 railroad cars from Stalingrad in December to Donbass was completed ahead of schedule: by December 29, 604 railroad cars were shipped, of which 313 railroad cars (52%) were shipped over the period of December 26‐29.

By agreement with Lesosbyt, on December 30, one route of fastening timber in the amount of 38 cars was shipped to Donbass as a gift to the 17th Party Congress.

Pom. Head of TO OGPU Grach


1) Berry; 2) Stalin; 3) Molotov.

F. 3. Op. 1.D. 602.L. 143‐144. Copy .

Special message of the OGPU on the results of the inspection of the work of the non‐ferrous metallurgy of the Urals. January 17, 1934

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1.D. 596.L. 145‐154. Certified copy

January 17, 1934, No. 50091

Top secret

Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to Comrade Stalin

At this, a letter is forwarded to assistant. Head of the EKU OGPU Comrade Dmitriev, who is part of the brigade of comrade Pyatakov, sent to work on the Ural non‐ferrous metallurgy by the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Deputy OGPU Chairman Prokofiev


The copper industry is a completely forgotten area in the Ural organizations. The restructuring of the work carried out in the Donbass in the coal industry, its experience passed by copper, which works in the old‐fashioned way, has such forms of organization that have long been canceled in other sectors of the national economy.

In addition to all this, in the copper industry, from top to bottom, the deepest deception exists on a massive scale, which literally entered the flesh and blood of every worker.

The Krasnouralsk Combine is in a deep breakthrough: instead of the daily target of 1800 tons of ore and 40 tons of copper, which is clearly an underestimated target, the plant produces on average 1100‐1200 tons of ore and 22 tons of copper. The technical equipment of the mines exceeds that of the Donbass, the mechanization of the processes is colossal, and there is very little sense. On the very first day, we uncovered massive facts of fraud on the part of the plantʹs administration. The spectacle‐eater‐leader tries to cover up his shortcomings both by referring to ʺobjective reasonsʺ and by giving completely fictitious data.

Example No. 1. The administration of the Kompaneisky mine allowed a systematic posting of the ore produced by the steighers, paying the workers for the actually mined ore, which resulted in a shortage of 30 thousand tons of ore at the end of the year.

Example No. 2. When reporting to Comrade Pyatakov on the provision of living space for the miners by pom. the director of the mining department Kosyakov said that as a result of the measures taken, the miners were provided with housing in the amount of over 6 square meters, for each family member. We carried out, on behalf of Comrade Pyatakov, a check of this statement and found that this certificate was a complete deception, and that in fact the living space of the miners ranges from 3 to 3.5 square meters, and up to 25% of all miners continue to live in barracks.

Example No. 3. In November, the copper smelting shop gave inflated figures for the implementation of the program, exaggerating the actual copper smelting by 53 tons. In order to balance the book records, at the direction of the director of the plant Gazaryan, the head of the Brekhovskikh shop (both members of the CPSU (b)) drew up a forged act these 53 tons of copper to one of the contractors of the plant, which in reality, of course, did not exist.

Example No. 4. The flotation pyrite shop of the copper smelting plant was presented under the signature of pom. the head of the shop and the pre‐trade union committee, the requirement to receive in January 131 cards for shock workers of hazardous production. Our inspection found that all workers in this production are only 74 people.

Example No. 5. Wishing to cover up the poor operation of the mine and excessive downtime with “objective” reasons, the technical manager Chernyatiev (member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) resorted to forgery, artificially reducing the number of downtime in December in the information provided and indicating only 109 hours instead of 326 hours. At the same time, idle hours due to non‐energy supply (i.e., from reasons beyond its control) have been increased from 19 to 64 hours.

All these facts could be multiplied, for eyewash in the combine has developed into a system. Carelessness, mismanagement, lack of elementary organization and discipline in the combine lead to directly anecdotal cases.

Example No. 1. At the regional meeting of shock workers (in Sverdlovsk) one of the Krasnouralsk miners Danilov was awarded at the end of 1933 as the best drummer by a cow. Soon Danilov was fired from the plant on charges that he was a truant. We have verified this charge; it was not confirmed.

Example No. 2. A mining worker with 25 years of experience in production Bulavin was repeatedly awarded as a drummer. At the end of December, he was fired for the same reasons as Danilov. The charge turned out to be wrong.

Example No. 3. In September 1933, t. Pyatakov allocated 400 thousand rubles. for individual purchase of cows by miners. We checked this operation, and it turned out that as a result of its disorderly organization, almost none of those who received the money bought cows, spending them on personal needs. Thus, this most important measure for improving the material situation of the workers was thwarted.

Labour Organization

The organization of labor in the mines is useless. All young people work on critical units (hammer drills, electric locomotives, etc.), without any prior training to work on mechanisms. For example, a 17‐year‐old girl runs an electric locomotive depot and does not know the mechanism at all. Children 16‐17 years old work on electric locomotives, they do not know the mechanism. Hence the large number of accidents (which, by the way, are usually not technically investigated and studied), engine burns, etc.

In the mines, impersonality has not been eliminated (such tools as jacks ‐ a type of downhole hammers) are not assigned to the brigades.

Labor discipline is at a very low level. I went down to the mines and saw the workers myself, who, an hour after the start of the shift, were walking around the drifts, the workers stayed for a long time in the underground repair chambers, coming to pick up tools that were handed over for repair.

The managers all complain about the lack of labor, and in many cases, they place it incorrectly, there is an excess of the lower technical staff (foremen) in the mines.


It is also unsuccessful with her. Progressivka ‐ the basis for every restructuring at such mines as Kompaneisky ‐ has not been introduced at all. The bonus system is poorly introduced. Hence all the qualities: both low labor productivity and turnover. We were bluffed with the progressives: at a meeting of the heads of mines and mining administrations, we were told that it was introduced, in reality it turned out to be a lie, a fraud.

Work supply

The condition of the workersʹ supply is worse. All calculations are based on the centralized supply of the Peopleʹs Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Decentralized procurement, despite the wealth of fish and game, in the areas designated for this is extremely unsatisfactory. Thus, for the whole of 1933, one eater had additional self‐procurement products: 1 kg of meat, 1.1 kg of fish, 90 g of game, 19 g of fat, 3 kg of vegetables, 200 g of milk, and 0.5 of eggs. The products of the suburban farms, on the other hand, yield products worth no more than 12 rubles a year. 50 kopecks for every consumer.

The staff of the plant and its canteens are plundered (we examined a number of canteens, the collected material establishing the thefts was handed over to the prosecutorʹs office for organizing a show trial that will take place the other day). The canteens have extremely unsanitary conditions (Kompaneisky mine). When workers come to the canteen, they do not wash their hands and, in most cases, do not take off their overalls. Washbasins in canteens are out of order. The kitchen, floors, dishes, cabinets are in a very dirty condition, dust is everywhere, food is open, covered with flies, cockroaches, etc. The cooking kettles are rusty in many places, the food is tasteless, etc. Cases have been established of the purchase of dead horses by canteens in order to prepare food from them for workers.

The system for storing and distributing food cards is ugly. When we checked, we found a surplus of food cards in the mining party bureau, equal to the ration of 6,000 workers. This surplus was formed due to the complete absence of accounting for the blanks of food cards coming from the printing house and from Sverdlovsk and any control over their issuance.

The distribution of cards and the differentiation of supplies within the entire plant was in charge of independently and completely uncontrollably by a small employee who received 150 rubles. Now he is arrested by us for embezzlement of state money. The attachment of certain categories of workers and the size of the rations given to them depended on the decision of this person. In particular, through his fault, the families of the conscripted Red Army soldiers were removed from the supply, as well as the families of those killed in accidents in the mines. The fact that a large amount of food is being stolen can be judged by the fact that recently the GPU repressed 11 people who plundered the monthly ration of bread for 4,000 workers. The bakery where these thefts were uncovered is in such a state that, after looking at the manufacturing process, you will not want to eat bread: there is dirt everywhere, plaster is crumbling, it flows from the walls, the overalls are dirty, etc.

Living conditions for workers and engineers

Living conditions at the plant are extremely difficult. Together with the state of supply, they directly explain both the turnover of the labor force and the unsatisfactory work of the plant. Few of the workers stay at the plant for a long time. It should be borne in mind that Krasnouralsk is a sparsely populated area, located in the thick of the Ural taiga. The city itself arose only with the completion of the construction of a copper smelter (2 years ago), therefore, the living space here is generally negligible. At the same time, the administration of the plant was very little worried about housing construction.

The plant did not use the appropriations allocated for this purpose by NKTProm. At the same time, the overcrowding and crampedness in the dwellings of even the main cadres (miners, foremen) is absolutely inconceivable. We have established a number of cases when 7‐9 cadre workers huddled in one room, often in two floors (homemade bunks). 2‐3 families or women with children and 5‐6 single men live in one room. The lack of sheds and services forces some of the miners to keep pets in their dwellings. In particular, goats occupy an equal position in their rooms with family members.

The engineering and technical personnel are not in the best position either. Despite the fact that there are only 18 engineers at the mines, the mining department has not yet been able to provide them with even the slightest tolerable living conditions.

The neglect of the workersʹ everyday needs is reflected in the extremely unsanitary state of the plant. The Kompaneiskiy mine, for example, has a bathhouse, but it is closed, although it requires minor repairs. You cannot use the shower at the mine, because the water flows there either only hot or only cold.

A similar situation is at the processing plant, where the shower is full of dirt, and there is only enough water for the first 6 workers. Overalls, as a rule, do not dry, and workers dress them wet when entering the next shift.

Factory position

It is also unsuccessful at the factory. No preparatory work for the winter has been done here. The bunkers at the processing plant are not insulated. The canopy is open on both sides, the windows are broken. The ore is frozen. This delays the supply of ore to the concentrator. The frozen ore often explodes with dynamite, causing the bunkers to collapse. In particular, this ʺdynamite practiceʺ has already destroyed two wooden supports, and all the windows of the canopy over the bunkers have been broken.

The use of ore crusher equipment is the most barbaric. For 11 months, the McCool and Simons crushers were idle for 60% of their working hours.

One of the reasons for downtime is accidents that occur, in particular, from various metal objects (sledgehammers, pieces of rail, etc.) getting into the crushers.

Such accidents can be prevented by installing magnetic catchers in the crusher. According to the head. Popovʹs enrichment plant (member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), these catchers can be manufactured by the plant itself, but the administration has not done this for a number of years.

At the Copper Smelter, out of two converters, only one of the two converters is operating due to a lack of ore, which is under constant threat of accident and failure for a long time. This threat occurs due to the almost complete absence of a roof over the converter shop, due to which snow or ice can get into the converter. This will cause an explosion and damage the converter. The plant management, knowing about this danger, nevertheless does not build roofs, citing the absence of corrugated iron. The converter is often idle, in particular, due to the inexperience and negligence of the service personnel.

The copper smelter still does not have a balance for weighing finished products. The weight expression of the daily output of copper is calculated here, according to the so‐called ʺbayonetsʺ, i.e. very roughly. The factory will know the exact weight of the shipped products in 4‐5 days by rail. invoice. Therefore, the information on copper output sent daily to the region and to Moscow is incorrect and is corrected at the end of the month.

Despite a number of resolutions and acts of special commissions, the plant management did not take the most necessary fire‐prevention measures. In particular, the factory site has not been fenced, sufficient electric lighting has not been installed for such important units as the blower, a two‐way technical alarm has not been arranged, and the existing alarm does not work satisfactorily.

The state of the civilian security guard is unsatisfactory. The majority of the guards are old people who do not have the basic necessary training, are poorly paid and poorly supplied.

A wooden inclined gallery of the kiln shop, built in violation of elementary fire safety rules and requiring immediate serious measures to prevent a possible fire, poses a particular fire hazard.

In terms of direct operational work during our stay in Krasnouralsk, we have done the following:

1.                   A group of foremen of the mines was arrested for registering ore mining for personal gain. Pyatakov agreed with the district committee of the CPSU (b) and the prosecutorʹs office to organize a show trial.

2.                   The manager was arrested. canteen of the plant for the theft of bread, weighing workers. A show trial took place on January 7.

3.                   For theft of cards and embezzlement, the head of the department was arrested and brought to trial. card bureau of mining administration.

4.                   A group of workers of the plantʹs flotation shop was put on trial for registering a larger number of shock workers than in reality.

5.                   A group of employees of the supply apparatus (the head of the base, the head of the store, etc.) was arrested for systematic theft.

6.                   For deception and fraud, expressed in the submission of deliberately exaggerated information on housing construction, on downtime, on the size of copper residues at the plant (we have disclosed all this) to the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the assistant. directors of the mining administration, member of the CPSU (b), Kosyakov, heads of the municipal departments of mines, etc.

Along with this, according to our materials, the head. the metallurgical workshop of the Slabtsov plant, a warning was made about the expulsion from the party of the head. by the Brekhovskysʹ workshop and a penalty was imposed on the director of the plant. All this is for eyewash.

Deputy Head of EKU OGPU Shanin

F. 3. Op. 1.D. 596.L. 145‐154. Certified copy .

Memorandum of the TO OGPU on unloading coal and metal at the Ekaterininskaya railway. for the period from December 26, 1933 to January 22, 1934 January 23, 1934

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1.D. 602.L. 262‐263. Certified copy

January 23, 1934

Top secret

Deputy Chairman of the OGPU t. Yagoda

I am reporting on the results of work on unloading coal and metal from Donbass on the territory of the Ekaterininskaya railway.

For the period from December 26, 1933 to January 22, 1934 as of 17 hours. not only all the current coal mining in the mines of the Stalinugol and Makeevugol associations was removed, but also the coal reserves that were at the places of shipment, subject to orders for transportation by rail.

In the mines of Stalinugol, a total of 285 wagons were left unexplored of coal, with the mandatory norm of the remaining stock of 1223 wagons.

In the mines of Makeyevugol, 291 wagons of coal were left unexplored, with the expected amount of the remaining coal being 327 wagons.

As of December 26, of the past year, Yuzhugolʹs stocks were 2160 cars at Stalinugol and 1036 cars at Makeevugol, or a total of 3196 cars. Over the entire period of operation, 39,265 wagons were transported of coal, incl. except for the stock of current production ‐ 36,069 wagons. The digital data were subjected to the most thorough verification with the participation of representatives of the coal industry, party public organizations, surveying measurements, and acts were drawn up.

During the same period from December 26 of the past year to January 20, 1934, 19,050 wagons were exported. As a result of the export:

1)                   for the group of plants in the Yasinovatsky region (Stalinsky, Tomsky, [named after] Ilyich, Azovstal), the stock of metal ‐ 5980 cars as of December 26, decreased by 1851 cars or by 30.9%, and separately, the decline for plants: Azovstal ”‐ by 43%, [named after] Ilyich by 55%, Tomsky by 57.4% and Stalinʹs by 9.1%;

2)                   for the group of factories in Dnepropetrovsk region, namely: [named after] Dzerzhinsky, [named after] Petrovsky, [named after] Lenin, “DZMO”, [named after] Liebknecht, [named after] the Comintern, stocks of metal ‐ 5712 cars for 26 December decreased by 1590 cars for 20 this year. or by 27.8%, and separately for factories there was a decrease: [named after] Petrovsky ‐ by 20.8%, [named after] Dzerzhinsky ‐ by 24.7%, [named after] Lenin ‐ by 38.8%, DZMO ‐ by 65.7%, [named after] Liebknecht ‐ by 49% and [named after] the Comintern ‐ by 36.1%;

3)                   in total for all factories within the Ekaterininskaya railway. total decrease by 3441 wagons of metal, or in tons by 55 056 tons.

All work on unloading coal and metal was carried out with the broadest assistance and exclusive assistance from the regional party and Soviet organizations, as well as the political department of the road and the Yasinovatsky region, shock‐railway workers, factory and mine workers.

I consider it necessary to note the exceptionally accurate work of the mines, which have been carrying out coal shipment without interruption and without failure, in a number of cases with an excess of the relying norms of loading by 30.40.50%, despite the special cases of the supply of wagons with a significant violation of the periods by hours. So, for example, the mines of the Petrovsky mining administration of the Stalinugol association according to art. Mandrykino last days instead of the shipment norm of 407 wagons, 485 wagons were loaded, and on January 22 ‐ 600 wagons; In one of the groups, the Makeevka Ore Administration, instead of the daily norm of 38 wagons, loaded 60, 70, and in three cases ‐ 100 wagons per day for a considerable period of time.

Head of TO OGPU Kishkin


1) Stalin; 2) Molotov; 3) Ordzhonikidze.

F. 3. Op. 1.D. 602.L. 262‐263. Certified copy . Special message of the OGPU about financial difficulties in the sugar industry. January 29, 1934

Archive: F. 3. Op. 1.D. 602. L. 281‐283. Script.

January 29, 1934

Top Secret

As a result of very large excess losses, which reached 70 million rubles for sugar beet farms. and for sugar factories 32 million rubles, the sugar industry is currently in an extremely difficult financial situation. There is a debt to the State Bank that is not secured with commodity values: for state farms ‐ 58 million rubles, for sugar factories ‐ 29 million rubles. As of January 1, 1934, wage arrears to workers: for state farms ‐ 19 million rubles, for sugar factories ‐ 6 million rubles. Total debts: 112 million rubles.

In connection with such a colossal breakthrough, the bank stopped all lending to state farms, which therefore found themselves in a catastrophic situation: salaries were not paid, spare parts for tractors, fodder, food and various materials were not redeemed. Most of the repairs of tractors have been reduced, and the work of state farms has been paralyzed. The arrears of wages and incentives in some state farms amount to over 200 thousand rubles. The financial difficulties of individual sugar beet farms are presented in the following form.

Kharkov beetroot plant. The results of the financial year as of January 1, 1934, according to approximate data, give a loss in the amount of 28 385 thousand rubles. Wage arrears for the same date amount to 4 622 thousand rubles, incl. for the second half of December 1933 ‐ 1,105 thousand

The Kiev sugar beet factory finished the economic 1933, according to preliminary data, with a loss of about 15 million rubles. The wage arrears of state farms under the trust as of January 1, 1934 were 4,500 thousand rubles.

For some state farms, wage arrears are exceptionally high: for Starinsky beet state farm, arrears are 245 thousand rubles, Andrushevsky ‐ 156 thousand rubles, Kozhansky ‐ 176 thousand rubles, Fundukleevsky ‐ 200 thousand rubles, Pervomaisky ‐ 185 thousand rubles. ...

Due to the lack of funds, the premises in which the workers live are not heated, there are no beds and bedding, in connection with which there is an increased illness among the workers.

A similar situation is noted in other trusts:

On the state farm named after Shevchenko (Kharkiv sugar beet factory), salary arrears are 80 thousand rubles. In the Goloborodovsky beet state farm of the same trust, the debt to seasonal workers amounts to 145 thousand rubles. The resulting disastrous financial situation disrupts preparations for the spring sowing campaign.

Due to the lack of money, the Budyonov beet state farm of the Voronezh beet farm cannot buy the fuel, despite the warnings from the oil warehouse that there will be no fuel in the future. Spare parts are not redeemed.

The Krotov state farm on the Middle Volga also does not buy fuel because of the lack of funds. In the Windigan state farm, the recruitment of workers is disrupted due to non‐payment of wages.

Kursk beetroot. The bank stopped lending to state farms. Due to lack of funds, the arrived spare parts of agricultural equipment cannot be redeemed. For the same reason, the repair of tractors is suspended. Work on the preparation of livestock for the winter also stopped.

The main reasons for the stated facts are due to:

a)                   the mismanagement of a significant number of state farms, which allowed large losses in the loss of yield of both grain and industrial crops;

b)                  low labor productivity, which caused an increase in the number of workers, man‐days and cost overruns in this regard;

c)                   the death of a number of areas of row crops from weeds, reducing the overall yield of sugar beet.

Deputy OGPU Chairman Prokofiev Sending to: 1) Molotov.

F. 3. Op. 1.D. 602. L. 281‐283. Script.