Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIV SECRET REVIEWS 1934

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  Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIII SECRET REVIEWS 1933


Special report of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR on mass diseases of workers due to exhaustion in the city of Zinovievsk, Odessa region. February 9, 1933

February 9, 1933, No. 187 / sp Top secret

t. Yagoda

At the Krasnaya Zvezda plant in Zinovievsk, according to the local GPU apparatus, 237 workers fell ill from malnutrition and exhaustion (protein‐free edema and swelling) during the last 2 months (December and January). For 132 sick workers, the following data on their work experience was established:

with experience from 1 to 3 years ‐ 45 workers with experience from 3 to 5 years ‐ 12 workers with experience from 5 to 10 years ‐ 35 workers with over 10 years of experience ‐ 40 workers

An on‐site inspection revealed that the Krasnaya Zvezda plant has (as of February 1) 221 emaciated workers with signs of swelling; 110 workers (of the above number) have swelling of the face and legs. All these workers went through the factory dispensary and the working polyclinic.

In the city hospital, 8 workers from the Krasnaya Zvezda plant and 17 from other enterprises and local institutions are being cured of exhaustion; there were also 2 unemployed people swollen from malnutrition in the hospital. On February 1, at the reception of patients at the factory dispensary, 6 sick workers were found to have swelling of the face and legs.

The head physician of the workersʹ polyclinic Kondrashov, a party member, referring to the size and nature of morbidity among workers due to malnutrition, made the following statement to the GPU: “I have already reported about cases of hunger edema and severe exhaustion of workers at the Krasnaya Zvezda plant. The certainty of these cases was confirmed by a medical examination. In January (on the 27th), 2 people died. Many workers of the Krasnaya Zvezda plant do not get to the hospital due to the lack of free places. Currently, out of 50 factory workers who have already lost their ability to work, at least 10 will not be able to restore their ability to work, so profound changes have already taken place in the body. The number of cases of exhaustion and hungry edema at the plant reaches 200, and not all of these cases are covered by registration, but only those that end up in the outpatient clinic. Hunger edema and exhaustion are found in other enterprises as        well:      Button   factory,                 winnowing         machine,              communal workers; for small enterprises and institutions of the city in December and January, 61 people who lost their ability to work were those who received sick leave. ”

On the basis of the extremely difficult and tense supply situation, there is an increase in manifestations and strike tendencies among a part of the workers at a / c. Cases of malnutrition from exhaustion cause sharp negative reactions, including from workers who have not previously shown themselves anti‐Soviet, and from individual party members.

“They scoff at us, they give such dinners that dogs wouldnʹt eat, they donʹt give bread for dinner, wages are delayed, and the fools workers are silent and tolerate. If they quit their job and went on strike, then there would be better supplies ”‐ plant turner Brosheletsky.

“Run the program near the machine with one boiling water, and you will probably have to die at the machine. At home they look at one another like a beast ... and they tell us that we are going through difficulties. If there are difficulties, then not for everyone. ”‐ Worker Wing.

“Today in our workshop 7 people were out of order, they went home swollen. Can the Soviet government allow such a mockery of the workers? This can only be done by the bourgeoisie, the counterrevolution, but not in the country of the Soviets ”‐ cadre worker


The general situation with the supply of workers at the Krasnaya Zvezda plant is completely unsatisfactory. Implementation of the SAM plan for decentralized procurement for the first 2 decades of January this year. is negligible, as can be seen from the following data:

The plan for food groceries was fulfilled by 39.1%

The plan for vegetables was fulfilled by 19.1% The plan for dairy products was fulfilled by 7.7%

The plan for meat, fish was fulfilled by 21.2%

The auxiliary food bases of the plant cannot cope with their tasks. As a result of mismanagement, 1454 pigs and 57 horses died last year. The sowing of the air defense missile system yielded an insignificant harvest, and that one is largely squandered; Thus, only 820 tons of potatoes were harvested, although 549 hectares were sown, and the potatoes were not supplied to the factory kitchen at all. 185 tons of vegetables were received from the vegetable gardens of the plant, the workers were given only 109 tons.

The sanitary condition of the kitchen factory is unsatisfactory; food is delivered to the workshop canteens in untied thermoses; the back rooms of the kitchen factory are dirty and not lit. The quality of the food prepared is unsatisfactory, there is no control over the order of spending of the products entering the kitchen. The calorie content of meals does not exceed 400‐500 [kcal] on average.

The tense supply situation is aggravated by the late payment of wages. As of February 1, the wage arrears of the plant workers reached 1,010 thousand rubles. ‐ for the entire December and the first half of January.

Local organizations carried out the following activities:

1.  Diet canteen expanded to include up to 100 workers.

2.  A dispensary is organized by mobilizing funds from local organizations.

3.  From the sums of the mutual aid fund of the Krasnaya Zvezda plant, up to 40 thousand rubles were given out to the workers mutually.

On the line of the GPU, a question was raised before the regional committee to provide immediate assistance to the plant; an investigation has been launched and those responsible for the disruption of decentralized procurement and the discovered abnormalities in supply and public catering are brought to justice.

Deputy Chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Karlson

F. 2. Op. 11 D. 960. L. 38‐41. The original .

















A special summary of the SPO OGPU on the delay in wages in industrial enterprises and construction, as of February 17, 1933.

Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 34.L. 109‐111. Certified copy.

February 25, 1933, No. 143321

Top secret

Arrears in wages to workers were noted for a number of enterprises and construction projects in the Moscow] o [bloc], IPO, Western [adnoy] regions, the Urals, Sibkrai, LVO, SVK and Tataria. In individual industrial districts, industries and enterprises, the debt reaches large amounts.

As of February 1, the debt on IPO reached 20 million rubles, in the Western region. ‐ 10 million rubles; in Sevkra, the debt exceeds 10 million rubles, the largest debt in Sevkra was noted for enterprises that are part of the Sevles trust system (over 7 million rubles).

For enterprises belonging to the Vostokstal (Ural) association, debts to workers in the amount of 10,197 thousand rubles have not been liquidated.

Significant indebtedness was noted for enterprises of the woodworking industry, mainly for veneertrest ‐ Leningrad, Kostroma, Arkhangelsk, etc. ‐ as well as for construction and individual plants in the Moscow region. ‐ Vseviorgstroy, office No. 2 of the Stroitel trust, the experimental plant of the National Research University, the Tankostroy plant.

For a number of enterprises, workersʹ wages are delayed from 2 to 5 months (the Boevik plant, the Kostroma region of the IPO; Kamenskaya stationery, enterprises of the Duminichsky, Dyatkovsky and Bezhitsky regions in the Western [adnoy] region; Kashpir mines and the Samara railway hub in the SVK). A particularly long delay was noted for plywood mills (Krasny Plywoodnik ‐ IPO, Keret and Sunsky ‐ Karelia, Avrov ‐ Leningrad).

At some sawmills of Sevkraya No. 3, 5‐6, ʺTsʺ, 7, ʺKʺ, 24, 27, 29, ʺAʺ and ʺAʺ ‐ note *. The wages are not fully paid from September to October. ... These factories are the most lagging behind in the implementation of the production program, both in terms of gross sawn timber output and export products.

In a number of cases, the culprit is the administration of enterprises (spending of funds from salary funds for other needs, failure to take measures to sell finished products, etc.).

At Uralmashstroy (Ural), the administration spent the money intended for the payment of wages to workers in FZU on the needs of construction. An investigation is underway.

At the resin distillation plant (Ukraine) in January the salary for November and December has not yet been issued. The culprit of the delay is the director Zhukov, who overspend up to 70 thousand rubles intended for salaries. The party organization demanded 45 thousand rubles from the branch of the State Bank. to issue advances to workers. Director Zhukov is being held accountable.

At the end of January, at the Rodnikovskiy Bolshevik Combine (IPO), the salary for the 1st half of December was not yet issued due to the fault of the director, who went on a business trip without leaving his deputy with a salary schedule.

At the Kashpirsky mine (Middle Volga), wage arrears (wages were not issued for 3 months) could be liquidated by selling products (61 thousand tons of oil shale), but due to the inflexibility of the administrative apparatus, the oil shale remains motionless. The same is observed at the foundry in Melekess.

The Central Committee of the woodworking industry, despite the threat of disruption of the industrial financial plan for a number of enterprises, does not take any measures due to the delay in wages. All received telegrams with a request to transfer money are ʺput in a desk drawer.ʺ

Workersʹ mood and ASE activity

A number of conflicts and strikes by workers were registered on the basis of delayed wages; in some cases, the initiators of the strikes were kulaks.

On January 20, 40 workers who had not received their wages in November, December and January went on strike at the construction site of a training center (LVO). Didnʹt work for 4 days. The culprit of the salary delay is the foreman Lvov. An investigation is underway.

FZU Uralmashstroy (Sarapulsky district) did not work for 3 hours workers of the blacksmith and foundry shops. Debt 100 thousand rubles. The strike was initiated by 3 workers; of these, the worker Yegorov walked around the shops, campaigning for the termination of work. An investigation is underway. Informed by the RK and RKK.

At Sawmills No. 5‐6 and ʺTsʺ (Sevkrai) on January 21, a delegation of 3 people was allocated, headed by the chairman of the factory committee Titov. The delegation declared to the administration of the plant: “If you don’t give money, we will send a brigade to Severoles, the State Bank and the regional committee of the AllUnion Communist Party of Bolsheviks”. At some lumber factories and lumber yards in Sevkra, workers refuse to go to work, demanding money.

At timber yard No. 5, rigging workers (up to 20 people) do not go to work due to non‐payment of wages since November. These workers cannot buy back the bread ration and attach themselves to the canteen for lack of money.

Noteworthy is the Italian strike in a construction office in Zelenodolsk district (Tatarstan). There were 38 Italian carpenters in this office, 17 of them were kulaks. The artel, having declared a strike, demanded the immediate payment of wages. When the administration agreed to give out part of the salary, the artel refused this. The strike lasted from January 3 to January 8. At the construction site, 102 fists were identified. 4 kulaks ‐ initiators of the strike ‐ were arrested.

An investigation is underway.

Head of the SPO OGPU Molchanov

Head of the 1st department of the SPO OGPU



Pom. Secretary of the OGPU SPO Svetlov


1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Prokofiev; 4) Poskrebyshev (for Stalin); 5) Molotov; 6) Kaganovich; 7) Rudzutaku; 8) Mironov; 9) in the case; 10) in the department.

F. 2. Op. 11.D. 34.L. 109‐111. Certified copy.

* So, in the document.


Memorandum of the Mosgorzdrav to the OGPU on the epidemic state of Moscow. March 3, 1933

March 3, 1933

Top Secret

In the OGPU

The epidemic state of Moscow in relation to typhus at this time should be considered unfavorable. After relatively low incidence rates ‐ in October ‐ 145, November ‐ 131, and in December there was an overestimate ‐ 201, January ‐ 632 and in February, according to incomplete data ‐ 996 diseases as of March 1. The number of imported diseases in the last quarter of 1932 was 47%. In January, the number of imported goods was 45.8%, and in February, 32.3%.

In February, the composition of patients changed, the number of diseases among industrial workers decreased from 13% in 1932 to 10% in February, and diseases among housewives, family members, and students increased. The most affected areas in February were Sokolnichesky and areas adjacent to stations, Krasnopresnensky ‐ in the Tishinsky market area, Oktyabrsky, Krasnopresnensky in the central parts: Tverskaya and adjacent lanes.

The incidence in the 9th and 10th police stations began on the 20th of January, when an increase in diseases was noted among the homeless and homeless. In February, 38 diseases of housewives and 5 housemaids were registered.

When examining the most affected house ‐ Tverskaya, 38, 100 homeless children were withdrawn from bakery No. 1, more than 40 homeless were withdrawn from the attic of this house. The ongoing seizure caused illness among the police officers of the supervisory authorities. In February, 9 police officers, 5 MURs, 3 OGPUs fell ill and, in addition, 7 diseases were noted in the families of these workers. The ongoing removal of the homeless has confirmed the correctness of the source of the disease from the homeless and homeless. Among those sent to the Danilovsky reception center, 34 homeless children and 5 employees of the Danilovsky reception center who are in close contact with them fell ill.

The same source is the street children jostling in the markets and those coming from the periphery to sell old worn dresses. Tishinskaya square, st. Krasin, adjacent lanes give high incidence rates in connection with the Tishinsky market, where the whole Sukharevka moved. In other areas around the markets, there is also an increased incidence. A large number of diseases are associated with the homeless, huddling in the attics and staircases of large houses, from where the sick were taken out. During the examination, it turned out that some citizens in the cold let homeless people huddled on the stairs into their apartments or gave them their things to hide, got lice and fell ill with typhus. So, in the Bauman region a family of 6 people fell ill; in Krasnopresnensky [district], where the woman who lived on the stairs died, the tenants living on the stairs fell ill.

In connection with the onset of cold weather, there was a significant accumulation of homeless and homeless people in cafes, canteens; during the same time, 30 canteen workers fell ill; As confirmation of the source of illness from the street children was the dispatch to the hospital of a homeless child with typhus directly from the cafeteria. 22 workers of the food store and 14 grain cutters in bakeries fell ill.

The rest of the diseases fall on family members, students, etc. At the same time, it should be noted the increased number of diseases among children of preschool and school age.

It should be noted that there are a large number of diseases among the cleaning women of barracks, houses and institutions, which is explained by the presence of homeless people on stairs and grounds of houses, leaving during the day, but leaving behind lice. Cleaning ladies in the process of work inevitably get parasites.

The lack of cheap hotels for the accidentally homeless leads to overnight stays in barracks; those living in the station districts let visitors into their rooms for the night. This explains the predominant diseases in the areas adjacent to the stations, mainly near Kalanchevskaya square. and the Bryansk railway station, from where there is a large influx of visitors.

Train stations and railway stations are no less important sources. If in September only 2 typhus sick railway workers were taken from the railway stations, in October ‐ 3, in December ‐ 11, in January, in addition to transit, which went directly from the car through the medical room to the hospital, and there were 18 of them, there were 32 those who arrived and lived at railway stations sick for several days. In addition to arriving patients, 7 homeless people who lived at the stations and who were sick were taken from the station in January. The largest number of withdrawn patients coincides with the onset of cold weather from January 12th.

In February, this number increased significantly, 60 homeless people were removed from the stations. The largest number is at the Kazansky station ‐ 25 homeless, Bryansk ‐ 13, Severny ‐ 11, etc. In addition, 98 were removed from the stations and taken to hospitals with typhus in January ‐ 98, in February ‐211.

A party of Kazakhstanis, returning from Karelia to Kazakhstan, among whom there were diseases, huddled at the Kazansky railway station for a decade. All this created a threatening situation both for the city and for the workers who, by the nature of their service, were supposed to be at the station, as a senior station engineer, deputy. chief of traffic, accountant of the directorate, courier of the directorate, accountant of communication, etc. The total number of employees of the Kazan railway living in the districts of the city. got sick ‐ 23 and living on the line ‐ 19. The station served as a place of residence for workers who did not have an apartment, so a labor exchange watchman lived and fell ill at the station, lived at the stationʹs propaganda center and a musician from a military unit fell ill.

All this creates a threat of typhoid spread among the population. At the same time, the sanitary requirements imposed on the roads are not met. There are still no sanitary checkpoints for the threatened groups of workers at the Kazansky, Oktyabrsky, Belor [ussko] Baltiysky, Vindavsky stations. Long‐distance train crews, cleaners, porters go home without sanitization, and diseases in the families of conductors have been noted, two families of cleaning workers of carriages and passenger fleets have become ill.

The sanitary‐technical armament of Moscow is extremely weak. Due to the lack of central powerful disinfection facilities for the treatment of things, it is necessary to use disinfection chambers in hospitals, overloading and disrupting the normal operation of hospitals with insufficient satisfaction of needs.

The percentage of newly built desiccams is negligible. In addition to the existing 168, since January, 27 chambers have been built, 26 are under construction, business executives have not yet begun to build the rest. Business executives in every possible way evade from fulfilling the requirements of sanitary inspection on the construction of magic washers, citing the lack of building materials, etc. 32 movable disinfection chambers were purchased for prophylactic treatment of private apartments and small hostels.

Preparations to combat a possible increase in typhus began in the fall. Conducted sancult trek to them. The 15th anniversary of October was conducted under the slogan ʺFor cleanlinessʺ not only in barracks and hostels, but also in private apartments. Dormitories were inspected. The business executives set strict requirements for the insulation of the barracks, whitewashing, plastering, and the arrangement of magic washers in all hostels with 500 or more residents. This is how 65,727 sq. M. [Art.] Were cleaned. Passed through the sanitary checkpoints 53,913, brought through the baths 109,919 people.

The result of the work carried out was the state of hostels that was safe until recently in relation to typhus. In November, diseases were in 34 hostels, out of a total of about 850, and in December in 36, in January ‐ in 58 hostels, in February the number of diseases in hostels is increasing.

A checkpoint was organized in Krasnopresnensky district and a second checkpoint was opened in Oktyabrsky district. But the construction of a checkpoint in the Stalin region, which has a large number of hostels, has not yet been completed. In addition to the issuance of soap in the checkpoints, soap is issued in the baths of the 3rd category.

The supply of soap to the population is extremely irregular. When examining the household population, there is an increasing lice, explained by the lack of soap and queues in the baths.

There are 42 baths in Moscow with a capacity of 21,260 people, which, of course, does not in any way satisfy the needs of the population. Bathsʹ opening hours have been extended from 8 a.m. morning to 12 oʹclock. discounted nights in the morning hours, weekends destroyed.

In connection with the increase in diseases in February, more than 1000 teams were organized in all regional health services, consisting of a doctor and public activists, of which 350‐400 were released from their main work. The brigades carry out a general examination of all the living with the entry of the revealed lousy apartments on special lists for processing and monitoring them until they are completely dehydrated. During this time, the production of final disinfection was accelerated, the number of machines for chamber disinfection was increased daily to 12.

Since January 1, 116,554 apartments have been inspected, of which 12,292 have been sanitized. 240,914 people have been allowed through the sanitary checkpoints. Processed sets from the private housing sector 60 502 of apartments. 139 555 schoolchildren were examined, 1423 hostels were processed.

The constant shortage of disinfectants makes it impossible to use the most effective parasite‐killing agents. From the required amount of disinfectants for the IV quarter, extremely insufficient was received. Also, the situation is unsatisfactory with the supply of disinfectants. There is no dedicated factory for its preparation.

T [akim] o [brazom], the Sanitary Inspectorate often turns out to be insufficiently armed to carry out the planned activities.

The obligatory 100% hospitalization is carried out with great stress. As of March 1,  1050 typhus beds were opened. An additional 300 beds are slated to open.

Head Mosgorzdrav Efimov

F. 2. Op. 11.D. 33.L. 6‐9. Certified copy .  


Letter from the PP of the OGPU of the Urals on the situation in Magnetostroy. March 20, 1933

March 20, 1933, No. 50136

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Stalin

The OGPU is forwarding to you a letter from the responsible officer of the OGPU plenipotentiary office in the Urals, comrade Schastlivtsev, addressed to the head of the OGPU EKU, comrade LG

Mironov, about the situation in Magnetostroy.

Appendix: mentioned.

Deputy OGPU Chairman Prokofiev


Dear Lev Grigorievich!

The most sincere and warm greetings from Magnitogorsk!

For half a month now, I have been sitting in Magnitnaya in connection with the latest accidents in the blast‐furnace shop. I got acquainted with the Magnitogorsk cases more or less thoroughly. They ‐ these cases ‐ deserve, in my opinion, great attention. Therefore, using this opportunity, I decided to inform you of these matters. I will try to be as brief as possible and dwell on the most essential, the most important at this time.

1.  Piece of history

Roughly, the history of Magnitostroi can be divided into 2 periods: 1) the period of design and initial construction and 2) the period of expanded construction, commissioning (1931‐1932 and JanuaryFebruary 1933).

The first period is well known to you personally and to the ECU apparatus. This is the period of activity of the Gipromezovskaya and Magnitogorsk k.‐r. a wrecking organization (Hasselblat and Co.), which seized Magnitka in its hands even when the latter was, so to speak, in the womb (design, initial construction). In 19301931. the Hasselblat organization is identified and liquidated, Magnitka enters the second period of its existence (further construction and operation with the participation of a new engineering and technical staff, under new technical leadership).

2.  Brief results of construction for 1931‐1932.

What gave 1931 and 1932 from the point of view of the implementation of the construction plan and the commissioning of certain objects? The implementation of the construction plan was slowed down for individual objects up to 1‐2 years (mountain, openhearth, rental).

What is the site at the moment? Magnitka is currently the following

(the main operating and construction workshops):

a)  an operating mine named after Kabakov with one ore crushing plant;

b)  two operating coke oven batteries;

c)   two operating blast furnaces;

d) an iron frame (without roof and walls) of an open‐hearth shop with one completed furnace;

e)  steel frame (without roof and walls) of the rolling shop with one assembled Demag blooming mill;

f)   CES with a finished capacity of 48 thousand kW;

g)  blower.

3. Brief description of the condition and work of the shops

I will not dwell on the characteristics of the state and operation of all operating shops, I will focus on the most important one at the present time ‐ the blast furnace. Before proceeding with this description, I will try to give you an idea of the general appearance of the Magnetostroi site.

It is hard to believe that this is a new construction site. The construction site and operating facilities are littered to amazement. I will not give many examples, I will limit myself, again, to the blast furnace shop. The mighty beauties of the blast furnaces are soiled as if they have been working ʺsince the time of Ochakov and the conquest of the Crimea.ʺ The foundry yard (domain territory) was filled with slag, water, sand, etc. during the year. A fossilized layer of slag and other things, almost as tall as a man, covers the foundry yard. The impression is that there was a long volcanic eruption here. And no one during the entire period of operation touched a finger in order to clean the foundry yard.

All this is being put in order only now, under pressure, in particular, from the brigades of the Uralobkom of the CPSU (b), headed by the regional committee secretary Golovin, who came to Magnitogorsk to eliminate the breakthrough.

The cleaning of the foundry has been going on for two weeks. Final cleaning will take several more weeks. This is ʺclutterʺ. And so, at almost every step.

One of the furnaces described the state of the industrial objects and, so to speak, the local ʺstyleʺ of work as follows: ʺWe work like people, but we do dirty tricks like oxen.ʺ It is said very well. The territory of the blast‐furnace shop is littered not only with slag, scrap, parts of equipment, pipes, etc., but also with something worse. In the absence of latrines on the territory of the blast‐furnace shop, pipes and other more or less suitable pieces of equipment are used for individual and public latrines. This is the case in other workshops.

Now I turn to the question of operating the domain. For the entire period of operation of the domain (round ‐ [for] a year), they showed only one single decade, the so‐called ʺstorming decadeʺ (the third decade of October 1932), showed the design capacity (2000 tons per day). The rest of the time they were far from their design capacity. The state of blast furnaces over the entire period of their existence can be characterized as continuously emergency. ʺThey walk for a day, donʹt walk for two.ʺ Tuyeres are poured and burned, entrances become angry and lost, refrigerators burn, etc. etc. The result is countless oven shutdowns.

The technological process    was     and     is     being     conducted

incorrectly. The furnaces were systematically operated so that the temperature on the top of the furnaces reached 1000 C instead of the normal 250‐300 C. Countless stoppages, sharp temperature fluctuations led to the fact that a significant layer of lining was eaten away (at blast furnace No. 1 there was burnout last year).

Incorrect technological process, barbarous handling of the furnaces led the latter from accident to accident, led inevitably, in particular, to an accident on January 21 this year, when both furnaces went out of order, led to the failure of furnace No. 1 on February 9 this year. g. (the fall of a large cone due to unacceptably high temperatures ‐ up to 1000 C on the top).

By February 18, this accident was eliminated, but the stove did not start. the liquidated accident was replaced by a new one (the rope of a large cone jumped out) and furnace No. 1 is again at rest. Furnace No. 2 has not yet been fully commissioned after the January accident and produces, at best, 200‐250 tons per day.

This is the situation in the blast furnace shop. Stoves, I must say frankly, are ruining. This is not only my opinion. This is the opinion of our local employees. This is the opinion of the entire brigade of the Uralobkom and its leader, the secretary of the Uralobkom Golovin. This is what those who technically supervised and supervise the operation of furnaces say in their midst.

A year ago, unable to withstand the outrageous handling of the stoves, one of our [Maternity] employees] remarked to the technical director, engineer Kashchenko: ʺAfter all, the stove can be driven like this.ʺ Kashchenko calmly replied: ʺThe stove is gone.ʺ This is the case with the blast furnace shop. Almost no better in others (mountain, open‐hearth, rental). And just a catastrophic or almost catastrophic situation with water. The blower and cowper platforms are literally on the water. A strong inflow of groundwater (and spring is on the way) can disable the blower ‐ and then Magnitka became. On the other hand, there is a dam on the river under the threat of erosion every minute. Ural, which retains water for industrial purposes. Erosion of the dam also means a complete shutdown of production.

4.  Engineering staff, technical leadership, alignment of forces

There is a whole bunch of reasons due to which Magnitka is brought into such a grave condition. The main one is in the engineering and technical personnel, in the technical leadership. Almost all managerial positions in all shops are occupied by pests ‐ operated and not operated. In this there is still nothing particularly terrible, the trouble lies elsewhere. This, in turn, lies in the fact that not a single saboteurs were sent and arrived at Magnitogorsk, but groups of members of several organizations who settled in groups in separate workshops. Basically, these are three groups of pests ‐ Urals, Muscovites and southerners. The former took over the technical management of the mountain, the latter were in charge of the power industry, the latter were in charge of blast furnaces, openhearth furnaces, and rental. It is quite clear what such a distribution is ‐ distribution by workshops in groups,

5.  Blast furnaces

Blast furnaces are ruining by all means and predicting in advance when they will be finally ruined. So, on the top (large bowl) and cones, the temperature is allowed up to 790 С, instead of the normal 150‐200 С.

Sobolev is an old blast furnace operator. Could he ʺconscientiouslyʺ overlook this trifle? Of course not! Sobolev deliberately ʺcrushedʺ the furnace. One of the methods of such ʺditchingʺ is the actual transfer of the management of blast furnaces to young inexperienced, or rather completely inexperienced, shift engineers. Recently, Sobolev has almost completely retired from the management of the furnaces, apparently not wanting to pass on to us, undoubtedly, his extensive experience, not wanting to help us get the furnaces out of accidents. Our s [secret] s [employee], who was close to him, told me bluntly that Sobolev was doing nothing right now. “Chief engineer of the central hotel” is Sobolevʹs nickname at the moment. If Sobolev quite clearly ʺruinedʺ the furnace, then Zhestovsky, who replaced Sobolev as head of the blast furnace shop, is doing it now even more clearly, cynically.

Here, by the way, one more circumstance should be noted. By the time Zhestovsky arrived, the shop was headed by engineer Dmitrash (Sobolev was away at that time). Dmitrash is an old experienced domain manager, unfortunately not an administrator. It was during the management of the Dmitrash workshop that the furnaces were running normally, producing record heats that exceeded the design capacity (the design capacity was 2000 tons of pig iron per day for both furnaces). Immediately upon arrival, Zhestovsky survived Dmitrash (now he has left, it seems, to the south) and dispersed the most experienced craftsmen. This is not an accidental circumstance. This is Zhestovskyʹs method of work, making it easier for him to sabotage. This is established behind him and at the place of his former work. The sabotage in the blast‐furnace shop is beyond doubt.

6.  About water

The question of water in Magnitogorsk is literally a matter of life and death for the latter. In view of the extremely important importance of this issue, I dwell on it additionally.

To supply construction with water on the river. Ural has a dam. According to the project of the Americans, it should have been built of reinforced concrete, its base should be on a rock and iron dowels should have been hammered. It was built by Russian engineers (undoubted pests and ʺArtesiansʺ that are being developed by us and in EKU) on sandy‐gravelly soil with wooden dowel piles. As a result, the dam is being washed away and it is threatened with sediment and complete destruction ‐ and then Magnitka became (production will remain without water).

In November 1932, the Leningrad Hydraulic Engineering Institute gave the following opinion on the state of the dam: “The Magnitogorsk dam, about 1 km long, forming a backwater of about

7 m, was built without complying with the requirements of the project (the structure is based on soft soils, while the project presented by an American company provides bringing the foundation to solid rocks) ʺ.

In December 1932. The same institute of hydraulic engineering stated: ʺIf within the next 10‐20 days the construction does not change its attitude towards the operation of a critical structure, then no guarantees can be given that a serious disaster will not occur.ʺ

And finally, in January 1933, the same institute declared: “The dam is defective, and even if there is supervision and maintenance, without lowering the headwater, one cannot count on its long service life. The dam is dangerous because there are no ways, except for a major reconstruction of the structure, to prevent the possibility of subsidence of any of the buttresses, and a large subsidence of any buttress threatens to destroy the entire dam. Because the lowering of the headwater without stopping the plant is impossible, hence the urgent and urgent need for another retaining structure, and this dam should be considered as a temporary structure.

The fact that the dam is unreliable, that it should be considered as a temporary structure, was definitely stated by Professor Graftio.

So, the position is quite definite: the dam can collapse any day. We need to hastily build a second dam.

What is being done? Nothing is done about the first one, which is under threat of destruction. What is being done along the line of the construction of the second dam?

The Hydraulic Engineering Department of Magnetostroi (engineers Kamensky and Gurevich) drew up and defended the second project in the center, the so‐called. N [new] Magnitogorsk dam. We carried out some construction work, and then transferred the construction of the Magnitogorsk office of Soyuzvodstroy, headed by engineer Vetr (operated on the Ukrainian case ʺVesnaʺ, confessed), and agreed to complete the construction of this dam by 1935. Can you imagine: the existing dam can everyday collapse, and they want to build a new one only by 1935?!

But somehow this matter must be covered up! And so Kamensky is developing a project for dumping water into an existing reservoir from nearby lakes. They say, in this way, the deficit of the water balance will be covered, we will hold out until 1935, and by that time a new dam will be built.

But the point is that no dumping of lakes will help. the first dam may collapse not today or tomorrow. And Kamensky himself told us about the project of dumping lakes the following: “This option can be approached very carefully, because in fact, he was only nominated recently. ʺ And further (just a week or two ago): ʺThis can be done only if it is completely impossible to provide the 2nd dam with labor and materials.ʺ

So, the option of dumping lakes is unrealistic, says Kamenskiy, ‐ it can only be undertaken if the construction of the second ‐ N [new] Magnitogorsk dam is provided with labor and materials. And he does the following: he deliberately transfers the construction of the second dam to the Magnitogorsk office of Soyuzvodstroy and agrees to complete this construction by 1935, while he himself fumbles with the project of dumping lakes.

These are the wrecking tricks of Kamensky, Vetra and Co. With these plans, on February 15, Kamensky left for Moscow (Soyuzvodstroy), from Moscow he will leave for Leningrad (probably, to the Leningrad Hydrotechnical Institute).

The situation with fire‐fighting and drinking water is also bad. If r. Kizel, then the population will be forced to feed on the poisoned industrial waters. A way out of this situation is to build pumping station No. 10. There is a special decision of the government commission to force this pumping station, but the pest Wind does nothing, disrupts the implementation of the decision of this Commission.

This wrecking disruption of the construction of pumping station No. 10 is covered by a discussion about where to build pumping station No. 10 ‐ near well No. 2 or near well No. 7 (according to our data, it should be built near well No. 7).

In connection with the above, I consider it necessary to raise this issue in the most acute form in NKTProm and to ensure that


a)                   forced the Hydrotechnical Institute and Soyuzvodstroy to find and immediately implement all possible measures in order to prevent the failure of the existing dam;

b)                  forced Soyuzvodstroy to immediately speed up the construction of the second ‐ N [new] Magnitogorsk dam and pumping station No. 10, providing this construction with all the necessary means, materials and technical forces.

7. About grief

In addition to what I wrote to you in a previous letter, I feel it necessary to ask the following questions about the mountain:

1.  Mine

At the mine, the scope of mining operations is narrowed. It is narrowed by the disgusting condition of the haul roads. There is an urgent need to build a new haul road on the eastern slope of Atach. The project of this new haul road is being dragged out by Giproruda. The most brutal pressure on Giproruda is needed in order to shape the implementation of the project in every possible way.

2.  Washing factory

a)                   Here it is necessary to dismantle a part of the structures made according to the project of the American company MAK‐Key, and replaced by structures according to the Mekhanobra project. The Mekhanobra project is there, but Mekhanobr has not yet presented working drawings. The same brutal pressure on the Mechanobr is needed here.

b)                  To carry out work at the washing plant in winter, it is necessary to build a heating station. Not only does it not yet exist, but so far Mekhanobr has not presented a project for this station. No hardware specifications, no orders placed for the latter. If there is a delay with this case, the winter of 1933 will be lost for work, and this will hit the balance of ores. It is necessary to force the Mechanobr to speed up the design in every possible way.

c)                   The situation is exactly the same with the drying section for ore concentrate after washing (no Mechanobra project, no specifications, no equipment ordered). And here the matter is further complicated by the fact that the equipment for the drying department needs complex (tube furnaces, motors, fans, which require long periods of production and installation). Any delay in this respect will have the same consequences as in the case of the heating station. We must force Mechanobr to speed up this matter.

3.  Concentrating plant

The issue of equipment has not yet been resolved (which is import, which is at the factories of the USSR). Development of working drawings by Mechanobrom has been suspended. This issue requires an early resolution in NKTProm and, in this regard, the acceleration of work by Mekhanobrom.

4.  Crushing plant II section

Revision of the design of this factory is obligatory. Mandatory because a Krupp crusher will be purchased instead of the projected Trailor crusher. Krupp does not guarantee the integrity of his crusher if the ore feed is left unchanged. The change should be expressed in a new arrangement of the crusher and pan feeder (a short metal conveyor that feeds ore to the crusher), the design of the latter is not known. That is why a revision of the project is necessary. The mechanobr is still not revising the project.

Until now, Mekhanobr does not draw up a project and delivery of ore (ore warehouses) from the crusher of the II section. Until now, he has not taken up the issue of sorting ores (this, of course, is the fault of the Magnitogorsk Mining Administration, which, to a certain extent, is to blame for everything stated above about the mountain). It is necessary to push the Mechanobr in this regard as well.

5.  Mechanical repair shops

They are not here. The repair of the existing locomotive and dump car fleet is carried out at the depot. There is nowhere to assemble the arriving electric locomotives for electric rolling. Giproruda still does not give a project. It should be noted the outrageous attitude of Giproruda           and        Mekhanobra       to            all           the          projects                 listed above. Giproruda and Mekhanobr drag out the design for months and years.

Instead of forming this case, putting additional knowledgeable people on it, Giproruda and Mekhanobr rip off people in their apparatus who work for Magnitogorsk, occupy them with other work, send them on business trips on other issues, etc. It is necessary to press on Giproruda and Mechanobr in the most brutal way and force them to force the design. NKTProm needs to speed up the resolution of the issue of specifications and equipment placement.

8. Energy

I will not dwell on this issue in any detail. I should only note the following.

The head of the CES, a party member Avrosimov (a former professional worker), does not know the business, he is not sitting still. A strong, knowledgeable person is needed here. I donʹt think there is such a person here. In my opinion, Moscow should give it.

The Chief Engineer of the Central Electric Power Station ‐ MOGES pest ‐ Luknitsky is a notorious bastard. It doesnʹt work ‐ it unsubscribes. Iosif Dmitrievich knows him well enough. In my opinion, he should be removed from the post of chief engineer of the Central Electric Power Station and replaced by another ‐ a knowledgeable person who will work (Luknitskiy can be used in the Energy Administration apparatus, or even simply kicked out of Magnitogorsk somewhere far away).

Among other things, it is necessary to take into account, Lev Grigorievich, the following: Magnitka still cannot really cope with two blast furnaces, and after all, two more of the same superpowerful blast furnaces are to be commissioned, and this is followed by the second stage ‐ four more of the same furnaces. Therefore, it is extremely important to strengthen Magnitka with qualified technical management, and it is also extremely important to train qualified blast furnace workers for the furnaces under construction (two domains are being installed).

N. Schastlivtsev

F. 2. On. 11.D. 6.L. 308‐322. Copy .


Memorandum of the OGPU on the results of the inspection of the operation of the mills of Soyuzmuki for the period September 1932 ‐ March 1933.

Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 7.L. 7‐10. Copy

March 28, 1933, No. 50152

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) t. Stalin

In accordance with the decision of the Politburo of March 8 this year. The OGPU carried out work to uncover the theft and waste of flour and food products at the mills and mill plants of Soyuzmuki. For this purpose, 51 mills and 8 grinders (adjacent to mills) were specially tested in Ukraine, the North Caucasus, Western Siberia, Moscow Region, Tatarstan, Central Black Earth Region, Lower Volga, Middle Volga and IPO.

As a result of the work carried out, it was revealed that at these mills during the period from September 1932 to March 1933, 19,021 centners of flour, 1850 centners of grain, 5683 centners of bran, 5361 centners of feed waste and 10 centners of millet were plundered and squandered.

The investigation established that funds for the theft and waste of flour and feed waste were created at the expense of the socalled. ʺProduction savingsʺ by: illegal increase in spray rates; lowering the standard (quality) of produced flour; forged entries in acceptance certificates with exaggeration of moisture and grain contamination; drawing up internal acts by order of the mill administration on the shortage of grain after it arrives from transport.

The most common way of generating ʺproduction savingsʺ funds is by exaggerating mills in their operational reports versus actual spray. So, for example, only in two regions (Central Black Earth Region and NGO) within 3 months ‐ November, December, January ‐ the Soyuzmuki mills managed to create a reserve for themselves on the difference between the allowed grinding rate and the one shown in their reports ‐ 7228 centners of flour.

Thus, significant funds of flour were concentrated at the disposal of the mills directly. The lack of control on the part of trusts and the All‐Union Union of Soyuzmuk led to widespread squandering and theft of these funds, which were systematic and widespread in almost all proven mills.

So, for example, in 1932 Gosmelnitsa No. 1 alone (the plant named after Tsyurupa ‐ Moscow) established a shortage of 12,600 centners of high‐quality wheat flour. This shortage was partially covered by the surplus received due to the deterioration in product quality. (An investigation is underway. The perpetrators have been brought to justice).

At the Novo‐Omsk mill (Western Siberia) of Soyuzmuki, by illegally writing off 0.5% of the amount of grain coming from the railway, as well as exaggerating the actual percentage of moisture and trash, a saving fund was created in the amount of 3020 centners, due to which spending and theft.

At Kiev mills No. 2 and No. 3, grain write‐off was revealed without acts in excess of the established norm up to 6,000 poods.

In Tataria, 2,129 centners of flour and food waste were stolen from three mills of Soyuzmuki.

At the Pechishchinskaya mill of Soyuzmuki (Kazan), the OGPU at the time of the inspection discovered 304 sacks of flour and rye weighing 243.2 quintals, hidden and hidden from the register, which were intended for sale outside at speculative prices. (The perpetrators, led by the director of the mill, were arrested).

In the mills of Soyuzmuki, NPO has established a squandering of 1800 centners of flour and 2150 centners of bran in six months. Flour was spent in the order of bonuses, reckoning with temporary workers, commodity exchange operations, supplying mill canteens and selling to various organizations.

Theft and squandering were carried out with the direct participation of the responsible workers of the mills and mill enterprises. Moreover, the squandering of flour in the form of unprinted payments to workersʹ canteens and in‐kind bonuses was carried out, as was the case in the Gorky Territory and the Middle Volga, by the sanction of the managers of trusts and leaders of the All‐Union Union of Soyuzmuki.

For example, Nezlobin, an executive in the labor economics sector, shows: “By order of Comrade Lobachev, I gave permission to the Gorky trust to issue a kind of bonus at the expense of production savings. T. Pankratym (deputy chairman of the board of Soyuzmuki) was ordered to issue an in‐kind award to Orenburg. ʺ This kind of award covers not only all the workers of the mills, but also completely outsiders, such as the railway. cashiers, postal workers, etc. and has the character of a permanent additional soldering, the size of which is in direct proportion to the official position.

The Soyuzmuk apparatus did not pay any attention to the issue of production losses and production savings. For the entire 1932, none of the enterprises we inspected was surveyed by Soyuzmuk in order to determine whether the actual production losses corresponded to the losses indicated by the mills. This is confirmed in his testimony by the head of the technochemical control of the All‐Union Union of Soyuzmuk, comrade Izergin.

“Before the arrival of Comrade Mikhailov, that is, until November of last year, no one dealt with the issue of losses. The lack of a study of the reasons that reveal the losses made it impossible to carry out an actual inspection of enterprises. Inspection of the Belarusian and Tatar trusts and detection of shrinkage, significantly exceeding the normal spray in Belarus by 74.7 tons, and in Tatarstan by 99.1 tons for November, December, January 1932‐1933. was produced on the instructions of the OGPU. In general, the technochemical control group did not practice such checks ”(from the testimony of Izergin dated March 25 of this year).

In connection with the uncovered theft and waste of flour by the OGPU bodies, 330 people were brought to justice in the surveyed 51 enterprises.

Deputy OGPU Chairman Prokofiev

Head of ECU OGPU Mironov

F. 2. Op. 11.D. 7.L. 7‐10. Copy  


A special certificate of the OGPU STR on the delay in wages to workers in industrial enterprises, as of March 26, 1933.

Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 34.L. 144‐147. Certified copy

March 29, 1933, No. 145226

Top secret

The wage arrears of workers at individual enterprises and construction sites in the Ural Region, the Ukrainian SSR, Transcaucasia, Gorky, and Central Asia increased significantly in February‐March.

Across the Urals. The wage arrears, which amounted to 115,718 thousand rubles as of January 1, increased to 148,080 thousand rubles by February 1. Of the total amount of wage arrears to the workers of the Urals, due to the fault of the State Bank, 12,441 thousand rubles were not paid; 132 677 thousand rubles not paid due to the fault of economic enterprises.

From received by the cryolite plant on February 22, 100 thousand rubles for the issuance of wages to workers ‐ 27 thousand rubles were used by RIC to pay bills for materials.

On the Ilyinsky site of the asbestos mine, due to incorrectly established rates, monthly salaries are overpaid from 25 to 45 thousand rubles. For the same reasons, at the sulfuric acid plant in the Kalatinsky district from December 29 to February 9, the salary fund was overspent by 250 thousand rubles.

Across Ukraine. The largest industrial enterprises in Ukraine came out of the 1932 operating year with a large deficit: the plant. Petrovsky has about 20 million [rubles] of loss, the plant. Karl Liebknecht up to 8 million, plant them. Comintern ‐ 5 million rubles. Due to this, significant debt is noted for industrial enterprises in the Dnieper region. (on February 20 ‐ 15 791 thousand rubles.) and Odessa region. (20 344 thousand rubles).

At Krammashstroy in the Donetsk region. the debt to the workers on February 20 was 1 million 100 thousand rubles, at Luganstroy ‐ 2 million rubles. At the ʺHammer and Sickleʺ plant in Kharkov ‐ 1 million 300 thousand rubles.

Across the Transcaucasia. The total amount owed to the workers of enterprises in Armenia as of February 1 was 5 million rubles.

In the Moscow region At the Tula Arms Plant, the debt by March amounted to 1,570 thousand rubles; at the Cartridge Plant over half a million rubles. For a significant number of trusts, enterprises and construction, wage arrears are protracted, wages are not issued until 3‐4 months.

The workers of Sevkavryba and Sevryba have not been given a salary for 4 months. The total debt for the fishing industry in February is 5 million 703 thousand rubles.

In Gorky, indebtedness to workers up to 3‐4 months was noted at the Nizhne‐Vyksa plants, the Lespromkhoz and in some areas of the Gostroytrest.

In the Urals, at the talc mine, until recently, the wage arrears for 1932 in the amount of 350 thousand rubles have not been eliminated.

The same is noted at the plant No. 63 in N [Izhny] Tagil, at the Spartak mine in the Rezhevsky district, at the Krasny Oktyabr mines in the Korchakovsky district; workers of these mines are given only advances of 10‐20 rubles.

Workersʹ mood

Wage arrears, exacerbated by supply disruptions, are generating negative sentiments among certain groups of workers, which basically boil down to the following:

a)                   ʺThey talk and write about improving the situation of the working class, but in reality, they do not pay the workers the money they earnʺ;

b)                  ʺThe food rations are being cut and, moreover, there is nothing to buy it with, the workers have to work hungry, and at the same time they demand the fulfillment of the industrial financial planʺ;

c)                   ʺThere is no need to conclude a collective agreement every year when they are systematically violated.ʺ

At a number of enterprises, discontent with delayed wages, fueled by the ASE, takes on harsh forms: strikes, the organized presentation of ultimatum demands to the administration, and the tendency to send a delegation to regional organizations.

At the Tula Arms Plant in the machine‐gun, power and mechanical shops, separate groups of workers (from 10 to 20 people) on March 1 went to the administration, categorically demanding the payment of wages. There were tendencies among the workers to send a delegation to Moscow.

In Turkmenistan, loaders went on strike at the Kara‐Bogaz fields due to a three‐month salary delay and a failure to provide rations to families. As a result, two ships were left unloaded. The leadership of the Fisheries Trust is to blame for this situation, for a long time it did not take measures to find funds to eliminate the debt and to resolve the issue of an uninterrupted supply of products. Individual employees of the trust have been held accountable.

At the Foundry and Mechanical Plant in Kyshtym (Ural), a group of women came to the director of the plant, making a categorical demand for the immediate delivery of money and rations to their husbands. The women parted ways after promising to grant their demand.

Head of the SPO OGPU Molchanov, Head of the 6th branch of the

SPO OGPU, Korkin

Right: Pom. Secretary of the OGPU SPO Svetlov

Dispatched: 1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Prokofiev; 4) Agranov; 5)


F. 2. Op. 11.D. 34.L. 144‐147. Certified copy.


Certificate of the STR of the OGPU on the fight against theft and other abuses in the system of workersʹ supply for January‐March 1933 April 1, 1933

Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 34.L. 90‐97. Script

April 1, 1933

Top Secret

In recent months, in a number of PP (LVO, Ukrainian SSR, Ural, IPO, Sevkrai, Kazakhstan, Tataria, etc.), a significant number of wreckers have been discovered in the system of workersʹ supply and public catering groups and organizations that were systematically engaged in theft, speculation in scarce food and manufactured goods and self‐supply.

Theft of food cards was also practiced on a large scale. In total, according to incomplete data, 14 PP, in January‐March, up to 50 wreckers were discovered. groups and organizations for which more than 900 people were arrested and brought to justice, including: under the IPO ‐ 15 groups ‐ 226 people; in Sevkrai ‐ 10 groups ‐ 280 people; in the Ukrainian SSR ‐ 7 groups ‐ 120 people; in LVO ‐ 3 groups ‐ 35 people.

The subversive groups in the organization have also been discovered and eliminated in the BSSR, DVK, Kazakhstan, Western [adnoy] region, SKK, Tataria, ZSK, Ural, TsChO and NVK.

The liquidated groups and organizations in a number of cases were led by leading responsible cooperative workers. The surveys carried out in connection with the revealed large thefts and sabotage revealed a significant contamination of the working supply apparatus. On the basis of the materials of the PP OGPU, the apparatus for working supply and public catering was cleaned from a / s and a class alien element, and also brought to responsibility for inactivity, negligence, connivance with pests, etc. through the police and the peopleʹs courts.

We present the factual data for individual PPs, illustrating the extent of sabotage and our operational measures.

Sevkrai. In January, 4 wreckers were eliminated. groupings in workersʹ supply bodies with 130 members, including: 27 kulaks and former merchants, 13 former whites, 32 former party members and Komsomol members and 6 party members. The material damage caused to the state, thanks to the theft of these groups, reaches several million rubles.

The investigation of the liquidated group in the SAM of Lesobirzhi No. 2 revealed that over the course of a whole year, the candidatedistrict. a group of 31 people was systematically engaged in the theft of goods from air defense systems and bakery products, selling them on the private market at speculative prices. Fictitious acts were drawn up on the stolen goods, in addition, large quantities of stolen products were written off as unsuitable (in total, 80 thousand rubles were written off).

The group was engaged in sabotage, poisoning livestock with unfit food, broken glass, nails, rags, etc. were baked into bread, containers were deliberately damaged. The members of the group conducted systematic defeatist a / s campaigning. The party leadership of the air defense missile system has grown together with the participants of the candidate‐r. of the group, took part in predator drinking and covered up their criminal activities. ʹ 15 people were convicted in the case.

A       large       predatory       organization       was       discovered       at

Vsemasloprom. The losses caused to the state by the organization amount to 7 million rubles. The organization had its branches in Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Elizavetsky, Nyandomsky and other districts. 86 people were brought to justice, 48 of them in Arkhangelsk. The investigation ended the case, the accused were sentenced to different terms.

At the Krasavinsky factory, a systematic mass theft and spoilage of products was established in the Krasavinsky Cooperative, which is the main supplier of agricultural products for the factory. The apparatus of the Cooperative Agricultural Enterprise is involved in the plundering and self‐supply, incl. and individual party members. The Koopselkhoz apparatus is littered with a socially alien element. 10 people were convicted.

A wrecking group of workers at the Arkhangelsk warehouses of Soyuzmuki and Zagotzerno, engaged in organized theft of large consignments of bread and fodder, was liquidated. Employees of the breeding farm, Torgport and the Arkhangelsk Central Regional Commission took part in the thefts. 34 people were convicted.

The investigation into the case of a wrecking group of workers in the gardens of the air defense missile system (the Ogorodniki case) has been completed. The group consisted of fugitive kulaks and exiles engaged in sabotage, theft and speculation of air defense missile systems. Of the 20 people who were involved in the case, 3 were sentenced to MVD, 11 ‐ to 10 years in prison and 6 people to various terms in prison.

LVO. In Leningrad, a group of leading workers of the air defense system of the Krasnoye Znamya factory was liquidated, which was engaged in self‐supply and speculation in scarce products. Among those arrested were the chairman of the board of the ZRK Baranov, a member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1926. The arrested confessed to the organized supply of the market through speculators with foodstuffs, to raising prices and appropriating the difference.

In the air defense system of the Northern Shipyard, theft of goods, speculation in scarce products, manufactured goods, self‐supply and preparation of false documents were revealed. Of the 11 members of the group ‐ 8 members of the CPSU (b), incl. member of the board of air defense missile systems Astafiev.

Ukrainian SSR. In Kharkov, 30 workers of the kitchen factory of KHEMZ and the base of the Donnarpit trust at the Kharkov Tractor Plant were brought to justice. These persons sold products that came from a centralized supply to the local market through specially organized points. As a result of their activities, public catering has sharply deteriorated.

8 people were arrested for stealing food in the workersʹ cooperative in shop No. 4 of the Stalinʹs mining department.

Abuse and speculation with bread books, food cards and lunch coupons were revealed in the bread distributions of the KhPZ, at the cable plant named after Petrovsky and in the Makeevsky district.

Head in the canteen of the Progress plant (Berdichev), in a short time, together with the procurer of the canteen, he sold up to 5000 kg of flour, 500 kg of sugar and other products to private traders. Abuses were also revealed at the agricultural plant of the Progress plant, where the plantʹs managers were engaged in theft of grain, grain products and bread intended for the workers of the plant.

In Rykov, a group of persons engaged in theft, counterfeiting and speculation with Narpit coupons was liquidated. The theft was carried out by the head. warehouse of the printing house Berezovsky. 10 people were arrested, 2 of them dispossessed.

In the Kramatorsk region, 21 employees of Krammashtrest were brought to justice for systematic theft of products, incl. former kulak expelled from the party for corruption.

11 people were brought to responsibility for the systematic theft of products and the repurchase of the latter from the retail network of Stalino. Thirty workers of the ORS and factory canteens were put on trial for the theft of bread and food (ibid.).

At mine No. 11 ʺSmolyankaʺ 20 people were brought to justice, incl. former large merchant Zelikson, former merchant Knishevsky, etc. Theft of this group has recently become widespread.

A number of kulaks and former traders were removed from the slave supply department of the Rykov plant and arrested: Obroskin, the son of a kulak, a member of the Antonov gang, was sued for armed robbery, Kogan and Valovich were former traders, and Starykh was a big kulak.

Two groups were liquidated, consisting of students of the chemical and medical institutes in Dnepropetrovsk and Kamensky, including 7 people. The groups were connected with each other and committed theft of food share books, according to which they received food, bread and speculated with them. A member of the Mashinsky group (member of the KP (b) U) organized the forgery of food documents and seals. 4 fake seals, 171 seals and 40 share books of the air defense system were seized from those arrested.

A group of 7 students of the Mashtekhnikum was liquidated there, including 4 members of the Komsomol, who was engaged in the theft of cards and obtaining bread from them. During the last 2 weeks they received 168 kg of bread. Group members are arrested.

Tartary. In Kazan, 10 thousand food cards were stolen. The cards were delivered from the Tatpoligraf printing house and sold on the market for 15 rubles. 31 people were arrested.

A group of 22 people was liquidated, which consisted of employees, watchmen and workers of the Meat Processing Plant of the Republic of Tatarstan. The members of the group plundered meat products in an organized manner, selling them at speculative prices.

ZSK. In Novosibirsk, a group of 14 former merchants and disenfranchised persons who had infiltrated the Pyatiletka artel was arrested. Taking advantage of the lack of control, the group plundered over 330 tons of grain. The investigation ends.

A sabotage group that systematically plundered products and goods from the air defense missile system of the mining equipment plant has been eliminated. The group consisted of disenfranchised, traders and kulaks. 5 people were arrested.

CCM. A group of employees of the Regional Office for National Security of Gorkoopit and the Central Regional Committee of Nalchik was arrested. The members of the group were widely selfsufficient and sold scarce products to the private market. There were also arrested 45 employees of the Central Regional Committee No. 1, who plundered bread and sold it to private individuals.

Kazakhstan. An investigation has been completed in the case of a group of food supply workers at the Kolbinsk Combine of Altaysvetmetzoloto mines for 19 people, including 3 members of the CPSU (b). The group was engaged in theft, waste of food and selfsupply; the incurred losses amount to 558 thousand rubles. The accounting department, with the knowledge and consent of the management, in order to cover the embezzlement, made large markups on products released from the base. The members of the group systematically arranged booze.

The base specially prescribed wine and beer for this purpose. As a result of poor supply of workers (meals were prepared from dead sheep received by the base for processing for soap), workers strikes at the Daubai mine, resulting in the loss of 4,140 man‐days. The results of the decision of the three PPs have not yet been reported.

TsCHO. The investigation into the case of a group of employees of the Voronezh Public Catering Trust has been completed. The investigation confirms provoking workers into strikes and conflicts, embezzlement and squandering of scarce products. It was established that more than 200 kg of meat and lard, a significant amount of flour, rice, oil, vegetables and other products were plundered. The group presented fraudulent invoices in the amount of RUB 3,000, in addition, the accused had accountable amounts of RUB 7,000. The case was considered by the Troika PP TsCHO. 5 people were convicted.

NVK. At the plant ʺBarricadesʺ, according to incomplete data, in the air defense system of the plant 69 people were accounted for embezzlers who spent more than 70 thousand rubles. Theft, embezzlement, and other abuses also continue in the OPC. The perpetrators were brought to justice.

Ural. The investigation established K.‐R. an organization that plundered in large quantities, directly from the warehouse, food cards. 45 people were brought to justice.

SVK. A grouping of canteen workers led by pom director for labor supply (former member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) at the garment factory number 1 in Samara. The group consisted mostly of disenfranchised and former merchants; disrupted public catering by stealing and wasting food. In a number of cases, poor quality food was prepared, which caused sharp manifestations of discontent among the workers.

BSSR. Theft and squandering of products were large scaled in the construction trust of the Belarusian Communications

Directorate. The GPU of Belarus opened a group of workers of the trust and construction sites, who throughout 1932 were engaged in theft and squandering of workers rations, overalls and other state property intended for the construction of defense significance. Theft took place in an atmosphere of systematic drunkenness, with the mutual responsibility of party members and non‐party workers of the trust and construction sites, in an atmosphere of complete irresponsibility, in the absence of control and verification of the expenditure of scarce products.

In 4 months, 14 tons of flour, a wagon of fodder, 1.5 tons of cereals, a large amount of meat, sugar, fats, overalls, etc. were plundered at one construction site. 360 rations were issued monthly for 50 work sites. The workers received double the amount of flour; the rest of the rations were distributed among the group members. The poles intended for defense construction were taken by the group members to their apartments as firewood. Forage, overalls, etc. were plundered. The group consisted of 22 people, incl. the chief of supply of the trust and the former chief of supply, head of the personnel department; employees of the accounting department of the trust, the manager of the farm, etc. A participant was also the commander of the communications division Drozdov, a member of the CP (b) B, who for bribes in money and vodka provided the Red Army soldiers as labor. Accounting, Checking the reports on the expenditure of rations and the financial statements of construction sites, I did not find any errors. If the audit found waste, then it was covered, and the auditors received remuneration.

The head of one of the construction sites, Koren (homeowner, warrant officer), appropriated 10 thousand rubles, which he received from economic organizations for the work performed by the workers. 7 people were arrested. It is planned to arrest members of the CPB (b) ‐ members of the group.

West [hell] region. In the Bukharinsky air defense system, a group of 7 people was arrested for squandering scarce goods. Among those arrested, the catering accountant Ryabinkin is a former officer, responsible executive for the supply of air defense systems, Servuk is the son of a kulak, expelled from the CPSU (b), Ryabin is a former large trader, Isaev is a kulak, etc.

A sabotage group of 10 people was arrested in the Kamensky air defense missile complex and the suburban economy, 6 of them are party members. The investigation is over.

On the Lyudinovsky air defense system, 18 people were brought to court and party responsibility. 6 people were arrested. Of those brought to justice ‐ the secretary of the district committee of the AllUnion Communist Party of Bolsheviks Trager, a member of the district committeeʹs bureau Orlov and others [ugh] 4 people were expelled from the party.

IPO. In February, a number of sabotage groups with more than 200 members, engaged in theft and squandering of food intended to supply workers, were liquidated.

In the suburban economy of the Krasny Profintern factory, the wrecking kulak k.‐r. a group with the arrest of 25 people, whose activities were in the line of sabotage in workersʹ supplies and public catering, organized squandering, theft of food and self‐supply, the destruction of rabbits, undermining the fodder base and squandering seed funds. Among those arrested are the former director of the suburban economy, expelled from the CPSU (b), Travkin; deputy. director, former member of the CPSU (b) Salamanov and a number of other leading workers of the economy. All the accused, together with the director Travkin, organized systematic group drinking. As a result of the groupʹs sabotage activities, the farm was brought to complete collapse. The total loss to the farm is 150 thousand rubles.

The investigation will be completed in the coming days and sent to court for a show trial on the spot.

Head of the SPO OGPU Molchanov


1) Menzhinsky; 2) Berry; 3) Prokofiev; 4) Agranov.

F. 2. Op. 11.D. 34.L. 90‐97. Script.