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Transcripts from the Soviet Archives VOLUME XIII SECRET REVIEWS 1933
V – RED ARMY
Special message of the OGPU OGPU about illegal collection of funds and products from the population by the command of the 11th Cavalry Division of the PrivO. March 29, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1501. L. 129‐131. Script
March 29, 1933
Deputy Head of the OGPU OGPU Comrade Guy
In [your] special message of January 20, 1933, No. 212581, it was reported that the command of the Nikopol regiment of the Krivoy Rog division (UVO) was collecting food and livestock from collective farms, which were essentially in the nature of compulsory taxation of collective farmers. Currently, similar facts have been revealed in parts of the 11th Cavalry Division (PrivO). Collecting money from the population instead of the grain received from the ʺmilitary hectaresʺ, the command of individual units of the division practiced the appropriation of certain amounts by settlement, for example:
The former pompolite of the 44th Cavalry Regiment, Suprun, gave the divisional commanders an allocation for each settlement, taking into account its economic condition, with the words: ʺWe need money at all costs, we need it.ʺ Bearing in mind in the past the capacity of settlements in the manning area of the 3rd squadron (SolIletsk district), Suprun gave instructions to get 7 thousand rubles there.
Pom. The political squadron of the 43rd Cavalry Regiment Radtsev, having come to one collective farm, said: “The regiment imposed 5 thousand rubles on you. money that you have to pay. ʺ The Board refused to pay this amount, stating that such extraditions could not be allowed without the approval of the RIK. The same Radtsev, upon his arrival in the Saraktash district, told the chairman of the RIK: ʺAllow me to impose on some collective farms 50‐100 rubles, depending on their capacity.ʺ
In addition to this kind of ʺtaxʺ, there were cases of written appeals to collective farmers for help, in which the ʺdifficultʺ situation of the units was depicted.
The command of the 43rd Cavalry Regiment in January, sending the squadron commander Kharchenko to the recruiting area, wrote a letter with the following content: in the camps there is an admission ward for a sick person of variable composition, Leninʹs houses do not have sufficient equipment, normal water supply to the camp is not adapted, there are almost no apartments for command personnel, etc. ʺ
According to far from complete data, parts were collected: the 43rd cavalry regiment for the autumn transition last year collected and removed from the acquisition area: 14 pigs, 25 cows, 51 pcs. small livestock, 45 kg of butter, etc. In addition, the squadron commander Kharchenko, a member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, unauthorized and free of charge ʺprocuredʺ 18 sheep, 9 pigs, 1 centner of millet, 12 kg of butter and 1202 rubles in the Saraktash region. of money.
The same levies were made by the 44th cavalry and horse artillery div [ision].
In addition to all this, it was found that part of the products and funds received, due to the lack of accurate accounting and control over the fees and [over] their spending, was squandered and appropriated.
In the equestrian artillery regiment, money was collected by the commanders of batteries and platoons. How much was collected and how they were spent ‐ there are no traces. For the whole of 1932, 1,588 rubles were received at the regimentʹs cashier, and the rest remained in the hands of the commanders, moreover, the battalion commanders Bonich of the 700 rubles collected by him, 300 rubles. squandered and admitted it only after he was arrested.
44th Cavalry Regiment. A special commission created in January 1933 found that money was received and spent uncontrollably, often without supporting documents.
According to preliminary data, the 44th Cavalry Regiment (with the exception of the 4th squadron) received 53,843 rubles from the manning area, of which 6,861 rubles. until now, the regiments have not been handed over to the cashier and are in the hands of the unit commanders. The squadron commander of the 46th Cavalry Regiment, Gemini, must hand over the collected money about 4,000 rubles, in fact, according to the regimental books, 1,875 rubles are considered handed over, and the rest is unknown where.
The RVS PrivO was informed about the above. The last all unit commanders and political agencies were instructed to immediately stop such actions. OO PrivO is being investigated.
Head of the 5th department of the OGPU NGO
Operative of the 5th branch of the OGPU OGPU
1) Berry; 2) Prokofiev; 3) Agranov; 4) Voroshilov; 5) Gamarnik; 6)
Feldman; 7) Kuibyshev; 8) Orlovsky.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1501. L. 129‐131. The original.
Special message from the OGPU on suicides in the Red Army. June 8, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1497. L. 46‐48. Script
June 8, 1933
Table of contents
1. Composition of suicides
2. Facts of suicides in the Red Army
3. Separate suicides of the wives of military personnel
During the first four months of 1933, 185 suicides and attempted suicides took place in the Red Army units (according to incomplete registration of OO bodies). The composition of the suicides deserves great attention:
1) 30.8% (57 cases) falls on the commanding (average and above) personnel, which is much higher than the share of command personnel in the army.
2) 42.1% (78 cases) are military personnel from workers.
3) 51.4% (95 cases) accounted for party members ‐ 32.4% and Komsomol members ‐ 19%.
The causes of suicide were not well established in all cases. The 145 cases studied give the following picture:
Fear of responsibility for misconduct ‐ 35
Moral decay ‐ 26
Dissatisfaction with service and living conditions – 20
Illness ‐ 21
Inaccuracy of command personnel ‐ 12
Family troubles ‐ 31.
Thus, the bulk of suicide falls on moral decay and fear of responsibility. Suicides due to family troubles and a painful condition were also largely the result of the moral decay of suicides who were not tackled or supported in time.
Of the specific facts confirming this position, noteworthy are:
UVO. The chief of ammunition supply of the 7th cavalry regiment, Lebedev, a member of the CPSU (b), was shot dead due to a dissolute lifestyle, systematic drunkenness and family troubles as a result.
KKA. During a booze, the treasurer‐clerk of the department of the cavalry [alerist] squadron [she] 1 of the KSD Astashev IP, candidate [idat] VKP (b), worker, was shot. Before that, he attempted to murder his wife. Astashev decomposed, was expelled from the party for decomposition, but was reinstated, systematically drank. The political command did not take measures to educate him.
PrivO. On March 2, the executive secretary of the party collective of the 11th branch of the local battalion Kozhevnikov attempted suicide out of fear of party responsibility for contact with an alien class element, admitting aliens to the party and drunkenness among the communists. Timely measures on the part of the military commissar to eliminate this were not taken.
UVO. Having shot his wife beforehand, on April 13, 1933, the commander of a platoon of the 67th regiment of the regiment, Repin, a worker, b / p, committed suicide. In the letter he left, Repin complains that being an alcoholic, he did not receive appropriate medical assistance from the regimentʹs doctor. An investigation is underway.
Along with the suicides in the Red Army, the OO also took into account individual suicides of the wives of military personnel. The most typical of these suicides are listed below:
UVO. The wife of a Red Army soldier from the 7th communications battalion Pavlov tried to commit suicide. The circumstances preceding the suicide are as follows: being in difficult material conditions, Pavlova turned to the battalion commissar Slomovsky to assist in the sale of loan bonds. Slomovsky, taking advantage of this, began to cohabit with her. Pavlov, having learned about this, decided to divorce his wife. In this regard, the latter, having taken out the poison, decided to poison herself. A question has been raised about Slomovsky before the party organ.
The foregoing testifies to the need for a sharp fight against the phenomena that give rise to suicide.
Deputy head of the OGPU OGPU
Pom. Head of the OGPU OGPU Dobroditsky
Pom. Head of the 5th department of the OGPU
1) Berry; 2) Prokofiev; 3) Agranov; 4) Bulin; 5) Feldman; 6)
Poskrebyshev; 7) Orlovsky; 8) Kuibyshev.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1497. L. 46‐48. The original.
Special message from the OGPU about the situation in the Red Army. June 29, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1501. L. 296‐315. Copy
June 29, 1933
About the detection of K.‐R. leaflets
On June 2, 1933, the senior clerk‐super‐conscript of the Office of the 46th p [ogran] o [troop] Nosov FI (Born 1908, b / n) a closed mail letter was received, delivered by the Red Army messenger Iksanov. On the front side of the homemade envelope of the aforementioned letter the address was written in ink: ʺTSSR, Ashgabat, Border battalion, Party Club, F. Nosov.ʺ Having received the aforementioned letter from the Red Army soldier Iksanov, in the detachmentʹs archive, he immediately opened it and found 8 copies of K.‐R. leaflets printed with a handicraft rubber apparatus, with the following content: “Comrades, the Jews killed Lenin with a conspiracy, covered them up by the Social Revolutionaries, seized power in the center, robbed the country, sent all the wealth to the Jews in Palestine, leading us to starvation. We are the communist society of the All‐Union Academy of old partisans and Red Guards, we see everything, and therefore we call on the Komsomol and all the working people: arm yourself on the bloody night, which we appoint [from] 7 to 8 July 1933, [in order] to destroy the c. Jewish power that seeks to enslave the whole world of working people. Goodbye to each other, mercilessly destroy the Jews, those who are behind us are ours, those who are behind the Jews are the enemy of Leninʹs teachings and our [enemy]. Long live the rule of the soviets of workers and peasants. Rewrite and distribute. ʺ Signature ʺK.O.V.A.ʺ Rewrite and distribute. ʺ Signature ʺK.O.V.A.ʺ Rewrite and distribute. ʺ Signature ʺK.O.V.A.ʺ
The leaflet was accompanied by a note written by hand, in pencil through a carbon copy: “Comrade, tell your relatives and friends one by one to the nearest towns and villages. Organize guerrilla units, rewrite and distribute faster. Act by all means and means, this is the business of every worker. ʺ
After opening the aforementioned letter, Nosov read the title of the leaflet to the Red Army soldier Iksanov and immediately, with the letter and leaflets, came to the assistant. chief of the political department for Rusimov. During interrogation, the Red Army soldier Nosov testified that in the city of Kharkov, where this letter comes from, he had none of his friends who knew him before being drafted into the Red Army, with the exception of 3 former Red Army men of the 46th border detachment of Mindel, Pavlovsky and Grossman, who had demobilized and left. to Kharkov, but does not support correspondence with them. Original K.‐R. leaflets and a copy of the protocol of interrogation of Nosov were sent to the PA of the OGPU of Ukraine for the investigation and establishment of the author.
On June 1, the Red Army soldiers of the 23rd division of the VOGPU
BSSR Bely Lev, Chaus Ivan and the squad leader Klikin collectively refused to receive sugar due to its poor quality. On June 1, the battalion commander distributed sugar to the Red Army personnel for 15 days, at the rate of 500 g each, and the sugar was given out ‐ refined sugar 475 g each and 25 g of sand, remaining from refined sugar. At the time of receipt, the Red Army soldier Bely (worker, b / p) entered into an argument with the captenarmus and in the presence of the Red Army men declared: “I will not accept this sugar, this is garbage, not sugar. In the 17th border detachment, they did not feed such sugar. Let them do whatever they want with me, let them put me on trial, but I categorically refuse to accept such sugar. ʺ Belyʹs speech was supported by the squad leader Klikin (worker, member of the Komsomol) and the Red Army soldier Chaus (worker, member of the Komsomol). This collective performance did not have profound consequences and, in the end, they all received sugar. The case is under investigation.
Recently, in the city of Dnepropetrovsk, an unknown bandit group of 3 people committed a number of armed robberies under the guise of OGPU employees. By the measures taken, one member of the bandit group was detained, who turned out to be a Red Army soldier of the 15th cavalry regiment of the OGPU troops A.F. (candidate of the CPSU (b)). In the course of the investigation, it was established that his accomplices were: May Zel Zelman (member of the CP (b) U, secretary of the cell of the ʺSkhodʺ artel) and a certain ʺMishkaʺ, whose last name was not established, who escaped from deportation. Further investigation is underway.
Penetration at Chemical Plant No. 2
June 9, 1933 at 7 oʹclock 30 minutes. In the morning, on the territory of the restricted area of Chemical Plant No. 2 in the city of Chapaevsk, the sentry of the 26th regiment of the VOGPU killed an unknown citizen who, despite the sentryʹs two‐fold responses and warnings, tried to walk in the territory towards the sentry. Under what circumstances this unknown person entered the territory of the Chemical Plant and who he is, is being investigated and investigated.
About penetration into the plant named after Petrovsky
On June 12, 1933, a worker of the blast‐furnace shop of the plant named after A.I. Shchigolyamov was killed by a sentry of the 45th regiment of the VOGPU Shchigolyamov. Petrovsky Cool. The murder took place under the following circumstances: The Red Army soldier Shchigolyamov (a member of the Komsomol, a collective farmer), while at the post at the plant. Petrovsky, at 23 oʹclock. 25 minutes noticed that an unknown person climbed over the fence into the territory of the plant. After the call from the sentry ʺStopʺ, the man started to run. He did not stop at the next calls. Shchigolyamov, firing a warning shot upwards, seeing that further pursuit was impossible, fired a second shot at the fleeing one and seriously wounded the latter. On the way to the first‐aid post, Krut died.
The manifestation of great power chauvinism
Red Army soldier of the 49th p [ogran] o [order] Stepanenko F.Ya. (Born 1910, collective farmer, b / p) while escorting the arrested Cossacks showed great‐power chauvinism, expressed in lashing one Cossack with a whip because the latter lagged behind the party of the arrested. Stepanenko was arrested. An investigation is underway.
The manager of the base of the 49th p [ogran] o [order] Pimenov (a member of the CPSU (b), a worker), cleaning his blade on the street of the village of Dubun, swung the last at the Cossack boy who approached the boy, which resented the Cossacks standing nearby, saying: “Why wanted to kill our boy. ʺ To a remark made to Pimenov by a Red Army soldier, Pimenov replied: ʺI hate the Cossacks.ʺ An investigation is underway.
Violation of revolutionary legality
On May 9, 1933, a group of migrants to Western China appeared near the post of Kurya of the Separate Lepsin Border Committee. The squad commander Kolumbetov (b / p, Kazakh, collective farmer), who was at that time at the post, together with 3 Red Army men, without using weapons, detained the migrants. During the arrest, Kolumbetov showed extreme rudeness towards the detained Kazakhs, beating them with a blade and the butt of a rifle. To the remark of the Red Army soldiers, Kolumbetov said: ʺI will beat the Cossacks and the Cossacks, my blood does not digest them.ʺ Kolumbetov is put on trial by VT.
On June 2, 1933, the head of the Aral‐Tyube outpost of the Separate Lepsinsky commandantʹs office, Klokov (a member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), with a group of Red Army men passed the village. Kopal, where he stopped to rest, and demanded from the chairman of the village council to provide him with an apartment. An apartment was given to him in the house of a collective farmer, but being dissatisfied with it, Klokov ordered the chairman of the village council to come to him for an explanation. The latter, being very busy, did not appear to Klokov, in connection with which Klokov, together with the Red Army men, came to the council and began to shout at the chairman as not wanting to obey the representative of the border guard. The chairman explained that he was busy with the sowing campaign, and therefore could not come to Klokov. Klokov was finally indignant with this answer and announced to the chairman that he was arrested, commanding him ʺHands upʺ, at the same time ordering the Red Army men to search the chairman, which was done. In response to the protests of the secretary of the party cell, Klokov said: ʺHere the owner is the border guard, and I have transplanted the chairmen of the village councils a lot and will not reckon with him.ʺ Klokov is brought to trial by VT.
Horse border guards of the 7th p [ogran] o [order] Mosin (collective farmer, b / p), Korolev (collective farmer, b / p) and Osipov (candidate [idat] VKP (b), collective farmer) were detained on June 4 in the village. Koskolovo of the Kingissepsky district of a drunk citizen Nikolaev, who was taken to the room of the duty officer at the stable of the Koskolovskaya outpost, beat him, and the Red Army soldier Osipov hit Nikolayev in the chest with the butt of a rifle. This fact was investigated on the spot and confirmed, having the following circumstances: Mosin and Korolev, heading to the club, met with a drunk citizen Nikolayev, who began to pester them, after which they decided to pick him up and took him towards the stable. Nikolaev put up resistance. At that moment, a patrol was walking to illuminate the area of the rear, Osipov and Garanin, whom Korolev invited to help. Nikolayev, who was brought to the stable duty room, grabbed the border guard Osipov by the rifle, who took it away with a strong jerk and then stabbed him in the chest with the butt. Nikolaev continued his antics, and then the Red Army soldier Mosin struck him twice in the face. The next day, citizen Nikolaev among the youth said that he felt a part of his guilt.
Considering that the revolutionary legality was partially not observed, which occurred due to its violation by the victims themselves, Mosin and Korolyov were subjected to disciplinary action, the first for 20 days of arrest, the second for 15 days of dismissal, and the Red Army soldier Osipov ‐ for 15 days of arrest and brought to party responsibility.
On the site of the 9th outpost of the 10th p [ogran] o [group] in the village. Empty Resurrection on June 11, 1933, a village festivities took place on the occasion of a religious holiday. The head of the 9th outpost Denisov (a member of the CPSU (b), a worker) came to the festivities with the commander of the department Gorshansky (a member of the CPSU (b), a collective farmer). During the promenade, a fight broke out between the citizens, in which Denisov and Gorshansky intervened, trying to disperse the audience. Some people began to resist, and Denisov, repulsing attempts to attack, struck a collective farmer ‐ tractor driver Leonov and Vasiliev with a Mauser revolver, and the first one punched his head bleeding. After these blows, Gorshansky ran up to Leonov and hit him with the revolver handle. During a fight that arose Denisov, in order to influence the citizens, fired upwards. An investigation is underway. Marauding
In April 1933, the Red Army soldier of the Akbulak outpost of the separate Lepsin border commandantʹs office, A.I. (Born in 1910, member of the Komsomol, worker), returning from art. Sarkan went to the outpost, met two citizens and made a document check and a personal search. As a result of the search of one citizen, Sborovskiy confiscated 9 m of the manufactory. Upon arrival at the outpost, the Red Army soldier Sborovskiy did not report the seized manufactory, transferring it to the storage of the construction worker Skrytnikov. The victim told the head of the outpost about the manufactory confiscated from him. During the investigation, Sborovskiy confessed to his act. The case was completed by the investigation and transferred to VT for consideration.
On June 7, 1933, Zhukovich A. (born in 1910, member of the Komsomol, worker) deserted the Red Army soldier of the 3rd Division of the 81st Regiment of the VOGPU. The reason for the desertion was the fear of responsibility for sleeping on the order, during which the officer on duty in the division at Zhukovich had a blade pulled out of its scabbard. By the measures taken, Zhukovich was detained. An investigation is underway.
On June 5, 1933, a Red Army soldier of the 45th regiment of the VOGPU Rydvan (born 1910, worker, b / p), while at his post, left his rifle and boots there [and] deserted. By the measures taken, Rydvan was detained at st. Igren and taken to the regiment. During interrogation, Rydvan testified that he had deserted in order to travel home to his relatives, whom he had not seen for a long time. Rydvan is brought to trial by VT.
On May 30, 1933, the Red Army soldier Vasnev (born in 1910, b / n, worker) deserted from the UPO squadron and the ZakGPU troops, who returned to the unit on June 14, 1933. The investigation established that the reason for Vasnevʹs desertion was the illness of his family, to which the latter, despite the memo submitted by him, was not released. The material about Vasnev was submitted for the conclusion of the Prosecutor of the PO and VZGPU.
On March 21, 1933, the Red Army soldier of the 40th p [ogran] o [troop] Khromov S.Ye. (Born in 1910, member of the Komsomol, worker) was dismissed on short‐term leave for family reasons until April 19, 1933, but has not returned to the unit so far. A telegraphic inquiry at the place of residence established that Khromov, having spent the allotted time at home, left and did not come again. The available data in the Khromov detachment is characterized as a former homeless and burdened by the service. Wanted.
On the night of June 11‐12, 1933, A.I. Ovanov, a Red Army soldier of the 2nd Division of the 40th Regiment of the VOGPU, deserted from the unit. (Born in 1913, volunteer for the draft in 1932, b / n, from the workers). When Ovanov escaped, he left a note: “Farewell, dear comrades, I have achieved what is destined. He left. Ovanov ʺ. Measures have been taken for the search.
The Red Army soldier Georgsky, who deserted from the 39th frontier detachment on April 11, 1933, was detained by the RO of the OGPU Liski TsChO and sent to the detachment. The investigation and the materials of the special check established that Georgsky is the son of the former owner of the fishery, currently connected with the ASE, suspicious of espionage. His three uncles live in Germany. During interrogation, Georgsky showed that he was brought up in an underworld environment and, being in the border guard, was burdened by the service, which prompted him to desertion from the army. An investigation is underway.
On April 18, 1933, on the basis of the conclusion of the medical commission, A.F. Kovalenko, a Red Army soldier of the 14th regiment of the [troop]. (Born in 1910, worker, member of the KSM), was dismissed on a monthʹs sick leave and left for Kadievka, Rudnevsky per., House No. 12. Despite the fact that Kovalenkoʹs vacation expired on May 18, 1933, the latter has not yet arrived at the detachment, and no notification has been received that his sick leave has been extended. Measures have been taken to find Kovalenko.
On June 11, 1933, a letter was sent to the commander of the 107th division of the VOGPU from the Red Army division Lukiyants, in which the latter reported that, while working in the divisional gardens with the Red Army soldiers Shtanko, Kashperovsky, Babenko, Mironov and Marchenko, the latter stole a sack of seed oats the money received from the sale was drunk. In conclusion, Lukianets writes that, fearing responsibility for what was happening, he decided to commit suicide: shoot himself or throw himself under the train. Lukiyanets set the date of suicide for June 10, 1933. The measures taken to search for Lukiyants or his corpse on the territory of the entire region did not yield any results. A preliminary investigation establishes that the theft of seed grain really took place on the part of Lukiyants and Kashperovsky. There is an assumption that the Lukian, fearing responsibility for the crime he committed, deserted from the unit, covering it up with a version of suicide. The search for Lukiyants was announced and an investigation is underway.
Attempted desertion for the cordon
The Red Army soldier Ryumin of the 14th frontier detachment (born in 1909, b / p, collective farmer), being in the border guard detachment instead of with the squad leader Chistyakov, suggested that the latter leave for Poland: “Letʹs go to Poland, itʹs close here, good, and we nobody will see. ʺ To Chistyakovʹs question: ʺWhat are we going to do in Poland?ʺ Ryumin replied: “Life in Poland is better than in the USSR, because you canʹt get anything here, and in Poland even deserters bring white bread with them. ʺ Chistyakov, categorically rejecting Ryuminʹs proposal, turned his attention to observing the latter and, upon arrival at the cordon, reported to the head of the outpost. Ryumin from the first days of his service in the 14th regiment of the [ogran] o [troop] showed himself negatively in matters of service and discipline, as a result of which he had a number of disciplinary sanctions. Among the Red Army men, he expressed a number of negative political sentiments. On May 28, 1933, Ryumin did not obey the order: he refused to clean the horse. Ryumin has been arrested and an investigation is underway.
About the Red Army soldiers who deserted from the p [ogran] about [detachments] who were behind the cordon
According to additional information from the INO, the Red Army soldier Prokopenko, who deserted from the 19th p [ogran] o [detachment], after crossing the border, was interrogated by military gendarmes who were accidentally on the guard, to whom he told about the number of people at the outpost, service dogs, routes of movement of border guards, the time of expulsion outfits, the number of weapons, the quality of food. When the gendarme asked how he personally lived at the outpost, Prokopenko replied that he lived well, better, and would not want. Prokopenko explained his flight to Poland by the fact that in the USSR the godless persecute priests, priests, in particular, his father was repressed as a clergyman. In conversation with the gendarmes
Prokopenko expressed his fear of being transferred back to the Soviet side, but the gendarmes assured him that he would stay in
Poland, where he would live well, without needing anything.
After that, Prokopenko said that being at the outpost, he noticed how a man of average height, in a short coat and boots, often walked from Poland to the Soviet side, he did not notice the face of this man. The gendarmes, together with Prokopenko, went around the huts of the peasants with. Koretskaya‐Guta with the aim of finding this person, but to no avail. Previously arrested, according to Prokopenkoʹs instructions, two residents of the Ludwipolskaya gmina are not our employees, and, according to the latest information, they have been released from custody.
After Prokopenko moved to Poland, the border guard was reinforced at the section of the guards No. 88‐89 for 4‐5 days. Through INO, the development of Prokopenko continues beyond the cordon.
The Red Army soldier GS Velichko, who deserted on September 9, 1932 from the 43rd p [ogran] o [detachment]. after crossing the border, went to p [ogran] o [group] Janil (not on the map), and then to the resettlement of Ali‐Keran, which is 10 km south of outpost No. 24 of the 43rd p [ogran] o [group], where he appeared to the head of the repost, and stated that he fled from the USSR, fearing arrest, since his father, a former rich man, has already been arrested. By the head of the repost, Velichko was disarmed, sent to the city of Ardabil and on September 19, 1932, was taken to the city of Tabriz, where, by order of the commander of the 2nd division, he was detained in a special position in the police duty room.
During interrogations, Velichko outlined the location of our border posts, the number, weapons, the number of command personnel and indicated the mood in the army and the ongoing intelligence work in the army through the special department. Soon Velichko was released from custody and settled in Tabriz under the name of Semyonov Naib Georges.
While at large, Velichko‐Semenov contacted Russian emigrantsmonarchists, to whom he indicated that he was a member of an underground organization existing in the USSR, where he was until the moment of flight to Persia and named the leading members of this organization: 1) Alexander Gribovsky, who lives at the station ... Kudinovo, pos. Small. Vasilyevo, no. 13, near Moscow; 2) Alexei
Nikolaevich Gvozdev, did not name the address; 3) Alexander Vanichkin ‐ radio operator of the 43rd p [ogran] o [group]. The object recommended that the Tavriz monarchical organization contact these persons and gave its chairman, Nakhichevansky, his photograph with the inscription ʺPlus one Georges ‐ trustʺ and asked to send it to Gribovsky, who, having received it, would understand that Velichko had contacted a foreign a / with the organization.
In addition, the object sent a letter to Vanichkin with the following content: “Be familiar with this person, the person who submitted this note, this person is not a Chekist, work with him at the same time. Velichko ‐ Georgy ‐ Georges ʺ. According to Velichko, if he contacts another [uh] a / s organization, he must send another [ug]. a photograph with the inscription: ʺPlus two Georges ‐ trust.ʺ
After these negotiations, Nakhichevansky wrote the following letter for Vanichkin: “Association of Tavriz emigrants, on the recommendation of the former. Your colleague Georgy Velichko, who emigrated to Persia, would like to enter into close contact with you in order to obtain some information in order to prepare an active struggle against the enslavers of the Russian people ‐ the communists. We ask you to send the answer through our person, he will come to you. Appendix: letter from G. Velichko. Chairman ‐ Nakhichevan, secretary ‐ Shahverdov. ʺ With this letter and a note, Velichko Nakhichevansky intends to send a proxy to Prishib, who will contact Vanichkin to receive information from him.
In addition, according to Velichko, in June 1933, out of the 43rd p [ogran] o [order], the following persons should go illegally to Persia: 1) Dmitrienko or Dmitrichenko Fedor Dementievich, battalion commander; 2) Kleenkin Kirill Vladimirovich ‐ platoon commander; 3) Gvozdev Matvey Nikolaevich ‐ brother of the above‐mentioned Gvozdev Aleksey, a Red Army soldier, a carrier of the detachmentʹs packages, moreover, Kleenkin must carry with him a large amount of money, a number of serious documents and detailed deployment of the detachment. It is possible that Vanichkin, who allegedly suspects that he is being watched and wants to be arrested, will go with him to Persia. The audit found that there are no command personnel with the indicated surnames either in the detachment, or in the district among the border units. Development of Velichko continues here and behind the cordon through INO.
June 19, 1933 in the dormitory of the 1st division of the 37th regiment of the VOGPU, with two shots from a revolver, the pom. platoon commander Kurbatov Alexander Andreevich (candidate] of the CPSU (b), a poor man, a collective farmer). Kurbatov did not leave any notes on the reasons for the suicide. On the day of his suicide, Kurbatov complained to the division commander that he was not feeling well, why he was released from classes and sent to a doctor, from whom he was released for 5 days. An investigation is underway.
On June 20, Karnach Pom committed suicide in the guardroom at the radio station with a rifle shot to the head. platoon commander of the 2nd division of the 50th regiment of the VOGPU Kravchenko Alexander Dmitrievich (born in 1909, member of the Komsomol, Ukrainian). In the letters he left, Kravchenko complains of illness and a weakening of memory: “Due to the fact that I became very weak, became powerless, it was influenced by the fact that I began to forget and I myself do not know what became of me. Even now I became sick, then and through that I decided myself, I began to forget everything and became hefty weak. ʺ
On June 14, a cadet of the 2nd frontier school Ivan Grigorievich
Butyanov (member of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, worker) seriously wounded himself with a shot from a revolver with the intent of suicide, leaving a note with the following content:
“To the commander of the 5th division.
June 14, 1933 from the 1st platoon cadet I.G. Butyanova Memorandum
So, let them not think about me, as they think, and perhaps Iʹm wrong, but Iʹm not guilty of anything, but Iʹm tired of the anonymous phrases heard from the cadets of our division and, in general, at school. I thought to be a good commander, but in all likelihood I was not destined to be a person who [kicked] out of the rut of life. More KGB sensitivity, and you will all have to identify the culprit for all this. Now I will pull the trigger and I will not exist. I.G. Butyanov ʺ
Immediately sent to a military hospital, Butyanov, without regaining consciousness, died on June 15.
Butyanov arrived at the school in May 1932 from the 43rd p [ogran] o [order]. Due to his low level of development, Butyanov in a number of subjects lagged behind in his studies, which created in him a decadent mood. In addition, he repeatedly complained to the platoon commander and individual cadets about the difficulties [in] their studies, in connection with which Butyanov was assisted in the form of attaching the most advanced cadets to him. An investigation is underway.
May 18, 1933 at 5 p.m. Stasyuk Saveliy Vasilyevich, a Red Army soldier of the 2nd division of the 44th regiment of the VOGPU, who was standing at the post, shot himself. An investigation is underway.
On June 3, paramedic Volkov Tikhon Stepanovich (born 1902, serving, from the peasants, b / p) committed suicide with a revolver shot in the garden of the Intercession Commandantʹs Office of the 50th regiment. Volkov left two notes with the following content:
1. “Comrades, do not blame anyone for my death; found himself unable to live and work. Donʹt bother your wife Vera, because she is not guilty of anything and knows nothing about my death and its causes. ʺ
2. “Vera, forgive me for everything, I am leaving life because I was unable to work. You can send Zina, Klavka, your mother to your brother Arefia when you go to Semipalatinsk, otherwise it will be very difficult for you to live”. An investigation is underway.
On May 31, 1933, the commander of the cavalry platoon of the 114th separate division of the VOGPU, Pavel Sharloimov, committed suicide. The data of the preliminary investigation portray the circumstances of the suicide as follows: May 31, 1933 at 12 noon. On the day, the Bureau of the Party Collective was convened in the divisionʹs clubhouse in the presence of all unit commanders with an agenda: about the discipline of party members and the tactless behavior of Sharloimov as a party member. On May 29, 1933, Sharloimov, after surrendering his duty, met with the demobilized Red Army soldier Trishkin, asked him to buy wine and bring the commanders‐conscripts to the hostel for drinks, which was done. After getting drunk, Sharloimov went into the cult base (city garden) in strong intoxication, but was spotted in time by the Red Army, who reported to the pom. the political commander Yatsenko, who himself personally went to the cultural base, in order to take Sharloimov to the division, and, before reaching the warehouse, he saw Sharloimov standing at the fence in a state of strong alcoholic intoxication, whom he took and brought to the OGPU, where he was put on duty until sobering up. Prior to this incident, Sharloimov was noticed several times in drunkenness, he has two reprimands on the party line, one of them with a warning. The bureau of the party collective, summing up all the actions of Sharloimov, expelled him from the CPSU (b) as morally decayed and made its decision to ask the command for the early demobilization of Sharloimov from the ranks of the OGPU troops. After the decision of the Bureau of the collective of the All‐Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Sharloimov was sent to the hostel of super‐conscripts, where at 14 oʹclock. 30 minutes. shot himself.
June 9, 1933 the Red Army soldier of the 9th regiment of the VOGPU Shestopalov M.A. committed suicide with a shot from a revolver revolver in the building of the editorial office of the railway. newspaper ʺOn railsʺ (station Novosibirsk) in the presence of 5 employees of the said editorial office under the following circumstances: having come to the editorial office in the morning of the indicated date, Shestopalov put a notebook on the table of Galina Sogdeevaʹs editorial secretary, turned to the door and fired a revolver at himself. Death followed instantly. The preliminary investigation established that Shestopalov had a long acquaintance with the said Sogdeeva (b / p, employee, Tatar by nationality), who promised to marry him. Sogdeevaʹs mother and elder sister, being bright nationalists, protested against this marriage and allegedly threatened to kill both of them, about which Galina informed Shestopalov, and on June 5, 1933, told him, that she allegedly married another. After that, Shestopalov threatened Sogdeeva that he would kill her if she did not live with him. Sogdeeva wrote a letter to the battalion commander, informing that Shestopalov intended to kill her.
Shestopalov, as having a decadent mood, was not taken on a business trip (the entire division left), which he took very painfully. In the posthumous notes left behind, Shestopalov writes to Galina: “Galya, take your photo. I took one cartridge with me just for myself. You can breathe freely with your chest. Well, Iʹm happy now, huh? Galya, your urgent package for the ʺcavalry divisionʺ has done its job. Departing from my oath to you, I must redeem my life. ʺ Chief of staff: “Comrades commanders, the package that was urgently sent to the battalion commander on June 5, he did his job. 19 months of service in the ranks of the VOGPU, the cause of our country needed me, and now ... it is not needed, and an unnecessary person does not need to live. ʺ Relatives: ʺI donʹt need life now; I am humiliated by people.ʺ An investigation is underway.
May 27 from the [rank‐and‐file] organizer of the Komsomol of the 49th regiment of the [order] Bogdanov N.K. (Born 1907, member of the CPSU (b), collective farmer) committed suicide with a revolver shot. Bogdanovʹs suicide was preceded by the following event: Bogdanov told the assistant by phone. the chief of the detachment for political affairs Makhorin, that he, Bogdanov, in the village. Tashkarasu, which is 50 km from Jarkent, shot his wife pom on romantic grounds. the commandant of the Sarjak commandantʹs office Sorokin. To Makhorinʹs offer to return to the detachment, Bogdanov replied that he knew the laws and did not want to walk around as a living corpse. Interrogation of Sorokina established that Bogdanov, in a Soyuztrans car between the villages of Tashkarasu and Chundzha, caught up with Sorokina, who was on her way to her husbandʹs office, and suggested that she return to Jarkent. Having received a refusal from Sorokina, Bogdanov fired three unsuccessful shots at Sorokina, after which he got into the car and fired a few more fruitless shots on the way at the carriers with whom Sorokina and her sister were traveling. An investigation is underway.
On June 13, a border guard of the household command of the 10th border detachment Sukhar Grigory (b / p, collective farmer) was stabbed to death with a razor. The investigation established that Seabiscuit committed suicide under the influence of letters from his homeland about his wifeʹs infidelities. The case was transferred to the Prosecutor of the PO and VOGPU.
June 12, 1933 head. With the financial pleasure of a separate Shlisselburg commandantʹs office, Gordeev (a member of the CPSU (b)), while on vacation in the Luga region, committed suicide. An investigation is underway.
On June 11, 1933, a cadet of the school of junior command personnel in the LVO Georgievich Aleksandr Savelyevich, born in 1910, an employee, by nationality Serb (homeless), a native of Warsaw, from a rifle, attempting to commit suicide, inflicted a serious wound in the chest. Being sent to the hospital, Georgievich died on the way. An investigation is underway.
On June 8, 1933, a Red Army soldier of the 38th border detachment Kondrashev (b / p, worker) attempted suicide, which was prevented. The preliminary investigation established that the attempt to commit suicide by Kondrashev was caused by the inept response of the outpost chief to the act committed by Kondrashev and the lack of explanatory work. The investigation continues.
On June 4, 1933, Starodubtsev (worker, b / p), a cadet of the regiment [ovoy] school of the 45th regiment of the VOGPU, tried to commit suicide by hanging. The reason for this was the accusation of Starodubtsev by the head of the school, Nosov, of stealing 1.5 kg of sugar from Sudakovʹs commerce department. Starodubtsev is undergoing treatment. The investigation is being conducted by the military investigator of the prosecutorʹs office of the PO and VOGPU.
Head of the 6th branch of the NGO OGPU
1) Frinovsky; 2) Roshal; 3) Talalaev.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1501. L. 296‐315. Copy.
A special message from the OGPU about the delivery of defective weapons to the Red Army and about the operation of military acceptance devices and factory technical control departments. July 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1039. L. 123‐129. Copy
Recently, the OGPU received information about a number of cases of the delivery of weapons with major defects by the industry to the Red Army. For example:
a) a number of artillery systems were handed over with defects, some of which lead to a decrease in the service life of the guns, complicate their control, and in some cases lead to complete disrepair (see Appendix No. 1 ‐ Help from the Main Artillery
Directorate of the GAU RKKA);
b) during the formation of squadrons of heavy bombers (TB‐3 aircraft) to be sent to the Far East, a number of defects were found both on the aircraft themselves and in the engines, significantly reducing their flight performance (see Appendix No. 2 * ‐ an extract from the materials on structural and manufacturing defects of TB‐3 ships).
c) obstacle mines fired in 1932‐33. and sent to the Far East, as well as to the Black and Baltic Seas, armed with defective strikers (see
Appendix No. 3 * ‐ an extract from materials about mines);
d) when checking for endurance 85 easel machine guns Maxim from among 1101, received into service by the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army (OKDVA) military warehouse No. 41 from the Tula and Izhevsk factories in the period December  ‐February 1933, 23% were rough defects, such as: bent box walls, bent frames, 13% had defects in the combat larva, etc.
These defects reduce the service life, and some of them make machine guns completely unsuitable for combat purposes;
e) a random check of the modernized rifles sent to OKDVA to the same military warehouse No. 41 also showed a number of defects: 2.8% of the examined rifles showed traces of rust in the barrel bores, 100% had defective bayonets, 9% lacked vigorous reflection of fired cartridges, etc. (see Appendix No. 4 ‐ an extract from materials on machine guns and rifles for OKDVA);
f) The coaxial machine guns of Degtyarev, sent along with the artillery board of the Belarusian Military District (BVO), were found to have massive delays during zeroing and checking, during the study of which it was found that they are obtained due to the softness of the metal on the bolts (see Appendix No. an extract from materials about Degtyarevʹs machine guns);
g) a significant number of delivered tanks also have major defects, up to the discovery of foreign objects in the mechanisms of tanks and engines (see Appendix No. 6 * ‐ an extract from the materials on defects of T‐26 tanks).
The presence of these defects leads not only to a decrease in the combat effectiveness of tanks, but also leads to the creation of an atmosphere of mistrust on the part of the composition of motormechanical units in the reliability of tanks.
In connection with the aforementioned and other similar facts, the OGPU carried out an agent and investigative check of the activities of the military acceptance apparatus and the factory technical control departments (QCD) responsible for preventing the delivery of low‐quality products to the RKKA for a number of factories. Based on the data obtained, the OGPU states that the main reason for the poor operation of these devices and their admission to the army of defective weapons is the lack of incentives for both military acceptance workers and, in particular, the OTK to fight for product quality and the absence of any liability for admission. such products to the army.
Employees of military acceptance, as well as employees of the Quality Control Department, did not receive bonuses for the absence of defects in the delivered weapons (non‐detection of these defects in military units during the operation of weapons). None of them answered administratively and did not financially suffer from the admission to the army of poor‐quality weapons ‐ all work on solid salaries (see Appendix Nos. 7, 8, 9 * ‐ extracts from the testimony of employees of the special department of head [ode] No. 37 Velyashev, the head of the quality control department of the plant [ode] No. 24 Tarakhtunov, the head of the quality control department of the plant No. 20 Kazantsev).
Moreover, at a number of factories there is a system of bonuses for employees of the Quality Control Department and military acceptance for the amount of products delivered by the plant, due to which, naturally, attention to its quality is weakened (see Appendix No. 7, 8 * ‐ testimony of employees of the special department] of the factory [ode] No. 37 Velyashev, head of the quality control department of plant No. 24 Tarakhtunov). This kind of system at some factories has grown into the giving of disguised bribes to military acceptance for indulgence in the acceptance of their products into the army.
1) at the Bolshevik plant (Leningrad), by order of the director of the Ruda plant, senior military representative Petrukhin, an apartment was repaired for 32 thousand rubles, in addition, he was supplied with firewood, winter clothes (coat with fur ‐ 1650 rubles, etc.).), unrestrictedly supplied with acutely scarce products from the factory kitchen, paid him travel expenses at the expense of the factory, along with the payment to him through the GAU, etc.
Other officers of the military reception were interested in systematically writing out money to them for the alleged overtime work, etc. It should be noted that the plant ʺBolshevikʺ handed over to the army a number of defective artillery systems (see Appendix No. 10 * ‐ testimony] of the military representative of the plant ʺBolshevikʺ Stepanov, as well as the accompanying accounting certificate and acts).
At aircraft plant No. 22 (Moscow), military acceptance workers Semenov, Ivanov and others [ugie] received from the plant management valuable gifts and monetary rewards timed to coincide with the October celebrations, the 15th anniversary of the Red Army, etc.
It was from this plant that defective TB‐3 aircraft were delivered to the newly formed squadrons on D [alniy] V [East] (see Appendix 11 ‐ testimony of the assistant of the military representative of the plant [ode] No 22 Urvachev and Appendix No 12 *).
At the Kovrov Tool Plant No. 2 (INZ), the military representative Ivanov received from the plant management large monetary bonuses (about 10 thousand rubles) for rationalization proposals, which actually amounted to a change in the technical conditions for packaging (see Appendix No. 12 * ‐ an extract from the material on the plant INZ).
An investigation is being conducted on the merits of the stated facts.
The lack of incentives for quality control departments in the struggle for product quality in the presence of facts similar to the above, negates the effectiveness of the ongoing reorganization of the technical control departments ‐ the transfer of factory quality control departments from subordination to the directorate of factories into direct subordination to trusts and associations.
It should also be noted attempts, often successful, to influence military acceptance workers by using the technical authority of specialists working at the plant: evidence that certain defects are not serious.
This method was used by the participants of the liquidated counterrevolutionary organization at the Barricades plant (see Appendix
No. 13 * ‐ an extract from the testimony of Pariisky).
There have also been cases of dismissal of employees of the military acceptance and quality control department, who imposed more stringent requirements for the quality of products (see Appendix No. 14, 15 * ‐ extracts from the testimony of the head of the military acceptance of plant No. 8 Sandler and Art [ arshei] control foreman of plant number 24 Semin).
At the ʺBarricadesʺ plant there was a system of advance notes of military inspectors for products not yet delivered; this forced the inspectors who issued such notes to be more lenient in the future to the quality of the products finally handed over by the plant (see Appendix No. 16 * ‐ extract from Ulyanovʹs testimony). Similar facts, according to intelligence, also took place at the factories named after. Molotov and No. 21.
Another reason for the unsatisfactory work of the Quality Control Department and the military acceptance is the poor organization of the workplace of the rejects: there are no necessary devices for work, the testing of individual parts is handicraft (for example, at the Voroshilov Tank Plant in Leningrad, tank motors were checked by ear while starting 5‐6 motors and in a large noise as a result, as a result, some motors were incorrectly rejected, while others were missed).
At a number of factories, there is no provision of premises for storing tested parts, which makes it possible to replace them, etc. (see Appendix Nos. 9 and 17 * ‐ testimony of the head of the quality control department of plant No. 20 Kazantsev and an extract from the materials of the inspection of the Voroshilov plant).
Based on the foregoing, the OGPU considers it necessary:
1) revise and change the entire system of remuneration for workers of military acceptance and quality control department, rebuilding it from the angle of stimulating the struggle for product quality;
2) categorically prohibit any bonuses for military acceptance workers from the plant management and
3) NKVM and NKTP check the provision of military acceptance apparatus and quality control department with the necessary devices for work and premises for storing accepted products.
Appendix: documents mentioned in the text *.
Deputy Chairman of the OGPU Yagoda
Head of ECU OGPU Mironov
1) the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) ‐ to Comrade
Poskrebyshev (for Comrade Stalin); 2) Council of Peopleʹs
Commissars of the USSR ‐ to Comrade Molotov; 3) NKVM ‐ to
Comrade Voroshilov; 4) NKTP ‐ Comrade Ordzhonikidze.
F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1039. L. 123‐129. Copy.
* There are no applications in the case
A note on a direct wire about incidents on the Soviet‐Chinese border. December 17, 1933
Archive: F. 2. Op. 11.D. 1021. L. 48. Certified copy
December 17, 1933
December 16 at the site of the Grodekovsky border detachment at 10 oʹclock. 15 minutes. one plane (type ‐ reconnaissance), having appeared on the whale [ai] territory opposite the Ushagou outpost, at an altitude of 1500 m flew along the border over our territory, heading north at a depth of up to one kilometer from the border line. Having reached the Zolotaya outpost, he turned deep into the whale
[Ai] territory. At 13 oʹclock. 15 minutes. one plane, emerging from China, circled over the fold at an altitude of 1000 m above the border line. Loose Pad disappeared back into the whale [ai] territory. At 13 oʹclock. 25 minutes one bomb carrier, appearing from the direction of Sanchagou, flew over our territory at Grodekovo at an altitude of 1000 m. Details are being specified.
According to the report of the Blagoveshchensk border detachment, on December 13 through the village. Machan to Sakhalyan was followed by an unknown equestrian unit of 152 horsemen, 5 carts, apparently making a long transition. According to the same detachment, in the Sakhalyan region, the Japanese are preparing to set up four new gendarmerie posts on Sakhalyan, Chekhantui,
Kolushan, Aigun, in connection with which premises are sought and White emigrants are being recruited for the service [in] the gendarmerie. No. 57157.
Dispatched: 1) Berry; 2) Agranov; 3) Frinovsky; 4) Artuzov.
F. 2. Op. 11. File 1021. Sheet 48. Certified copy.
* The document contains a resolution: “v. Stalin, comrade
Voroshilov. G. Ya. December 17, 1933 ʺ