The split between the social-patriots and the revolutionary
internationalists in Russia—a split that has taken place on a world
scale, too—is steadily growing wider. Having begun with defencism, the
Mensheviks have ended with the most despicable alliance with the
counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, inspiring and sanctioning the
persecution of internationalist organisations, the workers’ press, etc.,
etc. Having turned into menials of the Russian and allied imperialism,
they have ﬁnally gone over to the camp of the proletariat’s enemies.
Under these circumstances revolutionary Social-Democracy’s prime task is
to show the treacherous policy of the imperialist Mensheviks in its true
light to the broadest sections of the proletarian masses, and completely
isolate them from all elements of the working class who are in any way
revolutionary. Any attempt to secure a reconciliation between
imperialist and revolutionary- internationalist elements of socialism
through a “unity congress”, with the object of setting up a single
Social-Democratic party (plan of the Novaya Zhizn group of intellectuals
who have no base to stand on), would, therefore, be a heavy blow to the
interests of the proletariat. On the basis of its recognition of the
need for a total and irrevocable split with the imperialist Mensheviks,
the Congress declares that it is categorically opposed to such attempts.
In opposition to the dangerous slogan of the unity of all,
Social-Democracy advances the class revolutionary slogan of unity of all
internationalists who have in fact broken with the imperialist
Mensheviks. The Congress believes that such unity is necessary and
inevitable and calls on all Social-Democratic revolutionary elements to rupture
forthwith their organisational ties with the defencists and unite round
The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses,Conferences and
Plenary Meetingsof the Central Committee, 8th Russ. ed., Vol. 1, p. 501
* Forwarded to the CC for editing and printed only with stylistic
corrections. Adopted at the morning sitting on August 3. (Note by the
editors of the first printing of the minutes of the Sixth Congress.)
Speech Delivered at the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks)
July 26-August 3, 1917
1. Report of the Central CommitteeJuly 27
Comrades, the Central Committee's report embraces its activities
during the past two and a half months— May, June and the early half
The Central Committee's activities in the month of May were directed
along three lines.
First, it issued the call for new elections to the Soviets of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Central Committee proceeded
from the fact that our revolution was developing along peaceful
lines, and that the composition of the Soviets of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies, and hence of the government, could be altered by
new elections to the Soviets. Our opponents accused us of trying to
seize power. That was a calumny. We had no such intention. We said
that we had the opportunity by means of new elections to the Soviets
to change the character of the activity of the Soviets and make it
conform with the wishes of the broad masses. It was clear to us that
a majority of one vote in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
Deputies would be enough to make the government take a different
course. New elections were therefore the keynote of our work in the
month of May.
In the end we won about half the seats in the workers' group of the
Soviet, and about one quarter in the soldiers' group.
Second, agitation against the war. We took the occasion of the death
sentence passed on Friedrich Adler 2 to
organize a number of protest meetings against capital punishment and
against the war. That campaign was well received by the soldiers.
The third aspect of the Central Committee's activities was the
municipal elections in May. Jointly with the Petrograd Committee,
the Central Committee exerted every effort to give battle both to
the Cadets, the main force of counter-revolution, and to the
Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who willingly or
unwillingly followed the Cadets. We secured about 20 per cent of the
800,000 votes cast in Petrograd. The Vyborg District Duma we won
entirely. Outstanding service was rendered the Party by our soldier
and sailor comrades.
Thus the outstanding features in May were: 1) the municipal
elections; 2) agitation against the war, and 3) the elections to the
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
June. Rumours of preparation for an offensive at the front were
making the soldiers restless. A series of orders were issued
abrogating the rights of the soldiers. All this electrified the
masses. Every rumour spread through Petrograd like wildfire,
stirring up unrest among the workers and especially the soldiers.
Rumours of an offensive; Kerensky's orders and declaration of the
rights of the soldier; the evacuation from Petrograd of
"unnecessary" elements—as the authorities called them, it being
clear, however, that what they wanted was to rid Petrograd of
revolutionary elements; the economic disruption, which was becoming
ever more tangible— all this was making the workers and soldiers
restless. Meetings were organized at the factories, and we were
being constantly urged by regiments and factories to organize a
demonstration. It was planned to hold a demonstration on June 5. But
the Central Committee resolved not to hold a demonstration for the
time being, but to convene a meeting of representatives of the
districts, factories, mills and regiments on June 7 and to decide
there the question of a demonstration. This meeting was called and
was attended by about 200 persons. It became evident that the
soldiers were particularly restless. By an overwhelming majority of
votes it was decided to demonstrate. The question was debated as to
what should be done if the Congress of Soviets, which had just
opened, should declare against a demonstration. The vast majority of
the comrades who took the floor were of the opinion that nothing
could prevent the demonstration from being held. After that the
Central Committee decided to take it upon itself to organize a
peaceful demonstration. The soldiers wanted to know whether they
could not come armed, but the Central Committee resolved against the
carrying of arms. The soldiers, however, said that it was impossible
to come unarmed, that arms were the only effective guarantee against
excesses on the part of the bourgeois public, and that they would
bring arms only for purposes of self-defence.
On June 9 the Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee and the
Army Organization held a joint meeting. The Central Committee raised
the following point: in view of the fact that the Congress of
Soviets and all the "socialist" parties were opposed to our
demonstration, would it not be well to postpone it? All replied in
At midnight the same day the Congress of Soviets issued a manifesto
in which it brought the whole weight of its authority against us.
The Central Committee resolved not to hold the demonstration on June
10 and to postpone it to June 18, seeing that on that day the
Congress of Soviets was itself calling a demonstration, at which the
masses would be able to express their will. The workers and soldiers
greeted the Central Committee's decision with repressed
dissatisfaction, but obeyed it. It is characteristic, comrades, that
on the morning of June 10, when a number of speakers from the
Congress of Soviets addressed factory meetings urging the
"liquidation of the attempt to organize a demonstration," the
overwhelming majority of the workers agreed to listen only to the
speakers of our Party. The Central Committee succeeded in pacifying
the soldiers and workers. This was indicative of our high level of
When arranging the demonstration for June 18 the Congress of Soviets
announced that freedom of slogans would be allowed. It was evident
that the Congress had decided to give battle to our Party. We
accepted the challenge, and began to muster our forces for the
The comrades know how the demonstration of June 18 went off. Even
the bourgeois papers said that the overwhelming majority of the
demonstrators marched under the slogans of the Bolsheviks. The
principal slogan was "All power to the Soviets!" No fewer than
400,000 persons marched in the procession. Only three small
groups—the Bund, the Cossacks and the Plekhanovites— ventured to
display the slogan "Confidence in the Provisional Government!"— and
even they repented it, for they were compelled to furl their
banners. The Congress of Soviets was given proof positive of how
great the strength and influence of our Party was. It was the
general conviction that the demonstration of June 18, which was more
imposing than the demonstration of April 21, was bound to have its
effect. And it should indeed have had its effect. Rech averred that
in all probability there would be important changes in the
government, because the policy of the Soviets was not approved by
the masses. But that very day our armies launched an offensive at
the front, a successful offensive, and the "Blacks" began a
demonstration on the Nevsky Prospect in honour of it. That
obliterated the moral victory gained by the Bolsheviks at the
demonstration. It also obliterated the chances of the practical
results which had been spoken of by both Rech and official spokesmen
of the ruling parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.
The Provisional Government remained in power. The successful
offensive, partial successes of the Provisional Government, and a
number of projects to withdraw the troops from Petrograd had their
effect on the soldiers. These facts convinced them that passive
imperialism was changing to active imperialism. They realized that a
period of fresh sacrifices had begun.
The front reacted to the policy of active imperialism in its own
way. A whole number of regiments, in spite of orders to the
contrary, began to take a vote on the question of whether to attack
or not. The higher command failed to realize that in the new
conditions prevailing in Russia, and in view of the fact that the
aims of the war had not been made clear, it was impossible to hurl
the masses blindly into an offensive. What we had predicted
occurred: the offensive was doomed to failure.
The latter part of June and the beginning of July were dominated by
the policy of the offensive. Rumours were circulating that the death
penalty had been reintroduced, that a whole number of regiments were
being disbanded, that soldiers at the front were being subjected to
maltreatment. Delegates arrived from the front with reports of the
arrest and beating up of soldiers in their own units. There were
similar reports from the grenadier regiment and the machine-gun
regiment. All this prepared the ground for another demonstration of
the workers and soldiers of Petrograd.
I now come to the events of July 3-5. It all began on July 3, at
three in the afternoon, at the premises of the Petrograd Committee.
July 3, 3 p.m. The Petrograd City Conference of our Party was in
session. The most inoffensive of questions was being discussed—the
municipal elections. Two representatives of one of the regiments of
the garrison appeared. They raised a matter of urgency. Their
regiment had "decided to come out this evening," because they "could
not stand it any longer in silence when regiment after regiment was
being disbanded at the front," and they had "already sent round
their delegates to the factories and regiments" inviting them to
join the demonstration. In reply to this, Comrade Volodarsky,
speaking for the presidium of the conference, said that "the Party
had already decided not to demonstrate, and Party members in the
regiment must not dare to disobey the Party's decision."
4 p.m. The Petrograd Committee, Army Organization and Central
Committee of the Party, having discussed the question, resolve not
to demonstrate. The resolution is approved by the conference, whose
members disperse to the factories and regiments to dissuade the
comrades from demonstrating.
5 p.m. A meeting of the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of
the Soviets in the Taurida Palace. On the instructions of the
Central Committee of the Party, Comrade Stalin makes a statement to
the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee on what has occurred,
and reports that the Bolsheviks have decided against a
7 p.m. In front of the headquarters of the Petrograd Committee.
Several regiments march up with banners displaying the slogan "All
power to the Soviets!" They stop in front of the Petrograd Committee
promises and request that members of our organization "say a few
words." Two Bolshevik speakers, Lashevich and Kurayev, explain the
current political situation and urge against demonstrating. They are
received with cries of "Get down!" Members of our organization then
suggest that the soldiers elect a delegation to convey their wishes
to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and then disperse
to their regiments. This proposal is greeted with deafening cheers.
The band plays the Marseillaise. . . . By this time the news flies
round Petrograd that the Cadets have resigned from the government,
and the workers become restless. Following the soldiers, columns of
workers appear. Their slogans are the same as the soldiers'. The
soldiers and the workers march off to the Taurida Palace.
9 p.m. Headquarters of the Petrograd Committee. A succession of
delegates arrives from the factories. They all request our Party
organizations to join in and assume direction of the demonstration.
Otherwise there "will be bloodshed." Voices are raised suggesting
that delegations should be elected from the mills and factories to
make the will of the demonstrators known to the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets, and that the masses; after hearing the
reports of the delegations, should disperse peacefully.
10 p.m. Meeting of the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in the Taurida Palace. In
consequence of the reports of the workers that the demonstration has
already begun, the majority of the section decide to join in the
demonstration in order to avert excesses and to lend it a peaceful
and organized character. A minority do not agree with this decision
and walk out of the meeting. The majority elect a bureau to carry
out the decision just adopted.
11 p.m. The Central Committee and PetrogradCommittee of our Party
shift their meeting place to the Taurida Palace, to which the
demonstrators have been marching all the evening. Agitators from the
districts and representatives from the factories arrive.
Representatives of the Central Committee of our Party, the Petrograd
Committee, the Army Organization, the Mezhrayonny Committee and the
Bureau of the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet hold a
meeting. The reports from the districts make it clear:
1) That the workers and soldiers cannot be restrained from
demonstrating the following day;
2) That the demonstrators will carry arms exclusively for self-defence,
as an effective guarantee against provocative shots that may be
fired from the Nevsky Prospect: "It's not so easy to fire on armed
The meeting decides that at a time when the revolutionary worker and
soldier masses are demonstrating under the slogan "All power to the
Soviets!" the party of the proletariat has no right to wash its
hands of and stand aloof from the movement; it cannot abandon the
masses to the caprice of fate; it must remain with the masses in
order to lend the spontaneous movement a conscious and organized
character. The meeting decides to recommend the workers and soldiers
to elect delegates from the regiments and factories and through them
declare their wishes to the Executive Committee of the Soviets. An
appeal for a "peaceful and organized demonstration" is drawn up on
the lines of this decision. 3
Midnight. Over 30,000 Putilov workers arrive at the Taurida Palace
with banners displaying the slogan: "All power to the Soviets!"
Delegates are elected. The delegates report the demands of the
Putilov workers to the Executive Committee. The soldiers and workers
in front of the Taurida Palace begin to disperse.
July 4. Daytime. The procession of workers and soldiers, carrying
banners and Bolshevik slogans, marches to the Taurida Palace. The
tail of the procession consists of thousands of sailors from
Kronstadt. There are no fewer than 400,000 demonstrators—according
to the bourgeois papers (Birzhovka). The streets are scenes of
jubilation. Friendly cheers from the public greet the demonstrators.
In the afternoon excesses begin. Sinister elements in the bourgeois
districts cast a dark shadow over the workers' demonstration by
firing provocative shots. Even Birzheviye Vedomosti does not venture
to deny that the shooting was started by opponents of the
demonstration. "Precisely at two o'clock," it writes (July 4,
evening edition), "on the corner of the Sadovaya and the Nevsky
Prospect, as the armed demonstrators were filing past and large
numbers of the public were quietly looking on, a deafening report
came from the right side of the Sadovaya, after which shots began to
be fired in volleys."
Obviously, it was not the demonstrators that started the shooting;
it was "unknown persons" who fired on the demonstrators, not vice
Firing went on simultaneously in several places in the bourgeois
part of the town. The provocators were not dozing. Nevertheless, the
demonstrators did not go beyond necessary self-defence. There was
absolutely no sign of a conspiracy or insurrection. Not a single
government or public building was seized, nor even was an attempt
made to do so, although, with the tremendous armed force at their
disposal, the demonstrators could quite easily have captured not
only individual buildings, but the whole city. . . .
8 p.m. At a meeting of the Central Committee, the Mezhrayonny
Committee and other organizations of our Party in the Taurida Palace
it is decided that now that the revolutionary workers and soldiers
have demonstrated their will, the action should be stopped. An
appeal is drawn up on these lines: "The demonstration is over. . . .
Our watchword is: Staunchness, restraint, calm"
(see the appeal in Listok Pravdy 4). The appeal was sent to Pravda
but could not appear on July 5, because on the night of the 4th the
Pravda offices were wrecked by military cadets and secret agents.
10-11 p.m. In the Taurida Palace the Central Executive Committee of
the Soviets discusses the question of the government. After the
resignation of the Cadets the position of the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks has become very critical:
they "need" a bloc with the bourgeoisie, but a bloc is impossible
because the bourgeoisie want no more agreements with them. A bloc
with the Cadets is no longer feasible. Hence the question of the
Soviets taking over power themselves arises with full force.
There are rumours that our front has been pierced by the Germans.
True, these rumours are still unconfirmed, but they cause
There are rumours that on the following day a statement will appear
in the press containing an infamous slander against Comrade Lenin.
The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets calls out soldiers
(of the Volhynia regiment) to protect the Taurida Palace. From whom?
From the Bolsheviks, it appears, who have allegedly come to the
palace to "arrest" the Executive Committee and "seize power." That
is said of the Bolsheviks, who had been advocating the strengthening
of the Soviets and the transference to them of all authority in the
country! . . .
2-3 a.m. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets does not
assume power. It instructs the "socialist" Ministers to form a new
government and to get at least a few bourgeois into it. The
Ministers are furnished with emergency powers to "combat anarchy."
The matter is clear: the Central Executive Committee, faced with the
necessity of resolutely breaking with the bourgeoisie —which it
particularly fears to do, because it has hitherto derived its
strength from "combinations" in one form or another with the
bourgeoisie—responds by resolutely breaking with the workers and the
Bolsheviks, in order to join with the bourgeoisie and turn its
weapons against the revolutionary workers and soldiers. Thus a
campaign is launched against the revolution. The
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks open fire on the
revolution, to the glee of the counter-revolutionaries. . . .
July 5. The papers (Zhivoye Slovo 5) publish the statement with the
infamous slander against Comrade Lenin. Pravda does not appear,
because its offices were wrecked on the night of July 4. A
dictatorship of the "socialist" Ministers, who are seeking a bloc
with the Cadets, is established. The Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had not wanted to take power, now
take it (for a short period) in order to crush the Bolsheviks. . . .
Army units from the front appear in the streets. Gangs of military
cadets and counterrevolutionaries go about wrecking, making searches
and committing acts of ruffianism. The witch-hunt against Lenin and
the Bolsheviks raised by Alexinsky, Pankratov and Pereverzev is
exploited to the full by the counter-revolutionaries. The
counter-revolution hourly gains momentum. The hub of the
dictatorship is the army staff. The secret service agents, the
military cadets, the Cossacks run riot. Arrests and manhandlings.
The open attack of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets
against the Bolshevik workers and soldiers unleashes the forces of
counter-revolution. . . .
In reply to the slanders of Alexinsky and Co., the Central Committee
of our Party issues the leaflet, "Try the Slanderers!" 6 The Central
Committee's appeal to call off the strike and demonstration (which
could not appear in Pravda because of the wrecking of its offices)
appears as a separate leaflet. One is struck by the absence of any
appeals from the other "socialist" parties. The Bolsheviks are
alone. Against them have tacitly combined all the elements to the
Right of the Bolsheviks — from Suvorin and Milyukov to Dan and
July 6. The bridges have been raised. The pacifier Ma-zurenko and
his composite detachment are doing their punitive work. In the
streets, troops are suppressing recalcitrants. There is a virtual
state of siege. "Suspects" are arrested and taken to military
headquarters. Workers, soldiers and sailors are being disarmed.
Petrograd has been placed under the power of the military. Much as
the "powers that be" would like to incite a so-called "battle," the
workers and soldiers do not succumb to the provocation and do not
"accept battle." The Fortress of Peter and Paul opens its gates to
the disarmers. The premises of the Petrograd Committee are occupied
by a composite detachment. Searches are conducted and weapons
confiscated in the working-class districts. Tsereteli's idea of
disarming the workers and soldiers, which he first timidly
formulated on June 11, is now being carried into effect. "Minister
of Disarmament" the workers bitterly call him. ...
The Trud printing plant is wrecked. Listok Pravdy appears. A worker,
Voinov, is killed while distributing the Listok. . . . The bourgeois
press throws off all restraint; it represents the infamous slander
against Comrade Lenin as a fact, and now does not confine its attack
on the revolution to the Bolsheviks alone, but extends it to the
Soviets, the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries.
It becomes clear that in betraying the Bolsheviks the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks have betrayed themselves,
have betrayed the revolution, and have unleashed and unbridled the
forces of counter-revolution. The campaign of the
counter-revolutionary dictatorship against liberty in the rear and
at the front is in full swing. From the fact that the Cadet and
Allied press, which only yesterday was still carping at
revolutionary Russia, now suddenly feels satisfied, it may be
concluded that the "work" of pacification was not undertaken without
the participation of the Russian and Allied moneybags.
2. Reply to the Discussion
Comrades, it is evident from the discussion that no one criticizes
the political line of the Central Committee of the Party or objects
to its slogans. The Central Committee put forward three major
slogans: all power to the Soviets, control of production, and
confiscation of the landed estates. These slogans won sympathy among
the mass of the workers and among the soldiers. They proved to be
correct, and by waging the fight on that basis we retained the
support of the masses. I consider this a major fact in the Central
Committee's favour. If it issues correct slogans at the most
difficult moments, this shows that in the main the Central Committee
Criticism has centred not around primary, but secondary matters. It
amounted in substance to the claim that the Central Committee had
not formed contacts with the provinces and that its activities had
been confined chiefly to Petrograd. The reproach of isolation from
the provinces is not without foundation. But it was utterly
impossible to cover the entire provinces. The reproach that the
Central Committee virtually became a Petrograd Committee is to some
extent justified. This is a fact. But it is here, in Petrograd, that
the policy of Russia is being hammered out. It is here that the
directing forces of the revolution are located. The provinces react
to what is done in Petrograd. This, finally, is due to the fact that
this is the seat of the Provisional Government, in whose hands all
the power is concentrated, and the seat of the Central Executive
Committee, which is the voice of the whole organized revolutionary
democracy. On the other hand, events are moving fast, an open
struggle is in progress, and there is no assurance that the existing
government may not disappear any day. Under such circumstances, to
wait until our friends in the provinces say their word was quite
unthinkable. We know that the Central Executive Committee decides
questions concerning the revolution without waiting for the
provinces. The whole government apparatus is in their hands. And
what have we got? The apparatus of the Central Committee. And it is,
of course, a weak apparatus. To demand, therefore, that the Central
Committee take no steps without first consulting the provinces is
tantamount to demanding that the Central Committee should not march
ahead of events but trail behind them. But then it would not be a
Central Committee. Only by following the method which we did follow
could the Central Committee be equal to the situation.
Reproaches have been voiced on particular points. Some comrades
spoke of the failure of the insurrection of July 3-5. Yes, comrades,
failure there was; only it was not an insurrection, but a
demonstration. This failure was due to the breach of the front of
the revolution resulting from the treacherous conduct of the
petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and
Mensheviks, who turned their backs on the revolution.
Comrade Bezrabotny 7 said that the Central Committee made no effort
to flood Petrograd and the provinces with leaflets explaining the
events of July 3-5. But our printing plant had been wrecked, and it
was physically impossible to get anything printed in other printing
plants, as this would have exposed them to the danger of being
All the same, things here were not so bad: if in some of the
districts we were arrested, in others we found a welcome and were
greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. And now, too, the spirit of
the Petrograd workers is splendid and the prestige of the Bolsheviks
I should like to raise a few questions.
Firstly, how should we react to the slanders against our leaders?
Recent events make it necessary to draw up a manifesto to the people
explaining all the facts, and for this purpose a commission should
be elected. And I propose that this commission, if you decide to
elect it, should also issue a manifesto to the revolutionary workers
and soldiers of Germany, Britain, France, etc., informing them of
the events of July 3-5 and branding the calumniators. We are the
most advanced section of the proletariat, we are responsible for the
revolution, and we must tell the whole truth about the events and
expose the infamous slanderers.
Secondly, about the refusal of Lenin and Zinoviev to appear for
"trial." Just now it is still unclear who holds the power. There is
no guarantee that if they do appear they will not be subjected to
brutal violence. If the court were democratically organized and if a
guarantee were given that violence would not be committed, it would
be a different matter. In reply to our inquiries at the Central
Executive Committee we were told, "We cannot say what may happen."
Consequently, so long as the situation remains unclarified, so long
as the silent struggle between official power and actual power
continues, there is no sense in our comrades appearing for "trial."
If, however, at the head there will be a power which can guarantee
our comrades against violence, they will appear.
3. Report of the Political Situation
Comrades, to discuss the political situation of Russia is to discuss
the development of our revolution, its victories and defeats in the
midst of an imperialist war.
As early as February it was apparent that the main forces of our
revolution were the proletariat and the peasants whom the war has
put into soldier's uniform.
It so happened that in the struggle against tsarism there were in
the same camp as these forces, and as though in alliance with them,
other forces — the bourgeois liberals and Allied capital.
The proletariat was, and remains, the mortal foe of tsarism.
The peasants put their faith in the proletariat and, seeing that
they would not receive land unless tsarism was overthrown, followed
the proletariat. The bourgeois liberals were disillusioned in
tsarism and turned their backs on it, because it had not only failed
to win them new markets but was even unable to retain the old ones,
having surrendered fifteen gubernias to Germany.
Allied capital, the friend and well-wisher of Nicholas II, was also
"compelled" to betray tsarism, because the latter had not only
failed to ensure the "united front" it desired, but was clearly
preparing to conclude a separate peace with Germany into the
Tsarism thus found itself isolated.
This indeed explains the "amazing" fact that tsar-ism so "silently
and imperceptibly passed away."
But the aims pursued by these forces differed completely.
The bourgeois liberals and British and French capital wanted to make
a little revolution in Russia similar to that of the Young Turks, in
order to rouse the ardour of the masses and exploit it for a big
war, while the power of the capitalists and landlords at bottom
A little revolution for the sake of a big war! The workers and
peasants, on the other hand, were out for a thorough break-up of the
old order, for what we call a great revolution, in order to
overthrow the landlords and curb the imperialist bourgeoisie so as
to put an end to the war and ensure peace. A great revolution and
It was this fundamental contradiction that underlay the development
of our revolution and of each and every "crisis of power."
The "crisis" of April 20 and 21 was the first open manifestation of
this contradiction. If in this series of "crises" success so far has
on every occasion been with the imperialist bourgeoisie, it is to be
attributed not only to the high degree of organization of the
counter-revolutionary front, headed by the Cadet Party, but
primarily to the fact that the compromising parties, the
Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, which vacillate in favour
of imperialism, and which so far have the following of the broad
masses, every time broke the front of revolution, deserted to the
camp of the bourgeoisie, and so gave the front of counter-revolution
So it was in April.
So it was in July.
The "principle" of coalition with the imperialist bourgeoisie
advocated by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries has proved
in practice to be a most pernicious weapon, with the help of which
the party of the capitalists and landlords, the Cadets, isolating
the Bolsheviks, step by step consolidated its position with the
helping hand of these same Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries.
. . .
The lull which set in at the front in March, April and May was taken
advantage of to develop the revolution further. Spurred on by the
general disruption in the country, and encouraged by the possession
of liberties which not a single one of the belligerent countries
enjoys, the revolution drove deeper and deeper and began to put
forward social demands. It invaded the economic sphere, demanding
workers' control in industry, nationalization of the land and supply
of farm implements to the poor peasants, organization of proper
exchange between town and country, nationalization of the banks and,
lastly, the assumption of power by the proletariat and the poorer
strata of the peasantry. The revolution came squarely up against the
necessity for socialist changes.
Some comrades say that since capitalism is poorly developed in our
country, it would be utopian to raise the question of a socialist
revolution. They would be right if there were no war, if there were
no economic disruption, if the foundations of the capitalist
organization of the national economy were not shaken. The question
of intervening in the economic sphere is arising in all countries as
something essential in time of war. This question has also arisen of
sheer necessity in Germany, where it is being settled without the
direct and active participation of the masses. The case is different
here in Russia. Here the disruption has assumed more ominous
proportions. On the other hand, nowhere is there such freedom in
time of war as in our country. Then we must bear in mind the high
degree of organization of our workers; for instance, 66 per cent of
the metalworkers of Petrograd are organized. Lastly, the proletariat
in no other country has, or has had, such broad organizations as the
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Possessing the maximum
liberty and organization, the workers naturally could not, without
committing political suicide, abstain from actively interfering in
the economic life of the country in favour of socialist changes. It
would be rank pedantry to demand that Russia should "wait" with
socialist changes until Europe "begins." That country "begins" which
has the greater opportunities. . . .
Inasmuch as the revolution had advanced so far, it could not but
arouse the vigilance of the counter-revolutionaries; it was bound to
stimulate counter-revolution. This was the first factor which
mobilized the counter-revolution.
A second factor was the adventurous gamble started by the policy of
an offensive at the front and the series of breaches of the front,
which deprived the Provisional Government of all prestige and fired
the hopes of the counter-revolutionaries, who launched an attack on
the government. There are rumours that a phase of broadly conceived
provocations has begun in our country. Delegates from the front are
of the opinion that both the offensive and the retreat—in a word,
all that has happened at the front—were planned in order to
discredit the revolution and overthrow the Soviets. I do not know
whether these rumours are true or not, but it is noteworthy that on
July 2 the Cadets resigned from the government, on the 3rd the July
events began, and on the 4th came the news of the breach of the
front. An amazing coincidence! It cannot be said that the Cadets
resigned because of the decision regarding the Ukraine, because the
Cadets did not object to the decision on the Ukrainian question.
There is another fact which indicates that a phase of provocation
has really begun—I am referring to the shooting affray in the
Ukraine. 8 In the light of these facts it should be clear to the
comrades that the breach of the front was one of the factors in the
plan of the counter-revolutionaries which were to discredit the idea
of revolution in the eyes of the broad masses of the petty
There is a third factor which has helped to strengthen the
counter-revolutionary forces in Russia—Allied capital. If, when it
saw that tsarism was working for a separate peace, Allied capital
betrayed Nicholas' government, there is nothing to prevent it
breaking with the present government should it prove incapable of
preserving the "united" front. Milyukov said at one of the sittings
that Russia was valued in the international market as a supplier of
manpower, and received money for this, and that if it should turn
out that the new governmental authority, in the shape of the
Provisional Government, was incapable of supporting the united front
of attack on Germany, it would not be worth subsidizing such a
government. And without money, without credits, the government was
bound to fall. That is the secret why the Cadets became a big force
at the time of the crisis, while Kerensky and all the Ministers were
mere puppets in the hands of the Cadets. The strength of the Cadets
lay in the fact that they were supported by Allied capital.
Russia was faced with two courses:
Either the war was to be ended, all financial ties with imperialism
severed, the revolution advanced, the foundations of the bourgeois
world shaken, and an era of workers' revolution begun;
Or the other course, that of continuing the war, continuing the
offensive at the front, obeying every command of Allied capital and
the Cadets—and then complete dependence on Allied capital (there
were definite rumours in the Taurida Palace that America would give
8,000 million rubles for the "rehabilitation" of the economy) and
the triumph of counterrevolution.
There was no third course.
The attempt of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to make
out that the demonstration of July 3 and 4 was an armed revolt is
simply absurd. On July 3 we proposed a united revolutionary front
against counter-revolution. Our slogan was "All power to the
Soviets!" and, hence, a united revolutionary front. But the
Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries feared to break with the
bourgeoisie, turned their backs on us, and thereby broke the
revolutionary front in deference to the counter-revolutionaries. If
those responsible for the victory of the counter-revolution are to
be named, it was the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Menshe-viks. It
is our misfortune that Russia is a country of petty bourgeois, and
that it still follows the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks,
who are compromising with the Cadets. And until the masses become
disillusioned with the idea of compromise with the bourgeoisie, the
revolution will go haltingly and limpingly.
The picture we have now is a dictatorship of the imperialist
bourgeoisie and the counter-revolutionary generals. The government,
while ostensibly combating this dictatorship, is actually carrying
out its will, and is only a shield protecting it from the wrath of
the people. The policy of endless concessions pursued by the
weakened and discredited Soviets only supplements the picture, and
if the Soviets are not being dispersed, it is because they are
"needed" as a "necessary" and very "convenient" screen.
Hence the situation has changed fundamentally.
Our tactics must likewise change.
Formerly we stood for the peaceful transfer of power to the Soviets,
and we assumed that it would be sufficient for the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets to decide to take power, and the
bourgeoisie would peacefully clear out of the way. And, indeed, in
March, April and May every decision of the Soviets was regarded as
law, because it could always be backed by force. With the
disarmament of the Soviets and their (virtual) degradation to the
level of mere "trade union" organizations, the situation has
changed. Now the decisions of the Soviets are disregarded. To take
power now, it is first necessary to overthrow the existing
Overthrow of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie—that is
what the immediate slogan of the Party must be.
The peaceful period of the revolution has ended. A period of clashes
and explosions has begun.
The slogan of overthrowing the present dictatorship can be realized
only if there is a powerful new political upsurge on a country-wide
scale. Such an upsurge is inevitable; it is dictated by the
country's whole trend of development, by the fact that not a single
one of the basic issues of the revolution has been decided, for the
questions of the land, workers' control, peace and governmental
power have remained unsettled.
Repressive measures only aggravate the situation without settling a
single issue of the revolution.
The main forces of the new movement will be the urban proletariat
and the poorer strata of the peasantry. It is they that will take
power in the event of victory.
The characteristic feature of the moment is that the
counter-revolutionary measures are being implemented through the
agency of "Socialists." It is only because it has created such a
screen that the counter-revolution may continue to exist for another
month or two. But since the forces of revolution are developing,
explosions are bound to occur, and the moment will come when the
workers will raise and rally around them the poorer strata of the
peasantry, will raise the standard of workers' revolution and usher
in an era of socialist revolution in Europe.
4. Replies to Questions in Connection with the Report on the
First question: "What forms of militant organization does the
speaker propose in place of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies?" My
reply is that the question is not put properly. I did not oppose the
Soviets as a form of organization of the working class. The slogan
is determined not by the form of organization of the revolutionary
institution, but by its content, its flesh and blood. If the Cadets
had entered the Soviets, we should never have raised the slogan of
transferring power to them.
We are now advancing the demand for the transfer of power to the
proletariat and poor peasantry. Consequently, it is a question not
of form, but of the class to which power is to be transferred; it is
a question of the composition of the Soviets.
The Soviets are the most appropriate form of organization of the
working-class struggle for power; but the Soviets are not the only
type of revolutionary organization. It is a purely Russian form.
Abroad, we have seen this role played by the municipalities during
the Great French Revolution, and by the Central Committee of the
National Guard during the Paris Commune. And even here in Russia the
idea of a Revolutionary Committee was mooted. Perhaps the Workers'
Section will be the form best adapted for the struggle for power.
But it must be clearly realized that it is not the form of
organization that is decisive.
What really is decisive is whether the working class is mature
enough for dictatorship; everything else will come of itself, will
be brought about by the creative action of the revolution.
On questions two and three—what, practically, is our attitude
towards the existing Soviets?— the reply is quite clear. If the
point at issue is the transfer of all power to the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviets, this slogan is obsolete. And that is the
only point at issue. The idea of overthrowing the Soviets is an
invention. Nobody here has suggested it. The fact that we are
proposing to withdraw the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" does
not, however, mean "Down with the Soviets!" And although we are
withdrawing the slogan, we are not even resigning from the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviets, in spite of the wretched role it
has lately been playing.
The local Soviets have still a role to play, for they will have to
defend themselves against the attacks of the Provisional Government,
and in this fight we shall support them.
And so, I repeat, the withdrawal of the demand for the transfer of
power to the Soviets does not mean "Down with the Soviets!" "Our
attitude towards those Soviets in which we have the majority" is one
of the greatest sympathy. May they live and flourish. But the might
is no longer with the Soviets. Formerly, the Provisional Government
would issue a decree and the Executive Committee of the Soviets
would issue a counter-decree, and it was only the latter that
acquired force of law. Recall the case of Order No. 1. 9 Now,
however, the Provisional Government ignores the Central Executive
Committee. The decision that the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviets would take part in the commission of inquiry into the events
of July 3-5 was not cancelled by the Central Executive Committee; it
was by order of Kerensky that no effect was given to it. The
question now is not one of winning a majority in the Soviets—which
in itself is very important—but of overthrowing the
To question four—asking for a more concrete definition of the
concept the "poor peasantry" and an indication of its form of
organization — my reply is that the term "poor peasantry" is not a
new one. It was introduced into Marxist literature by Comrade Lenin
in 1905, and since then it has been used in nearly every issue of
Pravda and found a place in the resolutions of the April Conference.
The poorer strata of the peasantry are those which are at odds with
the upper sections of the peasantry. The Soviet of Peasants'
Deputies, which allegedly "represents" 80 million peasants (counting
women), is an organization of the upper sections of the peasantry.
The lower sections of the peasantry are waging a fierce struggle
against the policy of this Soviet. Whereas the head of the
Socialist-Revolutionary Party, Chernov, as well as Avksentyev and
others, are urging the peasants not to seize the land immediately,
but to wait for a general settlement of the land question by the
Constituent Assembly, the peasants retort by seizing the land and
ploughing it, seizing farm implements and so on. We have information
to this effect from the Penza, Voronezh, Vitebsk, Kazan and a number
of other gubernias. This fact alone clearly indicates that the rural
population is divided into lower and upper sections, that the
peasantry no longer exists as an integral whole. The upper sections
mainly follow the Socialist-Revolutionaries. The lower sections
cannot live without land, and they are in opposition to the
Provisional Government. These are the peasants who have little land,
only one horse or no horse at all, etc. Associated with them are the
sections which have practically no land, the semi-proletarians.
It would be unwise in a revolutionary period not to attempt to reach
some agreement with these sections of the peasantry. However, the
farm-labourer sections of the peasantry should be organized
separately and rallied around the proletarians.
What form the organization of these sections will take is difficult
to predict. At present the lower sections of the peasantry are
either organizing unauthorized Soviets, or are trying to capture the
existing Soviets. Thus, in Petrograd, about six weeks ago, a Soviet
of poor peasants was formed (composed of representatives from eighty
military units and from factories), which is waging a fierce
struggle against the policy of the Soviet of Peasants' Deputies.
In general, Soviets are the most appropriate form of organization of
the masses. We should not, however, speak in terms of institutions,
but should indicate their class content;and we should strive to get
the masses too to distinguish between form and content.
Generally speaking, the form of organization is not the basic
question. If the revolution advances, the organizational forms will
be forthcoming. We must not let the question of form obscure the
basic question: to which class must power pass?
Henceforth a bloc with the defencists is unthinkable. The defencist
parties have bound up their fate with the bourgeoisie, and the idea
of a bloc extending from the Socialist-Revolutionaries to the
Bolsheviks has suffered fiasco. The question now is to fight the top
leaders of the Soviets, to fight them in alliance with the poorer
strata of the peasantry and to sweep away the counterrevolution.
5. Reply to the Discussion
Comrades, first of all I must make a few corrections of fact.
Comrade Yaroslavsky objects to my assertion that the Russian
proletariat is the most organized, and points to the Austrian
proletariat. But, comrades, I was speaking of "red," revolutionary
organization, and in no other country is the proletariat organized
in this way to the same extent as the Russian proletariat.
Angarsky is quite wrong when he says that I advocate the idea of
uniting all forces. But we cannot help seeing that, for different
motives, not only the peasantry and the proletariat but also the
Russian bourgeoisie and foreign capital turned their backs on
tsardom. That is a fact. And it would be a bad thing if Marxists
refused to face facts. But later the first two forces took the path
of developing the revolution further, and the other two the path of
I shall now pass to the substance of the matter. Bukharin put it
most trenchantly but he, too, failed to carry it to its logical
conclusion. Bukharin asserts that the imperialist bourgeois have
formed a bloc with the muzhiks. But with which muzhiks? We have
different kinds of muzhiks. The bloc has been formed with the
Right-wing muzhiks; but we have lower, Left-wing muzhiks, who
represent the poorer strata of the peasantry. Now with these the
bloc could not have been formed. These have not formed a bloc with
the big bourgeoisie; they follow it because they are politically
undeveloped, they are simply being deceived, led by the nose.
Against whom is the bloc directed?
Bukharin did not say. It is a bloc of Allied and Russian capital,
the army officers and the upper sections of the peasantry,
represented by Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Chernov type. This
bloc has been formed against the lower peasantry and against the
What is the prospect Bukharin held out? His analysis is
fundamentally wrong. In his opinion, in the first stage we are
moving towards a peasant revolution. But it is bound to concur, to
coincide with a workers' revolution. It cannot be that the working
class, which constitutes the vanguard of the revolution, will not at
the same time fight for its own demands. I therefore consider that
Bukharin's scheme has not been properly thought out.
The second stage, according to Bukharin, will be a proletarian
revolution supported by Western Europe, without the peasants, who
will have received land and will be satisfied. But against whom
would this revolution be directed? Bukharin's gimcrack scheme
furnishes no reply to this question. No other approach to an
analysis of events has been proposed.
About the political situation. There is no longer any talk of dual
power. Formerly the Soviets represented a real force; now they are
merely organs for uniting the masses, and possess no power. That is
precisely why it is impossible "simply" to transfer power to them.
Comrade Lenin, in his pamphlet,10 goes further and definitely says
that there is no dual power, because the whole power has passed into
the hands of the capitalists, and to advance the slogan "All power
to the Soviets!" now would be quixotic.
Whereas formerly no laws were of any validity without the sanction
of the Executive Committee of the Soviets, now there is not even
talk of dual power. Capture all the Soviets, and even so you will
have no power!
We jeered at the Cadets during the district Duma elections because
they represented a miserable group which obtained only 20 per cent
of the votes. Now they are jeering at us. Why? Because, with the
connivance of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, power
has passed into the hands of the bourgeoisie.
Comrades are in a hurry to settle the question of how to organize
the governmental power. But power is not yet in your hands!
The chief task is to preach the necessity of overthrowing the
existing power. We are still inadequately prepared for this. But we
must prepare for it.
The workers, peasants and soldiers must be made to realize that
unless the present power is overthrown they will secure neither
freedom nor land!
And so, the question is not how to organize the governmental power,
but to overthrow it. Once we have seized power we shall know how to
Now a few words in reply to Angarsky's and Nogin's objections on the
subject of socialist changes in Russia. Already at the April
Conference we said that the moment had come to begin to take steps
towards socialism. (Reads the end of the resolution of the April
Conference "On the Current Situation")
"The proletariat of Russia, operating in one of the most backward
countries of Europe, in the midst of a small-peasant population,
cannot set itself the aim of introducing socialist changes
immediately. But it would be a great mistake, and in practice even
complete desertion to the bourgeoisie, to deduce from this that the
working class must support the bourgeoisie, or that we must confine
our activities within limits acceptable to the petty bourgeoisie, or
that we must reject the leading role of the proletariat in the work
of explaining to the people the urgency of a series of steps towards
socialism which are now practically ripe."
The comrades are three months behind the times. And what has
happened in these three months? The petty bourgeoisie has split into
sections, the lower sections are parting ways with the upper
sections, the proletariat is organizing, and economic disruption is
spreading, rendering still more urgent the introduction of workers'
control (for instance, in Petrograd, the Donets region, etc.). All
this goes to corroborate the theses already adopted in April. But
the comrades would drag us back.
About the Soviets. The fact that we are withdrawing the old slogan
about power to the Soviets does not mean that we are opposing the
Soviets. On the contrary, we can and must work in the Soviets, even
in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, that organ of
counter-revolutionary camouflage. The Soviets, it is true, are now
merely organs for uniting the masses, but we are always with the
masses, and we shall not leave the Soviets unless we are driven out.
Do we not remain in the factory committees and the municipalities
even though they have no power? But while we remain in the Soviets
we continue to expose the tactics of the Socialist-Revolutionaries
Now that the counter-revolution has patently revealed the connection
between our bourgeoisie and Allied capital, it has become more
obvious than ever that in our revolutionary struggle we must rely
upon three factors: the Russian proletariat, our peasantry, and the
international proletariat—for the fate of our revolution is closely
bound up with the West-European movement.
6. Reply to Preobrazhensky on Clause 9 of the Resolution "On The
Stalin reads clause 9 of the resolution :
9. "The task of these revolutionary classes will then be to bend
every effort to take the state power into their hands and, in
alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced
countries, direct it towards peace and towards the socialist
reconstruction of society."
Preobrazhensky : I propose a different formulation of the end of the
resolution: "to direct it towards peace and, in the event of a
proletarian revolution in the West, towards socialism." If we adopt
the formulation proposed by the commission it will contradict
Bukharin's resolution which we have already adopted.
Stalin : I am against such an amendment. The possibility is not
excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to
socialism. No country hitherto has enjoyed such freedom in time of
war as Russia does, or has attempted to introduce workers' control
of production. Moreover, the base of our revolution is broader than
in Western Europe, where the proletariat stands utterly alone face
to face with the bourgeoisie. In our country the workers are
supported by the poorer strata of the peasantry. Lastly, in Germany
the state apparatus is incomparably more efficient than the
imperfect apparatus of our bourgeoisie, which is itself a tributary
to European capital. We must discard the antiquated idea that only
Europe can show us the way. There is dogmatic Marxism and creative
Marxism. I stand by the latter.
Chairman : I shall put Preobrazhensky's amendment to the vote.
First published in Minutes of the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.
(Bolsheviks), Communist Publishing House, 1919
* In view of the brevity and obvious inadequacy of the Minutes of
the Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), which, moreover, were
published two years after the congress, the editors considered it
necessary in re-establishing the text of Comrade Stalin's speeches
at the Sixth Congress to consult, in addition to the Minutes, the
official records of the speeches printed in July and August 1917 in
the newspapers : Rabochy i Soldat, Nos. 7 and 14, and Proletary, No.
1. The Sixth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Bolsheviks) was held in
Petrograd from July 26 to August 3, 1917. It heard and discussed the
Central Committee's reports on policy and organization, reports from
the districts, on the war and the international situation, on the
political and economic situation, on the trade union movement, and
on the Constituent Assembly election campaign. The congress adopted
new Party Rules and resolved to form a Youth League. The report of
the Central Committee and the report on the political situation were
made by J. V. Stalin. The congress rejected the Trotskyite reso
lutions of Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, which were designed to
divert the Party from the course of socialist revolution, and
approved the resolution on the political situation submitted by J.
V. Stalin. The congress headed the Party for armed uprising, for the
2. Friedrich Adler—a leader of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party.
In 1916, in token of protest against the war, he as- sassinated the
Austrian Prime Minister, Sturgkh, for which he was sentenced to
death in May 1917, but was released in 1918. On emerging from prison
he took up a hostile attitude towards the October Revolution in
3. On July 4, 1917, the following leaflet was distributed in the
working class quarters of Petrograd :
"Comrade Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd, now that the
counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie has clearly come out in opposition
to the revolution, let the All-Russian Soviet of Workers', Soldiers'
and Peasants' Deputies take the entire power into its own hands.
"This is the will of the revolutionary population of Petrograd, and
it has the right to make its will known through a peaceful and
organized demonstration to the Executive Committees of the
All-Russian Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies
now in session.
"Long live the will of the revolutionary workers and revolutionary
"Long live the power of the Soviets!
"The coalition government is bankrupt: it has fallen to pieces
without having been able to perform the tasks for which it was
formed. Gigantic and most difficult problems confront the
revolution. A new power is needed which will, in conjunction with
the revolutionary proletariat, the revolutionary army and the
revolutionary peasantry, resolutely set about consolidating and
extending the peoples' conquests. This power can only be that of the
Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.
"Yesterday, the revolutionary garrison of Petrograd and the workers
came out to proclaim: ‘All power to the Soviet!' We urge that this
movement that has broken out in the regiments and the factories
should be turned into a peaceful and organized expression of the
will of all the workers, soldiers and peasants of Petrograd.
Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.
Petrograd Committee, R.S.D.L.P.
Mezhrayonny Committee, R.S.D.L.P.
Army Organization of the C.C., R.S.D.L.P.
Commission of the Workers' Section, Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers'
4. Listok Pravdy (Pravda Bulletin) appeared on July 6, 1917, in
place of Pravda, whose editorial offices had been wrecked by
military cadets. It carried an appeal of the Central and Petrograd
Committees and the Army Organization of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), under
the title: "Calm and Restraint."
5. Zhivoye Slovo (Living Word)—a yellow ultra-reactionary newspaper
published in Petrograd. In 1917 it called for violent action against
the Bolsheviks. It ceased publication with the October Revolution.
6. The leaflet "Try the Slanderers!" was issued by the Central
Committee, R.S.D.L.P.(B.) after July 5, 1917, and was printed on
July 9 in Volna (Wave), a newspaper published by the Helsingfors
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.). The leaflet said: "The
counter-revolutionaries want to decapitate the revolution by a very
simple means, by confusing the minds of the masses and inciting them
against their most popular leaders, the tried and tested champions
of the revolution. . . . We demand that the Provisional Government
and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies institute an immediate public inquiry into all
the circumstances of the vile plot of the reactionaries and hired
slanderers against the honour and lives of the leaders of the
working class. . . . The slanderers and slandermongers must be
brought to trial. The pogromists and liars must be pilloried!"
7. Bezrabotny—pseudonym of D. Z. Manuilsky.
8. On July 27, 1917, troop trains of the Ukrainian Bogdan
Khmelnitsky Regiment which were proceeding to the front were fired
upon by Cossacks and cuirassiers at stations near Kiev and in Kiev
9. Order No. 1 had been issued on March 1, 1917, by the Petrograd
Soviet on the demand of representatives of the revolutionary
military units, who reported that the soldiers were growing
increasingly distrustful of the Provisional Committee of the State
Duma and its Military Commission.
The Order directed the military units (companies, battalions, etc.)
to elect Soldiers' Committees and to appoint representatives to the
Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, commanded that the
weapons of the military units be placed at the disposal of the
Soldiers' Committees, sanctioned the carrying out of the orders of
the Military Commission only when they did not run counter to the
orders and decisions of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers'
10. J. V. Stalin is referring to Lenin's pamphlet, On Slogans,
written in July 1917 (see V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol.
25, p. 164).