MARXIST INTERNET ARCHIVE |
|Minutes of the Meeting of the
CPSU CC Plenum on the State of Soviet Foreign Policy
[Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2 (1994)
The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet
foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and
Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes
Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction.
Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World
are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern
Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against
Suslov chairing. Com. Molotov has the floor.
Molotov: Comrades, I have already spoken about the fact that I
wish further to touch on international issues. It seems to me
that in this regard com. Khrushchev's efforts are not entirely
successful. We all understand and consider it necessary to
conduct, support, and stimulate those measures which assist the
lessening of international tensions. This is the basis for our
work on strengthening peace, on delaying and averting a new war.
And we must by all means possible be careful that this policy
gives the results that we want to derive from it.
In connection with this, I consider that when com. Khrushchev,
in a conversation with the editor of the American newspaper, The
New York Times, Turner Catledge, published on 14 May spoke about
the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States of America, he committed an error, an incorrect [step];
he spoke as follows: "Speaking more concretely about
international tension, the matter, obviously, reduces in the
final analysis to the relations between two countries-between
the Soviet Union and the United States of America."
Molotov: And further, he says: "We consider that if the Soviet
Union is able to come to an agreement [dogovorit'sia] with the
United States, then it will not be hard to come to an agreement
with England, France, and other countries."
Molotov: I consider this incorrect both in essence and in
tactics. It does not accord with the Leninist policy in
international affairs which has been approved by the 20th party
congress. (Agitation in the hall)...
Molotov: ...we can fight against imperialism and win out over
imperialism only by making use of contradictions in the
imperialist camp. If we imagine that we can come to an agreement
between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and
therein see the expressed essence of our policy, then we forget
the basic Leninist position on making use of "cracks",
contradictions in the imperialist camp. We must not unite the
imperialist and capitalist states around America, [must] not
push for that and [must] not depict the situation in such a way
that the Soviet Union must only agree with the United States of
America, and all the remaining countries will supposedly play an
insignificant role. No, comrades, now that we have become a
great power, a powerful force, and have huge support in our
socialist camp in the East and the West-in these conditions we
must be particularly careful to deepen any split, any
disagreements and contradictions in the imperialist camp, in
order to weaken the international position of the United States
of America-the most powerful of the imperialist powers. But
imperially strong America cannot dictate everything to the other
imperialist states. For that reason we support all sorts of
contacts with non-socialist countries and consider it to be very
important. We support contact with little Denmark, Norway,
Burma, Egypt, and so on. Moreover, we bear in mind that the use
of contradictions in the camp of the capitalist states has a
very great significance. And only in that way, squeezing not
only America, but also other states which diverge from or waiver
within the capitalist camp, only in that way can we weaken
America itself, which is struggling against us. For that reason
the issue of the use of the stated contradictions, that we not
forget about these contradictions-that is our most important
issue in the whole of our foreign policy
[Ed. Note: After numerous interruptions]
Molotov: Let me finish. From a different angle, there is another
shortcoming here. How can one reduce the matter to the relations
between the USSR and the United States of America, forgetting
about the socialist camp? Com. Khrushchev's formulation ignores
all of the remaining socialist countries besides the USSR. One
must not, however, ignore the People's Republic of China,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, or the other socialist
Kirilenko: Answer this question: who are such dogmatists, how
are we to understand them?
Molotov: Maybe you are not up [plokho razbiraetes'] on this
matter, com. Kirilenko, but how are the others relevant here
[pri chem tut drugie]? I am talking about something that
requires the attention of the comrades present at this plenum.
For this reason I am saying important things, although maybe you
do not agree with this. There is a measure of truth here, in any
case. We have never formulated the issue of the mutual relations
between the Soviet Union and America as did com. Khrushchev.
Once in 1924, Trotskii tried to throw out the slogan that now
America had made a beggar of Europe. That was an anti-Marxist
thing. Perhaps com. Khrushchev forgot this and has forgotten the
lessons which the party had on that count in the past? But it
doesn't hurt us to give a reminder about that. (Noise in the
I, comrades, want to say something further about the second
mistake of com. Khrushchev in the statement to the editor of the
newspaper The New York Times. Com. Khrushchev speaks in this
way-I am citing from Pravda:
"If, for instance-N.S. Khrushchev adds as a joke-our minister
Gromyko and your secretary Dulles met, in a hundred years they
wouldn't agree on anything, and, perhaps, only our grandsons
would wait long enough to get any results from these
Voice. Read on.
Molotov: Read on yourself.
Voice: It is being said as a joke there.
Molotov: One does not play with the authority of the MID of the
USSR in front of the bourgeois governments. It is incorrect in
its essence, and it is tactically harmful to the Soviet state.
And however much you say, these things must not be condoned,
because they bring harm to our state, and let us tell com.
Khrushchev that right to his face [priamo v glaza]...
Khrushchev: Imagine: the President in the presence of the other
Finnish leaders invites guests to a steam bath, but the visitors
spit and leave. That offends, insults them. When we returned to
Moscow and they started to upbraid me for visiting the Finnish
steam bath and Bulganin began to join in as well, I said:
Molotov wants to depict me as an unprincipled person because I
went to the bath. How can you not be ashamed of yourself? You
here won't go with anyone. If you got your way, you would lead
the country to the end of its tether [do ruchki], would argue
with everyone, would lead [the country] to conflict. Look at
your telegram from San Francisco; what did you write in it? You
wrote that war could start right now. How could the foreign
minister behave so?
Molotov: Don't make things up [Ne vydumyvaete], com. Khrushchev.
Voice: Com. Molotov, there is nothing left for you to do but
drag out the dirty laundry [ubornuiu vytashchit']; you've
stooped so low.
Mikhailov: Com. Khrushchev, both in former trips, and when he
was in Finland, worked for the people, for the party, and you,
com. Molotov, should be ashamed to spit on this work; it is not
worthy of you.
Molotov: I disagree with com. Mikhailov. (Noise in the hall).
The First Secretary could have behaved in a more dignified
manner in Finland.
Voice: Tell us, how was it undignified?
Rudenko: And you consider it dignified to visit Hitler?
Voice: Better to go to a steam bath than to engage in
Suslov. Com. Molotov, you reduced questions in international
relations to a steam bath. It's possible to say that the CC
reached correct foreign policy despite you.
Molotov. A lie [nepravda].
Pospelov. The July 1955 plenum recorded this.
Voice. On Yugoslavia
Molotov. That was discussed; there was a CC resolution; I voted
for it. Comrades, on the Yugoslav issue I want to dwell on one
point. At one point in the heat of polemics on the Yugoslav
issue, com. Khrushchev imputed that I did not understand that on
some issues the Chinese comrades could correct us. I understand
this and recognize it. But I maintain that in the given case and
in a series of other cases, things were ascribed to me that I
did not say. I said something else. Once, when, on the basis of
a ciphered communication from Beijing, I referred to the fact
that com. Mao Zedong, criticizing the Yugoslav comrades, pointed
out that they were behaving like Laborites and not like
communists-on the basis of that case, I asked the question: why
do we not understand what the Chinese comrades understand? On
the given issue we should have figured it out earlier than them.
That is what I said on the subject
Pospelov. You said: you are going to the fascists cap in hand
Molotov. There were exaggerations in relation to Yugoslavia, but
not that sort. In a CC resolution in the summer of 1953, we
wrote that the Yugoslavs should be treated like other bourgeois
governments. You can find that resolution of the CC Presidium.
Comrades, you must not say something that hasn't happened. But
it was said by me, although the resolution was mistaken...
Molotov. Does our press, the selfsame Pravda, ever mention the
name of Stalin? No, it modestly remains silent about Stalin, as
if for 30 years Stalin did not play a prominent role in the
history of our party and of the Soviet state.
We recognized his mistakes, but one must also talk about his
achievements. Otherwise, the party itself is injured.
Voice. Why did you not made a statement about that at the 20th
Molotov. It was after the 20th congress, what I am saying to
you. Of course, when com. Zhou Enlai came, we began to attest
that Stalin was such a communist that, God grant, every one
should be; but after Zhou Enlai left, we stopped doing so. This
does not increase the authority of our party, since we are not
giving a firm, clear answer; but that is what is demanded of us,
and we should not permit anything else.
Khrushchev. You want to turn everything back, in order then to
take up the axe yourself.
Molotov. No, that is not so, com. Khrushchev. I hope that that
is not what you want, and moreover, that is not what I want.
Note the following fact. There is a decree of the CC Presidium
of 28 April 1955 on the archive of I.V. Stalin: "To confirm a
commission to examine the documents from the archive of Stalin,
staffed by coms. Khrushchev (chairman), Bulganin, Kaganovich,
Malenkov, Molotov, Pospelov, and Suslov." And, all the same,
after 28 April 1955, the commission has not once met. They do
not want to meet, and, after all, more than two years have gone
[Dmitrii] Shepilov. Bulganin already said that he did not meet
with me at any meetings.
Voice. The members of the CC Presidium told what assessment you
made, your approach to this issue.
Voice. Why is your surname in particular in this group, and not
another, if you are not privy [to this matter]?
Khrushchev. You are against the cult of personality, and I, no
less, have fought and fight against the cult of personality. But
if you are such a fighter, then why did you, after Stalin's
death, as editor of Pravda, falsify the photograph and place a
shot of Malenkov next to Mao Zedong in the newspaper, when this
did not actually happen [v prirode etogo ne bylo]?
Shepilov. It is true, that happened, and I was punished for
doing so. I considered that the basic problem was our friendship
with China, the closeness of the two heads of government-the
symbol of this eternal friendship, and I did it in those
interests; that was my mistake.
Khrushchev. For that the CC Presidium reprimanded you...
Mikoian. Comrades, first of all I want to talk about some facts
which have brought the party leadership chosen after the 20th
party congress to its present state, when the plenum meets
amidst the crisis of the party leadership. Now we have a crisis
in the party leadership; that must be frankly stated.
Voice. No, there is no crisis.
Mikoian. I am talking about the crisis in the CC Presidium.
[Averki] Aristov. But the CC Presidium is not the leadership of
our party. The leadership is the CC.
Mikoian. Com. Aristov has spoken correctly.
After the 20th party congress showed ideological unity, we
considered that collective leadership was the guarantee of the
success of our party, and tried in every way to uphold that
unity. It seemed that everyone tried. There were disagreements
on separate issues, disputes, but insofar as they did not turn
into a system, they did not harm the cause...
The events in Poland and Hungary were a great test for our party
and our leadership, [and] for the CC Presidium. I was very glad,
[and] everyone else was very happy that in those days our CC
Presidium was wholly unified and firm. On such serious issues,
unity was gratifying.1 It was pleasant for me that the comrades
with whom we disagreed, like Molotov, Kaganovich, [and]
Malenkov, in this matter behaved as was appropriate, although it
should be noted that on the issue of the new Hungarian
leadership, com. Molotov did not agree. Malenkov behaved well in
Hungary, and it was believed that he had come into line [voshel
v obshchuiu koleiu]. That is how it was until recently.
After the February 1957 CC Plenum, from the point where the
issue of the organization of the sovnarkhoz [large collective
farms] was decided, the atmosphere began to worsen; an unstated
dissatisfaction on the part of some members of the Presidium was
evident; disagreement was noted, [and] it was felt that some
people were not saying everything [they thought]. Then it was
still bearable, but the atmosphere continued to poison the
Until recently there was no sign of the formation of a group in
the CC Presidium, but there was some impression that com.
Molotov [and] com. Kaganovich were sometimes silent, as if they
had come to an understanding. They avoided arguing with one
another. For instance, I did not avoid argument with Molotov or
Kaganovich, but they avoided argument between themselves.
Perhaps there were no grounds for disagreement? There were.
Recently, Malenkov also began avoiding arguments with them.
There was one case in which he agreed that he had not acted
entirely properly; that was in relation to Yugoslavia. In
connection with the incorrect speech by com Tito in Pula, Soviet
communists and the communist parties of other countries
delivered a dignified rebuff. As a result, by its own fault, the
Yugoslav party ended up practically in isolation from the other
communist parties. After this, the Yugoslav leadership began to
speak out in conversations with our comrades and made known its
desire to improve relations with us in its open statements.
On com. Khrushchev's suggestion, we discussed this issue in the
CC Presidium and decided to instruct [Soviet Ambassador to
Yugoslavia] com. [Nikolai] Firiubin to engage in an appropriate
conversation with com. Tito at the instructions of the CC
Several days before this, information about the fact that one
Yugoslav diplomat tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to win over one
important leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
[HSWP] to the Yugoslav side, was sent around to the members of
the CC Presidium. Thus, in connection with a discussion of
measures to improve relations with Yugoslavia, com. Molotov
introduced a proposal that the CC CPSU inform all fraternal
parties that Yugoslav diplomats were engaging in the recruitment
of communists in fraternal parties. The adoption of com.
Molotov's proposal would have led, of course, to the disruption
of the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia, because such an
appeal by us to all parties could not be hidden from the
Yugoslav leadership, and, in this, it would see duplicity in our
policies and the absence of a true wish to reconcile. This was,
in essence, Molotov's wish to put a fly in the ointment [vlit'
lozhku degtia v bochku meda].
Then they talked very calmly about this; there were no insults.
Khrushchev said: Viacheslav, you again want to continue your
line on disputes with Yugoslavia. I also calmly spoke twice,
criticizing com. Molotov; com. Bulganin criticized him. Malenkov
sat opposite and stayed silent. I know that Malenkov was against
this; on many political issues he was not close to the views of
Molotov and Kaganovich, but he sat and kept silent...
Mikoian. Generally there was unity in the Presidium on the
Hungarian issue, but I must say that com. Molotov held an
incorrect line in relation to the new Hungarian leaders.
Imagine that tomorrow, on 4 November, our troops had to move out
[vystuplenie] all over Hungary, but by this evening it was still
unclear who would be at the head of the new government of
Hungary, by whose summons and in support of whom our troops were
mobilizing. Why? Khrushchev and Malenkov were in Yugoslavia
meeting with the Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and
Yugoslavs over the course of two days in order to obtain their
agreement for the use of our troops. I was busy with getting
[Janos] Kadar, [Ferenc] Muennich, and others out of Budapest;
there was still no government, [and] they were discussing whom
to move into the government. We proposed Kadar. Molotov insisted
that [Andras] Hegedus be at the head-the former prime minister.
He asked: who is this Kadar? We, he implied [mol], did not know
him and were slighting him. We could not agree on the
composition of the government. Zhukov said: I cannot put off the
operation; there is already an order to our troops to move out.
Molotov insisted on reinstating the old leadership.
Molotov. That's not correct; we spoke about Muennich.
Mikoian. You proposed Hegedus; before his departure to
Yugoslavia, Khrushchev proposed Muennich; others proposed
Kadar-we argued all day. If there had been no argument, why not
agree right away on the composition of the government? We had it
out [rugalis'] with you, argued fiercely. Bulganin and other
comrades should remember.
Khrushchev. Anastas Ivanovich [Mikoian], when, during the
Hungarian events, Malenkov and I returned from our trip to a
series of people's democratic countries and Yugoslavia, we had
formed the opinion that we must support Kadar's candidacy. Some
called for Muennich's candidacy. He is an honorable comrade who
likes us; I did military training together with him in the
Proletarian Division. He is an excellent comrade, but in the
given situation, com. Kadar is the best candidate.
Mikoian. Only after com. Khrushchev's arrival was it possible to
specify the composition of the government headed by Kadar. Com.
Kadar is from the working class and is a serious person, and
that has now been justified. It is good that com. Khrushchev
reminded [us]. There was the following case: Molotov calls and
proposes a meeting. On what topic? [Matyas] Rakosi wrote a
letter to the HSWP, [saying] that they were not allowing him
back into Hungary and requested that he remain here. Molotov
asked: who decided, how, why? He considered that the convocation
of a special session of the CC Presidium was called for. And
when we met at the next regular meeting [i.e., no special
session had been called], he insisted that Rakosi and [Erno]
Gero be given the chance to work.
Molotov. Who insisted? That is not exact.
Mikoian. After all, you demanded the convocation of a special
session of the CC Presidium in order to discuss Rakosi's letter,
which came to the CC CPSU Presidium with an accusation against
the new leadership of the HSWP. Two days later [cherez den'], at
the next meeting of the CC Presidium, you spoke with a criticism
of the resolution of the CC Plenum of the HSWP that at present
and in the near future, the interests of the HSWP demanded that
Rakosi, Gero, Hegedus [be prevented from working] in Hungary,
but remain in the Soviet Union for a specified period. You
demanded that Rakosi, Gero, and Hegedus return to Hungary. If we
had heeded Molotov['s advice], we would have lost the trust of
the Hungarian party; the Hungarians would have thought that we
were playing a double game. We argued with Molotov: Rakosi did
not see what was happening, became detached from reality and led
the party into a catastrophe. While located in Moscow, he called
certain of his supporters in Budapest on the telephone and,
essentially, led a group struggle against the new Hungarian
leadership. In connection with this we told him: do not live in
Moscow; live in another city, and don't mess things up [ne port'
Khrushchev. When the Hungarian government delegation visited us,
Molotov said to Kadar: why are you not taking Rakosi with you?
This question once again upset the Hungarian leaders. They
thought that we were supporting them [only] on a temporary
basis, and that then Rakosi would once again come to power in
Mikoian. It's true; during the reception, com. Molotov scolded
Kadar [as to] why they weren't taking Rakosi back to work in
Hungary. Such behavior by com. Molotov was incorrect.
Molotov. We were talking not about Rakosi, but about Hegedus.
Mikoian. You were talking about Rakosi.
Mikoian. In relation to the [Presidium] Saturday meeting, at
which Bulganin said that Khrushchev acted incorrectly. What does
that consist of?
The people's democratic countries request that, when we order
equipment for the next year, the orders be given out at least
six months' in advance, so that blueprints can be drawn up and
inventories can be ordered. Otherwise, it is impossible-to order
in January and receive the products in January. This is an
elementary thing. Not only our friends, but also the capitalists
This is an indisputable issue, but arguments have begun around
it: will we be able to pay for the equipment? Here we order, but
what will we pay with? I provide information: in all, we buy 16
billion rubles in goods, and now we are talking about a
preliminary order for 3 billion rubles in equipment, and these
are needed goods. Why should we not be able to pay? We will be
able to. There is no issue here. The total volume of trade will
be approximately the same as last year's.
Finally, what does this mean politically? On the whole,
equipment is being supplied by the GDR and Czechoslovakia. If we
do not strengthen East Germany, where workers are supporting
their communist government, our army will end up in the fire.
And, after all, there is an army of a half million [men] there.
We cannot lose the sympathy of the German populace. If we lose
their sympathy and trust-that will mean the loss of East
Germany. And what would the loss of East Germany mean? We know
what that would be, and for that reason operate on the basis
that we must use the capacity of East German industry in full.
Then the workers of the GDR will have work and will give us what
we need; otherwise we will have to give the GDR both goods and
food, without receiving equipment in return. I consider that our
position is absolutely correct.
Mikoian. But we are told: you will order, but will we be able to
pay? This is an issue unto itself-a great political issue. I
kept calm, although I am also a quick-tempered person, but
Nikita Sergeevich caught the scent of the whole political edge
of the issue. Seeing that a majority against the draft was
forming, he said the following phrase: "I would like on this
issue in particular to hold a vote and to remain in the
minority." The socialist camp has been created because it is
important to strengthen it and not to permit wavering. If East
Germany and Czechoslovakia today are left without orders, the
whole socialist camp will crack. Who needs such a camp if we
cannot ensure orders? After all, the issue stands as such:
either feed the workers of the GDR for free, or provide orders,
or otherwise lose the GDR entirely. That is why Nikita
Sergeevich blew up [vzorvalsia]. I also almost blew up.
Voices. Blew up.
Khrushchev. Now it is clear that they had an understanding to
fight us on this issue.
Mikoian. I also think so...
Comrades, after the Hungarian and Polish events, our prestige
abroad temporarily weakened somewhat. First, we bared our teeth
to the enemies, the Americans, for Hungary, and bared our teeth
for Egypt and achieved a halt to the war which had started
Then they again conducted a policy of disarmament in order to
turn the sympathy of the petty-bourgeois elements toward them.
Molotov says that the Leninist policy of using the
contradictions of the imperialist camp is not being put into
practice. But he makes [only] one citation. First of all, he
incorrectly interprets it. But even so, let us assume that he is
correctly interpreting it. Look at our party's policy on
splitting the bourgeois world. Our comrades went to India and to
Burma, and managed to undermine the influence of the imperialist
powers on the countries of Asia.
Mikoian. Earlier we had no access to the Arab countries; English
influence had such a hold on the Muslim religion, that we had no
access there. Three imperialist powers gathered together and
decided all of the issues of the Near East without us. But when
we sold arms to Egypt, we bared our teeth to our enemies, and
Nasser turned out to be a strong leader, so that now they cannot
any longer resolve the issues of the Near East without us.
Is that not a realization of the Leninist policy on using the
contradictions of the imperialist camp? In the given case we are
supporting bourgeois nationalists against the imperialists.
Mikoian. Com. Voroshilov went to Indonesia. Indonesia is a
bourgeois state, in many ways feudal, even, which only recently
won its political independence. They met Voroshilov triumphantly
not only because he is a good person, but because he represents
the Soviet Union. Remember the age we are living in, and the
strength we have. The Indonesians are a 70-million-strong
people; they have a smart President, Sukarno, but in order to
strengthen his power with the people, he needs a visit from
Voroshilov, in order to strengthen his influence through him.
What strength we have and communism has...
They accuse com. Khrushchev of being hot-tempered and harsh
[goriach i rezok]. But there they went and met without him. You
can't imagine the precipitousness and fervor of coms. Molotov
and Kaganovich at the meeting of the Presidium! In the course of
less than 10 days at three sessions of the CC Presidium on the
three foreign-trade issues this now open grouping held trial
battles, specifically on trade with Austria, on orders for
equipment in people's democratic countries, on trade with
Finland. After this, an attack started along the whole front. It
is true, Finland is a bourgeois country and borders us, but is
that really important to us? We know this through war with the
Finns and the Germans. The Finnish people knows how to make war,
and our task, not to make war, is the greatest task for our
state. For that very reason coms. Khrushchev and Bulganin
travelled to Finland and succeeded there...
Further, what did we do in foreign policy? Com. Khrushchev
proposed that a letter be written from com. Bulganin to the
Norwegians. At that time we had been arguing with the Norwegians
after the Hungarian events, so let's now write a letter to the
Norwegians, but say politely that if you meddle in military
affairs, we will wipe you off the face of the earth [sotrem s
litsa zemli]. We approved this, and it turned out to be a good
Khrushchev. To speak about serious issues in a friendly tone.
Mikoian. The people from MID [Midovtsy] have now begun to write
drafts of notes and letters. Well before, they put together
documents very badly, in a criminal, crude way of speaking,
stereotypically; it was impossible to read them.
That has made a huge impression. They sent letters to the
English as well. They were influential. They addressed the
French people. They didn't write to Eisenhower, not to everyone,
but only to those of whom I have talked. Does this mean that we
know how to see and use contradictions? We have been using the
contradictions of capitalism everywhere in our foreign policy.
Molotov has picked on one sentence of com. Khrushchev's: the
USSR and the USA are the only possessors of atomic weapons, and
now decide the questions of war and peace.
Khrushchev. Or the following fact: when we proposed to the
President of the USA, Eisenhower, to call England and France to
order during the English and French attack on Egypt. Was that
not a use of contradictions?
Mikoian. I am concerned about time, and for that reason do not
talk about that. Remember the circumstances: there was an
uprising in Hungary; our troops occupied Budapest, and the
Anglo-French decided: the Russians are stuck in Hungary, [so]
let's hit Egypt; they can't help; they can't fight on two
fronts. We'll pour dirt on the Russians, they say, and we will
thump Egypt; we will deprive the Soviet Union of influence in
the Near East. That is what they decided, and we found both the
strength to keep troops in Hungary and to threaten the
imperialists that if they do not end the war in Egypt, it could
lead to the use of missile weapons by us. Everyone recognizes
that with that we decided the fate of Egypt. Even before that,
we made a move that com. Khrushchev talked about. Since the
Americans were conducting a different policy from the English,
and did not want to dirty themselves with a colonial war, [or]
that their "friends" be so dirtied, but to do in Egypt
themselves [a samim ukhlopat' Egipet]. We said the following to
the Americans: let's introduce American-Soviet troops together
in order to restore peace in Egypt, which would accord with the
goals of the United Nations. This produced a huge effect.
From the point of view of using the contradictions of
imperialism in the interests of communist policy, there has
never been such a broad practice, such rich results, as in
recent years in our Central Committee with the participation of
Voice. Correct (Applause).
1 Ed. Note.: It is especially ironic to hear Mikoian praise the
opposition's unity in 1956, since he himself was the main
dissenter from the decision to invade Hungary. Unanimity of
decision was only formally maintained because Mikoian was in
Budapest, protesting long-distance, when the actual decision to
intervene was made on 30-31 October 1956. For more on this, see
"The Malin Notes on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956"
Translated, annotated and introduced by Mark Kramer, CWIHP
Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997) pp. 385-410."