* Bulletin of <<Zëri i popullit>>, 3rd Year, No. 33, February 7, 1944. CAP.
Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins>>, etc. was taken in a right or wrong way.
The Serbs, the Croats, the Macedonians and the Slovenes have assessed this decision and if they wish let them assess and reassess it as they deem most correct. What I want to point out is that with this decision, at least the inclusion of Kosova, the Dukagjin Plateau and other Albanian regions within <<the new federal Yugoslavia>> was done just as arbitrarily, this time, too, as it had been done by the imperialist powers in the Treaties of Versailles and London several decades earlier. In taking this decision the will of the people of Kosova, Dibra, etc., was totally disregarded. Only the will of the CC of the CPY was taken into account. No representative of Kosova and the other Albanian regions of the former Yugoslavia took part in this meeting, indeed, the representatives of the Provincial Committee of the CPY for Kosova and the Dukagjin Plateau were not even informed about it.
The decision of this meeting was not made known to us for a long time. At the same time, the fact that the Bujan Conference was organized a full month after the Jajce Meeting and took decisions which were contrary to the <<will>> of Jajce, but in conformity with the will of the people of Kosova, shows that neither the people of Kosova, nor the leaders of this zone, knew anything about what had been decided behind their backs by the CC of the CPY.
This is one of the most flagrant examples of the permanent perfidy of the Yugoslav leadership towards the Albanians.
Our brothers, the Albanians of Kosova and the other regions should have been represented at Jajce without fail and their right to freely have their say should have been respected. There they should have been allowed to express what they thought about their own future: Would they unite with Albania, or would they remain under the <<new Yugoslavia>>?! And, if they expressed themselves in favour of the latter solution, they should also have expressed themselves freely, with a will, not dictated by anybody on how they would build their future under Yugoslavia. That is, in this
case, they should have expressed themselves whether they wanted to be a separate republic, like Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, etc., wanted to be an autonomous unit, or wanted to be dependent on another unit, etc., etc. In short, this should have been the most elementary act, which the CC of the CPY should have done in advance to ensure that the extensive Albanian regions were represented at Jajce. Over years, the leaders of the CPY had assured us that the will of this population would be respected and taken into account in everything. But, as I said, this was not done and they flagrantly broke their word. Hence, this act can have no other name but perfidy.
Still worse, although everything about the future of Kosova had been decided at Jajce at the end of November 1943, even in 1944 letters and messages were sent to us from Tito and his henchmen (as I said only about the question of Kosova) in which the truth was hidden, in which they used such phrases as <<the question should not be raised today>>, <<but tomorrow>>, that the Albanians of Kosova <<will be free to go where and how they want>> (as if they were gypsies, without a homeland and possessions, and not an autochthonous people who were born, brought up, killed or died on their own soil).
Time was to prove that we were deceived not only in regard to the past period. While concealing the truth from us, while presenting the matter as something <<for tomorrow>> the Yugoslav leadership was preparing for more ferocious secret actions. Now Tito's closest collaborators and his official biographers write that he was greatly <<concerned>> about the question of Kosova, especially in 1944-1945, that he was <<vacillating>>, <<hesitating>>, etc. What these <<vacillations>> and <<concerns>> of Tito's were we do not know, but logic tells us that Tito and his henchmen were not in the least concerned about the <<special>> problem of Kosova at that period (or later). They had decided this. Their concern had to do with the other part of Albania, hence, with studying ways and means to place the whole of Albania under the domination
of Yugoslavia. This, too, we were to learn later, indeed this was to constitute one of the most dramatic chapters of our battle with the Titoites.
This is how matters stood at the close of 1943 and at the close of the period up till the summer of 1944 in our relations with the leadership of the CPY.
Here someone might say that for the whole period from August 1943 until summer 1944 only one side, one aspect of relations with the CPY -- that of the question of Kosova and other Albanian regions annexed to Yugoslavia, has been touched on. But why is there no mention of other aspects of these relations? What collaboration, what exchange of ideas, what accord or conflict with the CPY was there during this period, for example on the problems of the Party, the war, the Front, the state, etc., etc.?!
The fact is that after the bitter conflict with Vukmanovic-Tempo at Kucaka in August 1943 up till August 1944, that is a full year, no one was sent by the Yugoslav leadership to hold consultations, exchange experience or anything else of this sort with us. The fact is, also, that during this period, we did not receive any letter or other special material from the Yugoslav leadership which dealt with such problems as those of the life of the Party, the army and the national liberation war, the organization and functioning of the new state power which we were consolidating, the Anti-fascist National Liberation Front, etc., etc. In short, in all these aspects, each party went about its own business as it thought and judged best, on the basis of principles on which it operated and the reality of its own country.
Naturally, when I say that there is nothing to mention from these aspects, this does not mean to say that throughout this whole period there was a total loss of contact and information between our two parties. No. From time to time, various materials reached us, materials which spoke about the life and organization of the CPY, the Yugoslav National Liberation Army, the organization of the new state power, etc., etc. Likewise, there were occasions when, apart from
<<Radio Moscow>>, we picked up the broadcasts from the <<Free Yugoslavia>> Radio Station and heard some communique or commentary about the life and activity of the CPY and the Yugoslav partisan army.
For our part, too, from time to time, we gave the Yugoslav leadership comradely information about the state of the war and its prospects in our country, about the manoeuvres of the occupiers and reaction, and about the victories achieved. Miladin Popovic from time to time sent the Yugoslav leadership some information on his own behalf about the development of the war and the situation in our country.
In order to prove how absurd is the claim of the Yugoslav leadership about the aid which they allege to have given us during the period up till the end of 1943, I want to mention one more fact: the letter of J. B. Tito addressed to Miladin Popovic on October 9, 1943 for the CC of the CPA. Whichever way you look at it, this letter, too, which is in the archives of our Party, cannot have any description from our side other than that which we gave Tito's first letter, which reached us in December 1942 and which I mentioned earlier.
With his own mouth, or more precisely with his own hand, Tito proved that at the end of 1943, just as at the end of 1942, he had not the slightest idea about the situation of our Party and our National Liberation War. After asking whether it were true that <<the leader of the partisan army of Albania is a former prefect of police>>!!! (apparently he had learned that from Radio London!), Tito began his <<instructions>>. In October 1943 he told us that if the partisan ranks in Albania had increased, we should go over to bigger formations, brigades!
We could only smile in pity, because we had taken the decision to go over to big formations in March 1943 at the 1st National Conference; in June we had issued the instruction for the formation of the 1st Shock Brigade, while in October, when Tito gave us his <<instructions>>, we had already created the 1st and 3rd Brigades and were continuing to work for the formation of other partisan brigades.
Tito made himself even more ridiculous with the <<advice>> he gave us on the question of the future state power of Albania. <<I advise you,>> he said <<that the setting up of the people's state power should begin in Albania, too. . . , with the people's liberation councils as its basis. . .>>, and, after describing to us the <<specific difficulties>> in regard to this problem in Yugoslavia, he continued: <<Amongst you, in your country, you can immediately set up a people's government which should be based, as I said, on the people's liberation councils. . . If the situation in your country is not ripe for this, then create a people's national liberation council, which will carry out all the functions of the government until the time comes for such a government to be formed.>>[*]
Any one who does not know the reality of our country at that time or wants to distort this reality, as the Titoites have done and are still doing, might say: <<There you have the clear directives which Tito has sent you! Why do you deny him his merits?>> With the historical truth in front of us, we have the right to reply, as we have done: The Communist Party of Albania at no time received and did not wait to receive <<directives>> from Tito on the cardinal problems of its activity or any other kind! And if what he wrote to us on the problem of the state power is to be called directives, then we have no alternative but to describe them as <<directives>> that came too late, or, as the people say, <<a day after the fair>>. Concretely: In the spring of 1942 the Communist Party of Albania had begun the work to set up the people's democratic state power with the creation of the first national liberation councils; at the end of that year the whole country had been filled with councils, while in September 1943, the 2nd National Liberation Conference at Labinot had declared them the only state power of the people in Albania. As for Tito's other <<instruction>>, that we should set up <<a people's national liberation council>>, it must be
 From Tito's letter addressed to Miladin Popovic for the CC of the CPA, October 9, 1943. CAP.
said: In Albania, as early as September 1942, and not in October 1943, when it <<occurred>> to Tito, our Party had formed the National Liberation General Council! The Presidium of the General Council, which emerged from the Labinot Conference in September 1943, carried out a series of functions of the Democratic Government!
In short, Tito knew nothing about what was done in our country and issued <<instructions>> to us about things which we had already done very well for ourselves long before. Therefore, it is not our fault that we did not await Tito's <<directives>> and then act. On the contrary, had we remained waiting, had we stopped to see what Tito and his henchmen would <<direct>> us to do, the cause of the Party and the future of our people would have been lost! This would have been a great and unpardonable sin.
Thus, however much one racks his brains and memory, nothing could be found in favour of the <<unlimited aid>> which the Yugoslav <<friends>> claim they had given us in that period.
But perhaps they are referring to our old <<friend>>, Dusan Mugosa, who for most of this period (up till May 1944) remained in Albania. If Tito and company base their pretended <<aid>> in this period on the <<contribution>> of Mugosa, then I must say a couple of words about the <<contribution>> of this Titoite, who appeared to be unimportant and crazy, but who was charged with sinister long-range missions.
As the man of the <<terrain>> which he was, from the spring of 1943 Dusan Mugosa <<stuck to>> the region of Vlora. He was especially in tune with Mehmet Shehu and, later, when we sent Liri Gega there as delegate of the CC, these three became like a tripod. They were known as people of deeds and action, as resolute and brave, but the three of them were also known for their arrogance and conceit, for their insatiable thirst to be seen and heard, even to the extent of committing terrorist acts for which they were continually criticized and warned orally and in writing. But I am referring to Mugosa. Exploiting his friendship with Mehmet Shehu and Liri Gega, Dusan got himself into meeting
after meeting, contact after contact, and half in Albanian, half in Serbian, tried <<to convince>> the Skënder Muços and Hysni Lepenicas to associate themselves with the line of the Front and with the war which the Communist Party of Albania led!
With his tactless and irrational interference, especially in a district like Vlora, Mugosa only damaged the work that we did.
How much work and effort the Party, especially Hysni Kapo, had to expend to put right what Dusan Mugosa, Liri Gega and Mehmet Shehu weaved by night and unravelled by day in the region of Vlora.
We began to receive signals, one after another, about their grave sectarian mistakes, and after we described their work as seriously harmful, we removed them from the Vlora district.
Of course, we were bound to act cautiously, as we did, to avoid leaving any grounds for dissatisfaction, especially in the <<friend>> Mugosa. In August 1943, we formed the 1st Shock Brigade and Dusan persistently demanded that we send him there.
<<I'll be in permanent action,>> said <<the man of the terrain>>, <<and with Mehmet Shehu I get along very well.>>
And truly he did get along well with him.
In one of our meetings with Tempo we had had a fierce quarrel with him over what we should call our partisan brigades. He said, <<You should call them proletarian brigades,>> as in Yugoslavia. While Miladin, Spiro Moisiu and I insisted that they should be called <<shock brigades>>, because in this way we left no room for misunderstanding even in terminology, did not go beyond the slogans of the National Liberation War, etc. Despite Tempo's insistence, we acted as we ourselves thought best. The only one of our people who liked the Yugoslav term was Mehmet Shehu. In front of us he was obliged to call the 1st Brigade, where we had appointed him commander, a <<Shock Brigade>>, but in confidential conversations and letters to the Yugoslav <<friends>> he called it <<a proletarian brigade>>. Indeed, in one of these letters which he sent to Mugosa, Mehmet Shehu expressed his <<profound regret>> that Dusan was leaving Albania <<before
the completion of the placard which he had ordered with the inscription, 1st PROLETARIAN Brigade.>>
Undoubtedly, this was part of the <<contribution>> of Dusan Mugosa who, in the absence of Tempo, applied the instructions and ideas of Tempo to introduce splits and differences in the opinions and stands of our comrades. However, the negative influence of Mugosa in the 1st Brigade was especially apparent in other aspects. The heroic deeds and exemplary fight which the valiant partisans of this brigade, under the leadership and inspiration of the Party and the General Staff, waged during the years of the National Liberation War, are well known. History has spoken and will continue to speak about these things. However, without in any way implicating the effective of the brigade, or the overwhelming majority of its cadres, it must be said that during those years, some arbitrary, harmful and sectarian acts, also, were carried out on the personal orders of Mehmet Shehu and the direct instigation and inspiration of Dusan Mugosa. Such, for example, was the case of the execution of a group of Ballists, who, captured after an armed clash with our forces, were shot in violation of the instruction of the Party, which in such cases called for dispassionate judgement on the basis of the crimes which each individual had committed. We sternly condemned this act immediately. Both in the terrain and in the brigade, Mugosa brought us nothing but harm with his sectarianism. But this was not the end of the <<contribution>> of Dusan Mugosa. The black smoke of his
 A copy of this letter and other letters, full of Mehmet Shehu's admiration for Dusan Mugosa, can be found in the CAP.
 Among other things, in a letter that Comrade Enver Hoxha addressed to Mehmet Shehu on November 5, 1943, he wrote: <<Executing them is an excess, a mistake and out of place, because, instead of bringing us any good, it harms us. We must bear in mind that the peasants who are in the çetas of the Balli Kombëtar are innocent, unclarified and victims. . . we must not antagonize the peasants, because they are the pillar of the Party, and behaving towards them like you did is sure to have repercussions among the peasant strata. We must in no way give the enemy an excuse to accuse us of what we are not>>. CAP.
work, as a secret agent, with some of the cadres of the 1st Brigade, or wherever he was successful, has appeared a number of times on the horizon of the Party, during the whole of its course, right up to the present day, whenever the Party has clashed with anti-party groups or individuals in the leadership.
Hence, for Tito and company, the <<merits>> of this sectarian, megalomaniac and careerist are very great. Dusan Mugosa roamed through the <<terrain>>, not simply on account of his <<personal enthusiasm>>, but because he had been charged to poke his nose in wherever he could gather information about our comrades and send it to the Yugoslav leadership.The plans and cadres were being prepared in secret for the attack on the leadership of our Party, for the distortion of our correct line and the complete subjugation of the Communist Party of Albania. Not accidentally, 4-5 months before Velimir Stojnic came to Albania, Dusan Mugosa was summoned to return urgently to Yugoslavia for <<special>> duties. We farewelled him in a way which he did not deserve (with honours and thanks), but he, too, <<honoured us>> as we did not deserve: he gave the Yugoslav leadership the facts it needed to arrive at the conclusion that they had to act swiftly, with a strong hand, against the CPA and our leadership. Otherwise, the card the Titoites held to get Albania into their clutches would become worthless.
A new period was beginning in our relations with the CPY. That is, the time was coming when the Yugoslav leadership would concentrate its attention on <<assisting us>> in those aspects which up till now it had neglected: in our internal problems. The time was coming when, after a lapse of a year, Tito's third emissary for the years of the National Liberation War was to be attached to our leadership. This was a colonel -- Velimir Stojnic. One of the most grievous events with the most serious consequences for our Party and country, the 2nd Plenum of the CC of the CPA, known in history as the <<backstage plot of Berat>> is linked from beginning to end with the name and mission of this special envoy of Tito.