(its own --
J. St.) country for the development, support and awakening of the revolution
in all countries " (see Lenin's book The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky
[34]). That is why our Party, since October 1917, has been transformed from a national into an international force, into the Party of revolution on an
international scale.
   
An equally radical change has taken place in the Party's position within the country as a result of October
1917. In the preceding periods the Party was an instrument for the destruction of the old order, for overthrowing capital in Russia. Now, on the contrary, in the third period, it has been transformed from a party of revolution within Russia into a party of construction, into a party for the creation of new forms of economy. In the past it recruited the best forces of the workers for the purpose of storming the old order; now it is recruiting them for the purpose of organising the food supply, transport and the basic industries. In the past it rallied the revolutionary elements of the peasantry for the purpose of overthrowing the landlords; now it is recruiting them for the purpose of improving agriculture, of consolidating the alliance between the labouring elements of the peasantry and the proletariat which is in power. In the past it recruited the best elements of the belated nationalities for the struggle against capital; now it is recruiting them for the purpose of building the life of the labouring elements of these nationalities on the basis of co-operation with the Russian proletariat. In the past it destroyed the army, the old militarist army; now it must build up a new, a workers' and peasants' army, which is needed to protect the gains of the revolution from external enemies.
   
From a party of revolution within Russia, the Russian Communist Party has been transformed into a party of peaceful construction. That is why it has removed from the arsenal of the proletariat such forms of struggle as strikes and insurrection, which are now unnecessary in Russia.
   
In the past we could dispense with experts in military and economic affairs, for at that time the Party's
activity was mainly critical, and it is easy to criticise. . . . Now, the Party cannot dispense with experts; in addition to utilising the old specialists it must train its own experts: mobilisation, supply and operations officers (for the army), food officials, agricultural experts, railway managers, co-operators, experts in industry and foreign trade (in the economic sphere). Without this we shall be unable to build.
   
A change has also taken place in the Party's position in that its forces and resources, its reserves, have grown and multiplied to a colossal degree.
   
The Party's reserves are:
   
1) The contradictions between the different social groups within Russia.
   
2) The contradictions and conflicts, which sometimes grow into military collisions, between the capitalist states around us.
   
3) The socialist movement in the capitalist countries.
   
4) The national-liberation movement in the backward and colonial countries.
   
5) The peasantry and the Red Army in Russia.
   
6) The diplomatic and foreign trade services.
   
7) The entire might of state power.
   
Such, in general, are the forces and potentialities within the framework of which -- and this framework is sufficiently wide -- the Party's strategy can manoeuvre, and on the basis of which the Party's tactics can carry out the day-to-day work of mobilising forces.
   
All these are the favourable aspects of October 1917.
   
But October also has an unfavourable aspect. The fact is that the proletariat took power in Russia under
distinctive internal and external circumstances which left their impress on the entire work of the Party after power was taken.
   
Firstly, Russia is an economically backward country; it is very difficult for her to organise transport, develop industry, and electrify urban and rural industry by her own efforts unless she exchanges her raw materials for machinery and equipment from the Western countries. Secondly, to this day Russia is a socialist island surrounded by hostile, industrially more developed capitalist states. If Soviet Russia had as her neighbour one big industrially developed Soviet state, or several Soviet states, she could easily establish co-operation with those states on the basis of exchange of raw materials for machinery and equipment. But as long as that is not the case, Soviet Russia, and our Party which guides its government, are obliged to seek forms and methods of economic co-operation with the hostile capitalist groups in the West in order to obtain the necessary technical equipment until the proletarian revolution triumphs in one or several industrial capitalist countries. The concession form of relations and foreign trade -- such are the means for achieving this aim. Without this it will be difficult to count on decisive successes in economic construction, in the electrification of the country. This process will undoubtedly be slow and painful, but it is inevitable, unavoidable, and what is inevitable does not cease to be inevitable because some impatient comrades get nervous and demand quick results and spectacular operations.
   
From the economic standpoint the present conflicts and military collisions between the capitalist groups, and also the struggle of the proletariat against the
page 112
capitalist class, are based on the conflict between the present-day productive forces and the national imperialist framework of their development and the capitalist forms of appropriation. The imperialist framework and the capitalist form of appropriation strangle the productive forces, prevent them from developing. The only way out is to organise world economy on the basis of economic co-operation between the advanced (industrial) and backward (fuel and raw material supplying) countries (and not on the basis of the plunder of the latter by the former). It is precisely for this purpose that the international proletarian revolution is needed. Without this revolution it is useless thinking of the organisation and normal development of world economy. But in order to bo able to start (at least to
start ) organising world economy on proper lines, the proletariat must triumph at least in several advanced countries. So long as that is not the case, our Party must seek roundabout ways of co-operation with capitalist groups in the economic field.
   
That is why the Party, which has overthrown the bourgeoisie in our country and has raised the banner of the proletarian revolution, nevertheless considers it expedient to "untie" small production and small industry in our country, to permit the partial revival of capitalism, although making it dependent upon the state authority, to attract leaseholders and shareholders, etc., etc., until the Party's policy of "doing the utmost possible in one country
for the development, support and awakening of the revolution in all countries
" produces real results.
   
Such are the distinctive conditions, favourable and unfavourable, that were created by October 1917, and
in which our Party is operating and developing in the third period of its existence.
   
These conditions determine the colossal might that our Party now possesses inside and outside Russia. They, too, determine the incredible difficulties and dangers that the Party is facing, and which it must overcome at all costs.
   
The Party's tasks in this period in the sphere of foreign policy are determined by its position as the party of international
revolution. These tasks are:
   
1) To utilise all the contradictions and conflicts among the capitalist groups and governments which surround our country, with the object of disintegrating imperialism.
   
2) To stint no forces and resources to assist the proletarian revolution in the West.
   
3) To take all measures to strengthen the national liberation movement in the East.
   
4) To strengthen the Red Army.
   
The Party's tasks in this period in the sphere of home policy are determined by its position
within Russia as the party of peaceful construction. These tasks are:
   
1) To strengthen the alliance between the proletariat and the toiling peasantry by:
   
a) recruiting for the work of state construction those elements of the peasantry which possess most initiative and business ability;
   
b) assisting peasant farming by disseminating agricultural knowledge, repairing machines, and so forth;
   
c) developing proper exchange of products between town and country;
   
d) gradually electrifying agriculture.
   
An important circumstance must be borne in mind. In contrast to the revolutions and proletarian parties in the West, a fortunate feature of our revolution, and a tremendous asset for our Party, is the fact that in Russia, the largest and most powerful strata of the petty bourgeoisie, namely the peasantry, were transformed from a potential reserve of the bourgeoisie into an actual reserve of the proletariat. This circumstance determined the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie and served the interests of the Russian proletariat. It is mainly due to the fact that, in contrast to what occurred in the West, the liberation of the peasants from bondage to the landlords took place in Russia under the leadership of the proletariat. That served as the basis also for the alliance between the proletariat and the toiling peasantry in Russia. It is the duty of the Communists to cherish that alliance and to strengthen it.
   
2) To develop industry by:
   
a) concentrating the maximum forces on the task of mastering the basic industries and improving supplies for the workers engaged in them;
   
b) developing foreign trade with a view to importing machinery and equipment;
   
c) attracting shareholders and leaseholders;
   
d) creating at least a minimum food fund for manoeuvring;
   
e) electrifying transport and large-scale industry. Such, in general, are the Party's tasks in its present period of development.
Pravda, No. 190,
August 28, 1921Signed:
J. Stalin