Josef. V. Stalin
Note to V.I. Lenin from Petrograd by Direct Wire
Written: May 25, 1919 (1)
First Published: in the symposium Documents on the Heroic Defence of
Petrograd in 1919, Moscow, 1941
Source: J. V. Stalin, Works, Volume 4, page 268-270. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953
Transcription: Hari Kumar for Alliance-ML
HTML: Mike B. for MIA, 2005
The dispatch of units is undoubtedly better organized now than it
was some three months ago, but it is also clear to me that neither
the Commander-in-Chief nor his chief of staff know anything about
the units which are being sent to Petrograd. Hence such surprises
as the arrival of mere handfuls of men under the guise of
regiments of the 2nd Brigade or the Cavalry Brigade from Kazan. At
any rate, Petrograd has received so far only six hundred men from
military schools who are really fit for action.
But the chief thing, of course, is not the quantity, but the quality
of the units. All we need to drive the whole pack beyond Narva is
three infantry regiments — fit for action, of course — and at least
one cavalry regiment. If you could have seen your way to meet this
small request in time, the Estonians would have been driven back
before now.
However, there is no cause for alarm, since the situation at the
front has become stable, the front line has stiffened, and in places
our forces are already advancing.
Today I inspected our Karelian fortifications and on the whole
found the situation tolerable. The Finns
are maintaining a stubborn silence and, strangely enough, have not
taken advantage of the opportunity. But this is to be attributed to
the fact that their own position at home is growing more and more
unstable, as we are assured by Finnish comrades familiar with the
state of affairs.
I was shown today a proposal of the Commander-in-Chief to cut down
the navy on account of the fuel crisis. I conferred on this subject
with all our naval men and have arrived at the conviction that the
Commander-in-Chief's proposal is absolutely incorrect. Reasons:
first, if big units are to be converted into floating rafts it will
be impossible to operate their guns, that is, the latter will simply
not shoot, because there is a direct connection between the
movement of a ship and the action of its guns; secondly, it is not
true that we have no large-calibre shells - the other day twelve
barge-loads of shells were "discovered"; thirdly, the fuel crisis is
passing, because we have already succeeded in accumulating four
hundred and twenty thousand poods of coal, apart from mazut, and are
receiving a trainload of coal daily; fourthly, I have convinced
myself that our navy is being turned into a real navy, with
well-disciplined sailors who are prepared to defend Petrograd might
and main.
I do not want to mention here the number of battle units already fit
for action, but I consider it my duty to say that with the naval
forces available we could defend Petrograd with credit against any
attack from the sea.
In view of this, I, and all the Petrograd comrades, insist that the
Commander-in-Chief's proposal be rejected.
Further, I consider it absolutely essential that coal deliveries be
increased to two trainloads a day for a period of three or four
weeks. This, our naval men assure us, will enable us to put our
submarine and surface fleet definitely in fighting trim.
Stalin
(1) In connection with Yudenich's offensive of May 1919 and
the threat of encirclement and capture of Petrograd by the Whites,
J.V.Stalin was sent to the Petrograd Front as plenipotentiary of the
Council of Defense, which furnished him with a mandate, dated May
17th 1919, stating that he was being sent on a mission to the
Petrograd and other areas of the Western Front for "the adoption of
all urgent measures necessitated by the situation on the Western
Front." J.V.Stalin arrived in Petrograd on May 19, 1919.