MARXIST INTERNET ARCHIVE

ALBANIA, ENVER HOXHA AND JOSEPH STALIN -
Choose Between the Legacy of Tito and the Legacy of Stalin
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Alliance Article First Presented At The First Moscow Stalin Seminar, 1994; Published in Alliance issue number 9;
Next published as a part of three articles in Alliance 29 at:
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THIS VERSION IS AS IT WAS FIRST PRESENTED IN MOSCOW, AND IN ALLIANCE NUMBER 9.
"UPON THE RELATION OF ENVER HOXHA TO JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN"

TABLE CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
I. FROM ANTI-FASCIST WAR TO SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.
II. ALBANIA AND JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN.
(A). UPON THE IMPERIALIST ATTACKS UPON ALBANIA,
THE ROLE OF GREECE, AND THE SAGE ADVICE OF STALIN.
Hoxha's criticisms of the KKE on points of principle were :
i) That the KKE Ceded Control of the battle against the Fascists to the British and American Mediterranean command.
ii) The defeatist Tactics of the KKE - capitulation at Varkiza.
iii) The KKE understanding of guerilla war.
(B) THE PRACTICAL SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ALBANIA IN BUILDING SOCIALISM.
(C) UPON THE REVISIONIST TITO LED COMMUNIST PARTY YUGOSLAVIA (CPY). Yugoslavia versus Albania; Stalin supports Albania.
i) Relations During the War between the CPY and the CPA.
ii) Tito Obstructs the Albanian path to socialist independence.
iii) Following the Open Letter of the CPSU(B) to the CPY.
CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

Marxist-Leninists view J.V.Stalin as a key touch stone, to distinguish who only calls themself a Marxist-Leninist from one who is truly a Marxist-Leninist. Only Marxist-Leninists consider that socialism in the Soviet Union was established and successfully functioned until shortly after Stalin's death. This view allows us to sort out from the welter of groups - those that are truly Marxist-Leninist from those that are not. Over time, a similar significance of Enver Hoxha and Albania becomes ever clearer.

We will put the view in this article, that Hoxha led the Albanian state through a two stage war of National Liberation into socialism. Thereby becoming only the second world power (to date) to establish socialism, after the Soviet Union. This enormously significant achievement, has not received adequate attention world wide. This inattention stems from revisionist misinformation and illegitimate claims.

Marxist-Leninists are, even now, actively re-assessing all their history. Any claims must be carefully scrutinized. We would argue, that the claims that socialism was established in several countries (the Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea) are illegitimate and spurious. We argue that these false claims devalue and debase the currency of socialism.

In fact, these revisionist illegitimate claims, obscure the differences between socialism and what was in most of these other countries, a nationalist "pseudo-socialism". In truth, leaders in these other countries never followed the explicit advice of both Lenin and Stalin. This advice, warned against halting the turn from the national democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. Stalin pointed out, using the prescient phrase "Chinese Wall"; (prescient because the Communist Party China did exactly what he had warned against), that one should not build a Chinese Wall between the Democratic Revolution and the Socialist Revolution.

But, still some honest Marxist-Leninists, may not be at this stage convinced that Albania was the only country to follow the Soviet example. Therefore we will here try to :
First describe the development of the Albanian revolution from anti-fascist national war of liberation to the socialist revolution;
Then outline the relations between Stalin and Hoxha, representing the Albanian party; and in doing so portray the attitude of the Tito revisionists towards the Albanians.

Together this information, we would argue, spells out the fact that during Stalin's life time, and with his direct support, the foundations of a socialist state were laid in Albania.

This review will only take the story up to the death of Stalin in 1953. Of course Albania's later history is very important to the fight against revisionism. Unfortunately, here, we cannot deal with these in this paper. The vital role that Albania played in exposing first Khruschevite revisionism, and then somewhat later, Chinese (Mao Tse-Tung) revisionism; has to be later separately reviewed.

But, here we only briefly remind ourselves, that by any criteria :

Socialism was established by the Albanian state and proceeded to great heights.

Firstly by scientific criteria, socialism was established. ALL private industry was expropriated, and the state controlled the levers of production, and in turn the state itself was directed by the working class and peasantry.
Secondly, by the criteria of ordinary folk, this scientific criteria was translated into the daily life of Albania.

In 1947 the Albanian state had been completely ravaged by fascism, and had no railway and no industry to speak of, with high illiteracy. Yet by 1989, Albania was a country whose standard of living was higher than its neighbours (including Yugoslavia); whose people were educated; and where the people were thriving - contrary to capitalist propaganda. Albania then exported to its neighbours a large range of products including electricity, and for wages all workers were subject to a ratio of highest wage to lowest wage of 1:1.2, of which the lowest wages went to party members. Diseases that were common in Yugoslavia, just across the border, were eradicated in Albania. Much more data can be easily adduced to highlight the real differences in the political, cultural and living standards of Albania as compared to those of the spurious "socialist" states.

Clearly Albania was a shining Socialist example to the workers and the peasants of the world. That is why the World Bank and the international capitalists class led by the USA so actively inspired the coup assisting the traitorous Ramiz Alia into power. It is true that socialism was dismantled rapidly in this state. But it took the international capitalist class to do so. Hoxha's acts live on and will continue to guide the workers and peasants of the still struggling Albania.

But how did Hoxha create the basis of the socialist state, and how did J.V.Stalin's actions and thoughts interact with Hoxha ?



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I. FROM ANTI-FASCIST WAR TO SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.
Marxist-Leninists know that at various points of struggle, different layers of the masses are drawn into struggle. Before the socialist revolution, this will include elements who will not adhere to socialist slogans and principles.

Even the Bolshevik revolution itself had two separate stages, first the national democratic revolution and only then the socialist revolution. As Lenin put it:

"If one does not want to understand that a bourgeois - democratic republic with a Constituent AAssembly is a step forward from the same sort of republic without a Constituent Assembly, and that a Soviet Republic is two steps forward, one is merely closing one's eyes to the difference between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat." Lenin CW, Moscow 1980, Vol 29: p.498.
At the very time he was travelling back to Russia after exile, in his "April Theses", Lenin was quite explicit about the two stages of the Bolshevik Revolution :
"The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that the country is passing from the first stage of the revolution - which owing to the insufficient class-coonsciousness and organisation of the proletariat placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie-to its second stage, which must place power in the hand of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasantry."
Lenin Selected Works (SW): "April Theses", Volume 2, Moscow 1977, p.30.
These specific features (ie "insufficient class consciousness and organisation of the proletariat" - ed) apply to Albania also. As identified by Lenin, the democratic revolution had taken place in Russia by the April months :
"1. The old Tsarist power which represented only a handful of feudalist landowners.. has been overthrown and removed, but not completely removed.. 2. State power has passed into the hands of a new class, the bourgeoisie and landowners who had become bourgeois. To this extent the bourgeois -democratic revolution in Russia is completed." Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat In Our Revolution". SW.Vol 2. p.37.
Lenin also pointed out that the tension of "Dual Power" then existing, would be resolved by the victory of one or other force:
"The main feature of the our revolution.. is the dual power which arose in the very first days after the triumph of the revolution. This dual power is evident in the existence of two governments: one is the main, the real and actual government of the bourgeoisie the "Provisional Government" of Lvov and Co,; which holds in its hands all the organs of power; the other is a supplementary and parallel government, a "controlling" government in the shape of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies which holds no organs of state power but directly rests on the support of a obvious and indisputable majority of the people, on the armed workers and soldiers.." Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat In Our Revolution" p.36-37, SW. Vol 2, Ibid.
Lenin and Stalin showed in practice that the socialist revolution only comes after the victory of the national democratic revolution. This understanding allowed Lenin and Stalin to navigate the storms of the colonial and semi-colonial world, something that Trotsky never could, mixing up the socialist with the national democratic phase. It was this same understanding that led to Stalin's later sympathy for the unravelling of revolution in Albania, and Hoxha's role.
For just as the Bolsheviks of the Soviet Union turned the struggle against Tsarist feudal oppression into the launching pad for the successful socialist revolution; the Party of Labour of Albania led the United Front against the fascist invaders of Albania, from the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) through to the socialist revolution.

Firstly in the NDR against the Italian fascists, and German fascists;
And then against the internal class enemies in the socialist revolution. Incidentally, in this epic battle during the Second World War, Albania was the only state bar the Soviet Union, able to liberate herself entirely by herself from the fascist grip.

The Communist Party of Albania (CPA) was formed from a number of grouplets who conducted significant struggle, in the midst of the Italian occupation. In fact it was these anti-fascist battles of the rank and file that led to more than just a formal unity between the various groups :

"While the negotiations among the leaders of the communist groups dragged along for months, the popular anti-fascist forces were growing all over the country. . a radical change had taken place. The rank and file members of the communist groups were becoming aware that unity could not be achieved through sterile talks among chiefs but through a common struggle against the fascist invaders.. The demonstrations were conducted under the slogans : "Long live free Albania", "Liberty or death!".
From : "History of The Party of Labour of Albania" Volume 1, Tirana,1971, p.70. (Hereafter listed as PLA).
These activities ultimately led to the formation of a branch of the Korca Communist Group to be formed in Tirana in 1940 under the leadership of Enver Hoxha (1908-1985). Under his leadership, the sectarian and Trotskyite elements of the "Youth Group", were in practice exposed. These included such incorrect slogans as :
"For a Soviet Albania", during the phase of the anti-fascist battle". p.79, PLA Ibid.

The Shkodra and Korca groups moved closer together with the need for joint actions against Italian fascism. Finally the Communist Party of Albania was formed from a meeting of groups, on November 8th, 1941. The party's ideological and organisational bases were explicitly those of Lenin and Stalin (PLA History p.89-91); and explicitly repudiated Trotskyite notions of "the reactionary and conservative nature of the peasantry, and the lack of a proletariat"; as being fatal pre-conditions against hopes of any victory (PLA History, p.86).

The STRATEGIC AIM of the party in 1941 was :

"To fight for the national independence of the Albanian people and for a people's democratic government in an Albania free from fascism." p.92, PLA.
The class struggle was not ignored, but :
"The basic contradiction existing at that time in Albania which demanded an urgent solution in order to clear the way for national social economic and cultural development (was) the contradiction between the people and the fascist invaders."
p.93, PLA.
The main enemy was :
"The Italian fascists.. and all those who sided with the invaders and had served them to oppress the Albanian people."
p.93, PLA Ibid.
The principal forces against them were :
"The workers and peasants who bore the main brunt of the fascist oppression, and (fulfilled the task-ed) to 'set up military units.. (to-ed) spread among the masses of workers in urban and rural areas."
p.93, Ibid.
But in accordance with the tactics of the broadest possible united front with those GENUINELY fighting the common enemy, the CPA set up a crucial TACTICAL DIRECTIVE:
"But the "non-national patriotic state were also interested in ensuring national independence. Therefore the party could not afford to neglect these strata, and it set down the rule of carrying on ceaseless work in order to mobilize them in the national-liberation movement:
"Unite with the nationalists who really want a free Albania, with all the honest Albanians who want to fight against fascism."
p.94 PLA, Ibid.
Having linked the masses with the vacillating but genuinely patriotic of the Albanian nationalists, the CPA proceeded to win the leadership of the National Liberation War. The process led to the National Liberation Councils:
"In February 1942, the Central Committee issued the first instructions to establish national-liberation councils which would serve as instruments organizing and mobilizing the people for the anti-fascist war and at the same time as the "nuclei of our future government". The councils were to serve as very important links with the broad masses of the people and unite with them in the national liberation front." PLA, Ibid, p.107.
The Founding of the National Liberation Front at the Peza Conference on September 16th, 1942, was key to harnessing the energy of the genuine anti-fascists.
In practice the true but non-communist patriots were distinguished from the false so called "patriots". The latter led by Abaz Kupi did not dare to : "openly oppose the guiding role the CPA had begun to play in the struggle." Ibid, p.123. The Councils exercised great influence :

"In the liberate regions the councils exercised the functions of organs of people's power. They maintained law and order looked after the development of the economy , the food supply, trade, sowing and harvesting of grain, organized education culture and the press; they settled councils patched up blood feuds and maintained the people's readiness for war...
"Throughout the National Liberation Councils, the government functions and the people are mobilised for struggle and the uprising."
PLA, Ibid, p.125.
It is true that the CPA "had the rich experience of the Soviets". But :
"Naturally it did not merely copy this experience, First and foremost it relied on the concrete circumstances under which the people ant-fascist uprising was developing in Albania. The composition of the organs of this uprising harmonized with its national liberation character. These councils the CC (said).. should include the militant representatives of the all the anti-fascist forces regardless of their political opinion and class background."
PLA Ibid, p. 126.
But the CPA during the guerilla war, obstructed and exposed the machinations of the "Balli Kombetar". Headed by the sham patriot Mithat Frasheri and Abaz Kupi, the Balli embraced :
"Reactionary bourgeois intellectuals, big landowners and merchants, reactionary clergymen, rich peasants and others.. The Trotskyite "Zjarri Group" also joined it. The Balli Kombetar was a motley political union of various reactionary trends. Its organisation was rotten.. the Balli announced that it did not recognise the Peza Conference.. they chose to collaborate with the invaders."
PLA, Ibid, p.131-33.
Sectarian elements goaded on by the Yugoslavs agitated for an "open war" against the Balli at this stage. This would have been premature. Instead of "open war" against the Balli, the CPA led by Hoxha fought to distinguish between the rank-and-file and leadership of the Balli. This line convinced the people of Albania that there was only one true leadership fighting for a national liberation- the CPA.
When the 2nd National Liberation Conference took place in Labinot on September 1943, the attempts at a rightist accommodation with the Balli by the more faint hearted of the CPA Central Committee (Ymer Dishnica) had been defeated by Hoxha. It timely now, to move to the slogan :

"To have the national liberation councils recognized as the sole people's power in Albania."
PLA Ibid, p.170.
Ultimately the correct line won out and the masses became ever more convinced of the CPA's correct unhesitating leadership. As time went on, even the more honest of the British military observers commented, in then secret reports :
"It is exceedingly difficult to explain to the partisans (ie the true National Liberation Front (NLF) led by the CPA-ED) the reason why the Allies not only DO NOT denounce these collaborators but give them supplies, and continue to maintain MILITARY missions with them.. During the past 6 months, together with Majors Titman and Palmer, I have asked for a change in policy, The position has remained unaltered.. I am a professional soldier not a politician, but from what I have seen of the NLF they are perfectly capable of running Albania and to the satisfaction of the populace."
British Documents of the Public Record Office in Kew, London : FO371/43551/39/R10429. Cited in "A Tangled Web : A History of Anglo-American Relations with Albania (1912-1955)", p.99. By W.B.Bland and I.Price. London, 1986, published by The Albanian Society.
The Italians capitulated on September 8th, 1943. But then came the Germans. The armed battle became even more intense. This led to the escalation of battle against the Balli internal enemy, more and more the vanguard of reaction. This coincided with the Abaz Kupi joining forces with the German Quisling governments; with the connivance of the British. The latter were by now increasingly worried about Hoxha and the CPA's revolutionary potential, and wished to prop up their future "right" to exploit Albania via the puppet Kupi; and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill held talks with the Albanian ex-King Zog.
It was in this climate that the CPA pushed to establish state power under the workers and peasants :

"The first question to be taken up is that of state power.. The establishment of the National Liberation Councils everywhere, their reinforcement and their protection from all attempts on the part of the "Balli Kombetar" or any other party to sabotage them, or to combat them overtly... There should exist no other power than that of the national-liberation councils. On this issue there can be no compromise and duality." PLA Ibid, p.184.
By May 1944, despite harsh German aggression in the winter, the CPA led partisans were dominant. By 1944, the National Liberation Army had grown to 35,0000 fighters. By now the Red Army had mounted an offensive since January 1944, on the Eastern Front, entering Rumania in April. At this critical time, the anglo-Americans aided the Kupi and Balli Quislings. But unlike Greece, where communists were butchered, the CPA followed correct tactics led by Hoxha. At Permet in April 1944, the Ist Anti-fascist National Liberation Councils Congress, addressed the question of state power. The CPA identified this question. With the first democratic elections in Albania ever, the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council was elected as the highest legislative and executive body in Albania, as :
"the representative of the sovereignty of the people and of the Albanian state. The Anti-Fascist Council elected in Permet was the first peoples Convention of Albania. The Congress charged the Anti-Fascist Council with forming the Anti-Fascist National-Liberation Committee with the attributes of a provisional people's democratic government.. Enver Hoxha was elected Chairman of the Anti-Fascist Committee. Establishing the supreme organs of the people's power, the Permet Congress decided:
"The new people's democratic Albania is to be built according to the will solemnly expressed today by the people through the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council."
PLA Ibid, p.208.
After this, Albania finally liberated herself from fascism.
In Berat in October 20-23, 1944, the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council took the decision to change the Anti-Fascist Committee into the Democratic Government of Albania.

This promised to organise the full democratic elections for the Constituent Assembly after Liberation. All citizens were guaranteed equality before law, freedom of meeting, of association, of press of religion and consciences, equality for women and men, right of election etc; in the "Declaration of The Rights of the Citizens". The first steps toward agrarian reform was taken with listing of all land ownership and counting of landless peasants; all foreign political and military and economic agreements concluded by ex-King Zog were annulled if they infringed upon Albanian interests; and close relations and collaborations were envisages with the Soviet Union (p.217-219, Ibid PLA).

When full liberation was achieved on November 29th, 1944;
the working class had played the dominant role in the National Liberation War correctly led by the CPA.
Despite the fact that :

"Both in the leading organs of the National Liberation War and in the composition of the Party, the number of workers was small. This did not however prevent the working class from fulfilling its leading role in this war."
PLA p.234.
The peasantry had become the main armed force of the National Liberation War and the "soundest support of the CPA".
It was true that:

"The Albanian peasantry constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. It is true that it was backward from the economic and cultural standpoint, but it preserved ..great revolutionary capacities.. against landlords and usurers, against the former anti-people regimes and ..foreign invaders..The peasantry accepted the programme ad leadership of the CPA..the well to do peasantry, the village gentry as a class did not..and aligned themselves with the Balli."
PLA Ibid, p.234-236.
Of the other classes the petty and the middle bourgeois also joined with the CPA led NLF. Of the petty bourgeois most were enthusiastic. Of the middle bourgeoisie there was vacillation but most took part. (p.236). Of course the youth and the women were the most active forces.
Now the tasks were clearly directed towards the second stage - securing socialism.

First the army was transformed from a guerilla and partisan army, into a regular army. Elections to the local organ of power were held. The Democratic Front was formed, convened at the Ist Congress of the National Liberation Front in August 1945, under the slogan of national unity. This called for elections, which were held on December 2nd. The only exclusions from the polls were ex-ministers of the Quislings, war criminals, and those who had lost their civic rights.
During the period directly leading up to the December elections certain progressive measures were taken.

1. Friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union was proclaimed.
2. Reconstruction was made a priority. Schools, factories, power stations etc.
3. Merchants and capitalists were compelled to pay taxes and yielded up hidden gold and merchandise. Property was expropriated of hostile elements and those refusing to pay the progressive taxes.
"In 1945 the revenue from the extraordinary taxation on war profits accounted for more than half the state budget income."
PLA Ibid, p.261.

In the midst of the electoral campaign, the Soviet Union recognised the Democratic Government of Albania.
The elections were decisive.

"About 90% of the voters took part.. and 93% of them cast their ballots for the candidates of the Democratic Front. These were the first democratic elections ever held in Albania... On January 11th, 1944 the Constituent Assembly, expressing the will of the People unanimously proclaimed Albania a People's Republic and chose the new government with Never Hoxha at its head."
PLA Ibid, p.272-3.
THE ENSUING CONSTITUTION :
"Proclaimed that the main means of social production were common property of the people; and that the private sector was subject to state control. The Constitution also regarded work as an honour and duty for everybody. It proclaimed the principle that each citizen was entitled to be paid according to is work and capability."
p.274. PLA Ibid.
To the cynics the elections must "have been rigged". It is interesting then to note the views of the 1945 US Special Mission of Special Officer Joseph Jacobs:
"The Albanian leaders are a sincere patriotic group of individuals who are going to be difficult to deal with."
p.i Bland and Price, Ibid.
"The NLF regime enjoys greater popular support than any opposition group. Opposition elements are poorly organised and have no positive programme. The NLF is the only movement which effectively resisted the Fascist invaders. Generally speaking, the NLF leaders are patriotic and well intentioned. they are more considerate of the well-being of the people than was any previous Albanian regime. That they have done as much as they have thus far is remarkable, considering their inexperience."
Bland and Price : "The Tangled Web", p.140, Ibid, citing National Archives USA Washington : 84/7/801/7-145.
The People's councils had become the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. What was Stalin's attitude to Hoxha, and to the fledgling socialist state of Albania?

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II. ALBANIA AND JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN.
Even leaving aside the powerful impetus to Communists in Albania, of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Albanians were heavily influenced by the Soviet state from 1917 onwards. Unlike the revisionists of the so called Peoples Democracies, the Albanians truly embraced the Soviet example from the beginning.

The anti-fascist war of national liberation itself, was boosted by the Soviet example. The Albanian Party history says :

"Led by the CP headed by J.V.Stalin the Soviet people rose in a body to wage their Great Patriotic War in defense of the freedom and independence of their Socialist homeland. This just war opened a new stage in the Second World War strengthened the liberation, anti-fascist character of the struggle of peoples against the fascist bloc, and laid the foundations for the unification of all the anti-fascist forces of the world into a single front.. the treacherous assault on the Soviet people and the outbreak of the great Patriotic War had deep repercussions in Albania. the broad masses of Albanian patriots were indignant at the Hitlerite aggression.. Only the Soviet Union had defended the rights of Albania and had raised its voices against the injustices perpetrated against her..
"Our struggle" Enver Hoxha said, "Did not begin after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, but after the entry of the Soviet Union into the War, our people felt that the blood that they shed would be not be in vain."
PLA. p. 81-2.
In fact the Meeting Of the Communist Groups that formed the CPA, set itself the task of linking the Albanian National Liberation with the Great Anti-Fascist World War. And as the PLA History puts it, the most :
"Decisive external factor of the historic victory of the Albanian people was the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and its great victory Over fascism.. Under the leadership of J.V.Stalin, the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the Second World War and played the principal role in the destruction of fascism."
PLA, Ibid, p.241.
The most direct evidence of the views of Stalin are the testimony of Hoxha from his five personal meetings with Stalin. Hoxha claimed in his memoirs of the meetings with Stalin that :
"We Albanian communists have successfully applied the teachings of Stalin in the first place in order to have a strong steel like Party, always loyal to Marxism-Leninism, stern against the class enemies."
"With Stalin - Memoirs", Enver Hoxha, p.39, Tirana 1979.
These Memoirs are redolent of a very warm and personal relationship between these two great fighters for humanity. It is not necessary to belabour this point, as the book speaks for itself. But we will try to describe briefly some specific aspects of the relationship between Stalin and Hoxha.
(A). UPON THE IMPERIALIST ATTACKS UPON ALBANIA, THE ROLE OF GREECE, AND THE SAGE ADVICE OF STALIN.

The Great Powers had always interfered in Albania, setting up their version of her borders. They had previously in the secret Treaty of London (Signed April 26th, 1915 by Britain France Italy and tsarist Russia) divided Albania into 3 parts; two of which were to be directly under Italian control and one under Greek control. (From British Foreign Office Records, Kew, FO371/3148/6163/199287. Cited Bland and Price Ibid, p.6). But the vigorous policy of the masses led by the CPA made it far more difficult to manipulate Albania.

Nonetheless, immediately after the Second World War, when the Greek revolution was crushed, the British and American imperialists, once again used the Greeks as pawns by which to disrupt Albania. The Greeks revived the specious claim to the part of the South of Albania that they called the "Northern Epirus". As an British Foreign Office memorandum urged :

"The State Department.. are inclined to consider that there might be justification for limited action by the Greek army just inside Albanian territory.. There is much to be said.. for hinting unofficially to the Greek military authorities that a minor incursion of this nature should be winked at." Cited by Bland and Price Ibid, p.235-236. Kew Documents:FO371/78444/10390/R7696.
Hoxha pointed out to Stalin, that the British and the USA imperialists were anxious to continue swallowing Albania, just as before the war. In addition the Greek and Italian and Yugoslavs had designs upon Albania. The advice of Stalin was to steadily proceed with the building of socialism. Sagely he advised :
"As for the screams of the external enemies about partitioning Albania, they are just to intimidate you because I do not think there is any danger in this direction at present.. In the first place Albania is a free and independent country, the people have seized independence and they know how to defend their independence. Second the external enemies have themselves contradictions with one another over Albania. None of them wants Albania to belong only to the other. If Greece wants to have Albania for itself, this would not be advantageous to Italy or Yugoslavia, which would raise obstacles.. On the other hand the independence of Albania has been recognised and confirmed by the delegation of the big three-The Soviet Union, Britain and the USA. This declaration may be violated, but it is not easy to do. Hence come what may, Albania has its independence protected."
Hoxha : "With Stalin", Ibid, p.116-117.
For Hoxha's part, he shared information on the incorrect handling of the partisan war in Greece; and the immediate post-war problems of the inexperienced and poorly led Greek Communist Party (KKE).
In 1947, at his Second meeting with Stalin Hoxha was blunt :

"We think that the leadership of the KKE made grave mistakes.. among others that the Greek Democratic Party (GDA) stood aloof from the people.. made great mistakes in regard to the expansion of the party in the countryside and the town during the war.. and during the war against internal reaction and Anglo-American intervention."
"With Stalin", Ibid, P.109-110.
Many of these mistakes were the very ones that the Hoxha leadership had to fight against within the CPA Central Committee. These mistakes were being urged by Trotskyites, and by hidden Titoite agents. In essence, these mistakes embodied a lack of reliance upon the masses, and opportunism :
"In the countryside.. the extension of the party was limited, and its organization weak and lax, with the organisation as of the party frequently confounded with the EAM (the National Liberation Front-Ed). There was opportunism both in the organization and in the political line of the national liberation councils at the village level, there was duality of power and coexistence with the Zervist reactionary organizations etc. in the liberated areas and elsewhere. We told the Greek comrades that their putting the Command of the National Liberation Army under the orders of Mediterranean Command (the British and the American Command-editor), their talks and agreements of an opportunist and capitulationist character with Zervas and the reactionary Greek government in exile, the predominance of peasant elements and of the old career offers in the leadership of the Greek National Liberation Army, and so on, were grave errors which would lead the heroic struggle of the Greek people to defeat. The Varkiza agreement was the logical conclusion to all these wrong actions and views - it bought about the capitulation to British and local reaction..
Even after the capitulationist Varzika Agreement and the period of 'legality' of the KKE, the leadership of the KKE did not go deeply enough into its former mistakes in order to correct them in a radical manner.. it did not have sound links with the broad masses of the people.. it did not appreciate the new situation after the defeat of fascism, underrated the internal enemy and Anglo-American reaction and was unable to foresee the great danger that would threaten it from these forces of reaction.. It had great hopes in 'legal' activity and parliamentarism. As a result the party was disarmed before the enemy, lost its sound ties with the people, the people's revolution in Greece went through a grave crisis, and the people were given the impression that the revolution would triumph on the parliamentary road and through elections.. they failed to prepare themselves for a protracted difficult war, under-rated the partisan war and described the partisan forces they succeeded in regrouping, as a regular army. They pinned all their hopes of victory on this 'regular army', in this way neglecting the main factor-the people, and the Marxist-Leninist principle that 'the army and the people are one."
"With Stalin",pp.110-114.
Stalin was disturbed about events in Greece, and the apparently strained relationship between the CPA and the KKE. In fact Stalin arranged for an open meeting with the leaders of the KKE - Nicos Zachariades and Mitsos Partsalides; with Enver Hoxha to discuss the allegations of Hoxha. These were openly ventilated in Stalin's office, on the occasion of Hoxha's Fourth meeting with Stalin.
Hoxha's criticisms on points of principle were:

i) That the KKE Ceded Control of the battle against the Fascists to the British and American Mediterranean command :

"Our party supported the Soviet-British-American Alliance, because through to the end it considered this an anti-fascist coalition to crush the German Nazis. But at the same time we never created the illusion that the Anglo-American imperialists would be the loyal friends and allies of the Albanian people.. we made a radical distinction between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans from the beginning.. Our Party, our Army and the General Staff of our army not only never submitted to the dictate of the British and the Allied Mediterranean Head quarters, but even when we allowed them to give us advice, we took it with very great caution..our two peoples (ie.Albanian and Greek) developed even closer fraternal relations during the war.. But we have criticised the comrades of the leadership of the KKE because the EAM and they themselves committed a major political mistake of principle in subordinating the National Liberation War of the Greek people to the Anglo-American strategy and placing it virtually under the leadership of the British and the Mediterranean HQ. We addressed our criticism to Comrade Zachariades personally. The person mainly to blame for this situation was Siantos.. Zachariades was imprisoned.. When we pointed out this matter to Comrade Zachariades later, he did not give me a clear answer, and leaned more to the view that mistakes had not been made."
With Stalin, p.166.
ii) Hoxha's Second Criticism Was That the defeatist Tactics of the KKE - capitulation at Varkiza.
Right wing forces in Greece formed a National Republican Greek League (EDES), led in name by General Nicholas Plastiras and in practice by General Napoleon Zervas.In a meeting of May 1944, in Lebanon, the EAM, ELAS and KKE agreed to place all their military forces under a "Government of National Unity" to be led by George Papandreou. Papandreou then demanded the disbanding of all military forces bar those of the Greek Government, when ELAS refused, civil war broke out led by the British Lieutenant -Colonel Ronald Scobie authorised by Winston Churchill. On January 3rd, 1945, Papandreou was replaced as Prime Minister by General Nicholas Plastiras. After this a "peace conference" on February 12th, was held at Varkiza where the ELAS agreed to disband in return for an amnesty, and handed in its arms. The remnants of the ELAS then re-grouped as the Greek Democratic Army, and civil war broke out again.
Hoxha stated that :

"Our opposition to the leadership of the KKE with Cmde Zachariades at the head is based in the first place on Varkiza, where the KKE and the EAM signed the agreement which nothing more than a capitulation a surrender of their arms. The CPA described this act as a betrayal committed against the KKE and the fraternal Greek people."
With Stalin, Ibid, p.170-171.
The Varkiza agreement was to have major significance, and devastated the forces of the Greek Communists.
iii) Hoxha's Third Criticism Was Upon The KKE understanding of guerilla war.

The practical experience of the CPA meant that these criticisms were sharp and telling :

"After the capitulation at Varkiza, the Greek national Liberation War was resumed.. we have had contradictions with Zachariades, Bardzotas, and Ionnides over the character of the war the Greek Democratic Army (GDA) should have waged against.. Greek reaction.. On the basis of the our National Liberation War, we think that the Greek Democratic War should not have been transformed into a frontal war, but should have retained the character is a partisan war, fought with small and large units. In this way the General Van Fleet (of the USA) superior forces would not have been able to liquidate the GDA.. Zachariades' views on strategy were in opposition to ours. The comrades of the leadership of the KKE.. described the.. partisan forces.. as a 'regular' and 'modern' army.. they also claimed that they had equipped it with the strategy and tactics of the frontal war of a regular army. On the other hand, in their military operations the Greek the comrades followed the tactics of passive defence which is the mother of defeat.. the KKE proceeded from the incorrect principle that partisan warfare has not a final objective, that is, does not lead to seizure of power."
"With Stalin" p.174, Ibid.
Hoxha goes on to point out that the GDA was very demoralised,and with the continual waiting instead of seizing an offensive, became more so. Even when there was a positive manoeuvre made in the Battle of Gramos in 1948, the victory was not built upon to "capture cities," and to "seize power". Hoxha links these military considerations with an even more significant point- that the leading role of the party was discarded by the KKE:
"We think that at the battles of Gramos and Vitsi the comrades of the Greek leadership did not keep in mind the Marxist-Leninist principles of people's war.. We have told the Greek comrades in a comradely manner that the leading role of the party in the Greek partisan army must be ensured more firmly; the political commissar of the company, battalion, brigade and division should be the true representative of the party, and as such should have the same right to command, just the same as the commander. But we have noticed and have often pointed out to the Greek comrades that they have not taken a correct view of the leading role of the party in the army.. Failure to understand the leading role of the party in the army was one of the main reason which led to defeat in the GDA.. In the Greek National Liberation Army (ELAS) the joint command of the commander and the commissar existed but this was poorly implemented in practice. The pressure of erroneous bourgeois views of career officers who could not tolerate trusted people of the party in command alongside them, brought about that.. the role of the commissar was overshadowed and relegated to second place. This is a consequence of the views of the leaders of the KKE on the 'regular army'."
Ibid, p.183, 187-190.
Stalin after hearing Zachariades, and having made himself conversant prior with the facts, supported Hoxha's analysis :
"As regards Varkiza, the Albanians are right.. Varkiza was a major mistake. You should not have signed it and should not have laid down your arms, because it has inflicted great harm on the Greek people's war.. as regards the assessment of the strategy and tactics followed in the Greek Democratic War, although it was a heroic war, again I think the Albanian comrades are right. You ought to have waged a partisan war." Ibid, p. 196-197.

THIS DISCUSSION ON GREECE SHOWS SEVERAL THINGS :
Firstly, that the standard Trotskyite argument that "Stalin was responsible for the debacle in Greece" is incorrect. Here Hoxha testifies that he and the CPA, advised the KKE to adopt a correct Marxist-Leninist line, one by which the CPA itself had secured victory.
Secondly, the relations between Stalin and Hoxha were very frank and open. Frank and warm, but principled also. The open party discussion between the CPA and the KKE was instigated by Stalin, in the best spirit of proletarian internationalism.ie. To have open and sharp debate, in order to heal dangerous rifts, to develop Marxist-Leninist policy, and to prevetn repition of mistakes. At the end of this potentially bitter debate, Stalin said : "Wait a moment, comrades! Embrace each other, Comrade Hoxha and Comrade Zachariades!" ("With Stalin",p.200).

Thirdly that the overall assessment of Albania's by Stalin (See beginning of this section) was in the long run correct. By building socialism the CPA avoided the capitalist encirclement for many years - until the death of Hoxha in fact.

B) THE PRACTICAL SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ALBANIA IN BUILDING SOCIALISM.

In all the meetings of Hoxha with Stalin, there was considerable talk of how the Soviet Union could help the fledgling socialist state of Albania. It was clear that Soviet leader was prepared to help the Albanian state considerably, in both political and practical terms.

For example, the very name of the Party of Labour of Albania was suggested by Stalin. The overwhelming mass of the people were from the peasantry, and Stalin understood the implications of this:

"The overwhelming majority of our people," I (Hoxha) told Cmde Stalin.. "Is comprised of poor peasants and next come the middle peasants. We have a working class small in numbers then we have a quite a large number of craftsmen and townspeople engaged in petty commerce, and a minority of intellectuals. All of these masses responded to the call of our Communist Party, were mobilised in the war.. and are now linked with the party and the people's power.. While assessing the policy of the Party.. towards the masses in general and the peasantry in particular as correct, Cmde Stalin gave us some valuable comradely advice about our work in future.. He expressed the opinion that since the biggest percentage of its members were peasants, our CP should call itself "The Party Of Labour of Albania".
"With Stalin, Ibid, p.62.
This suggestion was later adopted by the CPA. Stalin's attitude, showed how well he understood the problems of a peasant based society, and his practical experience in the Soviet Union :
"Cmde Stalin asked us in detail about the situation of the middle and poor peasants in our country. Hoxha told Cmde Stalin, about the policy of the CPA, and the great all-round work it had done.. in order to find support among the peasantry and win it over to its side.. Hoxha said "We acted in that way, proceeding not only from the Marxist-Leninist principle that the peasantry is the closest and most natural ally of the proletariat in the revolution, but also from that fact that the peasantry in Albania constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population and through the centuries had been characterised by great patriotic and revolutionary traditions.. Cmde Stalin replied :
"In general the peasants are afraid of communism at first because they imagine that the communists will take the land and everything they have. The enemies talk a great deal to the peasants in this direction with the aim of detaching them from that alliance with the working class and turning them away form the policy of the party and the road of socialism. Therefore the careful and far sighted work of the CP is very important, as you also said, to ensure that the peasantry links itself indissolubly with the party and the working class.".. "Stalin advised: "You must set up the Machine and Tractor Stations and strengthen them, so that they work the land well, both for the state and the cooperatives and for the individual peasants. The tractor drivers must always be in the service of the peasantry, must know all about agriculture the crops, and the soils, and must apply all this knowledge in practice to ensure that production increases without fail."
"With Stalin", Ibid, p.59-62;75-76.
Of course there was much more advice. But also there was much critical practical aid.
This consisted of everything from maize and cotton seeds(p.153), rails (p.103), army materials (p.103); and most importantly to specialists and educational help to build up industry and self-realince of the people:

"We shall help you with specialists in order to speed up the process of development of the Albanian economy and culture. As for oil think we'll send you Azerbajani specialists, because they are masters of their profession. For its part, Albania should send the sons and daughters of workers and peasants to the Soviet Union to learn and develop so that they can help the advancement of their Homeland".. We shall assist both with literature and with specialists in order to help increase the number of higher institutes which are the basis for the creation of the university"
P.77-8; 105.
The generosity of Stalin is to be contrasted to the attitudes of such as the later to be revealed revisionist Mikoyan :
"Stalin said: Comrades, we are a big country, but you know that we have not eliminated all the grave consequences of the war. However we shall help you today and in the future, perhaps not all that much, but with those possibilities we have. We understand that you have to set up the sectors of socialist industry, and in this direction we agree to fulfil all the requests you have presented to us, as well as those for agriculture." Then smiling he said : "But will the Albanians themselves work?" I (ie Hoxha) understood why he asked me this. It was the result of the evil-intended information of the Armenian huckster Mikoyan, who .. not only spoke in a language quite unlike Stalin, but also used harsh terms in his criticisms of our realization of plans in our country, alleging that our people did not work etc. His intention was to reduce the rate and amount of aid.
"With Stalin", Ibid, p.103-4.
Clearly, Stalin fully supported both Hoxha and the Socialist state of Albania.
C) UPON THE REVISIONIST TITO LED COMMUNIST PARTY YUGOSLAVIA (CPY). Yugoslavia versus Albania; Stalin supports Albania.

After the open exposure of the Trotskyites, revisionism went underground. Following the further exposure of the revisionists in the Soviet Union such as Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek etc; international revisionism was cautious.

The next open attempt to subvert the Marxist-Leninist world movement was taken by the CPY under Tito. It was the exposure of the Tito by Stalin that ultimately helped the Albanians to maintain their independence. For, from the earliest days of the Albanian War of Liberation, until Stalin exposed the CPY, Albania and the CPA were constantly under pressure to cede its independence in various ways to the Yugoslavs and the CPY.

i) Relations During the War between the CPY and the CPA.

In summer 1941, the CPA established links with the CPY. The background, between Yugoslavia and Albania was "embittered" :

"This whole grievous legacy built up over decades had been created by no fault of the peoples and the Albanian people in particular have never been to blame for it. The blame for this rests on the anti-Albanian policy of the monarchs of Serbia and princes of Montenegro who wanted to gobble up Albania.. The monarchs of Italy, Austro-Hungary, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria rushed to grab whatever they could from the "The periphery of the (crumbling-ed) Ottoman Empire.".. In particular the Serbian and Montengrin hordes assailed the Albanian territories.. occupied the outermost region of Kosova.. expelling about 3000,000 Albanians.. In 1912 the Albanians won the great victory - the independence of Albania... (But-ed) then Albania was cut in half-Kosova and other Albanian regions were violently annexed to Yugoslavia.. the anti-Albanian policy of.. great-Serb reaction was intensified.. Yugoslavia once again sanctioned its de jure its "rights', to the occupied Albanian territories.. and tried new ways of .. gobbling up the whole of Albania. It was precisely the Serbian monarchs who came to the aid of King Zog who had fled from Albania in June 1924.. Zog carried out the counter-revolution in December 1924. In return Zog initially gave the Serbs other pieces of Albanian territory, such as Vermsoh and Shen-Naum."
"The Titoites", Enver Hoxha, Tirana, 1982. p.4-9.
To seek unity and links with the CPY, with these bitter centuries, was not easy. But the CPY was fighting against fascism itself, and the CPA felt it important to establish links.
But, the CPY over the next years was to consistently attempt to foster another agenda-the long term swallowing of Albania.

The CPY falsely claimed "They had set up the CPA."

But actually the CPA had already begun forming itself before the first approach of the CPA to the CPY in July 1942. The various groups had met on 8th-14th November, 1941. A CPY contact only arrived in Albania on December 1942. Blazo Jovanocic, came with a letter from Tito, saying :

"It contains instruction and advice which are very important for you.. Do you agree with them or not!?"
Titoites, Ibid, p.27.
This hectoring tone and anxiety to "take over" the struggle was to mark the next years of interaction. The contents of that letter were later claimed by Tito to "have saved the CPA". But in fact the CPA had already dealt with all the problems that Tito purported to address.
Among many later "advisers" from the CPY were Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo; and Dusan Mugosa. Apart from denigrating the "stereotype of the October Revolution" (Titoites p.47. This attitude was vigorously rejected by Hoxha); they also attempted different subversions. They accused the CPA of sectarianism over collaboration with the nationalists, yet simultaneously accused the CPA of "softness" to the Balli :

"Your stand towards the Balli Kombetar is incorrect, it is wrong.. Your softness and tolerance towards the Balli Kombetar from the first moments when it appeared on the scene, it took you by surprise and subsequently you have not known what stand to take. Instead of declaring war on it, you offered the negotiating table."
Titoites Ibid, p.64.
These charges Hoxha could easily reject, pointing to the successes of the United National Liberation Front (See above, and further p.64-68 "Titoites"). The CPY "adviser" Colonel Velimir Stojnic, in 1944, charged the CPA and Hoxha as "opportunists", for even having talks with the Balli Kombetar at Mukje in August 1943. Again Hoxha pointed out the correct tactics of the CPA. Hoxha tried to end this sabotage by openly saying :
"Your interference in our affairs is out of place and your tone is unacceptable."
Ibid, p.137.
The Yugoslavs however, continued to promote the provocative sectarians of CPA members such as Liri Gega and Mehmet Shehu. They pursued sectarian acts; such as the arbitrary shootings of Ballists in violation of Party instructions to "dispassionately judge crimes". (p.126-30).
The Yugoslavs also began their policy of ultimately subordinating things Albanian to the CPY :

Early in their interaction the Yugoslavs, promoted :

"A big staff, a staff above the staffs, as you might say a universal organisation. this staff will be an inter-Balkan staff, or let us call it a Balkan staff for short."
Titoites, Ibid, p. 53; See also p. 57-61.
Hoxha saw this was ridiculous in times of fascism and war. The other sister parties involved (Greece and Bulgaria) rejected this absurdity. But this was only a temporary retreat for the CPY.
Despite all these provocations, the CPA concerned itself only with liberation from fascism - prelude to the socialist revolution.

Even where Kosova (Albanian territory annexed by Yugoslavia, overwhelmingly peopled with ethnic Albanians) was concerned, the CPA applied Marxist-Leninist policy. Despite the demagogic appeals of the Balli Kombetar to the Kosovan people, that they would "liberate Kosova from Yugoslavia", the CPA :

"Issued calls to the people :"Only unrelenting war against the fascists and their collaborators will lead to the solution of our national problems, an integral part of which is the putting right of historical injustices. For this our Communist party is fighting and the CPY likewise is leading the peoples of its country on the same course."
p.78, Titoites.
As Kosova was now occupied by the Fascists (Balli demagogues even claimed that this "represented a liberation" from the Serbs) this was a principled stand of the CPA. Of course, either one of the CPA or the CPY could have led the Kosovan struggle. In fact :
"The CPY demanded that the population of Kosova and the other Albanian regions of Yugoslavia should be mobilized in the fight under its leadership and immediately after the war, this population should decide its own future on the basis of the Leninist principle of the right of self-determination. This demand we considered reasonable and fair.. We agreed to make a concession.. so that this question could not be used even as a "pretext" by others.. this was not the time to explain the peculiarity of Kosova etc.. the main thing was to arouse the peoples in the general war against the fascist occupation. Later, when the communist parties were in power, then yes, then everything would be decided justly and would be settled finally, according to the will of the peoples themselves."
"Titoites", p.79-84.
The CPY reneged on its promises for a self-determination. During the war nonetheless, the CPA unsparingly showed the Kosova people, that struggle they must - against the fascists. This line persisted, despite serious and false Yugoslav charges of "Great Albanian chauvinism" (See Titoites p.97-116).
But the CPY was continually exposing itself as having aggrandizing motives. The Ist Conference of the National Liberation Council for Kosova and Metohia, was held in Bujan December 31st, 1943 to January 2nd 1944.

This Conference under the leadership of the CPY for Kosova and a local unit of the CPA (Shkodra and Tropoja, whose partisan units operated in the adjacent highlands of Gjakova) proclaimed the :

"Albanian people of the Kosova and the Dukagjin Plateau, will have the possibility to decide their own future through the right of self-determination up to secession."
Ibid,p119.
But the CC of the CPY headed by Tito, erased this from the written resolutions; but this fact was kept secret from the CPA (Titoites, Ibid p.121).
Further unprincipled acts of the CPY followed. After the CPA had lit the torch in Kosova, Albanian partisans of the CPA helped actively in battle to achieve the liberation of Kosova. Now, Tito ordered the CPA and Kosova partisans, to pursue the Nazis into the North. This allowed the Titoites to :

"Enter Kosova, without meeting the resistance of the Albanian insurgent forces, Kosova liberated y the forces of the CPA army and the Kosova forces. Tito eliminated the national liberation councils that had been set up and launched unrestrained mass terror against the Albanians. These unprecedented reprisals of the Titoites quite rightly caused a great popular revolt which put the "New Yugoslavia" in doubt. In this extremely difficult position the patriotic people of Kosova demanded the return of the Albanian patriots.. Tito.. was obliged to agree to this demand, and the partisans returned.. after this Tito planned new manoeuvres.. it was necessary for him that our forces should finally withdraw from Kosova and return to Albania..But how? The direct withdrawal of our forces from Kosova .. would create unpleasant and grave scenes for the Titoites. The people of Kosova might rise in revolt again.. Tito staged the "need to pursue reactionary bands towards the South, towards Greece.", and for this he sought the aid of those forces of ours. We .. ordered our divisions to act. After they reached the Southern most borders of Macedonia our forces ere told there "was no further need" for them to stay in Yugoslavia. The border was crossed in the zone of Korca and Prespa, far from the eyes of the people of Kosova. Tito and Rankovic were left free to operate as they did, with their barbarous methods against the martyred Kosova."
p.212-4. Ibid.
Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs had actively recruited agents, such as CPA CC member Koci Xoxe, later to be exposed as a dupe of the CPY. All of this activity was directed against Enver Hoxha who had constantly exposed the Yugoslav emissaries and obstructed them. Even during the war, the Yugoslavs attempted a coup, by using these secret agents in the CPA Polit Bureau. The thrust was that Hohxa had been sectarian in the line of the CPA. But this was occurring just as the Liberation of Berat and the South of Albania was being achieved by the correct policies of the CPA and Hoxha.
On the eve of liberation of the entire country, the 2nd Plenum of the CC of the CPA was held in Berat, on November 23rd. This marked the naked attempts by the previously concealed Yugoslav revisionists to disrupt the Albanian party. Prior to the Plenum, the Yugoslavs had captured a hidden majority on the CC of the PLA. These hidden agents were led by Koci Xoxe, and also included Nako Spiru and Sejfulla Maleshova.

The immediate object was to "Open the Front" to include the Balli, who were by now exposed. The Second objective was to remove Hoxha.

An initial victory at the Plenum was scored by the hidden agents, who labelled Hohxa as : "The synthesis of all the mistakes observed in the political and organisational line." ; and the lien of the party as falling from "sectarianism into opportunism" "Titoites", Ibid, p.187-191.

The PCY delegate manipulating the agents, Stojnic, gave away the future agenda. He addressed the conference to say :

"You cannot go ahead without Yugoslavia and in particular, without the Yugoslavia such as has now been created in the Balkans and in Europe..The perspective of Yugoslavia is the perspective of the Balkans and of Europe.. you speak very little about us, therefore in the future you should speak more about Yugoslavia and Tito."
Titoites, Ibid,p. 214-5.
Another future agenda - alliance with the Western Great powers was also made clear.
Stojnic said in the debate before the CPA Plenum :
"The great Allies which plays a decisive role in this war should all be looked on in the same way, by the new state.."
"How",asked Hoxha. "By putting the Soviet Union on the same footing with the other two?"
"From the State viewpoint yes," Stojnic explained. "The policy of a true state makes no differentiation. In an unofficial way for example through party channels the Soviet Union can be considered as the main and most natural ally, but not through state channels, America and Britain are always allies, and their present policy is positive and in our own interests."
Titoites, Ibid, p. 220.
Hoxha firmly refuted this sabotage in his speeches.
Although the Berat Conference was a major set back; in one goal, the CPY failed. They did not eliminate Hoxha from the leadership, as the respect of the Plenum was so high for him. Hohxa was still able to push the correct line, which was to maintain the independence of the Front, and to now face the fact :
"That the question of state power is the central question for the party..we must strengthen the councils and purge them of alien elements."
Titoites, p.218.
Despite these treasonous acts by a supposed fraternal party, after the liberation of Tirana on the close of the Berat Confernce, the Albanian army pursed the Hitlerite forces into Yugoslavia and helped to liberate Montengro, Sandjak, and Bosnia (PLA History, Ibid, p.231).
ii) Tito Obstructs the Albanian path to socialist independence.

The attitude of Stalin towards helping Albania to build itself up, and develop its socialist industry has been described above. This attitude was in marked contrast to the behaviour of the Tito Regime. The post war relationship between Tito and Albania was one of obstructing its development. This facilitated Tito's plan to swallow Albania. Hoxha cites the Yugoslav, V.Dedijer,

"As early as the beginning of 1945, one of Tito's closest collaborators, Mosa Pijade demanded that the new chancellery of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade should have not 6, but 7 cabinets. According to the Titoites, the 7th Cabinet was for the "Yugoslav Republic of Albania." (Rijeka 1981) Titoites, p.231.
Tito and Kardelj and other Yugoslavs; expressed to their hidden agents in the CC of the CPA (Mehmet Shehu, Kristo Themelko Koci Xoxe, Sejfulla Maleshova) the Titoite revisionist views:
"On the "stages of revolution", the Yugoslavs thought that since the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution has still not been completed, we shall delay the transition to the second stage of the proletarian revolution", that " the road of transition from the former to the latter stage is the road of reforms"; that the " national liberation councils are organs of the bourgeois democratic revolution"; and that "one of the distinction between the October Revolution and the Yugoslav Revolution is that in the Yugoslav Revolution the bourgeois is a member, a participant in the front"; that " Tito has enriched Marxism with the tactics of the national liberation war."
p.240, Ibid.
The strategy of which Berat was one part, was becoming clear. The Berat Conference upbraided the CPA for Sectarianism in the Democratic Front. Now, the "innovative" views of Tito about the "stages of revolution", justified the agents of Tito in obstructing the second stage of revolution in Albania. The line give out was:
"Comrades Tito, Kardelj and Djilas.. advice us not to skip the stages." (See p.245-7).
Now the CPY even pressured the CPA to accept the ex-King Zog's treaties concluded with the imperialists.
Hoxha refused to allow the temporary defeat at Berat to dissuade him of the correct Marxist-Leninist line. The ambition of the 3 main hidden agents, each vying for power, helped the Marxist-Leninists. These agents were Xoxe, Maleshova and Spiru.

In the Spring of 1946, Hoxha launched his counter attack in the Polit Bureau of the PCA on the errors of the Berat 2nd Plenum. Although the CPY tried to prevent it, Hoxha pushed to hold openly (as opposed to secretly, as the CPY urged) the 5th Plenum for the 1st Congress of the CPA. Just at this juncture, Tito urgently requested Hoxha to come to Belgrade in July 1946.

Hohxa asked for tangible assistance in credits for the development of agriculture and industry; and a mutual aid treaty. Tito in return developed the idea of the "Balkan Federation". This had first been suggested by Georgii Dmitrov, the Bulgarian Communist who played a central role in the Comintern. As Tito took this idea, it was a vehicle by which, to use Hoxha's words:

"He aimed to and struggled to annex the whole of the Balkan including Albania into Yugoslavia."
Titoites, Ibid, p.287.
A treaty of friendship and Mutual Aid, as well as a Economic Convention was indeed signed between Albania and Yugoslavia. Though Hohxa obstructed talk of the Balkan Federation, this pressure continued. Stalin effectively stopped this manoeuvre. As Hoxha said:
"Xoxe, Kristo, and Themelko exerted considerable pressure on me to seek to enter the "Balkan Federation". which in their head meant that we should unite with Yugoslavia. I did not encourage the. One day about the beginning of 1948, they came to me and said :"The Balkan Federation is being formed between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria!". We wrote to the CPY.. we never received any reply. Stalin who had divined Tito's expansionist plans drew Dmitrov's attention to them and at the beginning of 1948 the latter declared publicly that he had been wrong in his views about the Federation of Yugoslavia with Bulgaria."
Ibid, p. 287-88.
The reality of Tito's Aid, soon became clear :
"In the first year after Liberation we had trade relations only with Yugoslavia.. the trade was virtually one-way and in our disfavour. We gave more than we received, We gave good products and received rubbish. We expropriated the big merchants of their property and sold the fabric to the Yugoslavs at prices which they set, while the razor blades and minor things of this type which they sold us cost us the earth. We imported grain from them because we were short of it, some leather and iron plough shares and these they sold to us at their internal prices which were very high. We sold them olives, cheese, olive-oil.. when we did not have enough of them for ourselves."
Titoites, p.302.
Of course the Albanians wished to transform their state :
"We had to lead the country consistently forward on the road to the construction of socialism in all fields and in the concrete instance, in the sector of the economy too. We knew that the fundamental factor for the socialist transformation of the country was the internal factor; we knew that the external auxiliary factor would be the Soviet Union of Stalin, in the first place, but specifically in the conditions when we had still not established the necessary direct link with the Soviet State, we turned with open hearts to our neighbouring friends the CPY."
Titoites, p.302.
But the CPY had different ideas, revolving around a sort of semi-colonial basis for Albania in relation to Yugoslavia :
"The CPY said: "This is not the time for transformations of a socialist character".. Our "friends" greatly hindered and misdirected us also on the question of the Land Reform.. We were advised that we should not "fall out" with the former landowners, they told us to take a bit of their land(someone even "advised" to pay for it with money) and to leave them a good part of the land which in fact represented areas ten or 20 times larger than those of the "poor".. As for industry.. we were advised : "Later, we shall see what can be done with the mines and the oil, but for the time being record what you have, supply us with raw materials and we shall supply you with ample finished products".. "Agriculture - that is what you should go in for as the backward agrarian country you are!" Titoites, p.304-5.
The credits arranged were via Joint Stock Companies. These agreements were signed on November 27th, 1947.
Increasingly the Yugoslavs violated the agreement by:
i) The open distortion of the customs union with Yugoslavia, to open the borders to the benefit of Yugoslavia. This allowed Albanian goods to be taken into Yugoslavia for useless Yugoslav dinars (p.323).
ii) Operating the joint companies without input of funds from the Yugoslavs; (p.323).
iii) Setting all prices unilaterally; and by not setting up factories in Albania (p. 323-324).
iv) By on the other hand complaining that the Albanians were not fulfilling their obligation; despite the fact that these were dependent upon Yugoslav equipment never sent (p.326).
v) By demanding parity of prices between the 2 countries, which was difficult for Albania (p.339).
Finally when it became clear to the Yugoslavs that the Albanians had tried to obtain advice and aid from the Soviets, the Yugoslavs said that:
"A new line is emerging in Albania." Ibid, (p.333).
The Yugoslavs had tried repeatedly to
"keep the road to Stalin closed to us as long as they could if possible." (p.344).
Yugoslavia tried preventing USSR equipment coming to Albania:
"Albania is like a clock, it cannot work with all kinds of tools, Some may be better, others may be worse, but whatever they are they must be of one brand! Not some Yugoslav and some of another production. Since a Yugoslav foundation has been laid in your country, everything that will be built upon it must be Yugoslav alone."
P. 349-50.
An "Ultimatum" was put by Yugoslavia in November 1947 :
"The CC of the CPY insisted that the relations of Yugoslavia with Albania ought to be characterised every day by the idea that our union should be sounder and our friendship should move in the direction of the fraternization and collaboration of our peoples, including Bulgaria to. Because of its backwardness the Albanian economy is not capable of developing independently. The criterion of this aid is that you should not take everything ready and rely on us in parasitic way! You will advance yourselves more strongly with us, and our CC thinks that the Yugoslav aid will be greater when we bring about an economic union between our countries!".
Ibid, p. 360.
The hidden Yugoslav agents within the CC of the CPA tried to get this line accepted. But Hoxha tried to fight them off. But the mounting pressure continued. At the 8th Plenum of the CPA, the party was under the pressure forced to take the line that a new pro-Yugoslav line was to be taken. The Plenum was also being pushed towards discarding Hoxha. This all culminated in accepting the leading role of the Front, thereby discarding the leading role of the Party; as the Yugoslavs had wanted (See p.459 Ibid).
But Hoxha persisted in his struggle. Hastily the Yugoslavs pressed on with their mission to swallow Albania. Hoxha demanded these requests to be made in writing.
The reason for the Yugoslav haste to conclude agreement to have a unitary state between Albania and Yugoslavia became obvious soon. Obviously the Yugoslavs were aware that the CPSU(B) led by Stalin, were about to expose Yugoslav revisionism. The Yugoslavs wished to commit Albania to unifciation in one state, before this occurred.

But the CC of the CPSU(B) exposed Yugoslav revisionism openly, on March 27th, 1948. There can be no doubt that this intervention of Stalin and the CPSU(B), had enormous significance in helping safeguard Albanian socialism (The Titoites P.484-498).

Relations were subsequently cool between Yugoslavia and Albania; and conversely warm between the USSR and Albania.

iii) Following the Open Letter of the CPSU(B) to the CPY.

It soon became clear that Stalin had been aware for sometime about the improper conduct of the Yugoslavs towards the fledgling state of Albania :

Firstly, Stalin had defended the Albanians refusal to Tito to deploy Yugoslav troops in Albania(p. 533, Titoites);

Secondly, Stalin openly criticised and prevented Dmitrov's proposal for the Balkan Federation - a mask for Titoite aggrandizement (p. 5333, Titoites);

Thirdly, as applied to the Balkans, Stalin acknowledged the right of the Kosovan peoples' to self determination (p.537, Titoites).
Indeed for strategic reasons, as well as reasons of principle, Stalin applied this to the Yugoslav Federation itself also:

"I think that as Marxist-Leninists in the future too we must attack the anti-Marxist views and actions of Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, but I stress that in no way should we ever interfere in their internal affairs. That would not be Marxist. The Yugoslav communists and the Yugoslav people must attend to that matter; it is up to them to solve their problems of the present and the future of their country. It is in this context also that I see the problem of Kosova and the Albanian population living in other parts of Yugoslavia. We must not leave any way for the Titoite enemy to accuse us later of allegedly waging our fight to break up the Yugoslav Federation. This is a delicate moment and needs very careful handling, because by saying: "See, they want to break up Yugoslavia," Tito not only gathers reaction around him, but also tries to win the patriotic elements over to his side."
"With Stalin," Ibid, p.142-43.
Now it became easier to expose the Titoite agents in Albania. The 9th to the 11th Plenums of the CC of the CPA dealt openly with the history and repercussions of the Titoite penetration of the party. The way was clear for the continuation of the road to consolidate socialism.
Stalin's aid continued as discussed above.

But even now Stalin warned about the Yugoslav danger :

"In the present situation, you should guard against any danger from Yugoslavia, The Titoites have their agents in your country, indeed they will smuggle in others. They want to attack you, but cannot, because they fear the consequences. You should not be afraid, but must set to work to strengthen the economy, to train the cadres, to strengthen the party, and to train the army and must always be vigilant. With a strong Party, economy and army, you need fear nobody."
"With Stalin", Ibid, p.205.
Stalin's forewarning was correct. As Khrushchev came to power, dismantling socialism in the USSR, the Titoites renewed their assaults on socialism world wide, but especially upon Albania.
CONCLUSIONS :

THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT HOXHA WAS A GREAT MARXIST-LENINIST. THERE IS ALSO LITTLE DOUBT THAT STALIN SUPPORTED THE CPA IN ITS HEROIC STRUGGLE TO FORM A SOCIALIST STATE. WE CAN ONLY REPEAT HOXHA'S EXHORTATION TO THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST KHRUSCHEVITE REVISIONISM. THE MESSAGE RINGS TRUE NOW:

"You who fought and triumphed over the most dangerous enemies of humanity with the name of Stalin on your lips, what are you going to do?.. In your country the party is no longer a Marxist-Leninist party. You must build a new party of the Lenin-Stalin type through struggle.. Will you accept the yoke of a new capital? We.. have faith in the great revolutionary strength of the Soviet Peoples the Soviet proletariat, and that is why we are convinced that this strength will gradually express itself, through struggle and sacrifices , will be built up to the level the time demands, and will smash Soviet social-imperialism to its very foundations."
With Stalin", Ibid, p.41-49.