Mao Tse-tung


From the
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung
Foreign Languages Press
Peking 1967

First Edition 1965
Second Printing 1967

Vol. II, pp. 61-74.

Prepared © for the Internet by David J. Romagnolo, (January 1998)




The Present Situation Is One of Transition from a War of
Partial Resistance to a War of Total Resistance



Capitulation Muat Be Combated Both Inside the Party and
Throughout the Country


Inside the Party, Oppose Class Capitulationism
In the Country as a Whole, Oppose National Capitulationism
The Relation Between Class Capitulationism and National Capitulationism




From Marx
to Mao



Notes on
the Text

    page 70


      [1] This refers to the "Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Patty" adopted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at its meeting in Lochuan, notthern Shensi, on August 25, 1937. The full text reads as follows:

          (1) The military provocation by the Japanese aggressors at Lukouchiao and their occupation of Peiping and Tientsin represent only the beginning of their large-scale invasion of China south of the Great Wall. They have already begun

    page 71

      their national mobilization fot war. Their propaganda that they have "no desire to aggravate the situation" is only a smokescreen for futther attacks.
          (2) Under the pressure of the Japanese aggressors' attacks and the Chinese people's indignation, the Nanking government is beginning to make up its mind to fight. General defence arrangements and actual resistance in some places have already statted. Full-scale war between China and Japan is inevitable. The resistance at Lukouchiao on July 7 marked the starting point of China's national war of resistance.
          (3) Thus a new stage has opened in China's political situation, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is over. In the present stage the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance. The winning of democracy, which was not accomplished in the previous stage because of the Kuomintang's unwillingness and the inadequate mobilization of the people, is a task that must be fulfilled in the course of the struggle for victory in the War of Resistance.
          (4) Our differences and disputes with the Kuomintang and other anti-Japanese groups in this new stage are no longer about whether to wage a war of resistance but about how to win victory.
          (5) The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won. The Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation now proposed by our Party spells out concretely the way to win final victory in the War of Resistance.
          (6) A great danger lurks in the present state of resistance. The main reason for this danger is that the Kuomintang is still unwilling to arouse the whole people to take part in the war. Instead, it regards the war as the concern of the government alone, and at every turn fears and restricts the people's participation in the war, prevents the government and the army from forming close ties with the people, denies the people the democratic right to resist Japan and save the nation, and refuses to reform the government apparatus thoroughly and to turn the government into a national defence government of the whole nation. A war of resistance of this kind may achieve partial victories, but never final victory. On the contrary, it may end in grievous failure.
          (7) The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that the war will be an arduous and protracted war. But we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already statted will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop. We must overcome all difficulties and firmly fight for the realization of the Ten-Point Programme for victory proposed by our Party. We must firmly oppose all wrong policies which run counter to it and combat national defeatism and the pessimism and despair it engenders.
          (8) Together with the people and the armed forces under the leadership of the Party, members of the Communist Party must actively take their stand in the forefront of the struggle, become the core of the nation's resitance and do their utmost to develop the anti-Japanese mass movement. They must never for a moment relax or miss a single opportunity to do propaganda among the masses and to organize and arm them. Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan will be cettain provided the masses in their millions are really organized in the national united front.    [p.61]

    page 72

      [2] In the initial period of the War of Resistance, the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek made a number of promises to introduce various reforms under popular pressure, but very quickly broke them one after another. The possibility that the Kuomintang might introduce the reforms desired by the whole people was not actualized. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung said later in "On Coalition Government":

          All the people, including the Communists and other democrats, earnestly hoped that the Kuomintang government would seize the opportunity, at a time when the nation was in peril and the people were filled with enthusiasm, to institute democatic reforms and put Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles into practice But their hopes came to nought (See Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Eng. ed., FLP, Peking, 1965, Vol. III, p 263.)    [p.64]

      [3] The Lushan Training Course was set up by Chiang Kai-shek at Lushan, Kiangsi Province, to train high and middle-ranking officials of the Kuomintang party and government to form the core of his reactionary regime.    [p.66]

      [4] Chang Nai-chi was then advocating "issuing fewer calls and offering more suggestions". But it would have been useless merely to submit "suggestions" to the Kuomintang, since it was following a policy of oppression. Calls had to be made directly to the masses, in order to arouse them to struggle against the Kuomintang. Otherwise, it would have been impossible to keep up the war against Japan or to resist Kuomintang reaction Chang Nai-chi was wrong on this point, and gradually be realized his mistake.    [p.66]

      [5] This refers to the "Draft Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Concerning the Communist Party's Participation in the Government" which was drawn up on September 25, 1937. The full text reads as follows.

          (1) The present situation in the anti-Japanese war urgently requires a united front government representing the whole nation, for only such a government can effectivdy lead the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war and defeat Japanese imperialism. The Communist Party is ready to participate in such a government, that is, to undertake administrative responsibilities in the government directly and officially and play an active part in it. But such a government does not yet exist. What exists today is still the government of the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship.
          (2) The Communist Party of China can participate in the government only when it is changed from a one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang into a united front government of the whole nation, that is, when the present Kuomintang government (a) accepts the fundamentals of the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation proposed by our Party and promulgates an administradve programme in accordance therewith; (b) begins to show by deeds the sincerity of its efforts to carry out this programme and achieves definite results; and (c) permits the legal existence of Communist Party organizations and guarantees the Communist Party freedom to mobilize, organize and educate the masses.
          (3) Before the Central Committee of the Party decides to participate in the Central Government, members of the Communist Party must not as a rule participate in any local government or in any administrative councils or committees attached to the administrative organs of the government, central or local. For such participation would only obscure the distinctive features of the Communist Party, prolong the Kuomintang's dictatorship and hinder rather than help the effort to bring a unified democratic government into being.

      page 73

          (4) However, members of the Communist Party may participate in the local governments of certain particular regions, such as battle areas, where the old authorities find it impossible to rule as before and are on the whole willing to put the Communist Party's polides into effect, where the Communist Party is free to operate openly, and where the present emergency makes Communist participation a necessity in the opinion both of the people and of the government. Still more so in the Japanese-occupied areas, the Communist Party should come forward openly as the organizer of the anti-Japanese united front governments.
          (5) Before the Communist Party officially joins the government, it is permissible in principle for Party members to participate in representative bodies, such as an all-China national assembly, for the purpose of discussing a democratic constitution and policies to save the nation. Thus, the Communist Party should strive to get its members elected to such assemblies and use them as a forum for propagating the Party's views, so as to mobilize the people and rally them round the Party and promote the establishment of a unified democratic government.
          (6) Given a definite common programme and the principle of absolute equality, the Central Comminee of the Communist Party or its local branches may form united front organizations with the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang or its local headquarters, such as various joint comminees (e.g., national revolutionary leagues, committees for mass movements and committees for mobilization in the war zones), and through such joint activities the Communist Party should achieve co-operation with the Kuomintang.
          (7) With the redesignation of the Red Army as part of the National Revolutionary Army and the change of the organ of Red political power into the Government of the Special Region, their representatives may, by virtue of the legal status they have acquired, join all the military and mass organizations which further the resistance to Japan and the salvation of the nation.
          (8) It is most essential to maintain absolutely independent Communist Party leadership in what was originally the Red Army and in all the guerrilla units, and Communists must not show any vacillation on this maner of principle.    [p.66]

      [6] "Parliamentarism" here refers to the proposal of some Party comrades that the system of political power in the revolutionary base areas, the system of people's representative conferences, should be changed into the bourgeois parliamentary system.    [p.67]

      [7] The Ho Ming Incident took place after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. In October 1934, when the Central Red Army moved northward, Red Army guerrilla units stayed behind and maintained guerrilla warfare in extremely difficult circumstances in fourteen areas in the eight southern provinces of Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, Honan, Chekiang and Anhwei. When the anti-Japanese war began, these units, acting on instructions from the Central Comminee of the Chinese Communist Party, entered into negotiations with the Kuomintang for the cessation of civil war and organized themselves into a single army (namely, the New Fourth Army which later stubbornly fought the Japanese on the southern and northern banks of the Yangtse River) and moved to the front to resist Japan. But Chiang Kai-shek plotted to exploit these negotiations for the purpose of wiping out the guerrilla units. Ho Ming was one of the guerrilla leaders in the Fukien Kwangtung border area which was one of the fourteen guerrilla areas. He was not on the alert against Chiang Kai-shek's plot, with the result that more than one

    page 74

    thousand of the guerrillas under his command were surrounded and disarmed by the Kuomintang forces after they sssembled.    [p.68]

      [8] Founded in Yenan in 1937, the Liberation Weekly was the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It was superseded by the Liberation Daily in 1941.    [p.68]

      [9] They were that section of the national bourgeoisie for whom newspapers like the Shanghai Shen Pao served as a vehicle.    [p.69]

      [10] In The Fu Hsing Society and the C.C. Clique, two fascist organizations within the Kuomintang, were headed by Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Li-fu respectively. They served the oligarchic interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. But many petty-bourgeois elements had joined them under compulsion or had been duped into joining. The text refers to the section of the Fu Hsing Society consisting mainly of lower and middle-ranking officers in the Kuomintang army and to the section of the C.C. Clique consisting mainly of members not in power.    [p.69]