10. Cf. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936; 1954), Evanston 1970. [Ed.]
illusory function of the search for a philosophical 'guarantee'), it would be, in our eyes at least, suspect. Instead, we will offer you two means of control.
First, we offer the practice of our philosophy. The same scientists who are capable of 'feeling' from experience whether or not a given philosophy is treating the sciences in cavalier fashion, or abusing or exploiting the sciences, will be able to tell if we are exploiting the sciences or if, on the contrary, we are serving them in our philosophical practice. This is a de facto argument.
And here is a de jure argument. It is true that all the great philosophical currents we have briefly analysed are subordinated to the 'values' of the practical ideologies which exist in a conjuncture: to the values, let us say, of the dominant ideology (and, beneath it, the dominated ideologies). Let us go even further: it is highly probable that every philosophy, even if it is not religious, spiritualist or idealist, maintains an organic relation with the 'values' of some practical ideology, with the values in question in the ideological struggle (which takes place against the backdrop of the class struggle). Which implies that materialist philosophies, of which we have not spoken, obey the same law themselves. Even if they do not exploit the sciences to prove the existence of God or to shore up great moral and aesthetic values, even if they are devoted, as they most certainly are, to a materialist defence of the sciences, they are not without a relation to a practical ideology, usually political ideology even if, as in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, it is highly contaminated with juridico-moral ideology.
We must go that far. But it is necessary to go a lot further. For if this dependence of philosophy on practical ideologies and their conflicts is recognized, why should philosophy passively submit to dependence on these realities (practical ideologies) without being able to produce a knowledge both of the nature and of the mechanism of these realities? Now it so happens that the principles of this knowledge were furnished by Marx in historical materialism, and that this knowledge transformed the old materialism into a new materialism: dialectical materialism. It has been seen that the philosophy to which we adhere - or, more exactly, the position we occupy in philosophy - is not unrelated to politics, to a certain politics, to Lenin's politics, so much so that Lenin's political formulae were of use to us in stating our theses on philosophy. There is no contradiction here: this politics is the politics of the workers'
11. This knowledge did not, as is all too often said, transform philosophy into a science : the new philosophy is still philosophy, but scientific knowledge of its relations with practical ideologies makes it a 'correct' philosophy.
movement and its theory comes from Marx, just as the knowledge of practical ideologies that finally permits philosophy to control and criticize its organic link with practical ideology, and therefore to rectify the effects of this link by taking a 'correct' line, comes from Marx. In the absence of an absolute guarantee (something that does not exist except in idealist philosophy, and we know what to think of that), here are the arguments that we can present. They are both practical (they can be judged by comparing the services which we can render the sciences) and theoretical (the critical check on the inevitable effects of ideology on philosophy through a knowledge of the mechanisms of ideology and ideological struggle: in particular, by a knowledge of their action on philosophy).
II THE SPONTANEOUS
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENTISTS
We may now take up this second point.
The meaning of the manufacture of 'new' or 'true' philosophies of science' by scientists in the grip of a scientific 'crisis' will now perhaps be more readily understood. In so far as they simply adopt spiritualist or idealist themes that have been 'worked upon' for centuries in the history of philosophy, they too take their place, even though they are scientists, in the long tradition of those who exploit the sciences for apologetic ends, and naturally without the counterweight of materialism and without the critical checks that can be ensured, within materialism, by knowledge of the mechanism of ideology and the class conflicts within it.
But at the same time we can also understand something else: what we have described as the reaction of those stubborn and silent hard-working scientists who, even in the midst of the pseudo-crisis, obstinately pursue their work and defend it with arguments, always the same arguments, that the great philosophers of the 'crisis' call naive and materialist. We have spoken very little of this type of scientist (the first reaction). However, Lenin, who violently attacked other scientists, defended them by evoking their 'materialist instinct'. These scientists never proclaimed that 'matter' had disappeared: they thought that it continued to exist and that physical science does indeed produce a knowledge of the 'laws of matter'. These scientists have no need of a neo-critical philosophy to revitalize their idea of science and of the 'conditions of possibility' of scientific knowledge; they have no need of a philosophy to guarantee that their knowledges are truly knowledges - that is, objective (in a double sense: knowledge of its object and knowledge valid outside of any subjectivity). They defend themselves as best they can. Their arguments may seem 'simple' or even 'crude' to their adversaries; they
may even be mistaken in their idea as to how to resolve the contradictions of modern physics: but who is guaranteed not to err? They represent a very different position to that of their peers, who are in the 'grip' of the philosophy they profess.
Their existence is important for us. For if we want to speak of the spontaneous philosophy of scientists in all its breadth and its contradiction, we must take into account both extremes: not only the scientists who construct a philosophy that exploits the difficulties of science, but also those scientists who obstinately fight, at considerable personal risk, on the basis of very different positions.
I will cut short these indispensable analyses in order to justify the details of the exposition and get down to basics.
1. By looking at the elements furnished by the experience of a 'crisis' in a science, we have come to the conclusion that there exists a relation between philosophy and the sciences, and that this first relation may be revealed in the work of scientists themselves in so far as they are bearers of what I have termed a spontaneous philosophy of scientists (SPS).
2. We understand this term (SPS) in a very strict and limited sense. By SPS we understand not the set of ideas that scientists have about the world (i.e., their 'world-view') but only the ideas that they have (consciously or unconsciously) concerning their scientific practice and science.
3. We therefore rigorously distinguish between (1) the spontaneous philosophy of scientists and (2) scientists' world-views. These two realities are united by profound ties, but they can and must be distinguished. Later, we will examine the notion of world-view. The SPS bears only on the ideas (conscious or unconscious) that scientists have of the scientific practice of the sciences and of 'Science'.
4. If the content of the SPS is analysed, the following fact may be registered (we are still at the level of empirical analysis): the content of the SPS is contradictory. The contradiction exists between two elements that may be distinguished and identified in the following manner: