None of the incidents or dialogue in The Great Conspiracy has been invented by the authors. The material has been drawn from various documentary sources which are indicated in the text or listed in the Bibliographical Notes.
1. Peace in the West
The First World War had ended abruptly. As the German officer, Captain Ernst Roehm, said: "Peace broke out." Soviets were set up in Berlin; Hamburg and throughout Bavaria. Workers demonstrated for peace and democracy in the streets of Paris, London and Rome. Revolution gripped Hungary. The Balkans were seething with peasant discontent. After the terrible four years' war, passionate vows were on all men's lips: No more [Var! Nie Wieder Krieg! Jamais plus de guerre! Never Again!
"The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution," David Lloyd George was to tell the Paris Peace Conference in his confidential Memorandum of March 1919. "There is a deep sense not only of discontent, but of anger and revolt, amongst the workmen against pre-war conditions. The whole existing order in its political, social and economic aspects is questioned by the masses of the population from one end of Europe to the other."
Two names summed up the aspirations of the masses and the fears of the few: Lenin and Wilson. In the East, Lenin's revolution had swept away Czarism and opened a new era to the oppressed millions of the old Russian Imperial domains. In the West, Woodrow Wilson's dryly phrased Fourteen Points had stirred up a ferment of democratic hope and expectancy.
When the President of the United States stepped onto the blood-soaked soil of Europe in December 1918, happy crowds rushed to kiss his hands and to fling flowers at his feet. The President of the New World was greeted by the people of the Old World as "King of Humanity" - "Savior" - "Prince of Peace." They believed that the tall, thin professor from Princeton was the Messiah come to herald a new great age.
Ten million men had died in battle; twenty million were crippled and maimed; thirteen million civilians were dead of famine and plague; millions more wandered destitute and homeless amid the smoking ruins of Europe. But now at last the war was over, and the world listened to words of peace.
"My conception of the League of Nations is just this - that it shall operate as the organized moral force of men throughout the world," said Woodrow Wilson.(1)
Early in January, 1919, the Big Four - Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau and Vittorio Orlando -- sat down in a conference room at the Quai D'Orsay in Paris to talk about world peace.
But one sixth of the earth was not represented at the Peace Conference.
Even as the peacemakers talked, tens of thousands of Allied soldiers were waging a bloody, undeclared war against Soviet Russia. Side by side with the counterrevolutionary White Armies led by Kolchak and Denikin, the Allied troops were fighting the young Red Army on an immense battlefront that stretched from the bleak arctic regions to the Black Sea, and from the Ukrainian wheatfields to the mountains and steppes of Siberia.
A violent and fantastic campaign of anti-Soviet propaganda was sweeping Europe and America in the spring of 1919. The London Daily Telegraph reported a "reign of terror" in Odessa accompanied by a "free love week." The New York Sun headlined: "U. S. Wounded Mutilated by Reds with Axes." The New York Times reported: "Russia Under Reds a Gigantic Bedlam . . . Escaped Victims say. maniacs Stalk Raving through the streets of Moscow . . . Fight Dogs for Carrion." The entire world press, Allied and German alike, published fraudulent "authentic documents" showing that in Russia "young women and girls of the bourgeois classes" were being "commandeered and delivered to the barracks . . . for the needs of artillery regiments!"
Factual reports on the true conditions in Russia, whether they came from journalists, secret agents, diplomats or even generals like Judson and Graves, were suppressed or ignored. Anyone who dared to question the anti-Soviet campaign was automatically denounced as a "Bolshevik."
Scarcely two months after the Armistice, the Allied leaders seemed already to have forgotten the purpose for which the great conflict was fought. The "menace of Bolshevism" swept aside every other consideration. It dominated the Paris Peace Conference.
Marshal Foch, the French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, appeared before a secret session of the Peace Conference to demand a quick settlement with Germany, so that the Allies could hurl their combined resources against Soviet Russia. The French Marshal pleaded the case of France's mortal enemy, Germany.
"The present difficult situation of the German Government is well known," said Foch. "At Mannheim, Carlsruhe, Baden and Dusselderf, the Soviet movement is rapidly extending. At the present moment Germany will therefore accept any terms the Allies might demand. The German Government only asks peace. That is the only thing that will satisfy the people and enable the Government to master the situation."
To put down the German revolution, the German High Command was to be permitted to retain an army of 100,000 officers and men, as well as the so-called "Black Reichswehr" composed of the most highly trained and indoctrinated soldiers in Germany. In addition, the German High Command was allowed to subsidize underground nationalist leagues and terrorist societies to kill, torture and intimidate the insurgent German democrats. All of this was done in the name, of "saving Germany from Bolshevism." . . .(2)
General Max Hoffmann, former Commander of the German Armies on the Eastern Front and the "hero" of Brest-Litovsk, approached his recent enemy, Marshal Foch, with a Plan whereby the German Army was to march on Moscow and annihilate Bolshevisin "at its source." Foch approved the Plan, but proposed that the French Army, instead of the German, should spearhead the attack. Foch wanted to mobilize the whole of eastern Europe against Soviet Russia.
"In Russia at the present moment Bolshevism and complete anarchy reign," Foch told the Paris Peace Conference. "My plan would be to settle all the important outstanding questions on the Western side in order to enable the Allies to use the resources thus made available for the solution of the Eastern question. . . . Polish troops would be quite able to face the Russians, provided the former are strengthened by the supply of modern appliances and engines of war. Great numbers are required, which could be obtained by mobilizing the Finns, Poles, Czechs, Rumanians and Greeks, as well as the Russian pro-Ally elements still available. . . . If this is done, 1919 will see the end of Bolshevism!"
Woodrow Wilson wanted a fair deal for Russia. The President of the United States recognized the absurdity of talking about world peace when one sixth of the earth was excluded from the conversations. Wilson urged the Peace Conference to invite Soviet delegates to come and sit down with the Allies in an attempt to reach a peaceful understanding. Again and again, Wilson returned to this idea, striving to banish the specter of Bolshevism from the minds of the peacemakers.
"There is throughout the world a feeling of revolt against the large vested interests which influence the world both in the economic and political spheres," Wilson warned the Council of Ten at one of the secret peace meetings in Paris. "The way to cure this domination is, in my opinion, constant discussion and a slow process of reform; but the world at large has grown impatient of delay. There are men in the United States of the finest temper, if not delay. the finest judgment, who are in sympathy with Bolshevism because it appears to them to offer that regime of opportunity to the individual which they desire to bring about."
But Woodrow Wilson was surrounded by men determined at all costs to preserve the status quo. Bound by their secret imperialist treaties and commercial pacts, these men schemed to outwit sabotage and frustrate Wilson at every step. There were tense moments when Wilson rebelled and threatened to take his cause over the heads of the politicians and militarists to the people.
In Rome, Wilson had planned to make a sensational speech from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia overlooking the great square where, only two years later, Benito Mussolini was to harangue his Blackshirts. The Italian monarchists, fearing the effects of Wilson's words on the people of Rome, prevented the crowd from gathering in the square and broke up the demonstration on the grounds that it was inspired by "Bolsheviks." The same thing happened in Paris, where Wilson waited at his hotel window all morning to make a promised speech to the Paris workers. He did not know that French police and soldiers had been called out to stop the workers from reaching his hotel. . . .
Wherever Wilson went in Europe he was surrounded by secret agents and propagandists; behind his back, endless intrigue went on.
Each of the Allied powers had organized its own espionage apparatus for use at the Peace Conference. At 4 Place de la Concorde in Paris the U. S. Military Intelligence established a special Code Room, where highly trained c officers and carefully selected clerks worked day and night interrupting and deciphering the secret messages of the other powers. This Code Room was under the charge of Major Herbert O. Yardley, who later revealed, in his book The American Black Chamber, how eyewitness reports of American agents in Europe describing the true state of affairs were deliberately withheld from President Wilson, into whose ears lurid and fantastic anti-Bolshevik propaganda was ceaselessly dinned.
Frequently, Major Yardley intercepted and decoded secret messages concerning plots to sabotage Wilson's policies. On one occasion he decoded a message of an even more startling and sinister character. Major Yardley disclosed: -
. . . the reader may well appreciate the shock I received as I deciphered a telegram which reported an Entente plot to assassinate President Wilson either by administering a slow poison or by giving him the influenza in ice. Our informant, in whom we had the greatest confidence, begged the authorities for God's sake to warn the President. I have no way of knowing whether this plot had any truth in fact, and if it had, whether it succeeded. But there are these undeniable facts: President Wilson's first sign of illness occurred while he was in Paris, and he was soon to die a lingering death.
2. At the Peace Conference
At the early sessions of the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson found an unexpected ally in his attempt to win fair play for Russia. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Lloyd George, came to Wilson's support with a series of stinging attacks on the anti-Soviet plans of Foch and the French Premier Clemenceau.
"The Germans," declared Lloyd George, "at the time when they needed every available man to reinforce their attack on the Western Front were forced to keep about a million men to garrison a few provinces of Russia which was a mere fringe of the whole country. And, moreover, at that time Bolshevism was weak and disorganized. Now it is strong and has a formidable army. Is any one of the Western Allies prepared to send a million men into Russia? If I proposed to send a thousand additional British troops to Russia for that purpose, the army would mutiny! The same applies to U. S. troops in Siberia; also to Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. Even admitting it is done, who is to occupy Russia?"
Unlike Wilson, the British Prime Minister was not motivated by idealistic considerations. He feared revolution in Europe and Asia; and, as an old politician, the Welsh "Fox" was keenly sensitive to the popular mood in Britain which was overwhelmingly against further intervention in Russia. There was an even more cogent reason for opposing the plans of Marshal Foch. Sir Henry Wilson, the British Chief of Staff, in a recent secret report to the War Cabinet had stated that the only policy for Britain was "to get our troops out of Europe and Russia and concentrate all our strength in our coming storm centers, England, Ireland, Egypt, India." Lloyd George feared that Foch and Clemenceau would try to establish French hegemony in Russia while Britain was preoccupied elsewhere.
And so the astute British Prime Minister, believing he could eventually get what he wanted by simply leaving Russia alone for a while, supported the President of the United States in demanding fair play for the Bolsheviks. At secret sessions of the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George minced no words.
"The peasants accepted Bolshevism for the same reason that peasants accepted it in the French Revolution, namely, that it gave them land," Lloyd George declared. "The Bolsheviks are the de facto Government. We formerly recognized the Czar's Government, although at the time we knew it to be absolutely rotten. Our reason was that it was the de facto Government . . . but we refuse to recognize the Bolsheviks! To say that we ourselves should pick the representatives of a great people is contrary to every principle for which we have fought."
President Wilson said he did not see how anyone could controvert what Lloyd George had said. He proposed to call a special conference on the Island of Prinkipo, or some other place "convenient of approach," to explore the possibilities of peace in Russia. In the interests of impartiality, delegates of both the Soviet Government and the White anti-Soviet groups should be invited to attend. . . .
The French "Tiger," Georges Clemenceau, spokesman for the French holders of Czarist bonds and the General Staff, rose to reply on behalf of the advocates of intervention. Clemenceau knew that Lloyd George's subtle policy would not be supported in British ruling circles, where the militarists and the Intelligence Service were already committed to an anti-Soviet war. At the same time, Clemenceau felt it was necessary, for Wilson's benefit, to break down Lloyd George's arguments by a strong statement of the menace of Bolshevism.
"In principle," began Clemenceau, "I do not favor conversations with the Bolsheviks, not because they are criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level by saying that they are worthy of entering into conversation with us." The British Prime Minister and the President of the United States, if the French Premier might be permitted to say so, were adopting too academic and doctrinaire an attitude to the question of Bolshevism. "The Bolshevik danger is very great at the present moment," Clemenceau declared. "Bolshevism is spreading. It has invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and this very morning we have received very bad news regarding its spread to Budapest and Vienna. Italy, also, is in danger. The danger is probably greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, after spreading in Germany, were to traverse Austria and Hungary and to reach Italy, Europe would be faced with a very great danger. Therefore, something must be done against Bolshevism!"
Clemenceau did not rely on his own eloquence alone. He asked permission to introduce "expert witnesses" on the subject of Bolshevism. The first of them was Ambassador Noulens, the onetime friend of Ambassador Francis at Petrograd and the ringleader of the anti-Soviet intriguers in the diplomatic corps. Noulens was introduced to Wilson and Lloyd George.
"I will confine myself to statements of facts," said Ambassador Noulens, and immediately plunged into an amazing recital of "Bolshevik atrocities."
"Not only men, but women have been shot," said Noulens. "There have been atrocities, drowning', the cutting off of noses and tongues, mutilations, burials alive, mock shootings, rape and pillage everywhere."
Noulens repeated the feverish gossip of the anti-Soviet diplomatic corps and the Czarist émigrés: "A company of professional torturers is being maintained at the Fortress of Peter and Paul. . The Bolshevik Army is more a rabble than an army!"
."Then there is the case of Captain Cromie, the British Naval Attaché," Noulens continued, "who was killed in defense of the British Embassy, and whose body was exposed for three days in the window of the Embassy!" Terror, mass murder, degeneracy, corruption, complete contempt for the Allies - these were the distinguishing features of the Soviet regime. . . .
"Finally," said Ambassador Noulens, "I wish to point out that the Bolshevik Government is definitely imperialist. It means to conquer the world, and to make peace with no Government!"
But for all Noulens's efforts, the President of the United States was not greatly impressed. Only a few days before, a special American agent, W. H. Buckler, at Wilson's request, had held a confidential talk with Maxim Litvinov of the Soviet Government. In a report dated January 18, 1919, Buckler informed President Wilson: -
Litvinov stated that the Soviet Government was anxious for permanent peace. . . . They detest the military preparations and costly campaigns which are now being forced upon Russia after four years of exhausting war, and wish to ascertain whether the United States and the Allies have a desire for peace.
If such is the case, peace can easily be negotiated, for, according to Litvinov, the Soviet Government are prepared to compromise on all points, including protection to existing foreign enterprises, the granting of new concessions in Russia, and the Russian foreign debt. . . . The Soviet Government's conciliatory attitude is unquestionable.
. . . In so far as the League of Nations can prevent war without encouraging reaction, it can count on the support of the Soviet Government.
Buckler added that there were certain elements within the Bolshevik ranks who were strongly opposed to the Soviet Government's peace policy. These opposition elements, stated Buckler, "hope for more active Allied intervention," and, he warned, "the continuation of such intervention plays into the hands of these extremists."
Woodrow Wilson's peace plan, backed by Lloyd George, seemed about to go through in spite of Clemenceau and Foch. Wilson drew up a note outlining the terms of his proposal and sent it to the Soviet Government and to the various White Russian groups. The Soviet Government promptly accepted Wilson's plan, and prepared to send delegates to Prinkipo. But, as Winston Churchill later put it, "the moment was not propitious" for peace in Russia. The majority of the Allied leaders were convinced that the Soviet regime would soon be overthrown. On the secret advice of their Allied supporters, the White groups refused to meet with the Soviet delegates at Prinkipo.
The atmosphere at the Peace Conference changed. Lloyd George, realizing he was getting nowhere, abruptly returned to London. In his place, Winston Churchill, the youthful British Secretary of War and Aviation, hurried to Paris to state the case for the anti-Bolshevik extremists.(3)
It was February 14, 1919, the day before Wilson was to go back to America to face the isolationist Congressional bloc, beaded by Senator Lodge, which had undermined his every effort to create a system of world co-operation and security. Wilson knew he had failed in Europe, and feared he might fail in the United States. He was disillusioned, tired and profoundly discouraged.
Winston Churchill was introduced to President Wilson by the British Foreign Secretary A. J. Balfour who announced that the British Secretary of War had come over to Paris to explain the present views of the British Cabinet on the question of Russia. Churchill immediately plunged into an attack on Wilson's Prinkipo peace plan.
"There was a Cabinet meeting in London yesterday," said Churchill, "at which great anxiety was manifested concerning the Russian situation, particularly in respect of the Prinkipo meeting. . . . If only the Bolsheviks are to attend the conference, it is thought that little good will come of the meeting. The military aspect of the case must be considered. Great Britain has soldiers in Russia who are being killed in action."
Wilson answered Churchill: "Since Mr. Churchill has come over from London specially to anticipate my departure, I feel I should express what my personal thoughts on the subject are. Among the many uncertainties connected with Russia, I have a very clear opinion about two points. The first is that the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are doing no sort of good in Russia. They do not know for whom or for what they are fighting. They are not assisting any promising effort to establish order throughout Russia. They are assisting local movements, like, for instance, that of the Cossacks, who cannot be induced to move outside of their own sphere. My conclusion, therefore, is that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to withdraw their troops from all parts of Russian territory."
"The second point," Wilson wearily continued, "relates to Prinkipo. . . . What we are seeking is not a rapprochement with the Bolsheviks, but clear information. The reports received from Russia from various official and unofficial sources are so conflicting that it is impossible to form a coherent picture of the state of the country. Some light on the situation may be obtained by meeting the Russian representatives."
When the American President had finished speaking, Churchill replied: -
"Complete withdrawal of all Allied troops is a logical and clear policy, but its consequence would be the destruction of all non-Bolshevik armies in Russia. These number at the present time about 500,000 men and though their quality is not of the best, their numbers are nevertheless increasing. Such a policy would be equivalent to pulling out the linch-pin from the whole machine. There would be no further armed resistance to the Bolsheviks in Russia, and an interminable vista of violence and misery would be all that remained for the whole of Russia."
"But in some areas these forces and supplies would certainly be assisting reactionaries," objected Wilson. "Consequently, if the Allies are asked what they are supporting in Russia, they will be compelled to reply that they do not know!"
Churchill listened politely. "I would like to know," he said, "whether the Council would approve of arming the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia should the Prinkipo Conference prove a failure?"
Dispirited, ill, deserted by Lloyd George, Wilson realized that he was isolated among a company of men determined to have their own way.
"I have explained to the Council how I would act if I were alone," said the President of the United States. "I will, however, cast in my lot with the rest."
Wilson returned to the United States to fight his tragic, losing battle with American reaction.(4) Secretary of State Lansing took his place at the Paris Conference, and the tone of the discussions underwent a notable change. The Allied representatives no longer felt the need of concealing what was in their minds.
Clemenceau dryly recommended that the Peace Conference "get out of its troubles as discreetly and simply as possible." The Prinkipo question should be dropped entirely, and no further mention made of it. "The Allies got into this Prinkipo business," said Clemenceau, "and now they have got to get out of it!"
The British Foreign Secretary Balfour amplified Clemenceau's comments. "It is necessary," he declared, "to take steps to put the Bolsheviks in the wrong, not only before public opinion, but before those who hold the view that Bolshevism is democracy gone astray with large elements of good in it."
Whereupon the Conference settled down to a prolonged discussion of the most effective means of aiding the White Russian armies against the Soviet Government.
Churchill, who had replaced Lloyd George at the conference table, proposed the immediate establishment of a Supreme Allied Council for Russian Affairs, with political, economic and military sections. The military section was "to get to work at once" on drawing up the details of a broad program of armed intervention.
3. Golovin's Mission
With Churchill as the acknowledged but unofficial Commander-in-Chief of the Allied anti-Soviet armies, the scene shifted to London where, during that spring and summer, special White Russian emissaries streamed into the British Government offices at Whitehall. They came, as representatives of Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin, and other White Russian leaders, to make the final arrangements for an all-out drive against the Soviets. Their highly secretive negotiations were conducted for the most part with. Winston Churchill and Sir Samuel Hoare. Churchill, as Secretary of War, undertook to equip the White Russian armies with materiel from Great Britain's accumulation of surplus war supplies. Hoare supervised the complex diplomatic intrigues.
Among the White Russian representatives were such "democratic Russians" as the famous Social-Revolutionary terrorist, Boris Savinkov; the Czarist Prince Lvov; and Sergei Sazonov, the former Czarist Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had been acting as both Denikin's and Kolchak's representative in Paris. On May 27, 1919, the London Times reported: -
M. Sazonov met a number of members of Parliament at the House of Commons last night. Sir Samuel Hoare presided . . . M. Sazonov took a favorable view of the prospects of an early overthrow of the Bolshevik regime, and said that recognition of Admiral Kolchak's Government would do much to hasten this event. He expressed the deep gratitude of Russians not only for the material support which had been afforded them by Great Britain, but for the services of the British Navy in saving a large number of refugees.
The "Official Representative of the White Russian Armies" at the British War Office was Lieutenant General Golovin. He had arrived early that spring carrying a personal note of introduction to Winston Churchill. Shortly after Golovin reached London, he conferred with Sir Samuel Hoare. Among the subjects they discussed was the question of the Caucasus and, in particular, its great oil deposits at Grosni and Baku.
On May 5, accompanied by Hoare, Golovin paid his first visit to the British War Office. On Hoare's advice, the Russian officer wore his full-dress uniform. He was received with great cordiality by the British officers, who listened absorbedly as he outlined the progress of the various White Russian campaigns.
That same day, at half-past five in the afternoon, Golovin saw Churchill. The Secretary of War spoke angrily of the opposition of the British liberals and workingmen to military aid to the White anti-Soviet armies. Churchill expressed the hope that, in spite of this obstacle, he would be able to send an additional 10,000 "volunteers" for the northern campaign. Reinforcements, he knew, were badly needed in this area because of the serious demoralization that had set in among the British and American troops.
Churchill also stressed his eagerness to assist General Denikin as much as possible. At any event, Denikin could expect 2500 "volunteers" for service as military instructors and technical experts. As for immediate material help, Churchill told Golovin that £24,000,000 (approximately $100,000,000) would be allocated to the various anti-Soviet fronts, and there would be adequate equipment and arms to outfit 100,000 Yudenitch troops for the march on Petrograd. Arrangements would be made for 500 Czarist officers who were prisoners of war in Germany to be transferred to Archangel at British expense. . . .
"The result of the interview exceeded all my expectations," Golovin stated in the report he submitted to his superiors when he returned to Russia. "Churchill is not only a sympathizer but an energetic and active friend. The greatest possible aid is assured us. Now we have to show the English that we are ready to turn words into deeds." (5)
1. In his opening address to the Paris Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson also said: "There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people."
2. The reason for the failure of the Allied Armies to march to Berlin in 1918 and permanently disarm German militarism was Allied fear of Bolshevism, skillfully exploited by German politicians. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Foch, revealed in his postwar memoirs that from the outset of the peace negotiations the German spokesmen repeatedly invoked "the threatened Bolshevist invasion of Germany" as a means of securing favorable peace terms for Germany. General Wilson of the British General Staff recorded in his War Diary on November 9, 1918, two days before the Armistice was signed: "Cabinet meeting tonight from 6:30-8. Lloyd George read two telegrams from the Tiger (Clemenceau) in which he described Foch's interviews with the Germans: the Tiger is afraid that Germany may collapse and that Bolshevism may gain control. Lloyd George asked me if I wanted that to happen or if I did not' prefer an armistice. Without hesitation I replied: "Armistice." The whole cabinet agreed with me. For us the real danger is no longer the Germans but Bolshevism." In a moment of claritv, Clemenceau himself warned the Paris Peace Conference that "anti-Bolshevism" was a device being utilized by the German General Staff to confuse the Allies and to save German militarism. "The Germans are using Bolshevism," said Clemenceau in 1919, "as a bogey with which to frighten the Allies." Nevertheless, under the influence of Foch, Petain, Weygand and others, the Tiger forgot his own warning and succumbed to the anti-Bolshevik hysteria which soon paralyzed all clear thought and democratic action by the Allied peacemakers.
3. At that time, and for many years to come, Winston Churchill was the leading spokesman for British Tory anti-Sovietism. Churchill feared the spread of Russian revolutionary ideas through the eastern regions of the British Empire.
Rene Kraus, in his biography Winston Churchill, writes: "The Big Five in Paris had decided to support the White Russian counterrevolution. Churchill was entrusted with the execution of an action he was not responsible for. But there is no denying that once the decision was made he was all on fire to carry it out.... In association with the Chief of Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, he worked out a program to equip and arm the various White Armies from surplus war stores, and to help them with expert officers and instructors."
After Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, Churchill recognized that Nazism constituted the real menace to British interests in Europe and throughout the world. Without hesitation, Churchill reversed his stand on Soviet Russia and began calling for an alliance between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union to halt the march of Nazi aggression. In 1941, when Nazi Germany invaded Soviet Russia, Churchill's voice was the first to address the world with the declaration that Russia's fight was the fight of all free peoples and would receive Britain's support. At the conclusion of the Seccnd World War, Churchill, while on the one hand supporting the British-Soviet alliance, on the other hand again raised the cry of the "menace of Bolshevism" to Europe.
4. Woodrow Wilson made one last effort to win fair play for Russia. On his own initiative he sent William C. Bullitt, then a young State Department official attached to the American Peace Delegation in Paris, to Moscow to contact Lenin and ask the Soviet leader if he really desired peace. Bullirt was accompanied on his mission by the great American newspaperman, Lincoln Steffens, who returned with his eight-word report on Soviet Russia: "I have seen the future it works!" Bullitt himself brought back Lenin's peace terms both for the Allies and for the White groups. Lenin was more than willing to make peace, but his proposals, as Winston Churchill was finally to reveal in his work The World Crisis: The Aftermath, were "treated with disdain" and "Bullitt himself was not without some difficulty disowned by those who had sent him." Bullitt's explanation, as he stated to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September 1919, of why Lenin's peace terms were ignored: "Kolchak made a 100-mile advance, and immediately the entire press of Vu is was roaring and screaming on the subject, announcing that Kolchak would be in Moscow within two weeks; and therefore everyone in Paris, including, I regret to say, members of the American commission, began to grew very lukewarm about peace in Russia, because they thought Kolchak would arrive in Moscow and wipe out the Soviet Government."
For Bullitt's subsequent career as an antagonist of the Soviet Union, see pages 374ff.
5. This report, subsequently captured by the Red Army in the secret archives of the Murmansk White Government, was published in the Daily Herald in London a short time after, causing considerable embarrassment to anti-Soviet circles in England.