ON THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT
class struggle, ensures the material domination of the dominant ideology. The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat is an essential part of the argument that there can be no socialism and no destruction of the very foundations of exploitation in all its forms without the overthrow, in one way or another, of the State power of the bourgeoisie and the installation of the State power of the working people. This is something quite different from 'giving their fair place' to the workers within the existing State. And it is something quite different from 'strengthening the State of the whole people' on the backs of the workers.
Finally, this concept is an essential part of the argument that there can be no definitive liquidation of capitalism without the effective, constantly fortified and developed combination of (i) the mass democracy of the working people (something incompatible with the whole State apparatus of capitalism) with (ii) revolutionary transformations in the mode of production (therefore in property, but also beyond it, in the antagonistic forms of the social division of labour, in the industrial structure of production, in the forced consumption which it entails, whose recognition is itself forcibly imposed in the form of more or less unsatisfied 'needs', in the manner of the development of the productive forces themselves). In short, there can be no liquidation of capitalism without a progression towards communism, which is the organic unity of these two aspects, whatever the length and difficulty of this process of progression, which no-one today imagines to be the affair of a single day.
On this basis we are all in agreement that to talk about 'transcending' the dictatorship of the proletariat -- as do certain comrades, pretending to understand by this term 'dictatorship' a simple localized and dated 'tactic' of the revolutionary movement -- is in effect to suggest that this whole body of basic concepts and theoretical arguments, i.e. Marxism itself, must be 'transcended'
It is often suggested that Gramsci, in talking about hegemony and not simply about dictatorship, thereby attenuates the Leninist conception of the power of the bourgeoisie by adding 'consent' to 'coercion' or violence. But Gramsci on the basis of the dramatic experience of fascism, actually strengthens this conception. He says: class power is much more absolute than you think, because it is not only direct 'coercion', it is not only the surface 'armour', it is also 'consent', i.e. the materially dominant ideology and the organization of the 'general functions' of sociey by the ruling class. The proletariat must therefore substitute its dictatorship and hegemong for those of the bourgeoisie on this terrain too. The whole question is to know how and here the means and forms of bourgeois hegemony will not help . . .
. . . Of course, Marx's Capital is not Moses' Law, whose rejection would be blasphemy! But before proceeding to such a 'transcendence', i.e. in the event to a replacement of the Marxist theory of the class struggle, the labour movement would do well to make sure that it possesses another theoretical basis compatible with its political autonomy and its revolutionary perspectives . . . Another class basis, of course.
That is, why, beyond all questions of words (which may have their importance, but which are not decisive in theoretical matters), we have rejected the idea of the 'transcendence' of the dictatorship of the proletariat put forward by certain French and other Communists, considering this idea worse than equivocal. Not only did this formulation in practice appear as a compromise formula designed to 'persuade' comrades who might otherwise have jibbed at this change in the terminology and theory of the revolutionary party by dressing it up in a 'dialectical' justification (and such justifications can unfortunately serve any purpose); even more important, far from setting in motion the indispensable process of developing and rectifying existing theoretical conceptions inside the International Communist Movement, far from setting in motion the indispensable process of the renewal of Marxism demanded by the new conditions of the struggle for socialism today, such a formulation can only hinder it. In particular, instead of contributing to clarifying the contradictions of the 22nd Congress and the practice underlying them, and therefore to resolving them, it can only help to mask and aggravate them.
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This having been established, it remains true that the question at hand does not concern only the theoretical concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat -- far from it -- but also, as several participants in the discussion underlined, the relation between this concept and what is customarily called the 'strategy' of revolutionary struggles in a given historical period. A problem like that of 'class alliances', for instance, seems to be directly involved by this question. And on this point, the formulations proposed by Althusser's text would appear to contradict what I myself have argued and what Grahame Lock for his part is arguing. I do not want to evade this point.
Let us be very scrupulous. Which are the formulations of Althusser which might cause difficulty when compared with
certain analyses in this book? Essentially two. Althusser writes: 'this last argument -- the proletariat as the heart of a broad alliance is in the tradition of Marx and Lenin. The 22nd Congress takes it up in the form of the idea of the "leading role of the working class" at the heart of the broad union of the people. There are no serious problems on this point.' And further on, distinguishing between the relatively 'contingent' elements and the 'necessary' elements in the dictatorship of the proletariat, he classifies the problems of peaceful transition and of class alliances among the contingent elements, and writes: 'As far as these two questions are concerned [. . .] the 22nd Congress did [. . .] correct certain errors to which some comrades might have fallen victim with regard to the seizure of power and to socialism, errors induced by the Stalin deviation. But precisely on these two questions, the 22nd Congress added nothing new: it only repeated arguments about things which Marx and Lenin themselves had claimed to be possible (peaceful transition) or politically desirable (broadest possible alliance around the working class).'
We must try to understand what this distinction implies. Certain communists, arguing for the 'transcendence' of the dictatorship of the proletariat, make use of an analogous distinction in the following way: on the one side they argue for a 'necessary' general definition of 'socialism (socialization of the means of production and political power of the working people), while on the other side they classify the dictatorship of the proletariat itself among the 'contingent' aspects linked to particular historical conditions which have now been superseded. One might say: the way of posing the problem is at root the same in both cases, and the differences are only verbal, concerning the question of what is new and what is not . . . Is this not a little scholastic? I do not think so, and I believe that this becomes clear as soon as you have understood the immediate link between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Marxist conception of the State and of the struggle for communism.
What has to be demonstrated is that the problem of the proletarian revolution is not first of all a problem of 'strategy'. The
Cf. for example Lucien Sève's study 'Le XXIIe Congrès, développement léniniste de la stratégie de révolution pacifique', in Cahiers du communisme, June 1976: an English translation was published by Marxism Today in May 1977.
revolution does indeed need a strategy for the seizure and exercise of power, a strategy adapted to the historical conditions of the moment, therefore founded on a concrete analysis of these conditions and of their transformation. That is undeniable. But such an analysis can precisely only be made if it takes into account the historical tendencies of the development of capitalist relations of production, of the State dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and the specific forms of the historical counter-tendency, the tendency to the dictatorship of the proletariat, in each new period. Every true revolutionary 'strategy' therefore implies a theory of these tendencies, and the development of this theory. This for example is what Lenin provides when he develops the theory of imperialism, thus rectifying certain points in Marx's theory, certain aspects of Marx's own idea of the development of the 'tendencies' of capitalist society. On this basis, the characteristics of imperialism (those which Lenin was able to recognize at the beginning of the imperialist epoch) are incorporated into the analysis of capitalism, becoming the basis of a concrete analysis of the forms of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, therefore of the conditions and of the forms of the proletarian revolution. The construction of a strategy cannot be 'logically deduced' from a general historical tendency, as if this tendency had to follow an immutable and linear course, a predictable line of progression. Nor can it represent an empirical adaptation to (apparent) 'differences' between one country and another, between one epoch and another: on the contrary, all such differences and changes must be analyzed as (new, unforeseen but necessary) forms of the historical tendency if their real importance is to be understood. Worst of all is the temptation which often arises to justify after the event a strategic change by constructing the theory from which it might have been deduced (for example, in many of its aspects the 'theory of State Monopoly Capitalism' is quite simply the transposition into abstract economic terms of the conditions which one would have to imagine fulfilled in order to 'justify' a strategy of peaceful
We could go even further and suggest that they might become the basis of an analysis of the deviations of the revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If, as I have suggested, socialism and capitalism do not constitute two closed and isolated 'worlds', but two aspects of a single system of contradictions, then the internal obstacles to socialism, the deviant and regressive tendencies within it, are not to be explained simply by reference to 'capitalist relations' in general but necessarily to their present imperialist form.
transition to socialism, in order to 'justify' a strategic alliance between the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, the non-monopoly bourgeoisie, etc . . .).
It is quite easy to understand that the Stalinian degeneration of Marxism, which reduced the analysis of capitalism to a mechanistic prophecy of its 'final crisis', reducing the political conception of socialism to a form of technocratism armed with instruments of repression and propaganda, provoked revolutionaries and Communists to look for 'strategic alternatives', to try and find in Gramsci or beyond him political alternatives to the Stalinian form of 'Leninism', to replace the ideology of the 'frontal attack' on the bourgeoisie by that of the 'war of positions'. However, as long as you remain content to juxtapose one strategy to another, one 'model of socialism' to another, opposing them term for term, epoch for epoch, without bothering to construct the necessary theory and to make the necessary concrete analysis, every strategy must remain profoundly stamped with utopianism. Paradoxically at first sight, the reference to the concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of communism, therefore to difficult objectives and to a very long-term tendency, has a profoundly anti-utopian significance, provided of course that this reference is made within the framework of an effective concrete analysis and theoretical development. If this reference is lacking, the revolutionary strategy becomes once again a form of the construction of models. Models of the seizure of power : first of all alliances, then victorious elections, then reforms in the economic and social structures, etc. . . . , with in passing the 'neutralization' of the class enemy and of foreign imperialism, etc. . . . Economic models : more or less extensive nationalizations, more or less rigorous planning, more or less autonomous management of enterprises, industrial priorities, improvement of the conditions of life of the working people, etc. Models of the State : the 'formal', purely legal type of democracy, limited by economic pressure groups, is contrasted with the 'real' democracy of the working people, each type of democracy having its own institutions; centralization is replaced with decentralization; the separation between the elites in power and the passive mass of the population is replaced by the active participation of the masses, etc. . . . This is where utopianism and reformism meet : both think in terms of models of the State whose merits and possibilities of implementation have to be weighed up
. . . Marxism, on the other hand, by placing the dictatorship of the proletariat and communism at the centre of its theoretical apparatus, destroys every idea of a model, therefore every form of strategic empiricism. On the one hand it forbids us to confuse the announcement of a political or economic programme with the prediction of events to come (as if these events had to follow a plan), for every programme is transformed and finally destroyed by the national and international class struggle in which it is situated. On the other hand it shows that the only strategy which can, at least in part, succeed is a strategy which right from the beginning takes account of the final objective: not the construction of a new model of the State, however different from the existing State, but the abolition of classes and of every State. That is also why only such a strategy allows us to understand and genuinely to rectify the previous deviations of revolutionary practice (and let us add: also future deviations) instead of simply holding them 'at a distance' and relativizing them in space and time as 'out-of-date strategies'.
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Let us now return to the question of class alliances. As a real problem, requiring a concrete analysis, it is entirely open, and there can be no question of solving it in two words. In fact, this problem is posed in specific terms in each epoch and in each social formation in the history of capitalism. That is why there can also be no question of identifying the dictatorship of the proletariat in general with such-and-such a form of class alliance, for example with that form of alliance which made possible the Revolution of October 1917 and the installation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia, and whose progressive break-up explains, at least in part, the subsequent aggravation of the class struggle and its Stalinian deviation. What we must say is, on the contrary, that in the writings of Marx and Lenin themselves the problem of the dictatorship of the proletariat is never separated from the problem of class alliances, for the concrete conditions of the realization of the one are also the conditions of the realization of the other. Thus, to borrow Althusser's provisional terminology, what seems at first to be linked in a purely 'contingent' manner to the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat is shown in practice to be indissociably linked to it, in constantly new forms, which are but the 'realization' of this concept itself. Now this realization of the
concept itself is in no way 'contingent': it is on the contrary just as necessary as the historical tendency of the class struggle.
Let us make this point in another way. It is perfectly absurd to oppose the dictatorship of the proletariat to the idea of class alliances, to reject the dictatorship of the proletariat on the grounds of the limits and failures of the class alliance of the Russian revolution. But it is indispensable to work out the new forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat which go together with the new forms of class alliance that have become possible and necessary in a capitalist country like France today (and in Britain too, I suppose). In this respect, Leninist practice can do no more than indicate the existence of an open problem. For not only is the concrete configuration of classes no longer the same, but you could even ask whether the term 'class alliance' has exactly the same sense now.
From a Marxist point of view, as we have already pointed out, the capitalist mode of production reproduces tendentially only two classes, bourgeoisie and proletariat. In the Russian social formation of the beginning of the century, the capitalist mode of production was already absolutely dominant, which means that the question of revolution was already posed as bourgeois dictatorship or proletarian dictatorship, bourgeois democracy or proletarian democracy. However, capitalist development was very far from having suppressed every trace of other modes of production, even though it was transforming them profoundly from the inside. This is what made the 'alliance of the working class and peasantry' the fundamental problem. The peasantry, internally affected by capitalist antagonisms, tendentially divided between distinct fractions, some of which were in course of proletarianization, the others developing into an agrarian capitalist class, nevertheless formed a class with its own specific historical interests, its own ideology and its own political forces, whose autonomous position became the principal stake of the class struggle at certain moments. The same is not true of a social formation like France today, in which the capitalist mode of production is not only dominant, but the only true mode of production. It would be absolutely wrong, however, to represent the social structure of such a country as a simpler, more 'homogeneous' structure. In spite of Marx's formula, which refers in the Communist Manifesto to the 'simplification of class antagonisms' resulting from capitalism, we have to
admit that the history of social formations like capitalist France today is not producing a less complex class structure; it is simply a question of another type of complexity. The question of 'class alliances', as it is now once again posed, is precisely the political index of this new type of complexity.
I will give just two proofs ofthis argument, which would have to be backed up by a lengthy analysis.
In present-day capitalist France, agricultural production is now entirely under the domination of the capitalist mode of proauction, even with respect to what are called 'family farms', being entirely integrated into the whole process of capitalist production and circulation of commodities, 'squeezed' between the market in industrial products which the trusts are now imposing at monopoly prices, and the market in agricultural products controlled by the State within the framework of international competition. Even leaving aside the absolute drop in the active population in the countryside, this form of capitalist agricultural production cannot any more provide the basis of an independent social class. However, contrary to the imagination of the 'Marxist' evolutionism of the Second International (Kautsky), which has remained profoundly influential for a very long time, such a development in no way leads to the absorption of the peasantry within a single proletarian class, to its pure and simple fusion with the working class. What hinders this process is first of all the functional, decisive role which, in the case of France, the peasantry has played in the reproduction of the State dictatorship of the French bourgeoisie. The existence and the policies of the bourgeois State, in France, are perpetuating the division between the working class and peasantry, in opposition to all tendencies to the proletarianization of agricultural labour. But that is not all: even if one could forget about this factor, it would nevertheless not be possible to place the process of proletarianization of agricultural labour on the same basis as that of the working class. This is because of the material (even 'natural') constraints of the agricultural labour process, which affect both the process of its operations (the cultivation of crops, the breeding of animals) and the reproduction of labour power (its 'qualification', its maintenance). The
And is still playing -- witness the way in which, in May 1968, the Pompidou government made use of it in order to split the front of its enemies.
complete 'industrialization' of agriculture, in this respect, is a myth. And the merging of agricultural and industrial labour power on a single labour market, in present conditions, is an impossibility. Thus, from the point of view of the socialist revolution, even if the problem of the 'alliance of the working class and peasantry' does not have the same importance nor the same content as in Lenin's time, it nevertheless remains a decisive problem whose exploration is vital.
The problem is posed in an even more decisive manner with regard to what is normally called the 'petty bourgeoisie', as when an 'old' petty bourgeoisie (artisans, small shopkeepers, small business men, liberal professions) is sometimes distinguished from a 'new' petty bourgeoisie (managers, technicians of the State apparatus and of private enterprise). Without attempting to justify my argument in detail, I will point out here what seems to me to be the more correct starting point: that the 'petty bourgeoisie' does not exist as a class. What is normally referred to under this umbrella term is precisely the complexity of social stratifications created by the development of capitalism. The fact is that the tendency to proletarianization develops in an uneven manner: with historical 'delays' which, sometimes for very long periods, prevent entire masses of wage-earners from being subjected to the same conditions of life, of work and of 'negotiation' of their labour power which the most exploited workers and employees experience. Delays which are followed by brutal leaps forward in the process of proletarianization, when for example entire sectors of office or laboratory workers, etc., are hit by mechanization and the extension of the division of labour. What is therefore being referred to by this inadequate concept is the internal contradictions of the process of proletarianization, which is not a process of the slow growth of a uniform mass of interchangeable workers, but a process which ceaselessly recreates groups which are unequal, and whose immediate interests are more or less deeply divided. I will go even further: what is normally called by the name 'petty bourgeoisie' is in fact the internal division of the proletariat and the internal division of the bourgeoisie, whose effects extend to the whole of these two classes, leading to the fact that they never constitute two absolutely distinct sociological groups, without any overlap or interactions, and that they seem to give birth to an intermediate 'third class'. I say 'seem', not in order to deny that
different social groups occupy, from the economic and political points of view, an unstable position in the no man's land of class antagonism, more or less comfortably suspended 'between' proletarianization and capitalist bourgeoisification. I say it in order to deny that here we are talking about an independent class: in fact, its exact limits are indeterminate, and its specific interests non-existent for they only represent a combination, changing with the conjuncture, of the contradictory interests already present in each class.
But the object of revolutionary politics is precisely the present moment of a given historical conjuncture. Thus, the denial of the existence of an independent petty-bourgeois class in no way implies the denial of the existence of a specific problem of 'class alliances', on the grounds that, in the very end, all these secondary stratifications and contradictions must disappear. For this very end will never arrive, and has no historical reality. What is however true is that to pose the problem in these theoretical terms necessarily has political consequences.
Schematically, to admit the existence of an intermediate class (of a more or less extensive kind: sometimes the whole of the 'non-monopolist bourgeoisie' is included here) is to open the way to a conception of class alliances in terms of compromises, or even in terms of an 'historic' contract, i.e. finally, in legal terms. The problem, in this perspective, becomes a problem of knowing what concessions the proletariat and the 'petty bourgeoisie' will each have to make to the other, what particular interests they will have to sacrifice in order to reach an agreement, and how this agreement will be 'guaranteed'. Thus the problem would be to determine whether this agreement is to be made between 'equal' partners (equal in rights and duties) or between 'unequal' partners (and therefore whether such an agreement is viable).
In the version which is dominant in France, that of the theory of State Monopoly Capitalism, the problem is resolved in the following way: tendentially, the partners are already allied on the economic level, and on an equal basis, for all are equally exploited by big monopoly capital. Their interests, in the face of the monopolists, are spontaneously converging. It remains therefore to 'translate' this convergence onto the political level: it becomes precisely a question of a contract between political parties, democratically sealed and guaranteed by its democratic character. But something thereby becomes quite unintelligible, something which Communists, in the light of their experience, ought not to be prepared to ignore: 'the leading role of the working class', which, as they very well know, is the decisive force in revolutionary struggles. We might even say that it is this contradiction [cont. onto p. 230. -- DJR] which opens the way to the accusation of duplicity, to the accusation constantly made against the Communists that they want to maintain an underhand domination of the working class over its allies, or even the domination of their own party, behind the mask of a freely agreed compromise.
To reject the myth of the petty bourgeoisie as a third, independent class is therefore to reject the legal form which this argument about class alliances implicitly or explicitly takes. It is to propose another formulation, which may appear surprising if you extract it from its concrete historical context: that the class alliances which the proletariat needs are class alliances with fractions of the bourgeoisie itself, fractions which would turn against their class. It is therefore to imply that these alliances are in no way spontaneous, that they in no way result from a simple 'convergence' of interests, for they can only arise from the destruction of the system of class alliances of the bourgeoisie, which extends to within the proletariat itself, providing the bourgeoisie with its mass base through economic and political constraint, through the exploitation of divergent corporate interests, and through ideological domination. It is therefore to imply that the fundamental condition of this process, and in part also its result, is the class unity of the proletariat itself, which can never be spontaneously created.
As soon as you raise the problem of class alliances in the conditions of an imperialist social formation like France, then the internal divisions of the two antagonistic classes, together with the role played by the State in the reproduction of these divisions, become the main aspect of the problem. Lenin and other theoreticians of imperialism already showed something important: that imperialism reproduces the divisions within the proletariat and aggravates them. The proof today would be the existence of enormousry important phenomena like the 'national' division between 'French' and 'immigrant' workers (there were nearly four million of these latter, counting their families, in 1974), which in large part redraws the division between skilled and unskilled workers, which becomes tendentially the main basis of the 'industrial reserve army' of capital, and which, without a dogged struggle, may succeed in implanting racism within the working class itself. Another example would be the way in which the 'family' division between men and women operates, a division which is not simply a form of inequality in employment and wages, but an internal division running through the whole working class,
rooted in the bourgeois form of the family, in the role of the domestic labour of women, a form of super-exploited labour which the 'mass consumption' introduced by imperialism has not suppressed but perpetuated. For this mass consumption is a forced consumption of commodities of which the woman is the slave in the home, and the man the slave at work, because of the 'needs' which it creates. Another proof would be the division in the trade unions, which is an enormously important phenomenon of French social history, never really overcome, any more than its political divisions have been overcome (Gaullism constantly exploited these divisions). None of these phenomena, which demand a concrete analysis, can be reduced to simple ideological effects. To the extent that they concern the conditions of the reproduction of labour power and the forms of organization (whether trade-union or political) of the proletariat, they bring directly into question the function of the State in an imperialist social formation.
Too many Marxists, it seems to me, remain imprisoned in a bourgeois sociological framework with regard to the question of the imperialist State. What holds their attention is exclusively, or almost exclusively, the relation between the ruling class and 'its' State. They ask: what are the internal divisions (national, international) within the bourgeoisie? Which fractions of the bourgeoisie 'dominate' or 'control' the State? How does the State guarantee the relative unity of the ruling class or, inversely, how does it run into a 'crisis' when these internal divisions grow deeper? In posing the problem in these terms, they think that they are being faithful to the Marxist argument according to which every State is a class State. In fact, they are distorting and misunderstanding this argument. If the terms of the problem are limited to the State on the one side and the ruling class and its different fractions on the other, the essential term disappears: the internal relation of the State to the proletariat (therefore to exploitation, and to the reproduction of the conditions of exploitation) no longer plays any role. But this is precisely the fundamental aspect, the aspect from which one must begin if one is to understand the role of the State and the particular forms of its historical trans-
On this point some very useful indications can be found in Suzanne de Brunhoff's book Etat et Capital, Paris, Maspero, 1976.
formation. The function which the State fulfils in ensuring (or failing to ensure) the unity of the ruling class cannot be understood unless you analyze it on the basis of the relation of this State to the exploited class. In other words, the State of the ruling class cannot be understood from the point of view of the ruling class, it can only be understood from the point of view of the exploited class. From this point of view, the basic function of the State is to hinder the class unity of the proletariat, a function which is also the basis of its contradictions, both within its purely repressive apparatuses and in its ideological apparatuses. That is why you cannot seize on the contradictions of the ruling class and break up its historical system of class alliances, undermining its mass base, without attacking the existing State, in whatever form the existing relation of forces makes possible. You cannot create the class unity of the proletariat or the unity of all working people around it within the existing bourgeois State; you can only create this unity in a battle against the existing State, against its historical forms, in a protracted trade-union, political and ideological class struggle.
As soon as you stop thinking about the class unity of the proletariat as an already existing or given fact, and class alliances as contracts or compromises, the true, materialist relation between the two problems comes to light. You no longer risk substituting one problem (alliances) for the other (class unity), as every reformist type of politics tends to do. History shows that, under these conditions, neither the one problem nor the other can be resolved, not to speak of those circumstances in which the illusion of an alliance around a divided working class quite simply takes its revenge on this working class by leading to the restoration of an open and even more powerful bourgeois dictatorship. It is only
It is of course not enough to will the class unity of the proletariat in order to bring it about. That is why the historical analysis of the internal obstacles which this class unity runs up against (an analysis which must include the critical examination by the revolutionary party of the errors which it was not able to overcome in the past) is indispensable. It was not possible to bring about the class unity of the French proletariat either after the Popular Front (1936), or after the Resistance and Liberation (1945-47), or in 1958, or after May-June 1968 (the greatest workers' general strike in French and even European history!). Thus the masses of the people, instead of continuously playing the decisive role on the political scene and overturning the political landscape in a revolutionary manner, have remained an intermittent supporting force, in spite of their revolutionary power. Thus the class alliances around the proletariat have not been forged, in spite of the 'convergence of struggles' (as in 1968), or have finally broken (as in 1938 and in the 1950s, after the [cont. onto p. 233. -- DJR] anti-fascist unity). Thus the alliances between the political parties of the Left have repeatedly shattered. Thus the French bourgeoisie, though shaken by internal crises which have sometimes appeared to be mortal (from Vichy to the colonial wars, and to the 'construction of Europe'), has always succeeded in reconstituting its unity and once again broadening its mass base. This whole history is still, it seems to me, awaiting a satisfactory explanation.
on the basis outlined above that you can really pose the question of the concrete unity of these two problems, which is at the same time the main theoretical question and the main political question.
These few remarks will, I hope, suffice to show that this question is wide open, and that it cannot be solved simply by being formulated. In any case we have never claimed to be able to offer solutions, even less ready-made recipes; we have only tried to clarify the terms of the discussion.