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Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks
Notebook 1, §133
Military art and political art
Written: February - March 1930;
Source: Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp.231-33;
Translator: Quintin Hoare;
Online Version: Gramsci Internet Archive (marxists.org) 2003;
Html Markup: MGreen.
The relationship which existed in 1917-18 between the commando units and the
army as a whole can lead, and has led, political leaders to draw up erroneous
plans of campaign. They forget: I. that the commandos are simple tactical units,
and do indeed presuppose an army which is not very effective—but not one
which is completely inert. For even though discipline and fighting spirit have
slackened to the point where a new tactical deployment has become advisable,
they still do exist to a certain degree—a degree to which the new tactical
formation precisely corresponds. Otherwise there could only be rout, and headlong
flight; 2. that the phenomenon of commandos should not be considered as a sign
of the general combativity of the mass of the troops, but, on the contrary,
as a sign of their passivity and relative demoralisation. But in saying all
this, the general criterion should be kept in mind that comparisons between
military art and politics, if made, should always be taken cum grano salis
[with a pinch of salt]—in other words, as stimuli to thought, or as terms
in a reductio ad absurdum. In actual fact, in the case of the political
militia there is neither any implacable penal sanction for whoever makes a mistake
or does not obey an order exactly, nor do courts-martial exist—quite apart
from the fact that the line-up of political forces is not even remotely comparable
to the line-up of military forces.
In political struggle, there also exist other forms of warfare—apart
from the war of movement and siege warfare or the war of position. True, i.e.
modern, commandos belong to the war of position, in its 1914-18 form. The war
of movement and siege warfare of the preceding periods also bad their commandos,
in a certain sense. The light and heavy cavalry, crack rifle corps, etc.—and
indeed mobile forces in general—partly functioned as commandos. Similarly
the art of organising patrols contained the germ of modern commandos. This germ
was contained in siege warfare more than in the war of movement: more extensive
use of patrols, and particularly the art of organising sudden sorties and surprise
attacks with picked men.
Another point to be kept in mind is that in political struggle one should not
ape the methods of the ruling classes, or one will fall into easy ambushes.
In the current struggles this phenomenon often occurs. A weakened State structure
is like a flagging army; the commandos—i.e. the private armed organisations—enter
the field, and they have two tasks: to make use of illegal means, while the
State appears to remain within legality, and thus to reorganise the State itself.
It is stupid to believe that when one is confronted by illegal private action
one can counterpose to it another similar action—in other words, combat
commando tactics by means of commando tactics. It means believing that the State
remains perpetually inert, which is never the case—quite apart from all
the other conditions which differ. The class factor leads to a fundamental difference:
a class which has to work fixed hours every day cannot have permanent and specialised
assault organisations—as can a class which has ample financial resources
and all of whose members are not tied down by fixed work. At any hour of day
or night, these by now professional organisations are able to strike decisive
blows, and strike them unawares. Commando tactics cannot therefore have the
same importance for some classes as for others. For certain classes a war of
movement and manoeuvre is necessary—because it is the form of war which
belongs to them; and this, in the case of political struggle, may include a
valuable and perhaps indispensable use of commando tactics. But to fix one’s
mind on the military model is the mark of a fool: politics, here too, must have
priority over its military aspect, and only politics creates the possibility
for manoeuvre and movement.
From all that has been said it follows that in the phenomenon of military commandos,
it is necessary to distinguish between the technical function of commandos as
a special force linked to the modern war of position, and their politico-military
function. As a special force commandos were used by all armies in the World
War. But they have only had a politico-military function in those countries
which are politically enfeebled and non-homogeneous, and which are therefore
represented by a not very combative national army, and a bureaucratised General
Staff, grown rusty in the service. [1929-30]
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