Antonio Gramsci 1924
Gramsci to Togliatti, Scoccimarro, Leonetti, etc.
(Vienna, 21 March 1924)
Text from Antonio Gramsci 'Selections from political writings (1921-1926)', translated and edited by Quintin Hoare (Lawrence and Wishart, London 1978), transcribed to the www with the kind permission of Quintin Hoare.
Dearest Friends,
I have not yet received any reply from! you to my last letter,
indicating at least in general terms the practical steps you have
decided to take. So in this letter too I shall have to concern
myself solely with general questions, about which I do not know
whether you have already discussed, or in what terms.
Among others, I have received two letters which have greatly
moved me, and which seem to me to be the sign of a general
situation about which we must think very seriously. Sraffa has
written to me - you will read part of his letter, appropriately
commented on, in the third issue of O.N. - and so has Zino
Zini. 121 Both write that they are still with us, but both are
extremely pessimistic. Sraffa is moving towards a position which
seems to be precisely that of the maximalists. Zini remains in
principle with the communists, but writes that he is old, tired,
no longer has faith in anything or anybody, and has completely
devoted himself - outside his academic work - to arranging his
thoughts into a book which, to judge by the allusions contained in
his letter, will be a pure reflection of this state of political
passivity. Sraffa will collaborate with the Journal, and from
things he has written I think his collaboration will be very
interesting. 121 In his case, I do not think the problem is very
difficult. He has remained isolated since the contacts he had with
us in Turin, he has never worked among workers, but he is
certainly still a Marxist. It will only be necessary to keep in
contact once again in order to resuscitate him and make him an
active element of our party, to which he will be able to render
much useful service today and in the future.
In his letter, there is a passage which will not be published
that is extremely interesting. A propos the trade-union
question, he asks me how it is that our party has never thought of
creating unions of the same type as the American IWW, which was
precisely suited to the situation of lawlessness and violent
repression on the part of the State and the private capitalist
organizations. He has promised me an article on trade-union
bureaucracy in which, I think, he will also develop this argument,
which seems to me to merit our closest attention. It is certain
that we have not yet in practice considered the question of
whether it is possible to create a clandestine, centralized
trade-union movement that could work to bring about a new
situation in the working class. Our local groups and trade-union
committee have retained a purely party character, as party
fractions within the CGL - which must exist, but which do not
resolve the question entirely. Nor could it be resolved by taking
as a model the IWW, which was in effect the organization of the
so-called "migratory" workers. But the IWW's organization may,
nevertheless, give some indication and clarify the nature of the
question.
After the June Executive meeting, I had proposed - and Negri
and Urbani were in agreement (Tasca was totally against) - to try
to organize clandestinely a little conference of representatives
from the biggest Italian factories: twenty or thirty workers from
Turin, Milan, Genoa, Pisa, Livorno, Bologna, Trieste, Brescia,
Bari, Naples, Messina. The idea was that these, as representatives
of their factories and not in the name of the party, would study
the general situation, pass resolutions on various problems, and
before they dispersed nominate a Central Committee of Italian
factories. The conference would naturally have a purely
agitational and propagandistic value. Our party, which organizes
it, will prepare the necessary ideological material, and make
certain that the decisions taken have the maximum impact on the
masses. The CC elected will be a useful transmission-belt for
industrial action, and if we can sustain it will become the embryo
of a future organization of Factory Councils and Internal
Commissions, which will become a rival to the CGL in a changed
overall situation.
I think that on this basis an excellent work of reorganization
and agitation can be carried out. The party must systematically
avoid appearing the inspirer and leader of the movement, in the
present situation. The organization must be clandestine, both in
its national and its local centres. The national conference, once
its decisions have been made known through posters and through our
press, should be followed by local conferences, at city,
provincial and regional level. In this way, the activity of our
party groups will be revitalized. We shall have to study the
question of whether it is not possible to get some small dues
paid, for the national CC, for general propaganda, etc. Naturally,
the problem will arise that we shall be accused of trying to
create a rival organization. So it will be essential:
1. simultaneously to intensify the campaign for a return to the
Confederation unions; 2. to stress the fact that what is involved
is not new unions, but a factory movement like the Councils or
Internal Commissions.
This, broadly speaking, was my plan, which was accepted by
Negri and Urbani, but which has remained in the realm of good
intentions so far. I do not think that it has now become out of
date, quite the contrary. A letter from Losa (Turin), which will
appear in the third issue of O.N., shows that since the take-over
of the land workers' federation, the masses are even more
resistant to joining unions, fearing that the union lists may
become black lists. The situation, already favourable for a
clandestine trade-union movement, has thus become yet more
favourable. The important thing is to be able to find an
organizational solution which fits the circumstances and gives the
masses the impression of an overall enterprise, a
centralization. The question, in my view, is extremely important;
I would therefore like you to discuss it in detail among
yourselves and send me your opinions, your impressions, the
perspectives which you consider to be probable or possible.
That is what Sraffa's letter made me think about. Zini's made
me think about a different problem. Why, among the intellectuals
who were actively with us in 1919-20, has this passive and
pessimistic state of mind become widespread today? I think it is
at least in part because our party does not have an immediate
programme, based on perspectives of the likely solutions which the
present situation may have. We are for the workers' and peasants'
government, but what does that mean concretely in Italy? Today? No
one would be able to say, because no one has bothered to say. The
broad masses, whose spokesmen the intellectuals automatically
become, do not have any precise orientation, they do not know how
to get out of their present straits, so they accept the path of
least resistance: the solution provided by the
constitutional-reformist opposition. Sraffa's letter is clear on
this point. Zini is more of an old militant, he certainly does not
believe in the possibility of fascism being displaced by Amendola
or
Giolitti or Turati or Bonomi: he does not believe in
anything. For Sraffa, we are in the same situation as in 191517;
for Zini, we are barely in 1915, when the War had just broken out
(this is literal), when everything was confusion and thick
darkness. So I think a great deal of work needs to be done in this
direction: involving political propaganda, and study of the
economic basis of the situation. We must explore all the likely
solutions which the present situation may have, and for each of
these likely solutions we must work out a line.
For example, I have read Amendola's speech, which I consider
very important; there is a remark in it which could have
consequences. Amendola says that the constitutional reforms
ventilated by the fascists pose the problem of whether in Italy,
too, it is not necessary to separate constituent activity from
normal legislative activity. It is probable that this remark
contains the germ of the opposition's political line in the next
Parliament. Parliament, already discredited and deprived of any
authority by the electoral mechanism which produced it, cannot
discuss constitutional reforms, which could only be done by a
Constituent Assembly. Is it likely that the demand for a
Constituent Assembly will once again become relevant? If so, what
will our position be on it? In short: the present situation must
have a political resolution; what is the most likely form for this
resolution to take? Is it possible to believe that we will pass
directly from fascism to the dictatorship of the proletariat? What
intermediate phases are possible and likely? We must carry out
this task of political study, both for our own sake and for the
mass of party members and for the masses in general. I think that
in the crisis which the country will undergo, that party will gain
the upper hand which has best understood this necessary transition
process, and thus impressed its seriousness on the broad
masses. From this point of view, we are very weak, undoubtedly
weaker than the socialists - who, well or badly, do carry out some
agitational work, and what is more have a whole popular tradition
to sustain them.
It is in the light of this general problem that the question of
fusion too is posed today. Do we think it possible to arrive at
the eve of revolution with a situation like the present one? With
three socialist parties? How do we think this situation can be
eliminated? By the maximalists fusing with the reformists? It is
possible that may happen, but I do not think it very
probable. Maximalism will want to remain independent, in order to
exploit the situation on its own account. Well then? Will we make
an alliance with the maximalists for a Soviet government, as the
Bolsheviks did with the Left Social-Revolutionaries? I think that
if the situation arises, it will not be so favourable to us as it
was to the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to bear in mind the
tradition of the SP, the thirty-year links it has had with the
masses. Those cannot be resolved either with machineguns or with
petty manoeuvres on the eve of the revolution. This is a great
historical problem, which can only be resolved if we begin
studying it today in its full dimensions, and initiating a
solution to it.
I think that if we establish our group solidly, and if we
accomplish a political and organizational work that succeeds in
keeping the present majority of our party compact, neutralizing
the unshakeable leftists and the liquidatory rightists, we can
accept and automatically develop the Comintern's tactics for
winning the majority of the SP. This is an ultimate objective, an
orientation, certainly not something which can be achieved in
immediate practical terms. The question is to extend our influence
over the majority of the masses influenced today by the SP. The
question is to ensure that if there is a new revolutionary
workingclass upsurge, it will organize itself around the CP and
not around the SP. How can we achieve this? It is necessary to
press the SP until its majority either comes over to us or goes
over to the reformists. This involves a whole process, which must
be directed by us and must give us all the profitable results; it
is not a mechanical thing. So I think your latest positions are
very dangerous. We are falling back into the same situation as
existed from the Fourth Congress up till June. The episode of the
circular letter is very instructive. 130 Circular letters of such
a kind should only be sent to a few extremely trustworthy
comrades, not to organizations as such. In the present situation,
to organizations one should only send "political". "diplomatic"
circulars.
Did the Rome trial teach us nothing? And have you not
considered the fact that in many centres the
Illrd-internationalists have become the true leaders of our
movement? 13 1 And have you not considered the fact that Vella and
Nenni may have tried to introduce some of their own agents among
the IIIrd-internationalists who have left the SP? I am convinced
of it, sure of it. Nenni used to be in the Republican Party, where
they have some experience of intrigue, and in addition he has
learnt the organizational methods of the Comintern for his own
ends. In 1921-2, 1 visited many of our party organizations: in
Como, for example, the centre of a fairly industrial region, we
did not have a single organizing element; the federation had to be
run from Sondrio. In Como, because of the position which Roncoroni
had taken up at Livorno, the mass of communists had remained with
the SP and they subsequently became IIlrd -internationalist. I
would swear that in Como, just as an example, our party is in the
hands of the IIIrd-internationalists, more or less directly, and
that among those IIIrd-internationalists there are agents of
Momigliano. That this is happening, I have proof. The section of
Tortona has been reorganized. Who has been put in charge of the
reorganization? A Illrd-internationalist, believed to be a
communist, who enjoys no sympathy among the rank and file
members. At least, that is what a well-informed friend has written
to me. In practice, the Illrd-internationalist has had to turn. to
a communist for the reorganization, but the episode shows: 1. that
the party has an organizational apparatus that is very defective;
2. that the entry into the party of socialist agents who may leak
documents is possible.
I hope that the mail will bring me some communication from you, to which I will reply at once.
Affectionate greetings,
Masci
If you have the chance, send me a copy of this letter and
another to Urbani. In the new apartment where I am now, I cannot
use the typewriter very much, which causes a lot of
complications.